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At least 19 records

Tritium Release Limit for Fluoride Salt-cooled High-temperature Reactors

Tritium generation is potentially a significant issue in Fluoride salt-cooled High-temperature Reactors (FHRs). Tritium in its molecular form, T{sub 2}, is highly permeable through reactor structure materials, especially under high temperatures. Since tritium presents a potential health hazard, its release must be controlled and mitigated. However, tritium release limit for FHRs is not specified in the current radiation protection regulations since FHRs are still being developed. This study first reviews related radiation protection regulations and literature before proposing a potential limit value of the tritium release rate for FHRs. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Authorized Limits for the Release of a 25 Ton Locomotive, Serial Number 21547, at the Area 25 Engine Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly Facility, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

This document contains process knowledge and radiological data and analysis to support approval for release of the 25-ton locomotive, Serial Number 21547, at the Area 25 Engine Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly (EMAD) Facility, located on the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The 25-ton locomotive is a small, one-of-a-kind locomotive used to move railcars in support of the Nuclear Engine for Rocket Vehicle Application project. This locomotive was identified as having significant historical value by the Nevada State Railroad Museum in Boulder City, Nevada, where it will be used as a display piece. A substantial effort to characterize the radiological conditions of the locomotive was undertaken by the NTS Management and Operations Contractor, National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec). During this characterization process, seven small areas on the locomotive had contamination levels that exceeded the NTS release criteria (limits consistent with U.S. Department of Energy [DOE] Order DOE O 5400.5, “Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment”). The decision was made to perform radiological decontamination of these known accessible impacted areas to further the release process. On February 9, 2010, NSTec personnel completed decontamination of these seven areas to within the NTS release criteria. Although all accessible areas of the locomotive had been successfully decontaminated to within NTS release criteria, it was plausible that inaccessible areas of the locomotive (i.e., those areas on the locomotive where it was not possible to perform radiological surveys) could potentially have contamination above unrestricted release limits. To access the majority of these inaccessible areas, the locomotive would have to be disassembled. A complete disassembly for a full radiological survey could have permanently destroyed parts and would have ruined the historical value of the locomotive. Complete disassembly would also add an unreasonable financial burden for the contractor. A decision was reached between the NTS regulator and NSTec, opting for alternative authorized limits from DOE Headquarters. In doing so, NSTec personnel performed a dose model using the DOE-approved modeling code RESRAD-BUILD v3.5 to evaluate scenarios. The parameters used in the dose model were conservative. NSTec’s Radiological Engineering Calculation, REC-2010-001, “Public Dose Estimate from the EMAD 25 Ton Locomotive,” concluded that the four scenarios evaluated were below the 25-millirem per year limit, the “likely” dose scenarios met the “few millirem in a year” criteria, and that the EMAD 25-ton locomotive met the radiological requirements to be released with residual radioactivity to the public.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Independent Review of Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant Freon Release Authorized Limits and Evaluation of Corresponding Radiological Doses

The Portsmouth/Paducah Project Office (PPPO) proposes to use the American National Standard Institute (ANSI)/Health Physics Society (HPS) N13.12 (ANSI 2013) volumetric screening levels as Authorized Limits (ALs) for the release of cryofluorane R-114 (Freon) at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP) in Paducah, Kentucky. A review of the proposed ALs document indicated that potential exposure scenarios from the release of Freon are adequately discussed therein. However, questions arose regarding the assumptions made for the ANSI N13.12 clearance values, and whether or not all pathway doses were adequately considered in the Authorized Limits Request. For example, PPPO used the inverse square rule to estimate dose to the truck driver. A more appropriate evaluation would have considered the material as a cylindrical source for this pathway. In addition, the inverse square rule was inadequately applied to the inhalation and ingestion pathways. Furthermore, while the ANSI N13.12 volumetric clearance values are used in the ALs, questions arose concerning whether the values are appropriate for materials of greater than 1 metric ton, and whether or not the ANSI N13.12 standard could be used for liquids that are sent to an incinerator. For these reasons, dose modeling was conducted to demonstrate that using ANSI/HPS N13.12 screening levels as ALs for release of PGDP Freon meets the dose criteria set in U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 458.1. This report provides a bounding dose analysis using scenarios described in PPPO document. Realistic parameters, such as the incinerator characteristics data, are used when available.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Price To Be Paid for Two-Metal Catalysis: Magnesium Ions That Accelerate Chemistry Unavoidably Limit Product Release from a Protein Kinase

