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DOE OSTI2025

Radiation Accidents and Malicious Events – Scenarios and Scope of the Work of ICRP Task Group 120

The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) Task Group 120 (TG120) is developing ICRP recommendations for radiological protection for a wide range of radiation accidents and malicious events, complementing those given in ICRP Publication 146 (2020) for large nuclear accidents. The scope includes accidents involving criticalities, operating faults, and fires and explosions in nuclear facilities, inadvertent damage to sealed radiation sources, as well as malicious events, such as sabotage of nuclear facilities or materials, use of radiological dispersal devices, the contamination of food and drinking water supplies, and the deployment of nuclear weapons. A template has been designed to collate relevant information on a wide range of case studies and hypothetical malicious scenarios to ensure that the recommendations developed are broadly applicable and comprehensive. For all scenarios, a graded approach to protection is being taken, accepting that specific guidance may be required for some distinctive aspects, for example, protection during times of armed conflict. This paper provides an overview of the scenarios and scope of the work of TG120, including some of the radiological and non-radiological impacts of radiation emergencies, along the response and recovery timeline.

ICRP↗
NASA NTRS2014

Nuclear Thermal Rocket (NTR) Development Risk Communication

There are clear advantages of development of a Nuclear Thermal Rocket (NTR) for a crewed mission to Mars. NTR for in-space propulsion enables more ambitious space missions by providing high thrust at high specific impulse (approximately 900 sec) that is 2 times the best theoretical performance possible for chemical rockets. Missions can be optimized for maximum payload capability to take more payload with reduced total mass to orbit; saving cost on reduction of the number of launch vehicles needed. Or missions can be optimized to minimize trip time significantly to reduce the deep space radiation exposure to the crew. NTR propulsion technology is a game changer for space exploration. However, "NUCLEAR" is a word that is feared and vilified by some groups and the hostility towards development of any nuclear systems can meet great opposition by the public as well as from national leaders and people in authority. Communication of nuclear safety will be critical to the success of the development of the NTR. Why is there a fear of nuclear? A bomb that can level a city is a scary weapon. The first and only times the Nuclear Bomb was used in a war was on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War 2. The "Little Boy" atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 and the "Fat Man" on Nagasaki 3 days later on August 9th. Within the first 4 months of bombings, 90- 166 thousand people died in Hiroshima and 60-80 thousand died in Nagasaki. It is important to note for comparison that over 500 thousand people died and 5 million made homeless due to strategic bombing (approximately 150 thousand tons) of Japanese cities and war assets with conventional non-nuclear weapons between 1942- 1945. A major bombing campaign of "firebombing" of Tokyo called "Operation Meetinghouse" on March 9 and 10 consisting of 334 B-29's dropped approximately1,700 tons of bombs around 16 square mile area and over 100 thousand people have been estimated to have died. The declaration of death is very clear for conventional weapons and then the declaration of death due to radiation becomes vague and unclear. This may have been due to people mis-understanding the dangers and effects of radiation when assessing the damage and harm to people initially, but it is also become insidious when expressing opposition to nuclear energy. A nuclear radiation accident can be scary due to the power involved and the fear of radiation release. The International Atomic Energy