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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1982

Pilot selection and training

Personality and situational factors relevant to individual and group performance in highly demanding environments, such as those faced by astronauts or by jet transport crew, are discussed. It is emphasized that although technical competence and proficiency in pilot selection are prerequisites for safety, operating a modern jet transport is a group endeavor that requires the effective coordination of the entire crew. A self-report test battery for measuring positive and negative personality traits of pilot candidates, termed the Personal Characteristics Inventory, is described.

Helmreich, Robert L.↗
NASA NTRS1997

Information access in a dual-task context: testing a model of optimal strategy selection

Pilots were required to access information from a hierarchical aviation database by navigating under single-task conditions (Experiment 1) and when this task was time-shared with an altitude-monitoring task of varying bandwidth and priority (Experiment 2). In dual-task conditions, pilots had 2 viewports available, 1 always used for the information task and the other to be allocated to either task. Dual-task strategy, inferred from the decision of which task to allocate to the 2nd viewport, revealed that allocation was generally biased in favor of the monitoring task and was only partly sensitive to the difficulty of the 2 tasks and their relative priorities. Some dominant sources of navigational difficulties failed to adaptively influence selection strategy. The implications of the results are to provide tools for jumping to the top of the database, to provide 2 viewports into the common database, and to provide training as to the optimum viewport management strategy in a multitask environment.

User-Computer Interface↗
NASA NTRS1996

Evaluation of High-Angle-of-Attack Handling Qualities for the X-31A Using Standard Evaluation Maneuvers

The X-31A aircraft gross-acquisition and fine-tracking handling qualities have been evaluated using standard evaluation maneuvers developed by Wright Laboratory, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. The emphasis of the testing is in the angle-of-attack range between 30 deg and 70 deg. Longitudinal gross-acquisition handling qualities results show borderline Level 1/Level 2 performance. Lateral gross-acquisition testing results in Level 1/Level 2 ratings below 45 deg angle of attack, degrading into Level 3 as angle of attack increases. The fine-tracking performance in both longitudinal and lateral axes also receives Level 1 ratings near 30 deg angle of attack, with the ratings tending towards Level 3 at angles of attack greater than 50 deg. These ratings do not match the expectations from the extensive close-in combat testing where the X-31A aircraft demonstrated fair to good handling qualities maneuvering for high angles of attack. This paper presents the results of the high-angle-of-attack handling qualities flight testing of the X-31A aircraft. Discussion of the preparation for the maneuvers, the pilot ratings, and selected pilot comments are included. Evaluation of the results is made in conjunction with existing Neal-Smith, bandwidth, Smith-Geddes, and military specifications.

Stoliker, Patrick C.↗
NASA NTRS1997

Evaluation of High-Angle-of-Attack Handling Qualities for the X-31A Using Standard Evaluation Maneuvers

The X-31A aircraft gross-acquisition and fine-tracking handling qualities have been evaluated using standard evaluation maneuvers developed by Wright Laboratory, Wright Patterson Air Force Base. The emphasis of the testing is in the angle-of-attack range between 30 deg. and 70 deg. Longitudinal gross-acquisition handling qualities results show borderline Level l/Level 2 performance. Lateral gross-acquisition testing results in Level l/Level 2 ratings below 45 deg. angle of attack, degrading into Level 3 as angle of attack increases. The fine tracking performance in both longitudinal and lateral axes also receives Level 1 ratings near 30 deg. angle of attack, with the ratings tending towards Level 3 at angles of attack greater than 50 deg. These ratings do not match the expectations from the extensive close-in combat testing where the X-31A aircraft demonstrated fair to good handling qualities maneuvering for high angles of attack. This paper presents the results of the high-angle-of-attack handling qualities flight testing of the X-31A aircraft. Discussion of the preparation for the maneuvers, the pilot ratings, and selected pilot comments are included. Evaluation of the results is made in conjunction with existing Neal Smith, bandwidth, Smith-Geddes, and military specifications.

Stoliker, Patrick C.↗
NASA NTRS1980

Flight selection at United Airlines

Airline pilot selection proceedures are discussed including psychogical and personality tests, psychomotor performance requirements, and flight skills evaluation. Necessary attitude and personality traits are described and an outline of computer selection, testing, and training techniques is given.

