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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1996

Analysis of microgravity space experiments Space Shuttle programmatic safety requirements

This report documents the results of an analysis of microgravity space experiments space shuttle programmatic safety requirements and recommends the creation of a Safety Compliance Data Package (SCDP) Template for both flight and ground processes. These templates detail the programmatic requirements necessary to produce a complete SCDP. The templates were developed from various NASA centers' requirement documents, previously written guidelines on safety data packages, and from personal experiences. The templates are included in the back as part of this report.

Terlep, Judith A.↗
NASA NTRS2016

The NASA Commercial Crew Program (CCP) Mission Assurance Process

In 2010, NASA established the Commercial Crew Program in order to provide human access to the International Space Station and low earth orbit via the commercial (non-governmental) sector. A particular challenge to NASA has been how to determine the commercial providers transportation system complies with Programmatic safety requirements. The process used in this determination is the Safety Technical Review Board which reviews and approves provider submitted Hazard Reports. One significant product of the review is a set of hazard control verifications. In past NASA programs, 100 percent of these safety critical verifications were typically confirmed by NASA. The traditional Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) model does not support the nature of the Commercial Crew Program. To that end, NASA SMA is implementing a Risk Based Assurance (RBA) process to determine which hazard control verifications require NASA authentication. Additionally, a Shared Assurance Model is also being developed to efficiently use the available resources to execute the verifications. This paper will describe the evolution of the CCP Mission Assurance process from the beginning of the Program to its current incarnation. Topics to be covered include a short history of the CCP; the development of the Programmatic mission assurance requirements; the current safety review process; a description of the RBA process and its products and ending with a description of the Shared Assurance Model.

Commercial Crew Program↗
NASA NTRS2014

The NASA Commercial Crew Program (CCP) Shared Assurance Model for Safety

NASA established the Commercial Crew Program in order to provide human access to the International Space Station and low earth orbit via the commercial (nongovernmental) sector. A particular challenge to NASA is how to determine the commercial provider's transportation system complies with Programmatic safety requirements while at the same time allowing the provider the flexibility to demonstrate compliance. This will be accomplished through the use of Shared Assurance and Risk Based Assessment by NASA thus shifting more responsibility to the Provider. This model will be the focus of this presentation.

Programmatic safety requirements↗
NASA NTRS2016

The Evolution of the NASA Commercial Crew Program Mission Assurance Process

In 2010, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) established the Commercial Crew Program (CCP) in order to provide human access to the International Space Station and low Earth orbit via the commercial (non-governmental) sector. A particular challenge to NASA has been how to determine that the Commercial Provider's transportation system complies with programmatic safety requirements. The process used in this determination is the Safety Technical Review Board which reviews and approves provider submitted hazard reports. One significant product of the review is a set of hazard control verifications. In past NASA programs, 100% of these safety critical verifications were typically confirmed by NASA. The traditional Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) model does not support the nature of the CCP. To that end, NASA S&MA is implementing a Risk Based Assurance process to determine which hazard control verifications require NASA authentication. Additionally, a Shared Assurance Model is also being developed to efficiently use the available resources to execute the verifications.

Mission Assurance↗
DOE OSTI2025

Cross-Code Verification of Neutronics Analysis Tools at INL Applied for 238 Pu Production in the Advanced Test Reactor

Here, analyses are completed for experiments prior to experiment irradiation in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Various codes are used to qualify all experiments planned for insertion in the reactor, thereby ensuring that all safety and programmatic requirements are satisfied preirradiation. Among the common experiment analysis tools at INL are MCNP5 coupled to ORIGEN2 (MOPY) and MC21. MOPY uses MCNP5 for transport calculations along with calculations for fluxes and select reaction rates, and then ORIGEN2 handles the step-by-step and postirradiation depletion. MC21 handles all in-reactor transport and step-by-step, during-irradiation, depletion calculations, and then ORIGEN (SCALE 6.2.3) is used for decay and dose calculations postirradiation. The MOPY results, along with those obtained via two variations of the MC21 model, were compared in terms of 238 Pu production in the ATR’s H10 position. For the MOPY model, the MC21 model utilizing the HELIOS-based fission product (FP) library, and the MC21 model utilizing the expanded 1300 FP library, the during-cycle irradiation in-core heating results were sufficiently equivalent; however, the MOPY model and the MC21 model with the HELIOS library showed some differences relating to the respective FP libraries. Ultimately, the MC21 model with a 1300 FP library produced the most consistent results throughout the cycle, whereas the MC21 model that utilized the (smaller) HELIOS library was able to handle during-irradiation analysis but lacked certain short-lived FPs that significantly contributed to the total decay heat at shutdown. MOPY, on the other hand, was found to overpredict fission gas production, as a result of limitations in the ORIGEN2 code.

