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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2015

Hybrid statistical testing for nuclear material accounting data and/or process monitoring data in nuclear safeguards

The aim of nuclear safeguards is to ensure that special nuclear material is used for peaceful purposes. Historically, nuclear material accounting (NMA) has provided the quantitative basis for monitoring for nuclear material loss or diversion, and process monitoring (PM) data is collected by the operator to monitor the process. PM data typically support NMA in various ways, often by providing a basis to estimate some of the in-process nuclear material inventory. We develop options for combining PM residuals and NMA residuals (residual = measurement - prediction), using a hybrid of period-driven and data-driven hypothesis testing. The modified statistical tests can be used on time series of NMA residuals (the NMA residual is the familiar material balance), or on a combination of PM and NMA residuals. The PM residuals can be generated on a fixed time schedule or as events occur.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2010

Safeguards Envelope

The Safeguards Envelope is a strategy to determine a set of specific operating parameters within which nuclear facilities may operate to maximize safeguards effectiveness without sacrificing safety or plant efficiency. This paper details advanced statistical techniques that will be applied to real plant process monitoring (PM) data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). In a simulation based on this data, multi-tank and multi-attribute correlations were tested against synthetic diversion scenarios. Kernel regression smoothing was used to fit a curve to the historical data, and multivariable, residual analysis and cumulative sum techniques set parameters for operating conditions. Diversion scenarios were created and tested, showing improved results when compared with a previous study utilizing only one-variable Z-testing. A brief analysis of the impact of the safeguard's optimization on the rest of plant efficiency, criticality concerns, and overall requirements is presented.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2010

Safeguards Envelope Progress FY10

The Safeguards Envelope is a strategy to determine a set of specific operating parameters within which nuclear facilities may operate to maximize safeguards effectiveness without sacrificing safety or plant efficiency. This paper details the additions to the advanced operating techniques that will be applied to real plant process monitoring (PM) data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). Research this year focused on combining disparate pieces of data together to maximize operating time with minimal downtime due to safeguards. A Chi-Square and Croiser's cumulative sum were both included as part of the new analysis. Because of a major issue with the original data, the implementation of the two new tests did not add to the existing set of tests, though limited one-variable optimization made a small increase in detection probability. Additional analysis was performed to determine if prior analysis would have caused a major security or safety operating envelope issue. It was determined that a safety issue would have resulted from the prior research, but that the security may have been increased under certain conditions.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Voltammetry measurements in lithium chloride-lithium oxide (LiCl–Li 2 O) salt: An evaluation of working electrode materials

Instrumentation to provide process monitoring (PM) and safeguards for the oxide reduction (OR) step in the electrochemical processing of used oxide nuclear fuel is necessary to ensure equipment is operated as declared. Cyclic voltammetry (CV) has been proposed for real-time monitoring of the operation of an OR process for safeguards purposes. In this study, different materials including 316 stainless steel (SS), tantalum (Ta), molybdenum (Mo), tungsten (W), platinum (Pt), and iridium (Ir) were evaluated as potential working electrode (WE) materials based on their chemical inertness, corrosion resistance, and sensitivity in detecting Li 2 O and other chloride salts in the OR electrolyte. Of the electrodes evaluated, 316 SS, Ir, and Pt all performed reasonably well in the LiCl-Li 2 O electrolyte. Here, stainless steel was operated in the cathodic potential and had reasonable corrosion resistance and is relatively inexpensive. Iridium could be operated in both the cathodic and anodic potentials and was the most corrosion resistant of those evaluated. Platinum is limited to the anodic potential range, had reasonable corrosion resistance, and was the most sensitive to Li 2 O concentrations in the salt. In the development of a stand-alone safeguards instrumentation, our recommendation is a CV sensor fitted with both Ir and Pt WEs. The results in this study may also be helpful for anode material selection in other electrometallurgy industries, such as molten salt electrolysis.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

Application of Principal Component Analysis to Electrochemical Reprocessing PM and NMAC

