Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Programmatic safety requirements”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

Cross-Code Verification of Neutronics Analysis Tools at INL Applied for 238 Pu Production in the Advanced Test Reactor

Here, analyses are completed for experiments prior to experiment irradiation in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Various codes are used to qualify all experiments planned for insertion in the reactor, thereby ensuring that all safety and programmatic requirements are satisfied preirradiation. Among the common experiment analysis tools at INL are MCNP5 coupled to ORIGEN2 (MOPY) and MC21. MOPY uses MCNP5 for transport calculations along with calculations for fluxes and select reaction rates, and then ORIGEN2 handles the step-by-step and postirradiation depletion. MC21 handles all in-reactor transport and step-by-step, during-irradiation, depletion calculations, and then ORIGEN (SCALE 6.2.3) is used for decay and dose calculations postirradiation. The MOPY results, along with those obtained via two variations of the MC21 model, were compared in terms of 238 Pu production in the ATR’s H10 position. For the MOPY model, the MC21 model utilizing the HELIOS-based fission product (FP) library, and the MC21 model utilizing the expanded 1300 FP library, the during-cycle irradiation in-core heating results were sufficiently equivalent; however, the MOPY model and the MC21 model with the HELIOS library showed some differences relating to the respective FP libraries. Ultimately, the MC21 model with a 1300 FP library produced the most consistent results throughout the cycle, whereas the MC21 model that utilized the (smaller) HELIOS library was able to handle during-irradiation analysis but lacked certain short-lived FPs that significantly contributed to the total decay heat at shutdown. MOPY, on the other hand, was found to overpredict fission gas production, as a result of limitations in the ORIGEN2 code.

ATR↗

DESIGN AND PROTOYPING OF A FISSILE-BEARING CHLORIDE SALT IRRADIATION EXPERIMENT

Limited data exists on the properties of irradiated fueled chloride-based salts for use in advanced nuclear reactors. The design and prototyping of a salt irradiation experiment is underway. Mechanical design will integrate the experiment into existing assemblies in TRIGA type cores. Neutronics modeling demonstrated how targeted power densities can be reached and provide insight on radionuclide source term generation within the experiment. Thermal-hydraulic and computational fluid dynamics (CFD) analysis indicated that temperature ranges in the salt can satisfy both safety and programmatic requirements. Initial prototyping tests provided confidence in the ability to extract the salt post-irradiation, and in the heater performance. Future planned prototyping will provide an integral assessment of the proposed design prior to insertion in the reactor.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Internal Collaboration on Recent Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessments

Prevention of inadvertent criticality at facilities with large quantities of fissionable materials is one of the most important requirements those facilities grapple with. Given that criticality cannot be mitigated, only eliminated, a hard line must be taken on this requirement. The facilities and sites with the possibility of such an event must abide by a plethora of requirements, most stemming from the ANSI/ANS-8 series of consensus standards. One such standard, ANSI/ANS-8.19, Administrative Practices for Nuclear Criticality Safety, gives requirements and recommendations necessary for establishing a nuclear criticality safety program for a given facility or site. One of those requirements includes periodic assessments of the NCS program. To meet the assessment requirement, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) conducts periodic assessments on individual facilities and overall programmatic health aspects. The teams developed to perform these assessments include people both inside and outside the LANL NCS program. Recently, the Nuclear Criticality Safety Division and the Critical Experiments Team of the Advanced Nuclear Technology Group established a collaboration to aid in fulfilling the assessment requirement.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Meteorological Tower Network Expansion Pilot Project Siting Considerations to Ensure Data Quality and Representativeness of Three New Meteorological Towers at Los Alamos National Laboratory

