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At least 19 records

Textual and Network Analysis of Part 107 Waivers

Context: The management of hazards in sUAS operations is not as well defined as today's commercial operations despite sUAS widespread use. Part 107 waived operations' provisions, which manage hazards for higher risk operations that require approval, can offer insight to organizations establishing UAS Programs in managing their own operation hazards. Aim: We seek to understand how the FAA Part 107 waived operations manage hazards. Method: We used the constant comparative method to identify hazard mitigation textual categories from provisions and use networks to assess the dispersion of provisions and the identified categories across issued waivers. Results: Eight mitigation categories and twenty-four sub-categories were identified. Most provisions present in waivers are mostly reused in one waiver. Conclusion: While there is a broad range of provisions to control for hazard mitigations in the Part 107 issued waivers analyzed regulations, they require case-by-case modifications.

Urban Air Mobility↗

Textual and Network Analysis of Title 14 CFR Part107 Waivers

Context: The management of hazards in small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) operations is not as well defined as today's commercial operations despite sUAS widespread use. FAA Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 107 waived operations' provisions, which manage hazards for higher risk operations that require approval, can offer insight to organizations establishing UAS Programs in managing their own operation hazards. Aim: We seek to understand how the Title 14 CFR Part 107 waived operations manage hazards. Method: We used the constant comparative method to identify hazard mitigation textual categories from provisions and use networks to assess the dispersion of provisions and the identified categories across issued waivers. Results: Eight mitigation categories and twenty-four sub-categories were identified. Most provisions present in waivers are mostly reused in one waiver. Conclusion: While there is a broad range of provisions to control for hazard mitigations in the Title 14 CFR Part 107 issued waivers analyzed regulations, they require case-by-case modifications.

Urban Air Mobility↗

Design Requirements for Unmanned Rotorcraft Used in Low-Risk Concepts of Operation

This technical report presents the results of the second of two research studies on design and performance requirements supporting airworthiness certification of midrange unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) intended for commercial use. The two studies focused attention on UAS in the middle of the multidimensional spectrum of UAS; that is, UAS with attributes and capabilities exceeding the criteria to operate under Part 107 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs), but without the design or operational capabilities to comply with the airworthiness standards for commercially-operated manned aircraft. The goal of the two studies was to help address the gap in airworthiness standards for some UAS that fall between the extremes.

Hayhurst, Kelly J.↗

Real-Time Risk Assessment Framework for Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM)

The new Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Small Unmanned Aircraft rule (Part 107) marks the first national regulations for commercial operation of small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) under 55 pounds within the National Airspace System (NAS). Although sUAS flights may not be performed beyond visual line-of-sight or over non- participant structures and people, safety of sUAS operations must still be maintained and tracked at all times. Moreover, future safety-critical operation of sUAS (e.g., for package delivery) are already being conceived and tested. NASA's Unmanned Aircraft System Trac Management (UTM) concept aims to facilitate the safe use of low-altitude airspace for sUAS operations. This paper introduces the UTM Risk Assessment Framework (URAF) which was developed to provide real-time safety evaluation and tracking capability within the UTM concept. The URAF uses Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) to propagate off -nominal condition probabilities based on real-time component failure indicators. This information is then used to assess the risk to people on the ground by calculating the potential impact area and the effects of the impact. The visual representation of the expected area of impact and the nominal risk level can assist operators and controllers with dynamic trajectory planning and execution. The URAF was applied to a case study to illustrate the concept.

Ancel, Ersin↗

UAS Autonomous Hazard Mitigation through Assured Compliance with Conformance Criteria

The behavior of a drone depends on the integrity of the data it uses and the reliability of the avionics systems that process that data to affect the operation of the aircraft. Commercial unmanned aircraft systems frequently rely on commercial-off-the-shelf and open source avionics components and data sources whose reliability and integrity are not easily assured. To mitigate failure events for aircraft that do not comply with conventional aviation safety standards, operational limitations are typically prescribed by regulators. Part 107 of the Federal Aviation Regulations serves as a good example of operational limitations that mitigate risk for small unmanned aircraft systems. These limitations, however, restrict growth possibilities for the industry. Any reasonable path toward achieving routine operation of all types of drones will have to address the need for assurance of avionics systems, especially their software. This paper discusses the possibility of strategically using assured systems as a stepping stone to routine operation of drones. A specimen system for assured geofencing, called Safeguard, is described as an example of such a stepping stone.