Incorporation of divalent metal ions into an active site is a fundamental catalytic tool used by diverse enzymes. Divalent cations are used by protein kinases to both stabilize ATP binding and accelerate chemistry. Kinetic analysis establishes that Cyclin-dependent kinase 2 (CDK2) requires simultaneous binding of two Mg 2+ ions for catalysis of phosphoryl transfer. This tool, however, comes with a price: the rate-acceleration effects are opposed by an unavoidable rate-limiting consequence of the use of two Mg 2+ ions by CDK2. The essential metal ions stabilize ADP product binding and limit the overall rate of the reaction. We demonstrate that product release is rate limiting for activated CDK2 and evaluate the effects of the two catalytically essential Mg 2+ ions on the stability of the ADP product within the active site. We present two new crystal structures of CDK2 bound to ADP showing how the phosphate groups can be coordinated by either one or two Mg 2+ ions, with the occupancy of one site in a weaker equilibrium. Molecular dynamics simulations indicate that ADP phosphate mobility is more restricted when ADP is coordinated by two Mg 2+ ions compared to one. The structural similarity between the rigid ADP·2Mg product and the cooperatively assembled transition state provides a mechanistic rational for the rate-limiting ADP release that is observed. We demonstrate that although the simultaneous binding of two Mg 2+ ions is essential for efficient phosphoryl transfer, the presence of both Mg 2+ ions in the active site also cooperatively increases ADP affinity and opposes its release. Evolution of protein kinases must have involved careful tuning of the affinity for the second Mg 2+ ion in order to balance the needs to stabilize the chemical transition state and allow timely product release. The link between Mg 2+ site affinity and activity presents a chemical handle that may be used by regulatory factors as well as explain some mutational effects.

Jacobsen, Douglas M.↗

Financial Exposure After a Sealed-Source Release: Insurance Limits, Federal Cost Pathways, and Implications for Gamma Irradiator Substitution

This report assesses whether private insurance and existing federal authorities would likely provide meaningful financial protection to private operators of self-shielded gamma irradiators after a major sealed-source release. It does not answer this question quantitatively because publicly observable data on premiums, limits, uptake, and claims outcomes for this risk class appear sparse. Instead, it uses a qualitative structural analysis based on prior literature, review of relevant federal authorities, limited observable insurance-market evidence, expert outreach, and historical analogs. The analysis finds that available public and private mechanisms do not combine into a clear, dependable, or readily verifiable compensation structure for ordinary private sealed-source operators. Institutions therefore should not assume that either insurance or government response will make them financially whole after a severe incident. Source reduction and replacement remain more dependable than post-event financial mechanisms for reducing institutional exposure and broader radiological risk.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Performance of Silver-Exchanged Mordenite and Silver-Functionalized Silica-Aerogel Under Vessel Off-gas Conditions