In this report, data from an electrorefiner (ER) for nuclear fuel reprocessing is evaluated for process monitoring (PM) conclusions. This data comes from tests performed at the Idaho National Laboratory in 2022. Multivariate approaches utilizing methods of Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is applied. This is based off established work in process monitoring for fault detection in industrial facilities. This report will discuss the background, methods, and results of the application and some of the conclusions and applications that can be drawn from them. PCA is applied to two different electrorefiner (ER) operations that occurred at Idaho National Laboratory between August and October 2022. The first operation occurred with little incident while the second had several noted faults in the equipment in operational logs. The data from the first run was used to train the data for “normal” operations and applied to both sets of data to determine when operations were in an “off-normal” condition and identify where the fault occurs through PCA. PCA was able to identify off-normal events and identify the cause for off-normal operations. These identified off-normal events matched with the events and their causes in the operational logs. However, small amounts of variance in the data led to false detection of “off-normal” events. Thus, careful selection of training data and a-posteriori conclusions based off operator assessments will both be required for application of PCA to PM applications. This work demonstrated that multivariate approaches and latent variables are applicable to pyroprocessing PM applications and can be further expanded in future work as quality variables such as salt concentration from sensors and sampling become available.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2012

Status Report for Development of Advanced Process Monitoring Concepts for IAEA Safeguards Sponsored by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI)

Process monitoring (PM) is used in international safeguards as an additional measure to nuclear material accountancy (NMA). For large throughput nuclear facilities such as commercial spent fuel reprocessing plants, it is difficult to satisfy the lAEA's goal for detection probability using NMA alone. And, for an facilities, regardless of their throughput, PM can provide redundant verification for both NMA and containment and surveillance and can be used to detect abnormal plant operation through the use of IAEA's instrumentation and selected operator's process control instrumentation. Examples of PM include (1) continuity of knowledge of nuclear material flows and inventories by monitoring of tank solution levels in reprocessing plants, (2) load cell monitoring of cylinders in GCEPs, (3) thermal power monitoring of large research reactors to detect undeclared operation, and (4) providing data to enable frequent NMA-like evaluation (near-real-time-accounting), which involves a hybrid of NMA and PM, for many facility types. Sensors required for PM include for example sensors for measuring flow, volume, density, level, temperature, and other diverse sensors such as portal monitors, video cameras, motion detectors, and gamma and neutron detectors. Additionally, PM lends itself to remote and/or unattended monitoring which has the potential to reduce the IAEA inspection burden and intrusiveness to the operator.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2014

Integrated Process Monitoring based on Systems of Sensors for Enhanced Nuclear Safeguards Sensitivity and Robustness

This paper illustrates safeguards benefits that process monitoring (PM) can have as a diversion deterrent and as a complementary safeguards measure to nuclear material accountancy (NMA). In order to infer the possible existence of proliferation-driven activities, the objective of NMA-based methods is often to statistically evaluate materials unaccounted for (MUF) computed by solving a given mass balance equation related to a material balance area (MBA) at every material balance period (MBP), a particular objective for a PM-based approach may be to statistically infer and evaluate anomalies unaccounted for (AUF) that may have occurred within a MBP. Although possibly being indicative of proliferation-driven activities, the detection and tracking of anomaly patterns is not trivial because some executed events may be unobservable or unreliably observed as others. The proposed similarity between NMA- and PM-based approaches is important as performance metrics utilized for evaluating NMA-based methods, such as detection probability (DP) and false alarm probability (FAP), can also be applied for assessing PM-based safeguards solutions. To this end, AUF count estimates can be translated into significant quantity (SQ) equivalents that may have been diverted within a given MBP. A diversion alarm is reported if this mass estimate is greater than or equal to the selected value for alarm level (AL), appropriately chosen to optimize DP and FAP based on the particular characteristics of the monitored MBA, the sensors utilized, and the data processing method employed for integrating and analyzing collected measurements. To illustrate the application of the proposed PM approach, a protracted diversion of Pu in a waste stream was selected based on incomplete fuel dissolution in a dissolver unit operation, as this diversion scenario is considered to be problematic for detection using NMA-based methods alone. Results demonstrate benefits of conducting PM under a system-centric strategy that utilizes data collected from a system of sensors and that effectively exploits known characterizations of sensors and facility operations in order to significantly improve anomaly detection, reduce false alarm, and enhance assessment robustness under unreliable partial sensor information.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2013

Estimating Alarm Thresholds for Process Monitoring Data under Different Assumptions about the Data Generating Mechanism

Process monitoring (PM) for nuclear safeguards sometimes requires estimation of thresholds corresponding to small false alarm rates. Threshold estimation dates to the 1920s with the Shewhart control chart; however, because possible new roles for PM are being evaluated in nuclear safeguards, it is timely to consider modern model selection options in the context of threshold estimation. One of the possible new PM roles involves PM residuals, where a residual is defined as residual = data − prediction. This paper reviews alarm threshold estimation, introduces model selection options, and considers a range of assumptions regarding the data-generating mechanism for PM residuals. Two PM examples from nuclear safeguards are included to motivate the need for alarm threshold estimation. The first example involves mixtures of probability distributions that arise in solution monitoring, which is a common type of PM. The second example involves periodic partial cleanout of in-process inventory, leading to challenging structure in the time series of PM residuals.