Dill, Evan, T.↗

Gap Analysis of UAS Manuals and Hazards

Emerging aviation includes the use of small Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) in novel operations. The manufacture and operation of these small UAS are not as regulated as today’s commercial operation, and their widespread use introduces new risks and hazards to the general public. Today, there are case-by-case approvals for sUAS operations, particularly for emergency response operations in which the potential benefits to use of sUAS is perceived to outweigh potential risks. We analyze operational approvals, procedures, and concepts of operation to identify and categorize the risks and hazards that applicants and approvers are already considering, and also identify barriers and mitigations that the operators have already put in place. This analysis may help lead to routine checklists that standardize safety analysis and lead to more routine operations.

grounded theory↗

Flight Test Results from the Low Power Transceiver Communications and Navigation Demonstration on Shuttle (CANDOS)

The Low Power Transceiver (LPT) is an advanced signal processing platform that offers a configurable and reprogrammable capability for supporting communications, navigation and sensor functions for mission applications ranging from spacecraft TT&C and autonomous orbit determination to sophisticated networks that use crosslinks to support communications and real-time relative navigation for formation flying. The LPT is the result of extensive collaborative research under NASNGSFC s Advanced Technology Program and ITT Industries internal research and development efforts. Its modular, multi-channel design currently enables transmitting and receiving communication signals on L- or S-band frequencies and processing GPS L-band signals for precision navigation. The LPT flew as a part of the GSFC Hitchhiker payload named Fast Reaction Experiments Enabling Science Technology And Research (FREESTAR) on-board Space Shuttle Columbia s final mission. The experiment demonstrated functionality in GPS-based navigation and orbit determination, NASA STDN Ground Network communications, space relay communications via the NASA TDRSS, on-orbit reconfiguration of the software radio, the use of the Internet Protocol (IP) for TT&C, and communication concepts for space based range safety. All data from the experiment was recovered and, as a result, all primary and secondary objectives of the experiment were successful. This paper presents the results of the LPTs maiden space flight as a part of STS- 107.

Rush, John↗

Analysis of magnetic field data from Pioneer Venus orbiter

The subject grant (NAG 2-501) supported the analysis of magnetic field data from the Pioneer Venus orbiter for the period 10/1/87 to 9/30/94. During that period, 188 papers were contributed to scientific meetings that either analyzed the magnetometer data or used the data as part of the analysis of a scientific problem. Further, 107 papers were published in research journals and books. The magnetic moment of Venus was described. Venus was found to be essentially devoid of any intrinsic magnetic field. There was evidence though for the presence of lightning in the Venus atmosphere. The altitude distribution of impulsive signals in the night atmosphere was mapped and geographic clusters were found, most probably associated with local time ordering. A new means to create flux ropes in the ionosphere was postulated. On the nightside, ionospheric holes, ionospheric clouds, and tail rays were studied. The subsolar ionopause and the magnetic barrier were examined as was the altitude asymmetry of the ionopause, properties of the magnetosheath, and location of the bow shock upstream waves.