US regulations 40 CFR 61, 40 CFR 190, and 10 CFR 20 govern release limits for volatile radionuclides contained in the gaseous effluents of used nuclear fuel (UNF) reprocessing facilities. Of the four volatile radionuclides that are restricted by the release limits ( 3 H, 14 C, 85 Kr, and 129 I) 129 I will require the greatest degree of abatement. Previous studies have shown that overall plant decontamination factor (DF) for 129 I must, at minimum, exceed 1,000 to meet regulatory requirements. Iodine-containing off-gas will be present in the dissolver off-gas, the cell off-gas, the vessel off-gas (VOG), the waste off-gas, and the shear off-gas. The VOG will most likely contain 1%–5% of the total iodine at part per billion (ppb) concentrations. A number of studies have examined iodine abatement from the dissolver off-gas, which contains greater than 95% of the iodine inventory of the plant, but very few have examined the recovery of iodine from the VOG stream. Reduced silver-exchanged mordenite (Ag 0 Z) has been considered a promising iodine sorbent for use in UNF reprocessing plants, but recent efforts have identified silver-functionalized silica-aerogel (AgAerogel) as a potential alternative. The testing reported here reflects a substantial increase in the body of work available on iodine adsorption by both silver sorbents under prototypical VOG conditions. Both I2 and methyl iodide (CH 3 I) adsorption tests have been conducted with Ag 0 Z and AgAerogel at a range of concentrations up to 1,000 ppb. These experiments were performed with two specific aims: (1) to assess the effect of iodine concentration on its adsorption by the sorbent and (2) to compare the performance of Ag 0 Z and AgAerogel in the removal of iodine from a prototypical VOG stream.

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Quantify the Extent of Physisorption on Silver Based Sorbents under VOG Conditions

US regulations govern release limits for volatile radionuclides contained in the gaseous effluents of used nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities. Of the four volatile radionuclides that are most restricted by the release limits ( 3 H, 14 C, 85 Kr, and 129 I), 129 I will require the greatest degree of abatement. Within a reprocessing facility, the vessel off-gas stream will likely contain 1%–5% of the total iodine at parts per billion (ppb) concentrations. Studies conducted by the authors have now investigated both I 2 and methyl iodide (CH 3 I) adsorption by two silver-bearing sorbents, hydrogen-reduced silver-exchanged mordenite (Ag 0 Z) and silver functionalized aerogel (AgAerogel) at a range of concentrations up to 1,000 ppb. Throughout this suite of tests, and particularly in the case of CH3I adsorption tests, there was a significant discrepancy in the amount of iodine recovered on sorbent beds compared to the amount of iodine that was believed to be delivered to the test system.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Assessment of personal airborne exposures and surface contamination from x-ray vaporization of beryllium targets at the National Ignition Facility

Here, this article presents air and surface sampling data collected over the first two years since beryllium was introduced as a target material at the National Ignition Facility. Over this time, 101 experiments with beryllium-containing targets were executed. The data provides an assessment of current conditions in the facility and a baseline for future impacts as new, reduced regulatory limits for beryllium are being proposed by both the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and Department of Energy. This study also investigates how beryllium deposits onto exposed surfaces as a result of x-ray vaporization and the effectiveness of simple decontamination measures in reducing the amount of removable beryllium from a surface. Based on 1,961 surface wipe samples collected from entrant components (equipment directly exposed to target debris) and their surrounding work areas during routine reconfiguration activities, only one result was above the beryllium release limit of 0.2 µg/100 cm 2 and 27 results were above the analytical reporting limit of 0.01 µg/100 cm 2 , for a beryllium detection rate of 1.4%. Surface wipe samples collected from the internal walls of the NIF target chamber, however, showed higher levels of beryllium, with beryllium detected on 73% and 87% of the samples during the first and second target chamber entries (performed annually), respectively, with 23% of the samples above the beryllium release limit during the second target chamber entry. The analysis of a target chamber wall panel exposed during the first 30 beryllium-containing experiments (cumulatively) indicated that 87% of the beryllium contamination remains fixed onto the surface after wet wiping the surface and 92% of the non-fixed contamination was removed by decontaminating the surface using a dry wipe followed by a wet wipe. Personal airborne exposures assessed during access to entrant components and during target chamber entry indicated that airborne beryllium was not present in workers' breathing zones. Finally, all the data thus far have shown that beryllium has been effectively managed to prevent exposures to workers during routine and non-routine work.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Research Technology Laboratory (RTL) Disposition Program Final Status Survey Report