Burr, Tom↗
DOE OSTI2010

PROCESS MONITORING FOR SAFEGUARDS VIA EVENT GENERATION, INTEGRATION, AND INTERPRETATION

There is a recognized safeguards benefit from using process monitoring (PM) on nuclear facilities to complement nuclear materials accountancy. We introduce a model-based approach for PM in which the assessment regarding the state of the monitored system is conducted at a system-centric level. The proposed architecture integrates both time-driven and event-driven data integration and analysis for decision-making. While the time-driven layers of the proposed architecture encompass more traditional PM methods based on time series data and analysis, the event-driven layers encompass operation monitoring methods based on discrete event data integration and analysis. By integrating process- and operation-related information and methodologies within an unified modeling and monitoring framework that includes not only current but also past plant behaviors, the task of anomaly detection is greatly improved because this decision-making approach can benefit from not only known time-series relationships among measured signals but also from known event sequence relationships among generated events. Building from the proposed system-centric PM architecture, we briefly introduce methods that can be used to implement its different components. The application of the proposed approach is then demonstrated via simulation experiments.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2016

Report on Concepts & Approaches for SSBD for eCHEM

The verification of special nuclear material (SNM) in spent fuel pyroprocessing is an important safeguards challenge. The detection of spontaneous fission (SF) neutrons from curium is an accepted, non-destructive technique that has been applied to verify special nuclear material (SNM) content in used fuel and other materials in the fuel cycle. The nuclear material accounting (NMA) technique at the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute’s Reference Engineering-scale Pyroprocessing Facility (REPF) is based on the Cm balance technique. Several publications have demonstrated the safeguards benefit from using process monitoring (PM) on nuclear facilities as a complementary measure to NMA. More recently, this concept was expanded and preliminarily demonstrated for pyroprocessing. The concept of Signature Based Safeguards (SBS) is part of this expansion, and is built around the interpretation of input from various sensors in a declared facility coupled with complementary NMA methods to increase confidence and lower standard error inventory differences (SEID). The SBS methodology was conceptually developed and relies on near real time analysis of process monitoring data to detect material diversion complemented by robust containment and surveillance (C/S) measures. This work demonstrates one example of how the SBS framework can be used in the electrorefiner. In this SBS application, a combination of cyclic voltammetry (CV) and neutron counting is applied to track and monitor Pu mass balance. The main purpose of this experiment is to determine if meaningful information can be gained from CV measurements with regard to the Mg/Gd ratio. This data will be coupled with ICP-MS to verify Gd concentrations and analyzed for statistical significance. It is expected the CV data will register a significant change under the off-normal operating conditions. Knowing how to identify and interpret those changes may help inform how to target more traditional neutron counting methods, which could support a more efficient safeguards system. The experimental results will be compared with theoretical calculations and the ERAD simulations.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2014

Evaluating Safeguards Benefits of Process Monitoring as compared with Nuclear Material Accountancy

This paper illustrates potential safeguards benefits that process monitoring (PM) may have as a diversion deterrent and as a complementary safeguards measure to nuclear material accountancy (NMA). This benefit is illustrated by quantifying the standard deviation associated with detecting a considered material diversion scenario using either an NMA-based method or a PM-based approach. To illustrate the benefits of PM for effective safeguards, we consider a reprocessing facility. We assume that the diversion of interest for detection manifests itself as a loss of Pu caused by abnormally operating a dissolver for an extended period to accomplish protracted diversion (or misdirection) of Pu to a retained (unconditioned) waste stream. For detecting the occurrence of this diversion (which involves anomalous operation of the dissolver), we consider two different data evaluation and integration (DEI) approaches, one based on NMA and the other based on PM. The approach based on PM does not directly do mass balance calculations, but rather monitors for the possible occurrence of anomaly patterns related to potential loss of nuclear material. It is thus assumed that the loss of a given mass amount of nuclear material can be directly associated with the execution of proliferation-driven activities that trigger the occurrence of an anomaly pattern consisting of series of events or signatures occurring at different unit operations and time instances. By effectively assessing these events over time and space, the PM-based DEI approach tries to infer whether this specific pattern of events has occurred and how many times within a given time period. To evaluate the goodness of PM, the 3 Sigma of the estimated mass loss is computed under both DEI approaches as function of the number of input batches processed. Simulation results are discussed.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

