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At least 19 records

A Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) of Human Space Missions for the Advanced Integration Matrix (AIM)

The Advanced Integration Matrix (AIM) Project u7ill study and solve systems-level integration issues for exploration missions beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO), through the design and development of a ground-based facility for developing revolutionary integrated systems for joint human-robotic missions. This paper describes a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) of human space missions that was developed to help define the direction and priorities for AIM. Risk analysis is required for all major NASA programs and has been used for shuttle, station, and Mars lander programs. It is a prescribed part of early planning and is necessary during concept definition, even before mission scenarios and system designs exist. PRA cm begin when little failure data are available, and be continually updated and refined as detail becomes available. PRA provides a basis for examining tradeoffs among safety, reliability, performance, and cost. The objective of AIM's PRA is to indicate how risk can be managed and future human space missions enabled by the AIM Project. Many critical events can cause injuries and fatalities to the crew without causing loss of vehicle or mission. Some critical systems are beyond AIM's scope, such as propulsion and guidance. Many failure-causing events can be mitigated by conducting operational tests in AIM, such as testing equipment and evaluating operational procedures, especially in the areas of communications and computers, autonomous operations, life support, thermal design, EVA and rover activities, physiological factors including habitation, medical equipment, and food, and multifunctional tools and repairable systems. AIM is well suited to test and demonstrate the habitat, life support, crew operations, and human interface. Because these account for significant crew, systems performance, and science risks, AIM will help reduce mission risk, and missions beyond LEO are far enough in the future that AIM can have significant impact.

Jones, Harry W.↗

Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) of a Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) Dynamic Positioning System (DPS)

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) has been utilized by NASA in a variety of space oriented projects. It has served as one of the primary risk identification and ranking tools. Recent developments in the oil and gas industry have presented opportunities for NASA to lend their PRA expertise to both ongoing and developmental projects within the industry. As a result, NASA has entered into an agreement with Anadarko Petroleum Company (APC) to collaboratively develop PRAs for different aspects of the subsea drilling and completion process of well development. This paper documents how PRA was applied to estimate the probability that a Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) equipped with a generically configured Dynamic Positioning System (DPS) loses location and needs to initiate an emergency disconnect. Since this project was in essence a pilot project, the PRA described in this paper is intended to be generic such that the vessel meets the general requirements of an International Maritime Organization (IMO) Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)/Circ. 645 Class 3 dynamically positioned vessel. The results of this analysis are not intended to be applied to any specific drilling vessel, although provisions were made to allow the analysis to be configured to a specific vessel if required.

Thigpen, Eric B.↗

Determination of a Generic Human Error Probability Distribution, Part 1: A Dynamic Formulation of SPAR-H

In almost all major nuclear power plants (NPP) events include a significant human error component. As an example, in Fukushima Daiichi (2011) nuclear meltdown, the human actions related to the high-pressure injection cooling strongly affected accident evolution. Furthermore, in the Three Mile Island accident (1979) (which was initiated by a stuck open valve and thus was triggered a loss of coolant accident) the unit operators made decisions based upon false assumptions that contributed negatively to the accident. Given these premises, the ability to accurately model human interactions with plant evolution and, in particular, dynamically calculate human error probability (HEP) plays a major role in a probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). Human reliability analysis (HRA) identifies and models the causes of human errors, and quantifies HEP by applying different methodologies. HRA methods identify errors and reflect on the understanding of error-prone people and systems. There are a number of HRA methods available that assist in identifying the vulnerabilities in the system and provide guidance in determining the HEP. HEP is the probability of a human failure event (HFE), and quantification of HEPs under various situations is utilized in PRA of large complex systems. One of the more prominent HRA methods is the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk-Human Reliability Analysis (SPAR-H) method that was developed to estimate HEPs for the use in the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) PRA models employed in U.S. NPPs. SPAR-H is implemented in U.S. NPPs by regulators at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to determine the HEP based on expert estimation through the use of calculation worksheets. In SPAR-H, the nominal HEPs (NHEPs) are multiplied by performance shaping factors (PSF) multiplier values to obtain the overall error probability. PSFs encompass the human components, individual characteristics, their environment, and aspects of the task. With PSFs, the goal is to capture all factors that can affect human performance. In SPAR-H there are eight PSFs used, each having respective levels corresponding to multipliers: Available Time, Stress/Stressors, Complexity, Experience/Training, Procedures, Ergonomics/Human Machine Interface, Fitness for Duty, and Work Processes. The PSF multipliers indicate enhanced, nominal, or degraded human performance. The SPAR-H method estimates the HEP through multiplying a NHEP with PSFs. Hence, SPAR-H is a traditional HRA method that assesses human performance at a fixed, or static, point in time. In a dynamic HRA framework, human performance is assessed on a continuous time basis. SPAR-H can be used within a dynamic PRA framework through the use of simulation and stochastic models. The goal of dynamic HRA is to build a more realistic model of the human-system interaction to enhance calculation of reliability, risk and safety analysis. The progression of events in dynamic SPAR-H considers that some PSFs may experience gradual change, while other change can be sudden due to individualistic differences or rapid plant status changes. The PSF changes are caused by contextual changes in the scenario. For example, as more time passes, the realization that a task should be completed sooner may cause the operator more stress. In another example, a sudden relay of information about sickness of a family member may alter the operator's general stress level and fitness for duty. Each PSF has a different dynamic nature; PSFs like stress and complexity change more quickly over the course of a task than experience and training. While the experience of an operator changes over the course of attaining the objective, the amount that this added experience changes the HEP is very minimal. In contrast, the stress, complexity, and procedures PSFs may change quite a bit over the course of task completion.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

