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Semi-empirical simulation of in-motion radiation detection systems

The Replicative Assessment of Spectroscopic Equipment (RASE) is an open-source software that uses experimental data as the basis to simulate the response of commercial radiation detectors to sources in various situations, particularly in the context of nuclear security and safeguards applications. Dynamic RASE introduces the capability to simulate scenarios where sources and detector are in relative motion. Position-dependent experimentally acquired gamma spectra are ingested by Dynamic RASE to build maps that describe the detector response over all space. These response maps are used to replicate the time-dependent energy spectra collected as sources move on a path near the detector. Here, a Gaussian process is used to build each map, incorporating a novel kernel adapted to the special case of radiation detection. The approach has been validated against experimental data acquired using a NaI-based detector for 137 Cs and 54 Mn sources. The capability to create accurate simulations using either long-dwell static measurements or dynamic pass-by measurements as source data has been demonstrated. Quantitative relative performance, benefits, and shortcomings are discussed.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Nuclear Interdiction Through Relocatable Detectors

The NNSA Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) has investigated a set of minimal-infrastructure radiation detection systems as alternatives to fixed Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) for nuclear interdiction applications. These versatile and relocatable systems can improve nuclear security in missions or locations that do not warrant or support a standard fixed radiation detection system. Over 2019, a variety of relocatable detectors were characterized at the Interdiction Technologies Integration Laboratory at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). Evaluated detectors were diverse in their size and capabilities, ranging from backpack-sized systems to lane-spanning cargo scanning portals. Both spectroscopic and non-spectroscopic pedestrian and vehicle detection systems were characterized against uranium and plutonium sources. Signatures from the sources were modulated by both shielding and distance to quantify the performance of the relocatable systems as signal strength was decreased. Findings showed that relocatable spectroscopic detectors with isotope identification capabilities could reduce nuisance alarm rates compared to conventional fixed installation, gross-counting, radiation portal monitors. In vehicle scanning applications, detection ability generally trended with detection volume, regardless of spectral capability. In pedestrian scanning applications, several smaller backpack-sized detector systems were found to be more sensitive to detecting material than pedestrian portal monitors. The results of this characterization effort have helped inform the deployment of versatile equipment to improve nuclear security missions.

relocatable detectors, Nuclear Security↗

Natural attenuation of uranium in a fluvial Wetland: Importance of hydrology and speciation

A nuclear fuel fabrication facility released 43,500 kg of uranium into a riparian wetland located on the Savannah River Site between 1955 and 1988. Studies were undertaken to evaluate hydrological and geochemical processes influencing uranium accumulation in the wetland. Gamma-radiation-mapping surveys were conducted by systematically walking over the contaminated wetland with backpacks equipped with global positioning systems and NaI gamma detectors. Based on maps compiled from >700,000 gamma spectra and eight sediment uranium depth profiles, it was determined that 94% of the released uranium remained in the wetland. The uranium in the wetland is concentrated in five multi-hectare areas along the stream, accounting for ~11% of the land area adjacent to the stream. While land type (upland or wetland) and topography provided a reasonable first approximation of where much of the uranium was deposited, hydrological watershed modeling revealed that the stream velocity was especially slow through many of the hot spots. Here, using autoradiography combined with SEM/EDX measurements of contaminated sediments, surprisingly few hot particles were detected. Instead, uranium was evenly distributed throughout the sampled sediment, suggesting that dissolved uranium had bound to sediment particles that became suspended and later deposited in low energy (low flow velocity) portions of the stream. EXAFS suggested that U atoms were present as individual ions in disordered complexes within the sediment. Furthermore, linear combination analyses suggested that the predominant component of the U(VI) was adsorbed to sediment minerals (~70%) and a minor component (~30%) was associated with organic matter phases. Furthermore, these studies show that wetlands can be extraordinarily effective at binding and retaining uranium, thereby providing a natural barrier to the transport of uranium out of a watershed. However, significant anthropogenic or climatic changes to wetlands, such as those associated with flooding, forest fires, or land use, may disrupt the complex hydrological and biogeochemical balance necessary to maintain long-term immobilization of uranium.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