Integration of Nuclear Material Accounting Data and Process Monitoring Data for Improvement on Detection Probability in Safeguarding Electrochemical Processing Facilities (Final Technical Report)

The KAERI advanced spent fuel conditioning process (ACP) process is a critical component of the US- South Korean nuclear cooperation and the following “123 Agreement.” Its development has received considerable attention in both countries. The ACP is an electrochemical processing (pyroprocessing) that recycles over 96% of the used nuclear fuel (UNF). It is also intrinsically proliferation-resistant in theory. In normal operation, the U/TRU product is very hot radiologically. In addition, the Cm provides a high level of spontaneous neutrons, making the product unsuitable for weapon use. However, as pointed in some study, “the need for safeguards to protect against the diversion and misuse of separated plutonium applies essentially equally to all grades of plutonium.” As pointed by many studies, the well-established traditional Nuclear Material Accounting (NMA) approach cannot be directly applied to electrochemical processing because of the lack of an input accountability tank, the non-continuous material flow, and the unsatisfactory level of confidence in sampling methods. Therefore, nuclear safeguards remain a grand challenge in the developing of commercial electrochemical separations facilities, especially around the heart of such facilities, the electrorefiner (ER) systems. In contrast to NMA data, process monitoring (PM) data is normally an indirect measurement of the SNM and is acquired much more frequently. In a broad sense, PM includes monitoring by various types of equipment, e.g. radiation detectors, cameras, voltage, current sensors. Because it is already being collected by the operator, the additional cost to safeguards is low. It has long been believed that PM data can supplement NMA data and help improve safeguards, although the benefits are hard to quantify. The U.S. DOE’s Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technology (MPACT) campaign has made substantial investments into innovative PM sensor technology and predictive model development for real- or near real-time measurement and prediction of molten salt density and level, salt composition and actinide concentration especially Pu, the cell voltage, and the cell current to supplement traditional NMA. For aqueous-based reprocessing facilities, it is reported that PM, integrated with traditional NMA, have a high detection probability for specific diversions. For electrochemical reprocessing, preliminary studies have shown that PM data can support traditional NMA in various ways by providing a basis to estimate some of the in-processing nuclear material inventories. Despite early success, further studies on fusion of PM data and NMA data are still needed, which is the goal of this proposed work.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2013

Revisiting Statistical Aspects of Nuclear Material Accounting

Nuclear material accounting (NMA) is the only safeguards system whose benefits are routinely quantified. Process monitoring (PM) is another safeguards system that is increasingly used, and one challenge is how to quantify its benefit. This paper considers PM in the role of enabling frequent NMA, which is referred to as near-real-time accounting (NRTA). We quantify NRTA benefits using period-driven and data-driven testing. Period-driven testing makes a decision to alarm or not at fixed periods. Data-driven testing decides as the data arrives whether to alarm or continue testing. The difference between period-driven and datad-riven viewpoints is illustrated by using one-year and two-year periods. For both one-year and two-year periods, period-driven NMA using once-per-year cumulative material unaccounted for (CUMUF) testing is compared to more frequent Shewhart and joint sequential cusum testing using either MUF or standardized, independently transformed MUF (SITMUF) data. We show that the data-driven viewpoint is appropriate for NRTA and that it can be used to compare safeguards effectiveness. In addition to providing period-driven and data-driven viewpoints, new features include assessing the impact of uncertainty in the estimated covariance matrix of the MUF sequence and the impact of both random and systematic measurement errors.

Burr, T.↗
DOE OSTI2013

Safeguards inventory and process monitoring regulatory comparison

Detecting the theft or diversion of the relatively small amount of fissile material needed to make a nuclear weapon given the normal operating capacity of many of today’s running nuclear production facilities is a difficult task. As throughput increases, the ability of the Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) Program to detect the material loss decreases because the statistical measurement uncertainty also increases. The challenge faced is the ability of current accounting, measurement, and material control programs to detect small yet significant losses under some regulatory approaches can decrease to the point where it is extremely low if not practically non-existent at normal operating capacities. Adding concern to this topic is that there are variations among regulatory bodies as far as what is considered a Significant Quantity (SQ). Some research suggests that thresholds should be lower than those found in any current regulation which if adopted would make meeting detection goals even more difficult. This paper reviews and compares the current regulatory requirements for the MA elements related to physical inventory, uncertainty of the Inventory Difference (ID), and Process Monitoring (PM) in the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Rosatom of the Russian Federation and the Chinese Atomic Energy Agency (CAEA) of China. The comparison looks at how the regulatory requirements for the implementation of various MA elements perform across a range of operating capacities in example facilities.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2017