A Prognostic Launch Vehicle Probability of Failure Assessment Methodology for Conceptual Systems Predicated on Human Causal Factors

Create an improved method to calculate reliability of a conceptual launch vehicle system prior to fabrication by using historic data of actual root causes of failures. While failures have unique "proximate causes", there are typically a finite amount of common "root causes". Heretofore launch vehicle reliability evaluation typically hardware-centric statistical analyses, while most root causes of failures are been shown to be human-centric. A method based on human-centric root causes can be used to quantify reliability assessments and focus proposed actions to mitigate problems. Existing methods have been optimistic in their projections of launch vehicle reliability compared to actuals. Hypothesis: reliability of a conceptual launch vehicle can be more accurately evaluated based on a rational, probabilistic approach using past failure assessment teams' findings predicated on human-centric causes."Human Reliability Analysis Methods Selection Guidance for NASA"Chandler F.T., et al., NASA HQ/OSMA study group, July 2006. Outside HRA experts from academia, other federal labs, and the private sector. 50 system reliability methods considered, fourteen selected for further study, four finally selected as best suited for human spaceflight. Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) + Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) enabled incorporating effects and probabilities of human errors. While four down-selected methods deemed appropriate for failure assessment, it did not appear that these methods could be concisely applied to perform major system-wide assessment of probability of failure of a conceptual design without becoming unwieldy."Engineering a Safer World", Detailed, comprehensive study external to NASA Leveson N. G., MIT, 2011.Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP). All-encompassing accident model based on systems theory analyzed accidents after they occurred and created approaches to prevent occurrence in developing systems not focused on failure prevention per se, but rather reducing hazards by influencing human behavior through use of constraints, hierarchical control structures, and process models to improve system safetySystem Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) addresses predictive part of problem (a "hazard analysis"). Includes all causal factors identified in STAMP: "...design errors, software flaws, component interaction accidents, cognitively complex human decision-making errors, and social organizational and management factors contributing to accidents" can guide design process rather than require it to exist before-hand did not appear capable of concise application for system-wide assessment of probability of failure of a conceptual design without becoming unwieldy.

Williams, Craig H.↗

DYNAMIC PRA OF A MULTI-UNIT PLANT

Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) methods couple stochastic methods (e.g., RAVEN, ADAPT, ADS, MCDET) with safety analysis codes (RELAP5-3D, MELCOR, MAAP) to determine risk associated to complex systems such as nuclear plants. Compared to classical PRA methods, which are based on static logic structures (e.g., Event-Trees, Fault-Trees), they can evaluate with higher resolution the safety impact of timing and sequencing of events on the accident progression. Recently, special attention has been given to nuclear plants which consist of multiple units and, in particular, on the safety impact of system dependencies, shared systems and common resources on core damage frequencies. In the literature, while classical PRA methods have been employed to model multi-unit plants, Dynamic PRA methods have never been applied to analyze a full multi-unit model. This paper presents a PRA analysis of a multi-unit plant using Dynamic PRA methods. We employ RAVEN as stochastic method coupled with RELAP5-3D. The plant under consideration consists of the three units and their associated spent fuel pools (SFPs). The studied initiating event is a seismic induced station blackout event. We will describe in detail how the multi-unit plant has been constructed and, in particular, how unit dependencies and shared resources are modeled.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