Associated with the Meteorological Tower Network Expansion Pilot Project by the Environmental Protection and Compliance (EPC) Compliance Programs (CP) Meteorology and Air Quality (MAQ) team, the purpose of this technical report is to establish requisite justification for the siting of three 10-meter high instrumented meteorological towers at three new locations on the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) site. These towers and their associated instrumentation are similar in scope to the existing 10-meter meteorological tower that is collecting meteorological data in Mortandad Canyon (MDCN). The conclusions and recommendations in this technical report will inform LANL management, EPC-CP MAQ staff, and other LANL divisions of the criteria employed for the selection of the final location for siting these three new towers. Meeting such comprehensive criteria will ensure that all data acquired will be spatially representative for meeting the diverse Safety Basis (SB), emergency management, and operations organizations programmatic needs and analytical data input requirements to its codes.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

TA55-PMDS Programmatic Maintenance [Slides]

DOE Order 433.1B states: “The contractor must maintain real property assets in a manner that promotes operational safety, worker health, environmental compliance, property preservation and cost-effectiveness while meeting the program mission”. P950 Conduct of Maintenance serves as LANL’s Nuclear Maintenance Management Program specific to M/L 1 and M/L 2 SSC. PA-AP-01108 Maintenance Requirements for Programmatic Equipment defines the process for determining maintenance requirements, as defined in a maintenance plan, for all programmatic equipment owned by the Associate Directorate for Plutonium Science and Manufacturing (ADPSM) utilizing a formal, graded approach to maximize the reliability of permanently-installed programmatic equipment that does not perform a safety function. It bridges the gap between P950 and program equipment.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Packaging Capacity Calculation: Pu Oxide Packaging Options with the 2 Quart SAVY Container

This calculation supports programmatic efforts to Dilute and Dispose Pu. Metal is to be oxidized at LANL, then transported to SRS for dilution at SRS. Ultimately, the diluted oxide will be disposed of at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Currently 3013 containers are used to package the oxide, which are placed in to 9975 Type B shipping containers. The Oxide Packaging Technology Maturation Plan determined that a transition to the used of 2-qt SAVY containers placed in 9977 would increase efficiency in shipping and handling and increase programmatic flexibility. The 2-quart SAVY container meets DOE M 441.1 and TA-55 Documented Safety Analysis requirements for handling and storage of Pu oxide at LANL.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Status of SAS4A/SASSYS-1 Software Development and Application (FY2024)

SAS4A/SASSYS-1 is a simulation tool used to perform deterministic analysis of anticipated events as well as design basis and beyond design basis accidents for advanced liquid-metal-cooled nuclear reactors. With its origin as SAS1A in the late 1960s, the SAS series of codes has been under continuous use and development for over fifty years. It has been identified as a critical element of safety analysis capabilities for the U.S. Department of Energy and is utilized within industry to perform the transient safety analyses required to support the licensing of Liquid Metal-cooled Fast Reactors (LMFRs). This report summarizes the code development and update activities carried out during FY2024. In FY2024, programmatic activities focused on key improvements to software useability, such as enhanced user interfaces for reactivity feedback modeling, improvements in stability/useability of the Code Manual, and improvements to the acceptance testing infrastructure, including automation of acceptance testing and generation of the Acceptance Testing Report. To support end user applications, an open training was held, a semi-public forum was maintained, and a practical benchmarking and validation matrix was developed which allowed limitations of existing testing capabilities to be assessed. The existing fuel models were also enhanced with improved modeling capabilities and testing for the oxide and annular fuel models.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Best Practices for Resilience Hub Development and Management

The Carbon League and its community partners in East St. Louis, Illinois, have identified five facilities to serve as resilience hubs. These hubs are intended to support the local community through a range of services and resources during blue-sky (everyday), gray-sky (pre-event), and black-sky (emergency) conditions. Transforming these facilities into fully functional resilience hubs requires a broad operational improvement and programmatic planning roadmap. This memo outlines best practices to guide the development of these resilience hubs in East St. Louis, including recommendations for infrastructure services; safety and physical protection; community services; operational protocols; and a phased implementation strategy aligned with realistic funding and capacity constraints. Infrastructure recommendations include strengthening electric power, communications, water, sanitation, and transportation/logistics capabilities, all of which are essential for hubs that may serve as cooling and warming centers, distribution points, and information hubs during emergencies. Safety recommendations focus on accessibility, emergency action planning, indoor air quality, and secure storage of critical equipment. A phased roadmap provides guidance from immediate, low-cost readiness actions to long-term optimization and community integration. Performance metrics and maintenance protocols ensure continuous improvement and operational readiness. This guidance draws on best practices that can be used to support the development of resilient, community-centered hubs capable of enhancing public safety, health, and well-being during everyday operations and emergencies alike.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Programmatic Equipment Procurement: An Improved System for Coordinating the Procurement of New Programmatic Equipment