As part of the Battelle Facility Restoration Program (Smoter and Biebesheimer 2017), the Research Technology Laboratory (RTL) Complex was remediated through demolition and surveyed to show it meets the radiological release criteria for unrestricted use under the clearance process (DOE 2011). The restoration program has directed the implementation of the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM) methodology (NRC 2011) to verify the suitability of the site to be released for unrestricted use under the clearance process in U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 458.1 (Biebesheimer 2018a; DOE 2011). The use of MARSSIM is accepted by federal and state agencies, including DOE. This report documents how the MARSSIM process was used to assure any residual radioactivity is within acceptable levels and as low as reasonably achievable. Past land use for the RTL Complex property included agricultural, residential, and industrial activity. The historical site assessment (HSA) (Lindenmeier et al. 2015; Biebesheimer 2018b) identified use of radionuclides in past RTL Complex research and development activities from commissioning in 1966 until it was vacated in 2017. Based on the information provided in the HSA, the RTL Complex was delineated into six survey units. The 520 building footprint, tank vault and 530 building footprint, other building footprints, and pipeline survey units included excavated areas. The paved areas and open areas survey units were unexcavated areas. Survey units were all determined to be Class 3, with low probability of containing residual radioactivity, after demolition of the structures within the RTL Complex. The Research Technology Laboratory (RTL) Disposition Program: Final Status Survey Plan (Bunn et al. 2018) was designed and conducted to provide quantitative data regarding the residual radioactivity present in each survey unit. Authorized radiological release limits were developed and approved by the DOE Office of Science in December 2016 (DOE 2017). Fourteen random sample locations were identified within each survey unit. Forty-four specific judgmental sample locations were selected across the site based on information in the HSA. The number of sample locations within a survey unit ranged from 15 to 28, for a total of 127 random and judgmental sample locations identified across the RTL Complex. Sampling for the final status survey occurred over 12 days between November 11 and December 7, 2018. Laboratory results were independently validated by Analytical Quality Associates prior to evaluation. All of the over 880 residual radioactivity measurements were less than the release limits and action levels established through the RTL Disposition Program. A sum of fractions calculation for each survey unit resulted in values that were less than unity. Based on the results presented in this report, the restoration program recommends that the RTL Complex be released for unrestricted use.

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Summary of Surface Swipe Sampling for Beryllium on Lead Bricks and Shielding

Approximately 25,000 lbs of lead bricks at Site 300 were assessed by the Site 300 Industrial Hygienis tand Health Physicist for potential contamination of beryllium and radiation for reuse. These lead bricks and shielding had been used as shielding material during explosives tests that included beryllium and depleted uranium. Based on surface swipe sampling that was performed between July 26 and October 11, 2010, specifically for beryllium, the use of a spray encapsulant was found to be an effective means to limit removable surface contamination to levels below the DOE release limit for beryllium, which is 0.2 mcg/100 cm{sup 2}. All the surface swipe sampling data for beryllium and a timeline of when the samples were collected (and a brief description) are presented in this report. On December 15, 2010, the lead bricks and shielding were surveyed with an ion chamber and indicated dose rates less than 0.05 mrem per hour on contact. This represents a dose rate consistent with natural background. An additional suevey was performed on February 8, 2011, using a GM survey instrument to estimate total activity on the lead bricks and shielding, confirming safe levels of radioactivity. The vendor is licensed to possess and work with radioactive material.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Authorized limits for disposal of PCB capacitors from Buildings 361 and 391 at Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Illinois.