MEASURING RISK IMPORTANCE IN A DYNAMIC PRA FRAMEWORK

Risk importance measures are indexes that are used to rank systems, structures and components (SSCs) using risk-informed methods. The most used/known measures are: Risk Reduction Worth (RRW), Risk Achievement Worth (RAW), Birnbaum (B) and Fussell-Vesely (FV). Once obtained from classical Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) analyses, these risk measures can be effectively employed to optimize component testing and maintenance. In contrast to classical PRA methods, Dynamic PRA methods couple stochastic methods with safety analysis codes to determine risk associate to complex systems such as nuclear plants. Compared to classical PRA methods, they can evaluate with higher resolution the safety impact of timing and sequencing of events on the accident progression. The objective of this paper is to present a series of algorithms that can be used to determine classical risk importance measures (RRW, RAW, B and FV) along with newly developed ones from a Dynamic PRA analysis.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

SAPHIRE 8 Software Project Plan

This project is being conducted at the request of the DOE and the NRC. The INL has been requested by the NRC to improve and maintain the Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluation (SAPHIRE) tool set concurrent with the changing needs of the user community as well as staying current with new technologies. Successful completion will be upon NRC approved release of all software and accompanying documentation in a timely fashion. This project will enhance the SAPHIRE tool set for the user community (NRC, Nuclear Power Plant operations, Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) model developers) by providing improved Common Cause Failure (CCF), External Events, Level 2, and Significance Determination Process (SDP) analysis capabilities. The SAPHIRE development team at the Idaho National Laboratory is responsible for successful completion of this project. The project is under the supervision of Curtis L. Smith, PhD, Technical Lead for the SAPHIRE application. All current capabilities from SAPHIRE version 7 will be maintained in SAPHIRE 8. The following additional capabilities will be incorporated: • Incorporation of SPAR models for the SDP interface. • Improved quality assurance activities for PRA calculations of SAPHIRE Version 8. • Continue the current activities for code maintenance, documentation, and user support for the code.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Constellation Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA): Design Consideration for the Crew Exploration Vehicle

Managed by NASA's Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, a pilot probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) of the NASA Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) was performed in early 2006. The PRA methods used follow the general guidance provided in the NASA PRA Procedures Guide for NASA Managers and Practitioners'. Phased-mission based event trees and fault trees are used to model a lunar sortie mission of the CEV - involving the following phases: launch of a cargo vessel and a crew vessel; rendezvous of these two vessels in low Earth orbit; transit to th$: moon; lunar surface activities; ascension &om the lunar surface; and return to Earth. The analysis is based upon assumptions, preliminary system diagrams, and failure data that may involve large uncertainties or may lack formal validation. Furthermore, some of the data used were based upon expert judgment or extrapolated from similar components~systemsT. his paper includes a discussion of the system-level models and provides an overview of the analysis results used to identify insights into CEV risk drivers, and trade and sensitivity studies. Lastly, the PRA model was used to determine changes in risk as the system configurations or key parameters are modified.

Prassinos, Peter G.↗

Assessment and Control of Spacecraft Charging Risks on the International Space Station