A better structured system that outlines the communication required between the Project Manager (PM) and all the Key Stakeholders. This system will help the PM work with the SMEs to define the scope of the equipment to be procured. It will also help the PM confirm that all associated key stakeholders (WCI IT, FPOC, etc.) have been contacted and have reviewed the new equipment being proposed to be procured. This step is crucial in order to confirm that the piece of equipment being procured not only meets the SME requirements but also the security, safety and building requirements on site. This is a step that is currently missed or overlooked and can cause delays in procurement after the piece of equipment has already been decided on. This new system should help mitigate any delays or miscommunication regarding the piece of equipment being procured.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Assessing the Impact of Large Removable Beryllium Reflector Experiments on HFIR Performance and Safety Metrics

This study investigated the effect of various removable beryllium (RB) experiment configurations on High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) metrics to address increasing interest in these facilities for materials and fuels irradiation research. The RB reflector contains eight large and four small irradiation experiment facilities that offer excellent neutron flux conditions to perform fission and fusion reactor materials and fuels irradiation research. This work aims to outline acceptable RB configurations based on safety, performance, and programmatic metrics. This study assessed experiment effects on reactivity, cycle length, fission rate density distributions, and neutron flux distributions using the Shift, HFIRCON, and SCALE ORIGEN codes. Initial evaluations focused on generic experiment materials including aluminum plugs, stainless steel plugs, molybdenum plugs, and aluminum plugs with gadolinium shields. Subsequent analyses of MiniFuel experiments were performed to evaluate a heterogenous experiment, consisting of a more complex geometry and bearing several materials, and to test the correlations developed with the generic materials on a real experiment. Furthermore, the effects of neutron poison concentrations in the standard beryllium plugs were evaluated. When assuming a reference RB configuration with eight large fresh beryllium plugs, perturbed configurations with three aluminum plugs, one stainless steel plug, one molybdenum plug, one gadolinium-shielded aluminum plug, and one MiniFuel experiment resulted in a cycle length reduction of less than 1.3 days, the current threshold before requiring additional approvals. Configurations with five aluminum plugs, one stainless steel plug, one molybdenum plug, one gadolinium-shielded aluminum plug, and two MiniFuel experiments meet the 1.3 day limit if irradiated beryllium plugs are considered. Fuel element fission rate density distributions remained within safety limits, with maximum local increases under 9%. Neutron flux calculations revealed large thermal flux depressions inside and around the perturbed RB facilities, while epithermal and fast neutron fluxes increased because of reduced neutron moderation by the perturbed materials. These findings provide valuable guidance for optimizing RB configurations to balance safety and performance at HFIR.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Nondestructive Assay Technical Infrastructure Program Mission and Vision