This report contains data and analyses to support the approval of authorized release limits for the clearance from radiological control of polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) capacitors in Buildings 361 and 391 at Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Illinois. These capacitors contain PCB oil that must be treated and disposed of as hazardous waste under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). However, they had been located in radiological control areas where the potential for neutron activation existed; therefore, direct release of these capacitors to a commercial facility for PCB treatment and landfill disposal is not allowable unless authorized release has been approved. Radiological characterization found no loose contamination on the exterior surface of the PCB capacitors; gamma spectroscopy analysis also showed the radioactivity levels of the capacitors were either at or slightly above ambient background levels. As such, conservative assumptions were used to expedite the analyses conducted to evaluate the potential radiation exposures of workers and the general public resulting from authorized release of the capacitors; for example, the maximum averaged radioactivity levels measured for capacitors nearest to the beam lines were assumed for the entire batch of capacitors. This approach overestimated the total activity of individual radionuclide identified in radiological characterization by a factor ranging from 1.4 to 640. On the basis of this conservative assumption, the capacitors were assumed to be shipped from Argonne to the Clean Harbors facility, located in Deer Park, Texas, for incineration and disposal. The Clean Harbors facility is a state-permitted TSCA facility for treatment and disposal of hazardous materials. At this facility, the capacitors are to be shredded and incinerated with the resulting incineration residue buried in a nearby landfill owned by the company. A variety of receptors that have the potential of receiving radiation exposures were analyzed. Based on the dose assessment results, it is indicated that, if the disposition activities are completed within a year, the maximum individual dose would be about 0.021 mrem/yr, which is about 0.02% of the primary dose limit of 100 mrem/yr set by U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for members of the public. The maximum individual dose was associated with a conservative and unlikely scenario involving a hypothetical farmer who intruded the landfill area to set up a subsistence living above the disposal area 30 years after burial of the incineration residue. Potential collective dose for worker and the general public combined was estimated to be less than 4 x 10{sup -4} person-rem/yr, about 0.004% of the DOE authorized release objective of 10 person-rem/yr for collective exposure. In reality, the actual radiation doses incurred by workers and the general public are expected to be at least two orders of magnitude lower than the estimated values. To follow the ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable) principle of reducing potential radiation exposures associated with authorized release of the PCB capacitors, a dose constraint of 1 mrem/yr, corresponding to a small fraction of the 25 mrem/yr limit set by DOE, was initially used as a reference to derive the authorized release limits. On the basis of the dose assessment results, the following authorized release limits are proposed - 0.6 pCi/g for Mn-54, 0.6 pCi/g for Na-22, 0.1 pCi/g for Co-57, and 2.3 pCi/g for Co-60, with a corresponding maximum individual dose of 0.21 mrem/yr. This maximum dose, about 0.2% of the DOE primary dose limit of 100 mrem/yr for members of the public from all sources and exposure pathways, was then selected as the final dose constraint for releasing the PCB capacitors through the authorized process. The proposed authorized release limits would satisfy the DOE requirements for the release of non-real properties to a commercial treatment and disposal facility. In addition, due to the relatively short half-lives (< 5.27 years) of radionuclides of concern, there will be no long-term buildup of doses either in groundwater or through other exposure pathways associated with this particular release action. Contact with Clean Harbors and the State of Texas has been initiated. The radioactivity levels in the PCB capacitors meet the State of Texas radiological exemption limits and would be accepted by Clean Harbors, subject to the approval by DOE for the authorized release process. Cost benefit analysis shows that authorized release of the PCB capacitors would provide significant cost saving over the low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) disposition alternative, i.e. sending the PCB capacitors to a certified LLRW facility for treatment and disposal, and would not cause a significantly different impact in terms of human health protection. Therefore, authorized release is determined to be the preferred alternative for the disposition of Argonne PCB capacitors.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Management of Tritium in HANARO (High Flux Advanced Neutron Application Reactor) - 18113

Tritium is generated inevitably from HANARO (High flux Advanced Neutron Application Reactor), a multi-purpose research reactor at the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), because HANARO uses heavy water as a reflector. The specific activity of tritium in heavy water increases as the operation time increases. The release of tritium into the environment also increases as the specific activity of tritium in heavy water increases. Although the activity of tritium released from HANARO was less than 1/1,000 of the derived release limit regulated by the regulatory authority, for the last decade, significant effort has been exercised to reduce the activity of tritium released into the environment as well as the activity of tritium inside of HANARO to protect its workers. Recently the replacement of heavy water containing tritium by fresh heavy water was reviewed to maintain the activity of tritium in heavy water as low as possible. A replacement plan is being established based on the technical estimates and reviews and will be applied soon. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

NfoR: Chromate Reductase or Flavin Mononucleotide Reductase?