Agency defines a nuclear and radiation accident a "an event that has led to significant consequences to people, the environment or the facility." There have been 3 commercial nuclear reactor accidents (Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and Fukushima) that stand out to the public and much of the information about the result and impact to workers, environment, and public can be misleading. Often information is presented without clear correlation with radiation and other pertinent information is left out presenting a very scary situation to affect the emotions of the reader. A very boring but "critically acclaimed" movie was made in 1979 called "The China Syndrome" starring Jane Fonda and Jack Lemmon. The film was released on March 16, 1979, 12 days before the 3-Mile Island nuclear accident in Pennsylvania. The basis from the movie was from a few nuclear plant incidents and in particular, the Brown's Ferry Alabama Power Plant fire. In one scene from the movie, a physicist Dr. Elliott Lowell played by Donald Hotton states that a China Syndrome event would make "an area the size of Pennsylvania" permanently uninhabitable. Real serious nuclear incidents like Chernobyl and Fukushima are often sited to make people fear the consequences of using nuclear power. However, the consequences are at best poorly communicated and at worst fictitiously inflated to instigate social unrest against nuclear power. There is an article being circulated on Facebook with a title "28 Signs that the (US) West Coast is being absolutely fried with nuclear radiation from Fukushima" which focus on mis-information and fear mongering. Nuclear power and NTR are powerful resources that can open many doors for future prosperity and capability. With great power comes great responsibility. Radiation and its effects need to be better understood, quantified, and communicated. A human mission to mars has its own risks of deep space radiation and is considered a considerable risk at 400 milli-Sieverts per year in deep space and 245 milli-Sieverts per year on the surface of Mars as measured by the Mars Curiosity mission. Although these quantities of ionizing radiation are within the astronaut career limit, it exceeds the yearly average amounts of ionizing radiation. Astronaut crews have experienced these levels of radiation before, but for durations shorter than a year, and a mission to Mars could possibly be 3 years in length. There is also evidence that people can comfortably handle higher levels of ionizing radiation where the radiation occurs naturally like Ramsar, Iran when people can experience 270 milli-Sieverts per year. A risk posture that the development, test, and flight of an NTR will meet opposition from groups who oppose nuclear energy must be likely and the impact can be sever to the effort. Active risk mitigation must be taken for an NTR full-scale development project. The NTR design must take into account safety for transport and off nominal conditions. Nuclear fuel element must consider containment of fission products and Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) that may meet less opposition should be considered for safety and security reasons. Even though testing was conducted on Rover/NERVA safely and successfully in the 60's with exhaust sent heavenward in to open air, modern testing of NTR must consider full containment and no release of ionizing radiation to the public and must meet the current requirement of no more than 0.1 milli-Sieverts per year to the public. 0.1 milli-Sieverts is equivalent to eating one banana or a 20 hour plane flight. Good communication with the public and regulatory agencies will be essential to show that all effort is applied toward protection to the public and astronauts. The inspiring endeavor to put humans on Mars to study the planet, search for life, and learn more about this Solar System will be full of risks but it will be worth it. NTR will be worth the development effort if it allows humans to explore our Solar System.

