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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

Nuclear Weapons and the Atmospheric Test Era

The era of atmospheric testing defies a simple description. Beginning with the goal of proving fission, the United States’ test program grew in complexity as scientists explored thermonuclear reactions, met the military demand for a variety of weapons for an increasing number of delivery platforms, and reacted to the ever-growing public fear of fallout. And, of course, political considerations were always present, first in the prosecution of World War II and later in the Cold War. To understand the atmospheric test program, then, is to understand how science, politics, and the public shaped our society in ways that are still difficult to fully understand.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

S&TR Jan-Feb 2024 (Wind Tunnel - EMIT Issue)

At Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, we focus on science and technology research to ensure our nation’s security. We also apply that expertise to solve other important national problems in energy, bioscience, and the environment. Science & Technology Review is published eight times a year to communicate, to a broad audience, the Laboratory’s scientific and technological accomplishments in fulfilling its primary missions. The publication’s goal is to help readers understand these accomplishments and appreciate their value to the individual citizen, the nation, and the world.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2023

US Nuclear Testing: Health Consequences and Policy Decisions

With the approval of President Franklin D. Roosevelt to begin the research on a nuclear bomb in 1941 to the last test conducted by the U.S. in 1992, the fifty-year history of the nuclear weapons testing program has been an expansive topic of research. The program's growth is credited to the race to build the first atomic weapon for war. The termination of the Soviet Union and many other factors, including concerns about the adverse health effects of radioactive fallout, influenced the decline of the need for the program. The discovery of the negative health effects caused by low-level radiation and the subsequent studies influenced sitting U.S. presidents in passing policies that significantly impacted the nuclear weapons testing program.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

US Perspectives on the Conventional/Nuclear Interactions and the Impacts on Nuclear Escalation Risks and Future Arms Control Prospects

This short paper is organized around a few discrete questions. How have U.S. perspectives on conventional and nuclear interactions evolved in recent years? How have these changing perspectives shaped U.S. thinking on perceived nuclear escalation risks with Russia, both long standing and newly emerged? And finally, what do these U.S. perceptions of interactions and risks mean for future potential arms control either in the conventional or nuclear arena? The answers to these questions appear to show some promise for future work in this area. Conventional and nuclear interactions are increasing, and thus the two domains cannot be kept as deliberately or artificially separated as in the past. There is a growing mutual recognition regarding the interplay between conventional and nuclear capabilities in the strategic stability equation. There is also an increasingly shared recognition in the United States and Russia that nuclear escalation risks are likely to originate in conventional crises or conflict, placing an imperative on some form of conflict prevention procedures at the lower end of the spectrum. This requirement suggests some potential areas for risk reduction measures outside of those traditionally considered in conventional and nuclear arms control over the past several decades.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2024

Perspectives on Next Steps in Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Much has happened in arms control over the last year as this chapter has been in development. The prospects for arms control as a viable national security tool have, if anything, grown darker. Russia has falsely equated tearing down the remaining arms control edifice with creating potential leverage vis-à-vis its actions in Ukraine. China has failed to update its talking points on being a responsible arms control actor with its massive nuclear force expansion. The United States has stated clearly that it is open for business on arms control and risk reduction, but it unfortunately has no customers in Russia and China. It remains unclear what specifically the United States is selling in terms of what it wants in a potential agreement. Competitive dynamics and an atmosphere of great power competition are driving all parties further away from the table.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2026

On Theories of Change: Rethinking the Ban Treaty and Disarmament Strategies

A week before Israel bombed Iran’s nuclear facilities, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Rafael Grossi had lunch with the Financial Times. In the interview, Grossi expressed both optimism and pessimism about the nuclear landscape: he was hopeful about prospects for diplomacy, including with Iran. But he also expressed longer-term concerns about a proliferation cascade and rising nuclear risks, in particular, Russia’s nuclear threats amidst the war in Ukraine. “In the past, this was quite taboo,” he said, “but now people talk about tactical nuclear weapons like something which could be contained or permissible.” Given subsequent events in Iran, along with the expiration of New START in 2026 and expanding nuclear arsenals in Russia and China, pessimism would seem to trump hope for prospects for nuclear disarmament.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

The Dynamic Tripolar Strategic Balance: A Net Assessment (Workshop Summary)

On December 9-10, the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) hosted a workshop titled “The Dynamic Tripolar Strategic Balance: A Net Assessment.” The discussion was guided by the following key questions: • By what metrics should the strategic balance be assessed? • How dynamic is the balance? How fragile? • Is the United States gaining strategic advantage, losing it, or holding steady, overall? • In order to gain new advantages or re-gain advantages lost, can or should the United States prioritize some domains and accept more risk in others? If so, which ones?