Traub, W.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Impact of Airborne Radar Uncertainties on Detect-and-Avoid Systems’ Performance

Impact of sensor uncertainty on Detect-and-Avoid (DAA) systems’ performance is investigated. Key metrics analyzed are the loss of DAA well clear ratio, the near-mid-air-collision risk ratio, the alert ratio, and the number of maneuvers per loss of DAA well clear. Sensitivity of these metrics to the magnitude of sensor uncertainty, pilots’ selection of maneuver, and surveillance range is investigated. Benefits of a dynamic buffer around the DAA well clear separation boundary, computed based on track accuracies, are also analyzed. These metrics are computed from open- and closed-loop simulations of a large number of representative encounters between an unmanned aircraft system and a manned aircraft. Results show that sensor uncertainty degrades safety metrics considerably but has only a minor effect on the number of maneuvers per loss of DAA well clear. The number of maneuvers, nonetheless, can be reduced by a 5◦ buffer away from the edge of the range of conflict-resulting heading in pilots’ selection of maneuver.

UAS↗
NASA NTRS2008

Flying by Ear: Blind Flight with a Music-Based Artificial Horizon

Two experiments were conducted in actual flight operations to evaluate an audio artificial horizon display that imposed aircraft attitude information on pilot-selected music. The first experiment examined a pilot's ability to identify, with vision obscured, a change in aircraft roll or pitch, with and without the audio artificial horizon display. The results suggest that the audio horizon display improves the accuracy of attitude identification overall, but differentially affects response time across conditions. In the second experiment, subject pilots performed recoveries from displaced aircraft attitudes using either standard visual instruments, or, with vision obscured, the audio artificial horizon display. The results suggest that subjects were able to maneuver the aircraft to within its safety envelope. Overall, pilots were able to benefit from the display, suggesting that such a display could help to improve overall safety in general aviation.

Simpson, Brian D.↗
NASA NTRS1980

Captains' training at Swissair

The objectives, crucial points, and problems of the individual phase of the captain's basic training are examined. The prerequisites to pilot selection are given as well as a generalized outline of pilot career progression.

Grob, N.↗
NASA NTRS2001

Screening EEG in Aircrew Selection: Clinical Aerospace Neurology Perspective

As clinical aerospace neurologists we do not favor using screening EEG in pilot selection on unselected and otherwise asymptomatic individuals. The role of EEG in aviation screening should be as an adjunct to diagnosis, and the decision to disqualify a pilot should never be based solely on the EEG. Although a policy of using a screening EEG in an unselected population might detect an individual with a potentially increased relative risk, it would needlessly exclude many applicants who would probably never have a seizure. A diagnostic test performed on an asymptomatic individual without clinical indications, in a population with a low prevalence of disease (seizure) may be of limited or possibly detrimental value. We feel that rather than do EEGs on all candidates, a better approach would be to perform an EEG for a specific indication, such as family history of seizure, single convulsion (seizure) , history of unexplained loss of consciousness or head injury. Routine screening EEGs in unselected aviation applications are not done without clinical indication in the U.S. Air Force, Navy, or NASA. The USAF discontinued routine screening EEGs for selection in 1978, the U.S. Navy discontinued it in 1981 , and NASA discontinued it in 1995. EEG as an aeromedical screening tool in the US Navy dates back to 1939. The US Navy routinely used EEGs to screen all aeromedical personnel from 1961 to 1981. The incidence of epileptiform activity on EEG in asymptomatic flight candidates ranges from 0.11 to 2.5%. In 3 studies of asymptomatic flight candidates with epileptiform activity on EEG followed for 2 to 15 years, 1 of 31 (3.2%), 1 of 30 (3.3%), and 0 of 14 (0%) developed a seizure, for a cumulative risk of an individual with an epileptiform EEG developing a seizure of 2.67% (2 in 75). Of 28,658 student naval aviation personnel screened 31 had spikes and/or slow waves on EEG, and only 1 later developed a seizure. Of the 28,627 who had a normal EEG, 4 later developed seizures, or .0139% (4/28627). After review of the value of the EEG as a screening tool, the US Navy now uses EEG only for certain clinical indications (head injury, unexplained loss of consciousness, family history of epilepsy, and abnormal neurological exam). Currently the US Navy does not use EEG for screening for any flight applicant without a neurologic indication. In the US Navy, an electroencephalographic pattern is determined to be epileptiform by a neurologist.