Russell, Christopher T.↗

Terrestrial Sources of X-Ray Radiation and Their Effects on NASA Flight Hardware

X-rays are an energetic and penetrating form of ionizing electromagnetic radiation, which can degrade NASA flight hardware. The main concern posed by such radiation is degradation of active electronic devices and, in some cases, diodes. Non-electronic components are only damaged at doses that far exceed the point where any electronic device would be destroyed. For the purposes of this document, flight hardware can be taken to mean an entire instrument, the flight electronics within the instrument or the individual microelectronic devices in the flight electronics. This document will discuss and describe the ways in which NASA flight hardware might be exposed to x-rays, what is and isn't a concern, and how to tell the difference. First, we must understand what components in flight hardware may be vulnerable to degradation or failure as a result of being exposed to ionizing radiation, such as x-rays. As stated above, bulk materials (structural metals, plastics, etc.) are generally only affected by ionizing radiation at very high dose levels. Likewise, passive electronic components (e.g. resistors, capacitors, most diodes) are strongly resistant to exposure to x-rays, except at very high doses. The main concerns arise when active components, that is, components like discrete transistors and microelectronic devices, are exposed to ionizing radiation. Active components are designed to respond to minute changes in currents and voltages in the circuit. As such, it is not surprising that exposure to ionizing radiation, which creates ionized and therefore electrically active particles, may degrade the way the hardware performs. For the most part, the mechanism for this degradation is trapping of the charges generated by ionizing radiation by defects in dielectric materials in the hardware. As such, the degree of damage is a function of both the quantity of ionizing radiation exposure and the physical characteristics of the hardware itself. The metric that describes the level of exposure to ionizing radiation is total ionizing dose (TID). The unit of TID is the rad, which is defined as 100 ergs absorbed per gram of material. Dose can be expressed in other units, for example grays (gy), where 1 gy = 100 rads. The actual fluence of radiation needed to deliver a rad depends on the absorbing material, so units of dose are usually stated in reference to the material of interest. That is, for microelectronic devices, the unit of dose is generally rad (Si) or rad (SiO2). However, the definition of absorbed dose in this fashion has the advantage that the type of radiation causing the ionization can be normalized so that a realistic and adequate comparison can be made. The sensitivity of microelectronic parts to TID varies over many orders of magnitude. (Note: Doses to humans are typically expressed in rems-or roentgen-equivalent-man-which measures tissue damage, and depends on the type of radiation, as well as the dose in rads.) Thus far, the "softest" parts tested at NASA showed damage at 500 rads (Si), while parts that are radiation-hardened by design can remain functional to doses on the order of 107 rads (Si). This broad range of sensitivity highlights one of the most important considerations when considering the effects of radiation on electronic parts: In order to determine whether a radiation exposure is a concern for a particular part, one must understand the technologies used in the part and their vulnerabilities to TID damage. A NASA radiation expert should be consulted to obtain such information.

X-ray↗

Interim Groundwater Monitoring Report, Revision 0, Fluid Servicing Road Area, Solid Waste Management Unit (SWMU)s 037 and 102, Kennedy Space Center, Florida

This Interim Groundwater Monitoring (IGWM) Report presents the findings from the IGWM events, completed between December 2022 and June 2023, at the Fluid Servicing Road Area (FSRA), Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida. KSC is located on the northern portion of Merritt Island, between the Indian and Banana Rivers in Brevard County, Florida. The IGWM program is implemented at sites where active remediation is not occurring. The IGWM events at the Propellants Support Building Area (PSBA; Solid Waste Management Unit [SWMU] 102) included the collection of eight groundwater monitoring well samples and 107 direct-push technology (DPT) samples. The DPT samples were collected for the Five-Year supplemental plume monitoring event. Additionally, 27 wells were sampled as part of the December 2022 IGWM event at the Former Drum Storage Area (FDSA), SWMU 037. This IGWM Report was prepared by HydroGeoLogic, Inc. (HGL) for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) under Task Order 4 of Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity Contract 80KSC019D0012/80KSC019F0090.

FDSA↗

JWST NIRCam Defocused Imaging Photometric Stability Performance and How It Can Sense Mirror Tilts

We use JWST NIRCam short-wavelength photometry to capture a transit lightcurve of the exoplanet HAT-P-14 b to assess performance as part of instrument commissioning. The short-wavelength precision is 152 ppm per 27 s integration as measured over the full time series compared to a theoretical limit of 107 ppm, after corrections to spatially correlated 1/f noise. Persistence effects from charge trapping are well fit by an exponential function with short characteristic timescales, settling on the order of 5–15 minutes. The short-wavelength defocused photometry is also uniquely well suited to measure the real-time wave-front error of JWST. Analysis of the images and reconstructed wave-front maps indicates that two different hexagonal primary mirror segments exhibited “tilt events,” where they changed orientation rapidly in less than ∼1.4 s. In some cases, the magnitude and timing of the flux jumps caused by tilt events can be accurately predicted with a telescope model. These tilt events can be sensed by simultaneous longer-wavelength NIRCam grism spectral images alone in the form of changes to the point-spread function, diagnosed from the full width at half maximum. They can also be sensed with the fine guidance sensor instrument from difference images. Tilt events possibly from sudden releases of stress in the backplane structure behind the mirrors were expected during the commissioning period because they were found in ground-based testing. Tilt events have shown signs of decreasing in frequency but have not disappeared completely. The detectors exhibit some minor (less than 1%) deviations from linear behavior in the first few groups of each integration, potentially impacting absolute fluxes and transit depths on bright targets, where only a handful of groups are possible. Overall, the noise is within 50% of the theoretical photon noise and read noise. This bodes well for high-precision measurements of transiting exoplanets and other time variable targets.

