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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records

The Infrastructure Necessary to Support a Sustainable Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Program in Russia

The NNSA Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program has been engaged for fifteen years in upgrading the security of nuclear materials in Russia. Part of the effort has been to establish the conditions necessary to ensure the long-term sustainability of nuclear security. A sustainable program of nuclear security requires the creation of an indigenous infrastructure, starting with sustained high level government commitment. This includes organizational development, training, maintenance, regulations, inspections, and a strong nuclear security culture. The provision of modern physical protection, control, and accounting equipment to the Russian Federation alone is not sufficient. Comprehensive infrastructure projects support the Russian Federation's ability to maintain the risk reduction achieved through upgrades to the equipment. To illustrate the contributions to security, and challenges of implementation, this paper discusses the history and next steps for an indigenous Tamper Indication Device (TID) program, and a Radiation Portal Monitoring (RPM) program.

Bachner, Katherine M.↗

Creating a Comprehensive, Efficient, and Sustainable Nuclear Regulatory Structure: A Process Report from the U.S. Department of Energy's Material Protection, Control and Accounting Program

With the congressionally mandated January 1, 2013 deadline for the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Nuclear Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) program to complete its transition of MPC&A responsibility to the Russian Federation, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) management directed its MPC&A program managers and team leaders to demonstrate that work in ongoing programs would lead to successful and timely achievement of these milestones. In the spirit of planning for successful project completion, the NNSA review of the Russian regulatory development process confirmed the critical importance of an effective regulatory system to a sustainable nuclear protection regime and called for an analysis of the existing Russian regulatory structure and the identification of a plan to ensure a complete MPC&A regulatory foundation. This paper describes the systematic process used by DOE’s MPC&A Regulatory Development Project (RDP) to develop an effective and sustainable MPC&A regulatory structure in the Russian Federation. This nuclear regulatory system will address all non-military Category I and II nuclear materials at State Corporation for Atomic Energy “Rosatom,” the Federal Service for Ecological, Technological, and Nuclear Oversight (Rostechnadzor), the Federal Agency for Marine and River Transport (FAMRT, within the Ministry of Transportation), and the Ministry of Industry and Trade (Minpromtorg). The approach to ensuring a complete and comprehensive nuclear regulatory structure includes five sequential steps. The approach was adopted from DOE’s project management guidelines and was adapted to the regulatory development task by the RDP. The five steps in the Regulatory Development Process are: 1) Define MPC&A Structural Elements; 2) Analyze the existing regulatory documents using the identified Structural Elements; 3) Validate the analysis with Russian colleagues and define the list of documents to be developed; 4) Prioritize and schedule the development of documents; 5) Identify and develop processes to measure effectiveness of regulations. Utilizing this process is resulting in an effective regulatory process that is understood and is being adopted by the four RF organizations. It is anticipated that the current regulatory development process will continue after U.S. support ends. Utilization of the systematic methodology will ensure regulatory development is based on required MPC&A structural elements and will support the continued maintenance and development of an effective regulatory base.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

GKTC ACTIVITIES TO PROVIDE NUCLEAR MATERIAL PHYSICAL PROTECTION, CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING TRAINING FOR 2011-2012

The GKTC was created at the Kyiv Institute of Nuclear Research as a result of collaborative efforts between the United States and Ukraine. The GKTC has been designated by the Ukrainian Government to provide the MPC&A training and methodological assistance to nuclear facilities and nuclear specialists. In 2010 the GKTC has conducted the planned assessment of training needs of Ukrainian MPC&A specialists. The objective of this work is to acquire the detailed information about the number of MPC&A specialists and guard personnel, who in the coming years should receive the further advanced training. As a result of the performed training needs evaluation the GKTC has determined that in the coming years a number of new training courses need to be developed. Some training courses are already in the process of development. Also taking into account the specific of activity on the guarding of nuclear facilities, GKTC has begun to develop the specialized training courses for the guarding unit personnel. The evaluation of needs of training of Ukrainian specialists on the physical protection shows that without the technical base of learning is not possible to satisfy the needs of Ukrainian facilities, in particular, the need for further training of specialists who maintains physical protection technical means, provides vulnerability assessment and testing of technical means. To increase the training effectiveness and create the basis for specialized training courses holding the GKTC is now working on the construction of an Interior (non-classified) Physical Protection Training Site. The objective of this site is to simulate the actual conditions of the nuclear facility PP system including the complex of engineering and technical means that will help the GKTC training course participants to consolidate the knowledge and gain the practical skills in the work with PP system engineering and technical means for more effective performance of their official duties. This paper briefly describes the practical efforts applied to the provision of physical protection specialists advanced training in Ukraine and real results on the way to implement such efforts in 2011-2012.