Clark, Jonathan B.↗
NASA NTRS1981

Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 1st, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, April 21, 22, 1981, Proceedings

The impact of modern technology on the role, responsibility, authority, and performance of human operators in modern aircraft and ATC systems was examined in terms of principles defined by Paul Fitts. Research into human factors in aircraft operations and the use of human factors engineering for aircraft safety improvements were discussed, and features of the man-machine interface in computerized cockpit warning systems are examined. The design and operational features of computerized avionics displays and HUDs are described, along with results of investigations into pilot decision-making behavior, aircrew procedural compliance, and aircrew judgment training programs. Experiments in vision and visual perception are detailed, as are behavioral studies of crew workload, coordination, and complement. The effectiveness of pilot selection, screening, and training techniques are assessed, as are methods for evaluating pilot performance.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1994

A psychologist's view of validating aviation systems

All systems, no matter what they are designed to do, have shortcomings that may make them less productive than was hoped during the initial development. Such shortcomings can arise at any stage of development: from conception to the end of the implementation life cycle. While systems failure and errors of a lesser magnitude can occur as a function of mechanical or software breakdown, the majority of such problems, in aviation are usually laid on the shoulders of the human operator and, to a lesser extent, on human factors. The operator bears the responsibility and blame even though, from a human factors perspective, error may have been designed into the system. Human factors is not a new concept in aviation. The name may be new, but the issues related to operators in the loop date back to the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century and certainly to the aviation build-up for World War I. During this first global confrontation, military services from all sides discovered rather quickly that poor selection and training led to drastically increased personnel losses. While hardware design became an issue later, the early efforts were primarily focused on increased care in pilot selection and on their training. This actually involved early labor-intensive simulation, using such devices as sticks and chairs mounted on rope networks which could be manually moved in response to control input. The use of selection criteria and improved training led to more viable person-machine systems. More pilots survived training and their first ten missions in the air, a rule of thumb arrived at by experience which predicted ultimate survival better than any other. This rule was to hold through World War II. At that time, personnel selection and training became very sophisticated based on previous standards. Also, many psychologists were drafted into Army Air Corps programs which were geared towards refining the human factor. However, despite the talent involved in these programs and the tremendous build-up of aviation during the war, there were still aircraft designs that were man killers (no sexism implied since all combat pilots were men). One classic design error that was identified fifty years ago was the multipointer altimeter, which could easily be misread especially by a pilot under considerable task load. It has led to flying fully operational aircraft into the terrain. The authors of the research which formally identified this problem put 'Human Errors' in quotes to express their dissatisfaction with the traditional approach to accident investigation. It traditionally places the burden of guilt on the operator. Some of these altimeters still exist in older aircraft to this day.

Stein, Earl S.↗
NASA NTRS1973

V/STOL tilt rotor aircraft study. Volume 9: Piloted simulator evaluation of the Boeing Vertol model 222 tilt rotor aircraft

The results of a real time piloted simulation to investigate the handling qualities and performance of a tilting rotor aircraft design are presented. The aerodynamic configuration of the aircraft is described. The procedures for conducting the simulator evaluation are reported. Pilot comments of the aircraft handling qualities under various simulated flight conditions are included. The time histories of selected pilot maneuvers are shown.

Rosenstein, H.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

X-57 Cockpit Display System Development and Features

The X-57 Maxwell airplane [1,2] cockpit display system includes multiple, pilot-selectable pages in a multifunction display with detailed statuses of critical parameters from each of the cruise motors (CMs), cruise motor controllers (CMCs), and battery control modules (BCMs), as well as air temperature measurements at reference locations in the passive ram-air cooling ducts for the motors, controllers, and auxiliary equipment. The user (pilot or ground-test crew) can select overview pages that are part of the standard instrument panel scan pattern or switch to a series of detail or debug pages as the system is operating using a rotary position switch in the cockpit. This paper presents and describes each of these displays, and gives an overview of the development and verification process. The critical data condensed for cockpit handling from each of the major electric propulsion and traction power systems are discussed.