Kim, Tony↗
DOE OSTI2021

CBP/P300 Inhibitors Mitigate Radiation-Induced GI Syndrome by Promoting Intestinal Stem Cell-Mediated Crypt Regeneration

Radiation-induced gastrointestinal syndrome (RIGS) is currently the main cause of death for people exposed to a high dose of irradiation during nuclear incidents, and there is currently no approved effective therapy. Here, we found that CBP/P300 inhibitors, with high efficacy and low toxicity, might be promising radiation mitigators that can cure RIGS.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗
DOE OSTI2019

Panel Session 68: Small Business Procurement and Contracting Opportunities Within the DOE Complex and USACE FUSRAP Program

This panel session was held in the Panel Zone in the Exhibit Hall and focused on small business procurement and contracting opportunities within the DOE Complex as well as the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) National Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) projects. Each panelist provided a general overview of their respective organization, small business goals and the success in meeting those goals. They further discussed recently awarded procurement, upcoming opportunities and provided additional contact information for individual small business program managers within their organization. This panel was open to all WM participants, including Exhibitors. This panel session focused on small business procurement and contracting opportunities within the DOE Complex and the USACE FUSRAP Program. The DOE and USACE contract directly with small businesses and encourage prime contractors to obtain goods and services from small and disadvantaged businesses (Tier 2) and often tie these goals to contract award fee. Goods and services being considered for these procurements include decontamination and decommissioning, remediation, transportation and disposal of radioactive waste, health physics, emergency response planning and training, lab services, R and D products, waste treatment, maintenance, A/E and professional consulting. This panel complemented Session 21 and Session 48, US DOE Spring Quarterly Forum, and Session 88 on Doing Business with the DOE. Presentations proposed include: 1 - Small Business Procurement and Contracting Opportunities Within the DOE Complex (Aaron Deckard, US DOE (USA)); 2 - Small Business Procurement and Contracting Opportunities Within the DOE Complex (William Badger, AECOM (USA)); 3 - Engineering the Extraordinary (Lisa Tribuce-Leoung Tat, Bechtel National, Inc. (USA)); 4 - Fluor Small Business Procurement and Contracting Opportunities (Debra Sampson, Fluor Government Group (USA)); 5 - HII Technical Solutions Division Small Business Opportunities (Kela Lofton, HII Nuclear Inc. (USA)); 6 - U. S. Army Corps of Engineers Radiological Remediation Work (Nicki Fatherly, USACE (USA))

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

The Role of Indian Tribes in the Safe, Secure, and Routine Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste - 19463

Far too often federally recognized Indian Tribes are the last stakeholders invited to the table to discuss a particular issue with potentially wide-ranging impacts. Indian tribes were the first governments on this continent. With respect to the future transportation of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) or high-level radioactive waste (HLW), Indian tribes are potentially impacted in a myriad of ways: economics, cultural, environmental, health and safety. Yet few regulators fully understand and appreciate the legal and political standing of Indian tribes. This paper will examine the ways in which Indian tribes must be involved with the planning for safe, secure and routine SNF and HLW shipments and the ways in which the federal government is obligated to involve tribes. Indian tribes are similar to states in that they are responsible for the health and safety of its members (which they themselves define). Tribes, like states, make, implement, interpret, and enforce laws, and provide public services - healthcare, public education, social services, drug treatment, public safety and emergency management, transportation, managing natural resources, public housing, and environmental and cultural preservation. Many tribes also operate economic enterprises - manufacturing, farming, forestry, and gaming. The most basic principle of Indian law is the principle of 'sovereignty,' that is, an Indian tribe possesses all the powers of any sovereign state. Tribal governments are not subject to state or local jurisdiction but are subject to federal jurisdiction. The tribes enjoy a government-to-government relationship (and expectation) with the federal government (i.e., agencies, like the Department of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission). Of paramount concern to Indian tribes is the doctrine of Trust Responsibility, the general principle that the federal government's conduct 'in dealing with the Indians should therefore be judged by the most exacting fiduciary standards.' With respect to SNF/HLW this means that the federal government has an obligation (or a Trust Responsibility) to ensure that tribal people, lands and resources are protected. Equally important is the expectation that federal agencies will work with the Indian tribes on a government-to-government basis before undertaking any action with potential negative consequences on the tribe's people, land or resources. The concept of government-to-government consultation between Indian tribes and the United States is long standing and well recognized. As expressed in Executive Order 13175, 'Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments': 'Consultation - Each federal agency must have an accountable process to ensure meaningful and timely input by tribal officials in the development of regulatory policies that have tribal implications.' The purpose of consultation is to ensure that Indian tribes are consulted before government officials make decisions that may have an impact on their lives and territories. The three agencies involved with SNF and HLW transportation - the US Department of Transportation (DOT), the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the US Department of Energy (DOE) - have had various degrees of success with respect to direct consultation with Indian tribes. Given that there is plenty of lead-time before the first shipments commence, there should be ample time to develop a strategy for ensuring that tribes are equal partners when planning and preparing for shipments of SNF and HLW to the first interim storage facility. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Guidance Development: Management of Low Activity Waste After a Radiological Incident - 19616

The EPA, as the coordinating federal agency for long-term environmental recovery under the National Response Framework, is considering working with other Federal agencies, states and others to develop planning guidance for the management of the large volumes of waste that could result from a radiological incident. The 2017 revision of the PAG Manual contained, for the first time, limited generalized planning guidance on waste disposal; however, more detailed guidance that supports federal, state, and local planning efforts and can be initiated at the earliest stages of an incident would be desirable. This paper provides some of the considerations that EPA is exploring. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Geographic Information System Based Emergency Response Training Assessments for DOE Radioactive Materials Transport - 20027