Electrical interactions between the F2 region ionospheric plasma and the 160V photovoltaic (PV) electrical power system on the International Space Station (ISS) can produce floating potentials (FP) on the ISS conducting structure of greater magnitude than are usually observed on spacecraft in low-Earth orbit. Flight through the geomagnetic field also causes magnetic induction charging of ISS conducting structure. Charging processes resulting from interaction of ISS with auroral electrons may also contribute to charging albeit rarely. The magnitude and frequency of occurrence of possibly hazardous charging events depends on the ISS assembly stage (six more 160V PV arrays will be added to ISS), ISS flight configuration, ISS position (latitude and longitude), and the natural variability in the ionospheric flight environment. At present, ISS is equipped with two plasma contactors designed to control ISS FP to within 40 volts of the ambient F2 plasma. The negative-polarity grounding scheme utilized in the ISS 160V power system leads, naturally, to negative values of ISS FP. A negative ISS structural FP leads to application of electrostatic fields across the dielectrics that separate conducting structure from the ambient F2 plasma, thereby enabling dielectric breakdown and arcing. Degradation of some thermal control coatings and noise in electrical systems can result. Continued review and evaluation of the putative charging hazards, as required by the ISS Program Office, revealed that ISS charging could produce a risk of electric shock to the ISS crew during extra vehicular activity. ISS charging risks are being evaluated in ongoing ISS charging measurements and analysis campaigns. The results of ISS charging measurements are combined with a recently developed detailed model of the ISS charging process and an extensive analysis of historical ionospheric variability data, to assess ISS charging risks using Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) methods. The PRA analysis (estimated frequency of occurrence and severity of the charging hazards) are then used to select the hazard control strategy that provides the best overall safety and mission success environment for ISS and the ISS crew. This paper presents: 1) a summary of ISS spacecraft charging analysis, measurements, observations made to date, 2) plans for future ISS spacecraft charging measurement campaigns, and 3) a detailed discussion of the PRA strategy used to assess ISS spacecraft charging risks and select charging hazard control strategies

Koontz, Steve↗

Hazard and risk analysis framework for nuclear power plant–based integrated energy systems

Employing integrated energy systems (IESs) with nuclear power plants (NPPs) can improve NPP utilization by leveraging dedicated thermal and electric power delivery, but it may also increase operational safety risks. This paper presents a framework to identify and quantify hazards and risks for such IESs. The framework combines accidentology to review past industrial accidents with failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) to identify potential future incidents. Hydrogen explosion and toxic chemical release hazards are of particular concern. Explosion consequences are quantified using the Bauwens-Dorofeev (Bauwens) and trinitrotoluene equivalent mass (TNT-EM) methods, while chemical release consequences are computed using the Gaussian atmospheric dispersion method. Operational disturbances from direct electrical and thermal integration that may affect NPP safety are modeled using probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). Hazards and risks are then evaluated for regulatory compliance. The framework is applied to IESs comprising pressurized or boiling water reactors supplying three levels of thermal and electrical power to industrial customers. Case studies include high-temperature steam electrolysis hydrogen plants of varying capacities and a synthetic fuel production plant. Sensitivity analysis examines piping component failures in the PRA model as a precursor to cost estimation for thermal extraction line design. Additionally, Fussel-Vessely (FV) and risk increase importance (RII) measures identify risk-informed design improvements for the thermal extraction system. FMEA highlights hazards such as loss of offsite power, prompt loss of electrical load, loss of thermal output, and immediate steam diversion, in addition to hydrogen explosions and toxic chemical releases. Both Bauwens and TNT-EM methods suggest maintaining several hundred meters of separation between the NPP and hydrogen facility to mitigate explosion risks. PRA results show a maximum initiating event frequency increase of 1.15% and an overall risk increase of 0.28%. Importance measure analysis identifies upstream pipe leak isolation components as critical. Evaluating the results against safety regulations, it is concluded that hazards and risks can be managed to comply with regulations through risk-informed thermal and electrical connection designs, component selection, maintenance programs, and safe separation distances between NPPs and integrated industrial facilities.

08 - HYDROGEN↗

Introduction to the IMPACT Probabilistic Risk and Tradespace Analysis Tool for Medical System Design