Romanova, Olena↗

Cybersecurity of Wide Area Monitoring, Protection and Control Systems for HVDC Applications

The flexibility provided by High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) systems can be further extended by Wide Area Monitoring, Protection, and Control (WAMAPC) systems. WAMPAC systems enable many HVDC applications and, on the other hand, inevitably introduce cybersecurity concerns that need to be addressed. In this work, a security domain layer and decision framework is reported to detect and mitigate the impact of false data injection (FDI) attacks targeting HVDC stations. Specifically, a rule-based cyber-attack detection method is introduced and implemented on Raspberry Pi and tested on the real-time HVDC simulation facility on the real-time digital simulator (RTDS) platform at ABB U.S. Corporate Research Center.

cybersecurity↗

Refractory Materials for Flame Deflector Protection System Corrosion Control: Flame Deflector Protection System Life Cycle Cost Analysis Report

A 20-year life cycle cost analysis was performed to compare the operational life cycle cost, processing/turnaround timelines, and operations manpower inspection/repair/refurbishment requirements for corrosion protection of the Kennedy Space Center launch pad flame deflector associated with the existing cast-in-place materials and a newer advanced refractory ceramic material. The analysis compared the estimated costs of(1) continuing to use of the current refractory material without any changes; (2) completely reconstructing the flame trench using the current refractory material; and (3) completely reconstructing the flame trench with a new high-performance refractory material. Cost estimates were based on an analysis of the amount of damage that occurs after each launch and an estimate of the average repair cost. Alternative 3 was found to save $32M compared to alternative 1 and $17M compared to alternative 2 over a 20-year life cycle.

Calle, Luz Marina↗

Control and protection system for paralleled modular static inverter-converter systems

A control and protection system was developed for use with a paralleled 2.5-kWe-per-module static inverter-converter system. The control and protection system senses internal and external fault parameters such as voltage, frequency, current, and paralleling current unbalance. A logic system controls contactors to isolate defective power conditioners or loads. The system sequences contactor operation to automatically control parallel operation, startup, and fault isolation. Transient overload protection and fault checking sequences are included. The operation and performance of a control and protection system, with detailed circuit descriptions, are presented.

Birchenough, A. G.↗

Advanced Control and Protection system Design Methods for Modular HTGRs

The project supported the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in identifying and evaluating the regulatory implications concerning the control and protection systems proposed for use in the Department of Energy's (DOE) Next-Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP). The NGNP, using modular high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) technology, is to provide commercial industries with electricity and high-temperature process heat for industrial processes such as hydrogen production. Process heat temperatures range from 700 to 950 C, and for the upper range of these operation temperatures, the modular HTGR is sometimes referred to as the Very High Temperature Reactor or VHTR. Initial NGNP designs are for operation in the lower temperature range. The defining safety characteristic of the modular HTGR is that its primary defense against serious accidents is to be achieved through its inherent properties of the fuel and core. Because of its strong negative temperature coefficient of reactivity and the capability of the fuel to withstand high temperatures, fast-acting active safety systems or prompt operator actions should not be required to prevent significant fuel failure and fission product release. The plant is designed such that its inherent features should provide adequate protection despite operational errors or equipment failure. Figure 1 shows an example modular HTGR layout (prismatic core version), where its inlet coolant enters the reactor vessel at the bottom, traversing up the sides to the top plenum, down-flow through an annular core, and exiting from the lower plenum (hot duct). This research provided NRC staff with (a) insights and knowledge about the control and protection systems for the NGNP and VHTR, (b) information on the technologies/approaches under consideration for use in the reactor and process heat applications, (c) guidelines for the design of highly integrated control rooms, (d) consideration for modeling of control and protection system designs for VHTR, and (e) input for developing the bases for possible new regulatory guidance to assist in the review of an NGNP license application. This NRC project also evaluated reactor and process heat application plant simulation models employed in the protection and control system designs for various plant operational modes and accidents, including providing information about the models themselves, and the appropriateness of the application of the models for control and protection system studies. A companion project for the NRC focused on the potential for new instrumentation that would be unique to modular HTGRs, as compared to light-water reactors (LWRs), due to both the higher temperature ranges and the inherent safety features.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Classified Matter Protection and Control User Refresher Training Course 35043

Welcome to the Classified Matter Protection and Control Refresher Training for users of classified matter. The purpose of this refresher training is to familiarize workers with responsibilities of protecting and controlling classified matter. This biannual training must be completed by all workers whose job duties include generating, processing, accessing, handling, using, storing, reproducing, destroying, transmitting or accounting for classified matter.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

A Novel Architecture for Attack-Resilient Wide-Area Protection and Control System in Smart Grid