Safety and security are priorities of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) radioactive materials shipping campaigns. In the more than 70-year history of domestic transport of spent nuclear fuel (SNF), there has never been a transportation-related radiological injury. To support transportation planning, among the tools that DOE uses is the Stakeholder Tool for Assessing Radioactive Transportation (START). START contains geospatial data and transportation route analyses capabilities designed to support a range of DOE transportation planning initiatives. One of those functions is the capability to support emergency response planning and training for State and Tribal jurisdictions located on routes used for DOE shipments of radioactive materials. As part of the Department's commitment to public safety, DOE provides federally-funded radiological response training to emergency responders along DOE radioactive materials transportation corridors through its Transportation Emergency Preparedness Program (TEPP). START contains spatial data representing the locations and emergency-response capabilities of fire departments, police, hospitals, State emergency response centers, and where TEPP-trained personnel are based. The START tool supports State and Tribal users' ability to evaluate emergency-response coverage on active and potential DOE radioactive materials transport routes through their jurisdictions, provide expected response times to reach the scene of an incident, identify equipment available to support a response, and identify the number of response personnel and their respective training levels. In addition, START can be used to identify gaps in coverage along a transportation corridor where additional radiological emergency response training may be needed. This paper describes the data, features, and functionality DOE uses to provide a resource for emergency response training needs assessments for States and Tribes along active and potential routes for transporting radioactive materials, and illustrates its use. It also discusses future plans to integrate TEPP and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) radiological training data to provide a more comprehensive source of geospatial information on personnel who have received equivalent radiological response training. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

A Systematic Evidence Based Performance Approach to Regulation of Nuclear Sites in England and Wales - 20058

The Environment Agency for England has developed a systematic evidence-based approach to pursue our strategic environmental objectives for the regulation of nuclear sites. We use an annual evidence review process to ensure effective and efficient targeting of limited resources to achieve those objectives. Over the last 8 years, we have been developing and refining this approach to ensure risk-based and value driven regulation. The approach comprises nuclear site and nuclear sector review processes known as Site Environment Review (SER) and Nuclear Environment Review (NER). This approach complements our regulation of nuclear site permit holders under the Environmental Permitting Regulations (EPR). We deliver our regulation of nuclear sites in England and Wales alongside the Office for Nuclear Regulation. The SER process involves the lead regulator for each nuclear site assessing the permit holder's environmental performance across 14 themes, set within the context of the site's main activities and associated waste disposals. Our themes include environmental leadership, resources and climate change, radioactive waste management, facility management and decommissioning, groundwater, and environmental radiological protection. We use evidence from site inspections and working within our subject matter groups to grade current and predicted future environmental performance. We are particularly interested in sustainability and the application of Best Available Techniques (BAT) to prevent the creation, and minimise the disposal, of radioactive wastes. We use risk analysis (strengths, weaknesses, threats and opportunities) to examine performance against our strategic environmental objectives, which are set out, in our 5-year Nuclear Delivery Plan (NDP). The output supports the targeting of our resources at each nuclear site. We consult the relevant permit holders on the SER priorities and use their feedback to refine our plans. We expect all permit holders to take account of our priorities when considering their own programmes of work, objectives and plans. The NER process brings together what we learn and achieve through regulation across the sector. It provides input to planning priorities, supported by qualitative and semi-quantitative evidence. It covers the 28 nuclear sites in England and Wales and spans the same 14 environmental themes. During the process we collate, compile and summarise evidence from the SERs and other sources such as inspection reports and evidence from our other nuclear work programmes. The output is the NER annual report. This provides a snapshot of the status of the nuclear sector and gives insights to enable us to regulate more efficiently and effectively. It also takes account of cross-cutting issues and risks such as changes in international standards, domestic policy, regulatory framework, domestic standards and guidance, learning from experience such as incidents, events and good practice, and innovation, research and development. It provides graphics that illustrate the grading of environmental performance for the nuclear sector across the fourteen environmental themes. This analysis allows benchmarking of nuclear site's environmental performance and the visualisation provides a convenient comparison of performance across themes, sites, and over time. We use this intelligence to inform our investment in training and development of our staff, and our cross-cutting engagement on strategic issues with government, the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) and other corporate organisations. Adopting this approach can provide benefits with organisational reputation, stakeholder participation and ensuring value from the public investment. This paper describes the history of the SER/NER process, a selection of outputs from the process and ideas for improvement. The paper will be of interest to other regulators and organisations across the world that are interested in supporting continuous improvement. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Development of the Mobile Systems for Conditioning of Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources in Serbia - 20105