Background: Probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) is a method for estimating risk in complex engineered systems that, at a basic level, focuses on what can go wrong and the likelihood and consequences of those occurrences. NASA has used PRA as an integral component of medical system risk estimation and design for spaceflight. IMPACT (Informing Mission Planning via Analysis of Complex Tradespaces) is a novel tool to meet these goals for exploration missions. Overview: IMPACT performs hundreds of thousands of Monte Carlo simulations of missions to build aggregate pictures of medical risk. These simulations are based on 120 possible medical conditions (the IMPACT Condition List) selected in a consensus-based process because they are of highest likelihood and/or consequence for exploration spaceflight. The conditions are then tied to clinical capabilities which can be used for management (e.g., inserting an IV) and then to over 600 specific resources needed to deliver a capability (e.g., an angiocath or an ultrasound). Different mission profiles can be simulated with user-specified inputs such as mission duration, destination, number of crew and pre-existing medical conditions, and EVA frequency. While the IMPACT evidence base is designed for exploration environments, these user inputs allow the tool to be used across a broad range of missions. IMPACT’s primary outcome metrics include loss of crew life (LOCL, a measure of in-flight mortality due to medical conditions), need for evacuation (RTDC, return to definitive care), and crew disability (TTL, task time lost based on how medical conditions impact the ability to perform over 1000 specific exploration mission crew tasks). In addition to modeling medical risk, IMPACT also accepts user-specified constraints, such as limitations of mass or volume, and will output a recommended clinical capability set and specific medical resources that meet the mission constraints. Discussion: This abstract will provide an introduction to IMPACT and describe the nature of the underlying medical evidence. It will also detail potential use cases for how this tool can be utilized by NASA or commercial spaceflight providers.

Ben Easter↗

Application of Risk Assessment Tools in the Continuous Risk Management (CRM) Process

Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is currently implementing the Continuous Risk Management (CRM) Program developed by the Carnegie Mellon University and recommended by NASA as the Risk Management (RM) implementation approach. The four most frequently used risk assessment tools in the center are: (a) Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Hazard Analysis (HA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), and Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA). There are some guidelines for selecting the type of risk assessment tools during the project formulation phase of a project, but there is not enough guidance as to how to apply these tools in the Continuous Risk Management process (CRM). But the ways the safety and risk assessment tools are used make a significant difference in the effectiveness in the risk management function. Decisions regarding, what events are to be included in the analysis, to what level of details should the analysis be continued, make significant difference in the effectiveness of risk management program. Tools of risk analysis also depends on the phase of a project e.g. at the initial phase of a project, when not much data are available on hardware, standard FMEA cannot be applied; instead a functional FMEA may be appropriate. This study attempted to provide some directives to alleviate the difficulty in applying FTA, PRA, and FMEA in the CRM process. Hazard Analysis was not included in the scope of the study due to the short duration of the summer research project.

Paul S. Ray↗

Probabilistic risk analysis toward cost-effective 3S (safety, safeguards, security) implementation

Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) has been introduced for several decades in safety and nuclear advanced countries have already used this methodology in their own regulatory systems. However, PRA has not been developed in safeguards and security so far because of inherent difficulties in intentional and malicious acts. In this paper, probabilistic proliferation and risk analysis based on random process is applied to hypothetical reprocessing process and physical protection system in nuclear reactor with the Markov model that was originally developed by the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Working Group (PRPPWG) in Generation IV International Framework (GIF). Through the challenge to quantify the security risk with a frequency in this model, integrated risk notion among 3S to pursue the cost-effective installation of those countermeasures is discussed in a heroic manner.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Reduced Order Model Implementation in the Risk-Informed Safety Margin Characterization Toolkit

The RISMC project aims to develop new advanced simulation-based tools to perform Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) for the existing fleet of U.S. nuclear power plants (NPPs). These tools numerically model not only the thermo-hydraulic behavior of the reactor primary and secondary systems but also external events temporal evolution and components/system ageing. Thus, this is not only a multi-physics problem but also a multi-scale problem (both spatial, µm-mm-m, and temporal, ms-s-minutes-years). As part of the RISMC PRA approach, a large amount of computationally expensive simulation runs are required. An important aspect is that even though computational power is regularly growing, the overall computational cost of a RISMC analysis may be not viable for certain cases. A solution that is being evaluated is the use of reduce order modeling techniques. During the FY2015, we investigated and applied reduced order modeling techniques to decrease the RICM analysis computational cost by decreasing the number of simulations runs to perform and employ surrogate models instead of the actual simulation codes. This report focuses on the use of reduced order modeling techniques that can be applied to any RISMC analysis to generate, analyze and visualize data. In particular, we focus on surrogate models that approximate the simulation results but in a much faster time (µs instead of hours/days). We apply reduced order and surrogate modeling techniques to several RISMC types of analyses using RAVEN and RELAP-7 and show the advantages that can be gained.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Linking classical PRA models to a dynamic PRA