Everett Schlawin↗

Integrated Advanced Microwave Sounding Unit-A(AMSU-A). Performance Verification Report: METSAT AMSU-A2 Receiver Assembly, (P/N 1356441-1, S.N F04) S/N 107

The AMSU-A receiver subsystem comprises two separated receiver assemblies; AMSU-Al and AMSU-A2(PN1356441-1). The AMSU-A1 receiver contains 13 channels and the AMSU-A2 receiver 2 channels. The AMSU-AL receiver assembly is further divided into two parts; AMSU-A 1-1 (P/N 1356429-1) and AMSU-A 1-2 (P/N 1356409-1), which contain 9 and 4 channels, respectively. The AMSU-A receiver subsystem stands in between the antenna and signal processing subsystems of the AMSU-A instrument and comprises the RF and IF components from RF isolators to IF attenuators. It receives the RF signals from the antenna subsystem, down-converts the RF signals to IF signals, amplifies and defines the IF signals to proper power level and frequency bandwidth as specified for each channel, and inputs the IF signals to the signal processing subsystem. The test reports for the METSAT AMSU-A receiver subsystem are prepared separately for the A1 and A2 receivers so that each receiver stands alone during integration of instruments into the spacecraft. This test report presents the test data of the METSAT AMSU-A2 Flight Model No.4 (FM4) receiver. The tests are performed per the Acceptance Test Procedure for the AMSU-A Receiver Subsystem, AE-26002/6A. The functional performance tests are conducted either at the component or subsystem level. While the component-level tests are performed over the entire operating temperature range predicted by thermal analysis, the subsystem-level tests are conducted at ambient temperature only.

Kapper, R.↗

Inversion of Magnetic Measurements of the CHAMP Satellite Over the Pannonian Basin

The Pannonian Basin is a deep intra-continental basin that formed as part of the Alpine orogeny. In order to study the nature of the crustal basement we used the long-wavelength magnetic anomalies acquired by the CHAMP satellite. The anomalies were distributed in a spherical shell, some 107,927 data recorded between January 1 and December 31 of 2008. They covered the Pannonian Basin and its vicinity. These anomaly data were interpolated into a spherical grid of 0.5 x 0.5, at the elevation of 324 km by the Gaussian weight function. The vertical gradient of these total magnetic anomalies was also computed and mapped to the surface of a sphere at 324 km elevation. The former spherical anomaly data at 425 km altitude were downward continued to 324 km. To interpret these data at the elevation of 324 km we used an inversion method. A polygonal prism forward model was used for the inversion. The minimum problem was solved numerically by the Simplex and Simulated annealing methods; a L2 norm in the case of Gaussian distribution parameters and a L1 norm was used in the case of Laplace distribution parameters. We INTERPRET THAT the magnetic anomaly WAS produced by several sources and the effect of the sable magnetization of the exsolution of hemo-ilmenite minerals in the upper crustal metamorphic rocks.