Sealed radioactive sources (SRS) are being used worldwide in the field of medicine, agriculture, industry and research. They can be found in mobile as well as stationary devices. SRS contains radioactive material that is (a) permanently sealed in a capsule or (b) closely bounded and in a solid form. The capsule or material of an SRS should be strong enough to maintain leak tightness under the conditions of use and purpose for which the source was designed, also in case of accidents. In this case only emitted radiation is utilized. Firstly, the hazard from external radiation has to be considered, but the possibility of contamination due to fracture of the capsule should not be disregarded. The radioactive sources are composed of the radiating isotope contained in the filling medium, the single or double isotope holder that partially or totally surrounds the filling medium, the outer cover that contains the parts mentioned above and the capsule closed airtightly by welding or using some other method. The capsule must be tested for leakage periodically. If the SRS is no longer needed (e.g. replaced by a different technique) or it becomes useless for the intended application (e.g. the activity becomes too weak, the equipment containing the source works poorly or becomes obsolete, the source is damaged or leaking) it is considered disused. Disused sealed radioactive sources (DSRS) are typically conditioned and disposed if a facility is available. If the disposal option is not available, conditioned DSRS should be stored under proper conditions. In some cases, the radionuclide(s) in DSRS can be recovered/recycled or the DSRS can be repurposed for other applications. Conditioning of DSRS ensures containment of the radioactive material, provides confinement for leaking sources, provides sufficient radiation shielding, reduces storage/disposal volume by allowing consolidation of multiple sources into a single storage/disposal container, facilitates transport operations and contributes to safety and security as well. Typically, conditioning technologies are deployed either as permanently installed stationary systems in centralized or mobile on-site waste processing facilities, or in a mobile configuration. Centralized stationary facilities provide a single processing location for multiple users that requires transport of the waste to the facility. On the other hand, mobile systems may be provided for the selection and application of the optimum technology for a specific waste stream (such as DSRS) by bringing the process to the point where the waste is generated. In addition, mobile systems could offer additional flexibility by sharing equipment among multiple waste generating sites for processing campaigns that vary in duration, from very short periods to several years. The term 'mobile processing system' refers to any radioactive waste processing system or component which is designed to be transportable and which is not considered permanently installed. Two mobile system for conditioning of disused sealed radioactive sources are developed in the Public Company Nuclear Facilities of Serbia. Development of these mobile systems was supported by SRB9005 national project via Technical Cooperation of the IAEA. The first mobile system, built inside the 20 feet ISO container, will be used for conditioning of DSRS category 3 to 5. The second mobile system, built inside the 7 m long vehicle (Iveco Daily Van), will be used for dismantling of ionizing smoke detectors mostly with Am-241 sources. Designs of the mobile systems were defined in cooperation with two companies from Belgium (Belgoprocess and Leniko) and a Croatian company Ekoteh as well as with the support of the IAEA experts. The generic safety assessment and operational procedures for the mobile systems are developed. Based on safety assessment the acceptance criteria and operational limits and conditions are established. Operational procedures include: (a) equipment and material requirements, (b) assembling procedure of the mobile unit, (c) procedure for acceptance of devices for dismantling and conditioning, (d) dismantling procedure for devices to recover the DSRS, (e) characterization of DSRS, (f) encapsulation procedure of DSRS, (g) disassembling procedure of the mobile unit, and (h) keeping records, identification and traceability. In addition, radiation safety, health safety, security and emergency preparedness plans are prepared. The generic safety assessment and operational procedures could be updated with site specific requirements, DSRS inventory, and different needs for future customers. Developed mobile systems could be used in all situations when it is feasible to perform conditioning of DSRS on the spot in the county and worldwide. Development of these mobile units was just the first step to create the Reference Center for Radioactive Waste Treatment and Disused Radioactive Sources Conditioning for Small Facilities which can become a regional training center in the future, and/or as a tool for comprehensive national search and secure programmes. In the next phases development of e-learning platforms and blended learning packages as well as application for the IAEA Qualified Technical Centre (QTC) for the management of DSRS is foreseen. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Extra Robotic Legs for Bearing Equipment Loads During Emergency Response - 19532