The Nondestructive Assay Program (NDAP) mission and vision is achieved by identifying and accomplishing a set of programmatic goals that correspond with eight broad technical program elements. The NDAP was created as a result of Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board Recommendation 2007-1, entitled “Safety-Related In Situ Nondestructive Assay of Radioactive Materials,” which emphasized the need to improve in situ measurements of radioactive material at US Department of Energy (DOE) defense nuclear facilities. An NDAP five-year plan will define tasks to accomplish specific goals identified in the NDAP mission and vision. This mission and vision is applicable for eight technical program elements: Hardware/Software Development, Algorithm Development and Nuclear Data, Uncertainty Quantification, Nuclear Materials, Staffing, Personnel, And Training, Data Management, Requirement and Standards, and Information Preservation and Dissemination. An additional program element is technical support, which provides daily execution management support for the NDAP, site scope, and deliverable tracking via site task managers, along with technical advisement and support from the technical support group. The NDAP mission and vision provides attributes with specific goals for each program element, and some goals benefit multiple program elements. The goals and attributes defined herein are implemented via an NDAP five-year execution plan that defines site work scope, budget, and deliverables, all of which are updated annually. The NDAP is designed to benefit nondestructive assay (NDA) needs to support DOE nuclear criticality safety programs, ensuring that NDA technology is sufficiently capable of guaranteeing the safety of those who handle, store, process, or transport fissionable materials in the complex. Especially important for the NDAP is to maximize capabilities to identify, characterize, and manage in situ fissile material deposits in process equipment to ensure nuclear criticality safety at processing facilities.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Modernization of Technical Requirements for Licensing of Advanced Non-Light Water Reactors: Risk-Informed and Performance-Based Evaluation of Defense-in-Depth Adequacy

This document supports the work contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 18-04 “Risk-Informed Performance-Based Technology Inclusive Guidance for Advanced Reactor Licensing Basis Development” Revision 0. NEI 18-04 presents a modern, technology-inclusive, risk-informed, and performance-based (TI-RIPB) process for selection of Licensing Basis Events (LBEs); safety classification of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and associated risk-informed special treatments; and determination of defense-in-depth (DID) adequacy for non-LWRs. The NEI guidance document provides one acceptable means for addressing the aforementioned topics as part of demonstrating a specific design provides reasonable assurance of adequate radiological protection. This report provides the framework and associated methodology guidelines and discussion for establishing, then evaluating, confirming, and documenting the adequacy of defense-in-depth (DID) for advanced non-light-water reactor technologies. It was developed as part of the Licensing Modernization Project led by Southern Company and cost-shared by the United States Department of Energy and has benefited from considerable NRC formal reviews and public workshops. The methodology converts the DID philosophy into a structured process that is implementable, embraces existing United States and international definitions and philosophies of DID that set the foundation for the process. It builds on the DID framework developed in the Department of Energy Next Generation Nuclear Plant Project and earlier works on this subject. The approach to establishing DID adequacy involves the incorporation of DID attributes into the plant capabilities and programmatic elements of DID. The integrated evaluation of DID adequacy includes both quantitative elements to incorporate risk-informed and performance-based (RIPB) considerations and qualitative elements that address uncertainties and limitations in the quantitative models and supporting data. Demonstration of DID adequacy ensures that there are multiple layers of defense for risk-significant challenges to the design and that the plant capabilities and programs that support each layer are provided in a manner that minimizes dependencies among these layers. The focus of this report is assurance of DID adequacy with respect to protection of the public from radiological exposures resulting from accidental releases of radioactive material. While other hazards are not specifically addressed, this methodology is expected to be beneficial for determining DID adequacy for them as well. Risk-informed evaluation of DID considers the integrated performance of all plant SSCs and associated programs to manage daily operational activities, transients, and accidents, including the evaluation of strategies for accident prevention and mitigation. The RIPB LBE scenario methodology used in this evaluation defines the challenges to the plant safety features included in the plant design basis and beyond, and the scope of all deterministic and probabilistic safety evaluations. By examining event sequences across the whole spectrum of LBEs, a systematic assessment of DID can be accomplished.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Safe Operations at Roadway Junctions: Intelligent Roadway Infrastructure as Functional Interlocking