ATR↗
DOE OSTI2021

DESIGN AND PROTOYPING OF A FISSILE-BEARING CHLORIDE SALT IRRADIATION EXPERIMENT

Limited data exists on the properties of irradiated fueled chloride-based salts for use in advanced nuclear reactors. The design and prototyping of a salt irradiation experiment is underway. Mechanical design will integrate the experiment into existing assemblies in TRIGA type cores. Neutronics modeling demonstrated how targeted power densities can be reached and provide insight on radionuclide source term generation within the experiment. Thermal-hydraulic and computational fluid dynamics (CFD) analysis indicated that temperature ranges in the salt can satisfy both safety and programmatic requirements. Initial prototyping tests provided confidence in the ability to extract the salt post-irradiation, and in the heater performance. Future planned prototyping will provide an integral assessment of the proposed design prior to insertion in the reactor.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
NASA NTRS2015

Commercial Crew Program Crew Safety Strategy

The purpose of this presentation is to explain to our international partners (ESA and JAXA) how NASA is implementing crew safety onto our commercial partners under the Commercial Crew Program. It will show them the overall strategy of 1) how crew safety boundaries have been established; 2) how Human Rating requirements have been flown down into programmatic requirements and over into contracts and partner requirements; 3) how CCP SMA has assessed CCP Certification and CoFR strategies against Shuttle baselines; 4) Discuss how Risk Based Assessment (RBA) and Shared Assurance is used to accomplish these strategies.

Crew Safety↗
NASA NTRS2000

Software IV and V Research Priorities and Applied Program Accomplishments Within NASA

The mission of this research is to be world-class creators and facilitators of innovative, intelligent, high performance, reliable information technologies that enable NASA missions to (1) increase software safety and quality through error avoidance, early detection and resolution of errors, by utilizing and applying empirically based software engineering best practices; (2) ensure customer software risks are identified and/or that requirements are met and/or exceeded; (3) research, develop, apply, verify, and publish software technologies for competitive advantage and the advancement of science; and (4) facilitate the transfer of science and engineering data, methods, and practices to NASA, educational institutions, state agencies, and commercial organizations. The goals are to become a national Center Of Excellence (COE) in software and system independent verification and validation, and to become an international leading force in the field of software engineering for improving the safety, quality, reliability, and cost performance of software systems. This project addresses the following problems: Ensure safety of NASA missions, ensure requirements are met, minimize programmatic and technological risks of software development and operations, improve software quality, reduce costs and time to delivery, and improve the science of software engineering

Blazy, Louis J.↗
NASA NTRS1993

NASA safety program activities in support of the Space Exploration Initiatives Nuclear Propulsion program

The activities of the joint NASA/DOE/DOD Nuclear Propulsion Program Technical Panels have been used as the basis for the current development of safety policies and requirements for the Space Exploration Initiatives (SEI) Nuclear Propulsion Technology development program. The Safety Division of the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Quality has initiated efforts to develop policies for the safe use of nuclear propulsion in space through involvement in the joint agency Nuclear Safety Policy Working Group (NSPWG), encouraged expansion of the initial policy development into proposed programmatic requirements, and suggested further expansion into the overall risk assessment and risk management process for the NASA Exploration Program. Similar efforts are underway within the Department of Energy to ensure the safe development and testing of nuclear propulsion systems on Earth. This paper describes the NASA safety policy related to requirements for the design of systems that may operate where Earth re-entry is a possibility. The expected plan of action is to support and oversee activities related to the technology development of nuclear propulsion in space, and support the overall safety and risk management program being developed for the NASA Exploration Program.

Sawyer, J. C., Jr.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

X-57 Static Structural Requirements and Airworthiness Approach

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Armstrong Flight Research Center (AFRC) (Edwards, California, U.S.A.) has been flying various types of aircraft, including experimental ones requiring structural modifications. Many of these aircraft aren’t typically certified by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) or the Department of Defense (DoD), but NASA can provide its own airworthiness certification utilizing a riskbased approach. The AFRC has established review processes and procedures to identify hazards, manage risks associated with flight programs, ensure safe flight operations, and satisfy programmatic requirements. The Aerostructures Branch at AFRC developed guidelines for the structural safety of flight, covering experimental aircraft, new components, payloads, and modifications. These guidelines detail structural design, analysis, instrumentation, ground testing, and flight-test operational aspects. The guidelines are followed for defining the airworthiness plan throughout the life cycle of a project. The guidelines can be tailored to the risk posture of each individual project. This paper documents the details of the structural airworthiness plan for the X-57 aircraft, including existing, modified, and newly developed structures. Additionally, it covers the design requirements and load cases specific to the X-57 aircraft.