Soil bacteria can detoxify Cr(VI) ions by reduction. Within the last 2 decades, numerous reports of chromate reductase enzymes have been published. These reports describe catalytic reduction of chromate ions by specific enzymes. These enzymes each have sequence similarity to known redox-active flavoproteins. We investigated the enzyme NfoR from Staphylococcus aureus, which was reported to be upregulated in chromate-rich soils and to have chromate reductase activity (H. Han, Z. Ling, T. Zhou, R. Xu, et al., Sci Rep 7:15481, 2017, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-017-15588-y). We show that NfoR has structural similarity to known flavin mononucleotide (FMN) reductases and reduces FMN as a substrate. NfoR binds FMN with a dissociation constant of 0.4 μM. The enzyme then binds NADPH with a dissociation constant of 140 μM and reduces the flavin at a rate of 1,350 s -1 . Turnover of the enzyme is apparently limited by the rate of product release that occurs, with a net rate constant of 0.45 s -1 . The rate of product release limits the rate of observed chromate reduction, so the net rate of chromate reduction by NfoR is orders of magnitude lower than when this process occurs in solution. We propose that NfoR is an FMN reductase and that the criterion required to define chromate reduction as enzymatic has not been met. That NfoR expression is increased in the presence of chromate suggests that the survival adaption was to increase the net rate of chromate reduction by facile, adventitious redox processes.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 116: Area 25 Test Cell C Facility, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 116, Area 25 Test Cell C Facility. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; the U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management (FFACO, 1996 [as amended March 2010]). CAU 116 consists of the following two Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site: (1) CAS 25-23-20, Nuclear Furnace Piping and (2) CAS 25-41-05, Test Cell C Facility. CAS 25-41-05 consisted of Building 3210 and the attached concrete shield wall. CAS 25-23-20 consisted of the nuclear furnace piping and tanks. Closure activities began in January 2007 and were completed in August 2011. Activities were conducted according to Revision 1 of the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for CAU 116 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2008). This CR provides documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and provides data confirming that closure objectives for CAU 116 were met. Site characterization data and process knowledge indicated that surface areas were radiologically contaminated above release limits and that regulated and/or hazardous wastes were present in the facility.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Long-Term Performance of Transuranic Waste Inadvertently Disposed in a Shallow Land Burial Trench at the Nevada Test Site

In 1986, 21 m3 of transuranic (TRU) waste was inadvertently disposed in a shallow land burial trench at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site on the Nevada Test Site. U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) TRU waste must be disposed in accordance with Title 40, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 191, Environmental Radiation Protection Standard for Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level, and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes. The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant is the only facility meeting these requirements. The National Research Council, however, has found that exhumation of buried TRU waste for disposal in a deep geologic repository may not be warranted when the effort, exposures, and expense of retrieval are not commensurate with the risk reduction achieved. The long-term risks of leaving the TRU waste in-place are evaluated in two probabilistic performance assessments. A composite analysis, assessing the dose from all disposed waste and interacting sources of residual contamination, estimates an annual total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) of 0.01 mSv, or 3 percent of the dose constraint. A 40 CFR 191 performance assessment also indicates there is reasonable assurance of meeting all requirements. The 40 CFR 191.15 annual mean TEDE for a member of the public is estimated to reach a maximum of 0.055 mSv at 10,000 years, or approximately 37 percent of the 0.15 mSv individual protection requirement. In both assessments greater than 99 percent of the dose is from co-disposed low-level waste. The simulated probability of the 40 CFR 191.13 cumulative release exceeding 1 and 10 times the release limit is estimated to be 0.0093 and less than 0.0001, respectively. Site characterization data and hydrologic process modeling support a conclusion of no groundwater pathway within 10,000 years. Monte Carlo uncertainty analysis indicates that there is reasonable assurance of meeting all regulatory requirements. Sensitivity analysis indicates that the results are insensitive to TRU waste-related parameters. Limited quantities of TRU waste in a shallow land burial trench can meet DOE performance objectives for disposal of TRU waste and contribute negligibly to disposal site risk. Leaving limited quantities of buried TRU waste in-place may be preferred over retrieval for disposal in a deep geologic repository.

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