Kis, K. I.↗

Algae to Enhance Water Recovery for Future Space Habitats

Bioregenerative technologies have been suggested for human life support in space for decades. Such technologies have not yet been incorporated due to 1) assumed unreliability and 2) bioregeneration rates for given processes are slower when compared to equivalent physical/chemical treatment technologies. Slower treatment capacity for biological system result in larger technology infrastructure (i.e., higher mass, power, and volume requirements), and thus less attractive. Current ISS (International Space Station) life support systems are strictly physical/chemical. However, bioregenerative systems are being suggested for future surface systems (on the Moon or Mars) due to the limited access to resupplied materials and continued need for resiliency and sustainability. In the realm of water reclamation, the ISS system processes only urine, metabolic condensates, and hygiene (i.e., handwash and oral, no shower or laundry) waters with 75 percent closure. For future surface habitats with 4 crew members, approximately 30 liters per day of wastewater will be generated, containing estimated 850 milligrams per liter NH4-N. Conventional algae PBRs (photobioreactors) require dilution to accommodate such high concentrations of ammonium. If dilution is required, resulting technology hardware will increase dramatically in mass. A new approach was explored, whereby high carbon dioxide (1200-2000 parts per million) and light (400-600 micromoles per square meter per second) conditions were provided to treat the undiluted wastewater stream. Daily treatment capacity for Chlorella sorokiniana and Chlorella vulgaris was observed to be 85 and 107 milligrams NH4-N per gram of biomass, respectively. This preliminary study shows that there is capacity to increase ammonium removal rates by algal species, and thus reactor size (mass and volume) for future surface systems. Smaller reactor volumes will help bioregenerative treatment technologies compete with the presently accepted physical/chemical treatment technologies.

Water Purification↗

Mean Winds of the Mesosphere (60-80 Km), as Measured by MF Radars

Winds data obtained from medium frequency (MF) radars for heights of 60 to 80 km are discussed: locations are Saskatoon (52 N, 107 W), Christchurch (44 S, 173 W), Adelside (35 S, 183 E) and Townsville (20 S, 147 E). Whereas well defined summer easterly jets centered near 70 km develop in summer, no regular buildups and decays are observed in winter at midlatitudes. Part of this variability can be associated with stratospheric warmings, which develop into breakdown of the polar vortex in the Northern Hemisphere. Amplitude and phase profiles of the annual and semiannual oscillations are also presented. The radar winds from Saskatoon are compared and combined with rocket derived winds up to 60 km from Primrose Lake (54 N, 110 W) to give consistent cross sections from 20 to 110 km. The SH radar winds are compared with a model based on rocket winds which extends up to 80 km. The latter evidence considerable smoothing, as no winter variability is evident. The other consistent difference is that heights of the summer easterly maxima for the model are 5 to 10 km lower than the radar winds at all latitudes.

Manson, A. H.↗

Cockpit Interruptions and Distractions: Effective Management Requires a Careful Balancing Act

Managing several tasks concurrently is an everyday part of cockpit operations. For the most part, crews handle concurrent task demands efficiently, yet crew preoccupation with one task to the detriment of performing other tasks is one of the more common forms of error in the cockpit. Most pilots are familiar with the December 1972 L1011 crash that occurred when the crew became preoccupied with a landing gear light malfunction and failed to notice that someone had inadvertently bumped off the autopilot. More recently a DC-9 landed gear-up in Houston when the crew, preoccupied with an stabilized approach, failed to recognize that the gear was not down because they had not switched the hydraulic pumps to high. We have recently started a research project to study why crews are vulnerable to these sorts of errors. As part of that project we reviewed NTSB reports of accidents attributed to crew error; we concluded that nearly half of these accidents involved lapses of attention associated with interruptions, distractions, or preoccupation with one task to the exclusion of another task. We have also analyzed 107 ASRS reports involving competing tasks; we present here some of our conclusions from those ASRS reports. These 107 reports involved 21 different types of routine tasks crews neglected at a critical moment while attending to another task. Sixty-nine percent of the neglected tasks involved either failure to monitor the current status or position of the aircraft or failure to monitor the actions of the pilot flying or taxiing. Thirty-four different types of competing activities distracted or preoccupied the pilots. Ninety percent of these competing activities fell into one of four broad categories: communication (e.g., discussion among crew or radio communication), heads-down work (e.g., programming the FMS or reviewing approach plates), responding to abnormals, or searching for VMC traffic. We will discuss examples of each of these four categories and suggest things crews can do to reduce their vulnerability to these and similar situations.

Dismukes, R. K.↗