Adam Curry↗
NASA NTRS1992

Cockpit weather information needs

The primary objective is to develop an advanced pilot weather interface for the flight deck and to measure its utilization and effectiveness in pilot reroute decision processes, weather situation awareness, and weather monitoring. Identical graphical weather displays for the dispatcher, air traffic control (ATC), and pilot crew should also enhance the dialogue capabilities for reroute decisions. By utilizing a broadcast data link for surface observations, forecasts, radar summaries, lightning strikes, and weather alerts, onboard weather computing facilities construct graphical displays, historical weather displays, color textual displays, and other tools to assist the pilot crew. Since the weather data is continually being received and stored by the airborne system, the pilot crew has instantaneous access to the latest information. This information is color coded to distinguish degrees of category for surface observations, ceiling and visibilities, and ground radar summaries. Automatic weather monitoring and pilot crew alerting is accomplished by the airborne computing facilities. When a new weather information is received, the displays are instantaneously changed to reflect the new information. Also, when a new surface or special observation for the intended destination is received, the pilot crew is informed so that information can be studied at the pilot's discretion. The pilot crew is also immediately alerted when a severe weather notice, AIRMET or SIGMET, is received. The cockpit weather display shares a multicolor eight inch cathode ray tube and overlaid touch panel with a pilot crew data link interface. Touch sensitive buttons and areas are used for pilot selection of graphical and data link displays. Time critical ATC messages are presented in a small window that overlays other displays so that immediate pilot alerting and action can be taken. Predeparture and reroute clearances are displayed on the graphical weather system so pilot review of weather along the route can be accomplished prior to pilot acceptance of the clearance. An ongoing multiphase test series is planned for testing and modifying the graphical weather system. Preliminary data shows that the nine test subjects considered the graphical presentation to be much better than their current weather information source for situation awareness, flight safety, and reroute decision making.

Scanlon, Charles H.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Impact of Pilot Delay and Non-Responsiveness on the Safety Performance of Airborne Separation

Assessing the safety effects of prediction errors and uncertainty on automationsupported functions in the Next Generation Air Transportation System concept of operations is of foremost importance, particularly safety critical functions such as separation that involve human decision-making. Both ground-based and airborne, the automation of separation functions must be designed to account for, and mitigate the impact of, information uncertainty and varying human response. This paper describes an experiment that addresses the potential impact of operator delay when interacting with separation support systems. In this study, we evaluated an airborne separation capability operated by a simulated pilot. The experimental runs are part of the Safety Performance of Airborne Separation (SPAS) experiment suite that examines the safety implications of prediction errors and system uncertainties on airborne separation assistance systems. Pilot actions required by the airborne separation automation to resolve traffic conflicts were delayed within a wide range, varying from five to 240 seconds while a percentage of randomly selected pilots were programmed to completely miss the conflict alerts and therefore take no action. Results indicate that the strategicAirborne Separation Assistance System (ASAS) functions exercised in the experiment can sustain pilot response delays of up to 90 seconds and more, depending on the traffic density. However, when pilots or operators fail to respond to conflict alerts the safety effects are substantial, particularly at higher traffic densities.

Consiglio, Maria↗
NASA NTRS2004

Flight Simulator Evaluation of Display Media Devices for Synthetic Vision Concepts

The Synthetic Vision Systems (SVS) Project of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Aviation Safety Program (AvSP) is striving to eliminate poor visibility as a causal factor in aircraft accidents as well as enhance operational capabilities of all aircraft. To accomplish these safety and capacity improvements, the SVS concept is designed to provide a clear view of the world around the aircraft through the display of computer-generated imagery derived from an onboard database of terrain, obstacle, and airport information. Display media devices with which to implement SVS technology that have been evaluated so far within the Project include fixed field of view head up displays and head down Primary Flight Displays with pilot-selectable field of view. A simulation experiment was conducted comparing these display devices to a fixed field of view, unlimited field of regard, full color Helmet-Mounted Display system. Subject pilots flew a visual circling maneuver in IMC at a terrain-challenged airport. The data collected for this experiment is compared to past SVS research studies.

Arthur, J. J., III↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Detect-and-Avoid Maneuver Planning: Benefits of Including Route Recapture

Development of Detect-and-avoid (DAA) systems’ maneuver guidance requirements at RTCA has centered on tactical maneuvers away from the intruder. Recapturing the flight-plan route the initial maneuver is not directly taken into account by most DAA maneuver guidance algorithms. This work demonstrates potential challenges and inefficiencies that can arise in recapturing the route after resolving a conflict. Horizontal resolution trajectories for a test matrix of encounters with varying aircraft speeds and geometries are computed by minimizing either flight time or deviation to serve as a baseline. Turn directions computed from a reference DAA algorithm coupled with a pilot selection model and a second algorithm called Autoresolver (AR) are compared to these baseline resolution trajectories. Baseline results show that turning into the intruder yields favorable cost for most encounters. Additional analysis of pilot response data shows that only three-fourths of pilots’ horizontal maneuvers turn into intruders, a percentage much lower than the baseline results. Improvement to a DAA guidance algorithm based on findings in this work is discussed.

Route Recapture↗