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2026

In Search of Strategic Advantage: Understanding the Landscape of Technology Competition

In an era of seemingly ever-increasing global tensions, technology competition is often mentioned as a pathway for U.S. and allied success. The opening arguments are often very simple. “This is the most important struggle of the 21st century.” “We cannot afford to lose this competition.” “The United States must not fall behind in this race.” “We must be faster, more agile, more committed, more thoughtful than our competitors.” Competition around a particular technology is described as a once in a generational struggle with immense stakes. “This is a Sputnik moment” is a common analogy. The solutions proposed are fairly straightforward – more of everything. We should spend more money. We should build more widgets or more factories. We should innovate more. We should focus more. We should attract more talent. We should file more patents. We should produce more PhDs. If we do more of everything, we will have more technology than our opponents, they will see our technological advantage, they will not challenge us, and therefore we will win. If we fail to do these things, we will lose. To paraphrase Homer Simpson, in national security policy discussions technology competition has become the cause of, and solution to, all of life’s problems. And yet, beyond doing more across the board technology competition is not at all simple. First, it is a concept increasingly muddled together with other big issues such as innovation policy, national defense strategy, great power competition, allied cooperation, public-private partnerships, and a host of other issues. Certain policies, systems, coalitions, and so on may be excellent for tackling one challenge, but far less optional for others. Second, it is inherently dynamic, an action-reaction cycle between multiple players. A brilliant opening move can be squandered or successfully countered in subsequent moves. Third, there are limits to what you can do - limited time, limited financial resources, limited human capital, and limited knowledge of what lies ahead. One is forced to choose.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Beyond New START: Two Forecasts for Future Russian-US Arms Control

A world without the New START Treaty (NST) or treaty-based strategic arms control cannot simply be categorised as ‘unacceptable’.1 That world is possible. It has been increasing in likelihood for some time and thus it must be both understood and anticipated. Furthermore, the NST will expire on 5 February 2026 and it could disappear much sooner, depending on the actions of either Russia or the United States. No amount of positive thinking on the value of strategic arms control or talking points about the importance of the treaty can change its status as a hostage in the broader bilateral relationship.

Political science↗
DOE OSTI2024

The 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine: Nuclear Supply Chains vs. Sanctions

The United States and European countries are unlikely to collectively approve of sanctions against Russian exports of nuclear fuel assemblies and uranium in the near term despite the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Rather than bearing the costs that cutting off Russian imports would have on domestic nuclear energy production, the United States and European countries are more likely to prefer developing alternative supply chains of nuclear fuel and enriched uranium to reduce dependence on Russian resources. This outlook is primarily based on two areas of evaluation: (1) comparison of the Russian-made reactor fuel supply chain within the European Union (EU) in 2014 following the annexation of Crimea and in 2022 following the invasion of Ukraine, and (2) the dependence of France and the United States on Russia’s exports of enriched uranium. Additionally, the potential impacts to Kazakh uranium exports if trade routes for nuclear resources through Russia became unavailable were considered as an additional factor in the push for disentanglement from Russian nuclear resources. This work utilized BACI, a database of harmonized international trade data at the product level drawn from the United Nations Comtrade Database and created by the French international economics research institute CEPII.1 Comparisons of imports and exports were based on the trade value in U.S. dollars as reported in BACI instead of the quantity of the traded product. This evaluation only considers import and export data up until 2021, since the trade data for 2022 is incomplete within the Comtrade Database for several of the key countries presented in this work, including Australia, Canada, Namibia, Niger, and Russia.

Political science↗
DOE OSTI2023

Suspending democratic (dis)belief: Nonliberal energy polities of solar power in Morocco and Tanzania

This paper proposes the concept of technodemocratic imaginaries (TDIMs) to supplement the widely-used framework of sociotechnical imaginaries (STIMs) for analyzing nonliberal political contexts in energy social science research. Taking the power of coproductionist analysis of STIMs seriously, TDIMs highlight the inherent instabilities within overarching STIMs by arguing that not only are particular groups marginalized and excluded but that they continue to practice and mobilize their own imaginaries of collective governance and justice vis-à-vis energy systems. In contrast, the existing idea of contested STIMs, in which a shared mode of knowledge politics undergirds different imaginaries, casts aside subaltern modes of political engagement and knowledge-making. TDIMs expand conceptions of democracy to include shared practices of credibility in nonliberal political orders. The intent is not to promote democratic relativism but rather to ask scholars and international energy-access practitioners to suspend their democratic disbelief when studying energy matters in so-called nonliberal contexts. We develop the concept of TDIMs by comparing two African nation-states–Morocco and Tanzania–to show how the states and subaltern groups do (or do not) develop TDIMs related to solar power. While international governance organizations often portray Morocco as authoritarian and Tanzania corrupt, each state differently experienced colonization and decolonization and practices different relationships with domestic subaltern groups. Whereas low-income citizens and indigenous groups seek integration into the Moroccan state’s STIM, the Maasai in Tanzania chart their own TDIM separate from the state and international development groups.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