Wide-area protection and control (WAPAC) systems are widely applied in the energy management system (EMS) that rely on a wide-area communication network to maintain system stability, security, and reliability. As technology and grid infrastructure evolve to develop more advanced WAPAC applications, however, so do the attack surfaces in the grid infrastructure. This paper presents an attack-resilient system (ARS) for the WAPAC cybersecurity by seamlessly integrating the network intrusion detection system (NIDS) with intrusion mitigation and prevention system (IMPS). In particular, the proposed NIDS utilizes signature and behavior-based rules to detect attack reconnaissance, communication failure, and data integrity attacks. Further, the proposed IMPS applies state transition-based mitigation and prevention strategies to quickly restore the normal grid operation after cyberattacks. As a proof of concept, we validate the proposed generic architecture of ARS by performing experimental case study for wide-area protection scheme (WAPS), one of the critical WAPAC applications, and evaluate the proposed NIDS and IMPS components of ARS in a cyber-physical testbed environment. Our experimental results reveal a promising performance in detecting and mitigating different classes of cyberattacks while supporting an alert visualization dashboard to provide an accurate situational awareness in real-time.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Cyber-Physical Attack-Resilient Wide-Area Monitoring, Protection, and Control for the Power Grid

Cyber security and resiliency of Wide-Area Monitoring, Protection and Control (WAMPAC) applications is critically important to ensure secure, reliable, and economic operation of the bulk power system. WAMPAC relies heavily on the security of measurements and control commands transmitted over wide-area communication networks for real-time operational, protection, and control functions. Also, the current “N-1 security criteria” for grid operation is inadequate to address malicious cyber events and therefore it is important to fundamentally redesign WAMPAC and to enhance Energy Management System (EMS) applications to make them attack-resilient. In this paper, we propose an end-to-end defense-in-depth architecture for attack-resilient WAMPAC that addresses resilience at both the infrastructure layer and the application layers. Also, we propose an attack-resilient cyber-physical security framework that encompasses the entire security life cycle including risk assessment, attack prevention, attack detection, attack mitigation, and attack resilience. The overarching objective of this paper is to provide a broad scope that comprehensively describes most of the major research issues and potential solutions in the context of cyber-physical security of WAMPAC for the power grid.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

A Comprehensive Study of the Impact of Inverter-Based Resource (IBR) Modeling and Control on Protection Relay Elements

Inverter-based resources (IBRs) exhibit fault responses that differ significantly from those of synchronous generators, which can challenge the reliable operation of many commonly used power system protection elements. The fault response of IBRs is primarily influenced by their control algorithms and configurations, but the impact of these controls on protection relays is not yet fully understood. This presentation provides a comprehensive study of how IBR modeling and controls affect transmission line protection. Key modeling and control aspects include the DC source, inverter model, power level control, current control, and current limiting. The study reveals that certain aspects - such as the type of DC source (battery, PV, or hybrid), inverter model (average vs. switching), and power level control methods (PQ dispatch vs. Vdc-Vac control for grid-following IBRs, and droop vs. VSM for grid-forming IBRs) - do not significantly affect relay response. However, faster control loops, such as current control and current limiting, do influence the relay behavior. Additionally, the study explores the effects of other factors, including momentary cessation, operating points, fast/slow current responses, and grid strength on relay performance. Finally, the study offers recommendations for both IBR and protection engineers to improve IBR fault response and enhance the reliability of protection systems.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Introduction to the Minitrack on Monitoring, Control, and Protection.

This minitrack is on topics related to the monitoring, control, and protection of electric power systems for real-time operations and short-term operations planning. This year the emphasis has been on recent developments in the area of large-scale dynamic research for power systems and on hybrid and distributed control concepts for decentralized command and control of existing critical energy infrastructures.

Eto, Joseph H↗

Methods, systems, and computer readable media for protecting and controlling a microgrid with a dynamic boundary

Methods, systems, and computer readable mediums for protecting and controlling a microgrid with a dynamic boundary are disclosed. One method includes detecting a fault in a microgrid that includes a dynamic point-of-common-coupling (PCC), in response to determining that the microgrid is operating in a grid-connected mode, isolating the fault by tripping a microgrid side smart switch and a grid side smart switch that are located immediately adjacent to the fault, initiating the reclosing of the grid side smart switch, and initiating the reclosing for the microgrid side smart switch via resynchronization if the grid side smart switch is successfully reclosed, and in response to determining that the microgrid is operating in an islanded mode, isolating the fault by tripping a microgrid side smart switch that is located immediately adjacent to the fault, and initiating the reclosing of the microgrid side smart switch.

Wang, Fei↗