Wesley W. Li↗
DOE OSTI2023

Internal Collaboration on Recent Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessments

Prevention of inadvertent criticality at facilities with large quantities of fissionable materials is one of the most important requirements those facilities grapple with. Given that criticality cannot be mitigated, only eliminated, a hard line must be taken on this requirement. The facilities and sites with the possibility of such an event must abide by a plethora of requirements, most stemming from the ANSI/ANS-8 series of consensus standards. One such standard, ANSI/ANS-8.19, Administrative Practices for Nuclear Criticality Safety, gives requirements and recommendations necessary for establishing a nuclear criticality safety program for a given facility or site. One of those requirements includes periodic assessments of the NCS program. To meet the assessment requirement, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) conducts periodic assessments on individual facilities and overall programmatic health aspects. The teams developed to perform these assessments include people both inside and outside the LANL NCS program. Recently, the Nuclear Criticality Safety Division and the Critical Experiments Team of the Advanced Nuclear Technology Group established a collaboration to aid in fulfilling the assessment requirement.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Meteorological Tower Network Expansion Pilot Project Siting Considerations to Ensure Data Quality and Representativeness of Three New Meteorological Towers at Los Alamos National Laboratory

Associated with the Meteorological Tower Network Expansion Pilot Project by the Environmental Protection and Compliance (EPC) Compliance Programs (CP) Meteorology and Air Quality (MAQ) team, the purpose of this technical report is to establish requisite justification for the siting of three 10-meter high instrumented meteorological towers at three new locations on the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) site. These towers and their associated instrumentation are similar in scope to the existing 10-meter meteorological tower that is collecting meteorological data in Mortandad Canyon (MDCN). The conclusions and recommendations in this technical report will inform LANL management, EPC-CP MAQ staff, and other LANL divisions of the criteria employed for the selection of the final location for siting these three new towers. Meeting such comprehensive criteria will ensure that all data acquired will be spatially representative for meeting the diverse Safety Basis (SB), emergency management, and operations organizations programmatic needs and analytical data input requirements to its codes.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

TA55-PMDS Programmatic Maintenance [Slides]

DOE Order 433.1B states: “The contractor must maintain real property assets in a manner that promotes operational safety, worker health, environmental compliance, property preservation and cost-effectiveness while meeting the program mission”. P950 Conduct of Maintenance serves as LANL’s Nuclear Maintenance Management Program specific to M/L 1 and M/L 2 SSC. PA-AP-01108 Maintenance Requirements for Programmatic Equipment defines the process for determining maintenance requirements, as defined in a maintenance plan, for all programmatic equipment owned by the Associate Directorate for Plutonium Science and Manufacturing (ADPSM) utilizing a formal, graded approach to maximize the reliability of permanently-installed programmatic equipment that does not perform a safety function. It bridges the gap between P950 and program equipment.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
NASA NTRS2004

Assessment and Control of Spacecraft Charging Risks on the International Space Station

The International Space Station (ISS) operates in the F2 region of Earth's ionosphere, orbiting at altitudes ranging from 350 to 450 km at an inclination of 51.6 degrees. The relatively dense, cool F2 ionospheric plasma suppresses surface charging processes much of the time, and the flux of relativistic electrons is low enough to preclude deep dielectric charging processes. The most important spacecraft charging processes in the ISS orbital environment are: 1) ISS electrical power system interactions with the F2 plasma, 2) magnetic induction processes resulting from flight through the geomagnetic field and, 3) charging processes that result from interaction with auroral electrons at high latitude. Recently, the continuing review and evaluation of putative ISS charging hazards required by the ISS Program Office revealed that ISS charging could produce an electrical shock hazard to the ISS crew during extravehicular activity (EVA). ISS charging risks are being evaluated in an ongoing measurement and analysis campaign. The results of ISS charging measurements are combined with a recently developed model of ISS charging (the Plasma Interaction Model) and an exhaustive analysis of historical ionospheric variability data (ISS Ionospheric Specification) to evaluate ISS charging risks using Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) methods. The PRA combines estimates of the frequency of occurrence and severity of the charging hazards with estimates of the reliability of various hazard controls systems, as required by NASA s safety and risk management programs, to enable design and selection of a hazard control approach that minimizes overall programmatic and personnel risk. The PRA provides a quantitative methodology for incorporating the results of the ISS charging measurement and analysis campaigns into the necessary hazard reports, EVA procedures, and ISS flight rules required for operating ISS in a safe and productive manner.