The Extra Robotic Legs (XRL) system is a robotic augmentation worn by a human operator that consists of two articulated robot legs that help bear a heavy backpack payload and the operator's own weight. The design was driven by a need to increase the effectiveness of Department of Energy hazardous material emergency response personnel who are encumbered by their Personal Protective Equipment. A prototype was fabricated utilizing insights gained from force analyses and human-robot interaction safety requirements. A seamless hybrid control architecture was developed to allow the operator command over the pace of the stand-to-squat transition. Initial tests of balance control while performing squatting transitions indicate the feasibility of the XRL System. The legs will ultimately walk, climb stairs, crouch down, and crawl with the operator while eliminating all equipment loads on the operator. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

UPF and Y-12 Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) Radiation Testing Report

This report documents the experimental conditions and results for the testing of the Mirion Technologies CAAS-3S Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) for the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) and Uranium Processing Facility (UPF). The testing was conducted at the Godiva IV Burst Reactor at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) during the week of January 11, 2021. The testing was conducted in accordance with 25774-QL-POA-JR00-00002-VDE-27.0, CAAS-3S Radiation Testing of Cabinet Components Test Plan. The tests subjected the CAAS-3S system to intense and short duration mixed neutron and gamma radiation fields and to high integrated radiation doses. The purpose of the test was to environmentally qualify various CAAS-3S components in a radiation environment. Successful completion of the tests was predicated on the collaborative efforts of several organizations. Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) provided dosimetry to estimate photon and neutron dose. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) manages the NCERC facility, operated the Godiva IV reactor, and provided field support for CAAS-3S placement and communications interface for data acquisition systems supplied by Mirion Technologies. Throughout the test campaign, Y-12 and UPF personnel provided technical support in determining changes to the test schedule, as needed, interpretation of the results, and comparison between the measured dosimetry data and predicted results. Throughout the test campaign, Mirion personnel provided technical support in the operation of the CAAS-3S system itself.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2019