Field characterization of the PM 2:5 Aerosol Chemical Speciation Monitor: insights into the composition, sources, and processes of fine particles in eastern China

A PM 2.5 -capable aerosol chemical speciation monitor (Q-ACSM) was deployed in urban Nanjing, China, for the first time to measure in situ non-refractory fine particle (NR-PM 2.5 ) composition from 20 October to 19 November 2015, along with parallel measurements of submicron aerosol (PM 1 ) species by a standard Q-ACSM. Our results show that the NR-PM 2.5 species (organics, sulfate, nitrate, and ammonium) measured by the PM 2.5 -Q-ACSM are highly correlated ( r 2 > 0.9) with those measured by a Sunset Lab OC / EC analyzer and a Monitor for AeRosols and GAses (MARGA). The comparisons between the two Q-ACSMs illustrated similar temporal variations in all NR species between PM 1 and PM 2.5 , yet substantial mass fractions of aerosol species were observed in the size range of 1–2.5 µm. On average, NR-PM 1-2.5 contributed 53 % of the total NR-PM 2.5 , with sulfate and secondary organic aerosols (SOAs) being the two largest contributors (26 and 27 %, respectively). Positive matrix factorization of organic aerosol showed similar temporal variations in both primary and secondary OAs between PM 1 and PM 2.5 , although the mass spectra were slightly different due to more thermal decomposition on the capture vaporizer of the PM 2.5 -Q-ACSM. We observed an enhancement of SOA under high relative humidity conditions, which is associated with simultaneous increases in aerosol pH, gas-phase species (NO 2 , SO 2 , and NH 3 ) concentrations and aerosol water content driven by secondary inorganic aerosols. These results likely indicate an enhanced reactive uptake of SOA precursors upon aqueous particles. Therefore, reducing anthropogenic NO x , SO 2 , and NH 3 emissions might not only reduce secondary inorganic aerosols but also the SOA burden during haze episodes in China.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2024

EPCAPE-PT-LANL Measurements: PM Modulair 1

Coastal cities offer a unique environment for studying aerosol-cloud interactions and the effects of urban emissions on cloud properties. As part of the Eastern Pacific Cloud Aerosol Precipitation Experiment (EPCAPE), the Partitioning Thrust by Los Alamos National Laboratory (EPCAPE-PT-LANL) was conducted. Our campaign focused on measuring the optical and chemical properties of aerosols and their interactions within marine stratocumulus clouds in La Jolla, California. EPCAPE-PT-LANL enhances the primary goals of EPCAPE through innovative observations of vapor-phase transitions between aerosols and cloud droplets, the impact of black carbon on aerosol-cloud dynamics, and the effects of cloud processing on aerosol optical properties. Instrument: Quant-AQ MODULAIR. Mounted external to the instrument container, near the GCVI inlet. The MODULAIR™ air quality monitor uses the same patent-pending PM sensor found in the MODULAIR™-PM and adds four gas-phase measurements (CO, NO, NO2, and O3) to provide an all-in-one solution. Files data_10sec_Quant_Gas.csv, data_10min_Quant_Gas.csv Header: - CO[ppb]: Concentration of carbon monoxide (CO) measured at the time of sampling, expressed in parts per billion (ppb) - NO[ppb]: Concentration of nitric oxide (NO) measured at the time of sampling, expressed in parts per billion (ppb). - O3[ppb]: Concentration of ozone (O3) measured at the time of sampling, expressed in parts per billion (ppb). - Temperature[C]: The ambient temperature at the time of the measurement, expressed in degrees Celsius. - RelativeHumidity[%]: The relative humidity at the time of the measurement, expressed as a percentage. Files data_10sec_Quant_PM.csv, data_10min_Quant_PM.csv Header: - PM1[ug/m3]: Concentration of particulate matter with a diameter of 1 micron or less, measured in micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m³). - PM2-5[ug/m3]: Concentration of particulate matter with a diameter of 2.5 microns or less measured in micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m³). - PM10[ug/m3]: Concentration of particulate matter with a diameter of 10 microns or less, measured in micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m³). - Temperature[C]: The ambient temperature at the time of the measurement, expressed in degrees Celsius. - RelativeHumidity[%]: The relative humidity at the time of the measurement, expressed as a percentage.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