Koontz, Steve↗
DOE OSTI2023

Packaging Capacity Calculation: Pu Oxide Packaging Options with the 2 Quart SAVY Container

This calculation supports programmatic efforts to Dilute and Dispose Pu. Metal is to be oxidized at LANL, then transported to SRS for dilution at SRS. Ultimately, the diluted oxide will be disposed of at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Currently 3013 containers are used to package the oxide, which are placed in to 9975 Type B shipping containers. The Oxide Packaging Technology Maturation Plan determined that a transition to the used of 2-qt SAVY containers placed in 9977 would increase efficiency in shipping and handling and increase programmatic flexibility. The 2-quart SAVY container meets DOE M 441.1 and TA-55 Documented Safety Analysis requirements for handling and storage of Pu oxide at LANL.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
NASA NTRS2001

Phase 1 Space Fission Propulsion System Design Considerations

Fission technology can enable rapid, affordable access to any point in the solar system. If fission propulsion systems are to be developed to their full potential; however, near-term customers must be identified and initial fission systems successfully developed, launched, and operated. Studies conducted in fiscal year 2001 (IISTP, 2001) show that fission electric propulsion (FEP) systems operating at 80 kWe or above could enhance or enable numerous robotic outer solar system missions of interest. At these power levels it is possible to develop safe, affordable systems that meet mission performance requirements. In selecting the system design to pursue, seven evaluation criteria were identified: safety, reliability, testability, specific mass, cost, schedule, and programmatic risk. A top-level comparison of three potential concepts was performed: an SP-100 based pumped liquid lithium system, a direct gas cooled system, and a heatpipe cooled system. For power levels up to at least 500 kWt (enabling electric power levels of 125-175 kWe, given 25-35% power conversion efficiency) the heatpipe system has advantages related to several criteria and is competitive with respect to all. Hardware-based research and development has further increased confidence in the heatpipe approach. Successful development and utilization of a "Phase 1" fission electric propulsion system will enable advanced Phase 2 and Phase 3 systems capable of providing rapid, affordable access to any point in the solar system.

Houts, Mike↗
NASA NTRS2022

NASA’s Revised Planetary Protection Policy and Implementation

NASA has updated its planetary protection policy and implementation approach in response to advances in scientific understanding of solar system targets, upcoming mission opportuni-ties for exploration and sample return, and the private sector’s emerging capability to plan missions to Earth’s Moon and Mars. In September 2021, the NASA Procedural Requirements NPR 8715.24, entitled “Planetary Protection Provisions for Robotic Extraterrestrial Missions” was released which repositions planetary protection in existing NASA mission and program management structures, introduces risk-informed decision making, expands on key roles and responsibilities for both programmatic and the Oÿce of Safety and Mission Assurance, updates the categorization process and streamlines the planetary protection documentation approval and schedule. NASA is working on a more detailed technical standard to accompany NPR 8715.24 which will include the detailed technical requirements to address organic contamina-tion, inadvertent impact avoidance, biological control and management, end of mission disposal and restricted Earth-Return sample safety and assurance. This report to the COSPAR com-munity will describe the current NASA planetary protection policy and its alignment with the revised COSPAR planetary protection policy. NASA’s plans for updating the supporting “Handbook for Implementing Planetary Protection Technical Requirements” and future policies for addressing planetary protection of crewed missions will also be presented.

Elaine Seasly↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA’s Revised Planetary Protection Policy and Implementation

NASA has updated its planetary protection policy and implementation approach in response to advances in scientific understanding of solar system targets, upcoming mission opportunities for exploration and sample return, and the private sector’s emerging capability to plan missions to Earth’s Moon and Mars. In September 2021, the NASA Procedural Requirements NPR 8715.24, entitled “Planetary Protection Provisions for Robotic Extraterrestrial Missions” was released which repositions planetary protection in existing NASA mission and program management structures, introduces risk-informed decision making, expands on key roles and responsibilities for both programmatic and the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, updates the categorization process and streamlines the planetary protection documentation approval and schedule. NASA is working on a more detailed technical standard to accompany NPR 8715.24 which will include the detailed technical requirements to address organic contamination, inadvertent impact avoidance, biological control and management, end of mission disposal and restricted Earth-Return sample safety and assurance. This report to the COSPAR community will describe the current NASA planetary protection policy and its alignment with the revised COSPAR planetary protection policy. NASA’s plans for updating the supporting “Handbook for Implementing Planetary Protection Technical Requirements” and future policies for addressing planetary protection of crewed missions will also be presented.

Planetary Protection↗