Nuclear Crisis Communication in an Era of Fake News and Media Overload - 19414

Over the past several decades, the nuclear industry has worked diligently to improve the security and safety aspects of their technology, but it has failed to meet the challenge of the public's negative perception. Studies have shown that nuclear energy and nuclear waste evoke fear among the general populace because people see risks as immediate, unknown, uncontrollable, and potentially catastrophic. To some extent, negative public perception challenges for the nuclear industry are primarily a consequence of its own inability to communicate the benefits of nuclear science effectively with the lay public. While effective and trustworthy communication cannot guarantee success, it helps shape public opinion, and for a routinely misperceived project like a nuclear facility, that is paramount. Fukushima was the first nuclear accident to occur in the world where citizens have access to 24/7 news channels and the ability to respond in a real-time manner through social media outlets. Following the Fukushima accident, social media sites were filled with information regarding nuclear energy that were based more on mass rumor and even paranoia than facts. More locally, we have seen this trend following what was a minor external radiation release event at the WIPP in February 14, 2014. Many online news sources were flooded with anti-nuke stories aimed at pushing a fear of radiation, such as inferring an increase in cancer rates among the public from this minor incident; which was exactly the opposite of what was true. Today, when the public gets its news from social media and online sources, people are faced with rapidly changing and contrasting interpretations of the same story, depending on when they accessed the latest news. They are also increasingly vulnerable to fake news, including disinformation deliberately planted and cultivated by the anti-nuclear movement. Public reactions following these nuclear events reinforced the value of effective communication in maintaining the high level of transparency necessary for long-term, local acceptance and support for nuclear facilities. A lack of trustworthy communication leaves a vacuum that can be quickly filled by rumors and fake information. When dealing with a nuclear crisis, failure to recognize the rapidly changing and contrasting media framing, or believing fake news could have very real and catastrophic consequences. Trusted organizations must swiftly take charge and guide the way in which the crisis is framed to keep the public adequately and accurately informed. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Frisker Response to Soil Concentrations (Bq/g) Compared to NaI(Tl) - 19338

The Chalk River Laboratories (CRL) began nuclear operations in 1947. Portions of the site land areas have become radiologically contaminated through the 1952 National Reactor Experimental (NRX) accident and/or waste management activities over the past 70 years of site operations. The Environmental Remediation Projects Group (ERP) characterizes, and performs risk assessment, and remedial actions, as required over these contaminated land areas. ERP work activities are subject to controls established by CRL's Radiation Protection (RP) Group such that RP establishes the radiological controls and monitoring requirements for ERP field work activities. The different methods of monitoring soil contamination between ERP and the RP program present some challenges in the interpretation and comparison of the two sets of results and the soil disposition. ERP utilizes NaI(Tl) scintillation detectors and MARSSIM land scanning techniques to measure soil concentrations between sample locations and in excavated materials. Whereas, RP utilizes surface contamination monitoring equipment in the form of a 15.5 cm{sup 2} open area pancake Geiger-Mueller (GM) tube detector to measure soil contamination levels reported in counts per minute (cpm). This paper presents a method to evaluate the theoretical best responses that could be obtained from surface contamination monitoring instrumentation for a known concentration (1 Bq/g) of various radionuclides. A static efficiency of cpm/Bq{sup -1} g{sup -1} is obtained from these calculations. These contamination monitoring sensitivities are then used in a MARSSIM scanning sensitivity equation and compared to the scanning sensitivity of an NaI(Tl) scintillation detector. The results demonstrate that the sensitivity of the frisker probes to particle radiations (betas for pancake) tend to fall in a range of only a few cpm/Bq{sup -1} g{sup -1}. Rather, the primary static response of the pancake probe to soil contamination is from gamma radiation where a value of 36 cpm/Bq{sup -1} g{sup -1} for Cs-137 was obtained at 2.54 cm distance without the application of scanning statistics. In comparison, a 7.6 cm x 7.6 cm NaI(Tl) detector has a Cs-137 static response factor of 10,000 cpm/Bq{sup -1} g{sup -1} at 15 cm distance without applying scanning statistics. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Evaluation of Triage Methods for Criticality Accidents

Studies indicate that early identification of persons involved in and receiving high doses of radiation in accidents is key to providing life-saving medical treatment. Although the risk of criticality accidents is low the potential impact to workers is significant. For facilities that employ large numbers of workers a key element in the response to a radiological emergency is identifying personnel that received significant, and potentially harmful, doses. Also important is having the ability to screen large numbers of workers to identify persons that did not receive significant exposure so as to reduce the impact on emergency response efforts. At the Y-12 National Security Complex the focus on criticality accident response is the rapid triage of personnel in order to identify persons exposed to large radiation doses and to prioritize those persons receiving the highest exposures. Once identified personnel are transported to local medical facilities including the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) for medical evaluation and treatment. The Y-12 external dosimetry program utilizes a number of techniques to identify and prioritize workers and these methods were evaluated at a criticality dosimetry intercomparison exercise. Finally, the methods used were shown to perform as intended and other sites may consider incorporating these methods into their accident dosimetry response procedures.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2019