Automated vehicle (AV) technology is quickly maturing, and the corresponding infrastructure systems that evaluate traffic and communicate to vehicles requires sophisticated sensing and perception technologies, referred to as intelligent roadway infrastructure (IRI), to complement emerging AV capabilities. IRI provides signals to vehicles, indicating right-of-way for vehicles and communicating to approaching AVs that no other vehicle is failing to yield. This capability, denoted as safety-affirmative signaling, provides a green light or a green arrow as appropriate and affirms through communication links to connected vehicles when it is safe to proceed. About 36% of collisions occur at intersections, with most occurring upon left turns (22.2%) or crossing over (12.6%), and only a small percentage (1.2%) while turning right at an intersection. Of all intersection crashes about half (52.5%) of those vehicles were traveling through a signalized intersection 2. Safety-affirmative signaling would guarantee safety of AV fleet vehicles, by providing the interlocking principle, a term from automated train control that only allows progression through a railway intersection after affirming no opportunity for a crash exists. IRI through safety-affirmative signaling would bring performance and safety to complex roadway intersections where AV transit fleet service is most needed, as well as safety benefits to traditional, non-automated vehicles and vulnerable road users. The implementation of IRI has functional, programmatic, and technical challenges. Research work performed at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) in an integrative approach encapsulating these themes, and termed infrastructure perception and control (IPC) is motivated by improved performance (travel time), improved safety (reduced collisions), and improved energy efficiency (less fuel burned and minimized production of greenhouse gases). IPC is intended not only for roadway and intersection applications but also in extension to inform complementary buildings and grid systems to enable better co-management, as vehicles and their charging needs become increasingly integrated into the built environment. The NREL IPC project presents an open-source framework, architecture, and supporting technology to implement IRI, addressing critical issues such as fusion of data, reliability, standardization of data interfaces, and confidence of detection. The framework is informed by previous experience in U.S. Department of Defense research technology, specifically in the use of radar to detect, identify, and track aerial threats. These principles combined with multi-sensor fusion provides for a complete digital twin with known and measurable confidence and accuracy from which safety-affirmative signaling can be developed and deployed.

ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS,MATHEMATICS AND COMPUT↗

Spent Nuclear Fuel Exploratory Roadmaps - 20054

The U.S. Department of Energy manages nearly 2,500 metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM) of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) resulting from several decades of research, testing, and production reactors [DOE 1995]. This SNF is managed at the DOE Hanford Site in Washington State (Hanford), Idaho National Laboratory (INL), and Savannah River Site in South Carolina (SRS). From 1995 to 2004, the Department of Energy (DOE) made several key programmatic decisions, supported by appropriate documentation in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) for the management of SNF [DOE 1995]. These decisions have provided an overarching framework for SNF management, as well as site-specific and SNF-related management decisions for the past two decades. In the years since these decisions were made, with the notable exception of the successful drying and packaging of the production reactor fuel at Hanford, a majority of the decisions have been largely unimplemented. Also, since these decisions were made, a number of changes that bear on considerations relative to the path forward have occurred. A SNF Exploratory Road map activity, identified reasonable alternate pathways for DoE's inventory of SNF. Three fundamental pathways were identified in this activity for the long-term management and disposition of DOE SNF: Direct Disposal Pathway, Existing Processing Pathway and Alternate Processing Pathway. Further actions would be required (e.g., evaluation of NEPA analysis, technology maturity evaluations, refinement of cost and risks, benefits and advantages relative to other alternate paths) to define and inform many key decisions that will result in the selection of the disposition pathways that are most beneficial to the US Government in dispositioning DoE's SNF inventory. DOE is currently managing all SNF safely; however, the age of DOE-owned SNF and facilities for storing and processing SNF, coupled with the uncertainty of the storage duration, necessitates decisions and actions to ensure that the infrastructure will be in place to ensure continued safe and effective long-term management and eventual disposal. The identification of reasonable alternate pathways took these considerations into account in an effort to proactively manage conditions that could challenge the safety of storing and managing DOE SNF over the time periods now contemplated and also to ensure that flexibility is preserved to ensure that the DOE SNF remains compatible with final disposition pathways when they become available. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act Title II DOE Due Diligence and Lessons Learned from a Previous Site Transfer - 20352