Here, this paper presents a series of methods designed to incorporate classical Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) models such as Event Trees (ETs) and Fault Trees (FTs) into dynamic PRA. In contrast to classical PRA, dynamic PRA couples stochastic methods with system simulators to determine the risks associated with complex systems such as nuclear power plants. Compared with classical PRA methods, they can evaluate with higher resolution the safety impact of timing and sequencing of events on the progression of the accident. As part of a dynamic PRA analysis, it is not uncommon that parts of the system to be analyzed might not require a computationally expensive simulation model. These parts could be in fact modeled by employing classical PRA models (e.g., a FT). Here, we present a set of methods and tools that can be used to link the most common classical PRA models (ETs, FTs, reliability block diagrams and Markov models) to simulation codes such as RELAP5-3D: creating a “hybrid PRA.” In order to show the potential of such an hybrid PRA we employ this method to verify ET modeling assumptions (e.g., success criteria) using a large break loss of coolant accident initiating event as a test case. In this respect, we link a set of FTs from the original PRA to the RELAP5-3D code and perform a hybrid PRA. The FTs are employed to model the control logic of several safety systems and to propagate component failures throughout the system. Provided the generated dynamic PRA data, we show how conservative assumptions in the original PRA can be identified and how such original PRA can be modified by updating success criteria captured by the set of RELAP5-3D simulation runs.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

The Challenger tragedy was caused by an Apollo mistake, terminating risk analysis

NASA’s view of risk changed between early Apollo and the Space Shuttle. Risk was a known serious problem at the beginning of Apollo and the risk estimates were disturbingly high. To avoid public concern, risk analysis was discontinued. Risk analysis was avoided in Shuttle, leading to an unnecessarily risky design. The immediate cause of the Challenger tragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in cold weather. The fundamental cause was the high risk of the Shuttle design. Before Challenger, management thought and testified that the probability of an accident was 1 in 100,000. After Challenger, Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a Shuttle failure. The recent Orion design uses the safer Apollo approach, with a hardened capsule, launch abort escape, and the crew placed above the rocket tanks and engines. During Apollo it was estimated that, “assuming all elements from propulsion to rendezvous and life support were done as well or better than ever before, that 30 astronauts would be lost before 3 were returned safely to the Earth.” The chance of astronaut survival was only 10%. After the Apollo 1 tragedy, the awareness of risk led to an intense focus on achieving safety. “The only possible explanation for the astonishing success – no losses in space and on time – was that every participant at every level in every area far exceeded the norm of human capabilities.” During Apollo, a NASA PRA found that the chance of success was “less than 5 percent.” The NASA Administrator felt that “the numbers could do irreparable harm,” and discontinued numerical risk assessment. This led to decreasing understanding of risk. The head of Apollo reliability and safety decided, “Statistics don’t count for anything,” and that risk is reduced by “attention taken in design.” The great and initially unexpected success of Apollo appeared to validate the neglect of PRA. Continuing to neglect the mathematical estimation of risk led Shuttle into a high risk design that produced tragic results. The initial design of the Shuttle emphasized increasing capability and reducing cost without analysis or even mention of risk. A retired NASA official stated, “some NASA people began to confuse desire with reality. … One result was to assess risk in terms of what was thought acceptable without regard for verifying the assessment. … Note that under such circumstances real risk management is shut out.” Not computing risk led to removing launch abort, removing crew escape, selecting less reliable Solid Rocket Boosters, placing the crew compartment next to the rocket boosters, and accepting more stressed shielding tile designs. Accepting these specific risks directly caused the shuttle disasters. The Challenger tragedy is frequently taught as a case of management failure. The focus is on the Challenger launch decision hours before, which is a dramatic example of bad management. However, the true cause of the Challenger disaster occurred decades earlier in the Apollo era. When the easily predictable failures occurred, failure investigations focused on how they might have been avoided. The Shuttle was cancelled after the space station was completed because of its high risk. The ultimate cause of the Shuttle tragedies was the choice by the Apollo-era NASA administrator to avoid a negative public reaction to realistic risk analysis.

Harry W. Jones↗