WIPP Operational and Safety Lessons Learned from the 2014 Fire and Radiological Events - 19389

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) experienced two accident events in 2014 within 9 days of each other (salt haul truck fire and a radiological release). The repository was designed in the 1980's for high level waste and started operations in late 1990's for defense related transuranic (TRU) waste. Several long-standing technical issues from competing requirements between an underground facility (mine), nuclear safety, and environmental requirements lead to design, operations, and safety weaknesses that were not resolved prior to the two accident events. Other design issues and actions during early recovery efforts were identified as lessons learned for the Safety Significant Confinement Ventilation System (SSCVS) and Utility Shaft (US) capital asset projects and for future planning efforts. The infrastructure at WIPP was significantly degraded at the time of the events with key safety related items that had been out of service or not maintained for years. The emergency response to the two accident events was less than adequate and caused concerns with stakeholders. There are many operational and safety lessons learned from these two events and their corrective actions that will be valuable for all future planning of deep geological repositories (DGR). (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Safe and Secure Management of Disused Radioactive Sealed Sources in Egypt - 19063

Radioactive sources offer many benefits in medicine, industry and education but the lack of appropriate long-term management when they eventually become disused has led to accidents, in some cases with serious consequences, and increased their vulnerability for use in a malicious act. This lack is evident in the absence of clearly defined policy and strategy, responsibilities and resources to meet those responsibilities for safe, secure and sustainable management of disused sources. The strengthening of national legislative and regulatory infrastructures globally has led to major improvements in the protection and control of radioactive sources. Nevertheless, in many countries, radioactive sources were in use before such infrastructures had been developed or adequately strengthened and were therefore not under regulatory control. The paper presents some aspects from Egyptian experience related to safe and secure measures for management of Cs-137, Ra-226 and Co-60 sealed sources. Data relating to the disused radioactive sealed sources, DSRS inventory as well as the arrangements made in order to prepare for conditioning of sources is presented. The efforts made by technical staff and radiation protection team for all arrangements and details such as conditioning set-up, working area, leakage test, certified stainless capsules, radiation protection measures and sources characterization in addition to all security measures for stored DSRS are also presented. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Further Analyses of the Unburied Goiania Accident Packages - 19161

In 1987, in the city of Goiania, Brazil, a derelict teletherapy machine was disassembled by scavengers and Cs-137 was released in the environment, unleashing the biggest radiological accident in Brazil. During the 15 days before the accident was acknowledged, some contaminated materials were sold and delivered to recycling factories in a few cities in the state of Sao Paulo, Brazil, in the form of metal scrap and recycled paper bales. The contaminated material was then collected, the metal scrap was conditioned in forty-three 200-liter drums, and the paper bales were stored in fifty 1.6 cubic meter steel boxes at the interim storage of the Nuclear and Energy Research Institute (IPEN), in the city of Sao Paulo, and there remained ever since. In 2017, 30 years later, initial analyses were performed at a sample of these boxes, checking for their activity, weight, and incongruences between the original values recorded at the time of collection and the measurement results 30 years later. The results indicated that none of the boxes checked were close to the clearance limit and that, without any sort of treatment, this radioactive waste should be stored for at least 150 years more. Visual inspection could not be performed at that time. Nowadays, some of the boxes were opened and samples from the contaminated material inside were taken for analysis. The main objective of this work is to report the results from the evaluation of the physical state of this material. After these analyses, the treatment options for volume reduction that were previously proposed were reviewed, and the method that best suits the current characteristics of the waste was chosen. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