Title II of the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA) established that a government agency will provide perpetual care for closed uranium and thorium ore-processing sites that were operating under an NRC source material license in 1978 or were licensed thereafter. Commercial owners (licensees) operating under an NRC or agreement state specific license when UMTRCA was passed are responsible for conducting reclamation of any byproduct material remaining from uranium-ore processing operations in accordance with an NRC or agreement state approved reclamation plan. Reclamation includes both surface and groundwater remedies. Upon completion of reclamation and approval by NRC, the site is required to be transferred to either the host state or the DOE for long-term surveillance and maintenance. Since UMTRCA's enactment, six Title II sites have been transferred to DOE; an additional 24 Title II sites are anticipated to be transferred before 2050. DoE's role mandated under UMTRCA Title II as the long-term care custodian is to perform 'monitoring, maintenance, and emergency measures necessary to protect the public health and safety.' UMTRCA requires that the licensee pay a long-term surveillance charge 'sufficient to cover the annual costs of site surveillance.' However, at some sites such as the Bluewater, New Mexico, Disposal Site, this mandate has required additional effort and expense by DOE, beyond the originally anticipated and intended scope within UMTRCA, but within the authority of DOE under UMTRCA. In 1997, the Bluewater site became the second UMTRCA Title II site to be transferred to DOE. The site was the location of a uranium mill operated from 1953 until 1982. The specific licensee began site reclamation in 1991, and by 1995 all tailings and contaminated materials were encapsulated in two tailings disposal cells and other disposal areas. In addition to surface contamination, milling activities impacted groundwater in the two upper aquifers. In 1989, the specific licensee attempted active groundwater remediation; however, no significant reduction in contaminant concentrations was observed. As a result, the specific licensee applied to NRC for alternate concentration limits (ACLs) in 1990, which were approved in 1996 as being protective, after additional corrective actions were performed. Since transfer of the Bluewater site to DOE, unforeseen challenges have occurred, requiring additional actions. The first challenge is the occurrence of surface depressions located on the northern section of the main tailings disposal cell. The depressions were first observed during DoE's initial inspection in 1998; however, evidence of these can be observed on satellite images taken prior to transfer. Since being first observed, the depressions have continued to grow both in depth and areal extent. Due to the design of the main tailings disposal cell, the depressions impede storm water from being effectively shed off the 101- hectare (250-acre) top slope of the main tailings disposal cell. Instead, storm water accumulates in the depressions, forming a large ephemeral pond that has stored up to 16.3 x 10{sup 6} liters (4.3 million gallons) of stormwater. The ponding poses a potential risk to the integrity of the main tailings disposal cell in the case of a large storm event, with the potential to cause the pond to overtop and erode the cover material and underlying waste. DOE has taken a number of short-term actions to monitor, measure, and reduce the ponding and is currently working with the US Army Corps of Engineers to design and construct a repair. Additional challenges are associated with groundwater at the Bluewater site. Nine wells were present on the 1335-hectare (3300-acre) site upon transfer. Groundwater compliance was called into question after the State of New Mexico reduced its uranium groundwater standard from 5.0 to 0.03 milligrams per liter in 2004, and when an ACL for uranium was exceeded in a site monitoring well in 2010. Acquiring historical groundwater data and subsequent evaluations as well as additional DOE groundwater monitoring led to installing 10 new monitoring wells and performing additional site hydrogeology recharacterization. DOE continues to evaluate groundwater conditions at the site and works with the NRC to determine regulatory requirements and a path forward. As a result of lessons learned at the Bluewater site and other Title II sites, improved processes have been implemented at a programmatic level to increase due diligence before site transfer and prevent similar issues from occurring at other UMTRCA Title II sites under long-term management. DoE's due diligence process is documented in the Process for Transition of UMTRCA Title II Disposal Sites to DOE for Long-Term Surveillance and Maintenance and is designed to ensure that DOE has no technical or compliance concerns with regulatory decisions that might compromise protectiveness following site transfer to DOE. Implementation of the due diligence process has increased DoE's role prior to site transfer and has been effective in identifying potential issues. Actions by NRC and specific licensees, in response to enhanced due diligence efforts by DOE, are expected to minimize, if not totally prevent, the need for unanticipated actions by DOE pertaining to the surface and groundwater remedies after site transfer. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