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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

Integrating static PRA information with risk informed safety margin characterization (RISMC) simulation methods

The overall objective of the project was to develop a computationally feasible and user-friendly mechanized process to integrate traditional probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and dynamic PRA (DPRA) results. Starting with the systematic identification of items in an existing PRA that need dynamic augmentation, the project used a generic 4-loop pressurized reactor (PWR) and 3-loop PWR as example plants. Station blackout (SBO) and large break loss of coolant accident SBLOCA) were selected as the example initiating events. Using the traditional event-tree (ET)/fault-tree (FT) methodology augmented by dynamic evet tree approach, the potential consequences of the initiating events were simulated with RELAP-3D and MELCOR/RASCAL codes to cover Level 1 through Level 3 of PRA. RAVEN and ADAPT software were used to generate Level 1 simulations with RELAP-3D and Level 2/3 simulations with MELCOR (Level 2)/RASCAL (Level 3), respectively. Example branching conditions (BCs) for SBO included AC power recovery time, valve repair failure time, reactor coolant pump leak time/break size and emergency power supply duration to a total of 9. Example BCs for LOCA included off-site power recovery time, diesel generator power recovery time, auxiliary feed water system operation time, safety relief valve failure to open upon demand, reactor coolant pump seal break time and size to a total of 21. Each RELAP-3D simulation (9,587 scenarios) was labelled OK or Core Damage based on the maximum allowed peak clad temperature (2,100oF). Each MELCOR simulation (4610 scenarios) was labeled as Bin over 10rem or Bin 0-10rem based on the dose at the site boundary. The scenarios were clustered based on the criteria above using the mean shift methodology. Classical PRA (CPRA) and DPRA results were compared to identify the ET sequences that need DPRA augmentation. Several approaches were proposed for the incorporation of these sequences into CPRA using clustering with the mean shift methodology, restructuring the CPRA ETs by adding new BCs/sequences, and using the concept of a limit surface. Procedures for decision making regarding the possible consequences of an initiating event (e.g. core damage or not, site evacuation or not) were developed using a convolutional neural network (CNN), a recurrent neural network (RNN) and a transformer neural network (TNN). The project has led to two PhD degrees, three archival journal papers and five refereed conference proceedings.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Dose Consequence and Probabilistic Risk Assessment Integration into Digital Documented Safety Analysis

This is an intern poster presentation. The current reactor authorization process is complex and error prone. The development of a digital Documented Safety Analysis has been proposed to provide an automated and integrated solution to enhance the design and authorization process. The digital DSA will consist of interlinked models, analyses, and reports, all of which will be updated using automated workflows when design changes are made. This poster examines the integration of the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) with the transient and dose consequence analyses. A PRA for a generic high temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) has been constructed which will drive the input parameters for a transient analysis model currently being constructed. Dose consequence will be determined using the results of the transient analysis and the Radiation Safety Analysis Computer (RSAC) code. Dose consequence data will then be input back into the PRA to drive design parameters.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2022

ARC-100 Conceptual Design Phase Level 1 PSA Early Draft

This report represents the initial structure and content created for the ARC-100 nuclear reactor initial conceptual design Probabilistic Safety Assessment. The objective of the study is to assess the safety of the ARC-100 nuclear reactor conceptual design using a risk-informed approach. This early draft report is the first transmittal of the Probabilistic Safety Assessment approach and will be expanded over the remainder of the projects.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

The Meaning of Risk for Safety, Security, and Safeguards in the Design of Advanced Nuclear Reactors

What is the meaning of risk as it applies to the design of advanced reactors in the disciplines of safety, security, and safeguards? How can we find common terminology for the concept of risk and how can we find interfaces between these disciplines? These are important questions that should be explored in order that they may be applied in an integrated manner for the most effective and efficient design approaches. Eliminating or minimizing risks is a key design driver that motivates and informs the development of nuclear reactors. For safety, risk is well understood and applied in Probabilistic Risk Assessments. For security, the risk-based concepts of vulnerability assessments and vital areas are all considered in designing security systems. For safeguards, the concept of risk is not formally defined, as it relates to the design and operation of nuclear reactors. International nuclear safeguards seek to reduce the risk of proliferation in the nuclear fuel cycle and as such the concept of risk does exist. Therefore, the current understanding of the “3S’ approach, which seeks to find the interfaces and conflicts between safety, security, and safeguards requires a thorough understanding of the role that the reduction of risk plays in all three disciplines. The intersection of risk for safety and security is now being developed as there is a strong correlation between reactor design and operations and their vulnerability to sabotage. The intersection of risk for security and safeguards has to date chiefly been focused on the nuclear material control and accounting systems, which are relied on by both the operator (State) and the IAEA. This paper explores the concept of risk in each of the three disciplines, how they interact, potential conflicts and interfaces , how these might be addressed and leveraged, and a notional framework for how this could be achieved.

Kovacic, Donald N↗
DOE OSTI2021

Dynamic Probabilistic Safety Assessment Studies for Advanced Reactor Using RAVEN

Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) is used extensively to evaluate the risks associated with complex engineering systems like Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs). Current PSA models are based on the Event-Tree/Fault-Tree (ET/FT) methodology. ET and FT models are static and are based on Boolean logic approaches. In the past, concerns have been raised in the literature regarding the capability of the traditional static modelling approaches to adequately account for the impact of process, hardware, software, firmware and human interactions on the stochastic system behaviour. To overcome the limitations of the traditional approach to PSA, several dynamic PSA methodologies have been proposed. One of the dynamic PSA methodologies used for dynamic evaluations is Dynamic Event Tree (DET) framework which can be used to assess the impact of the parameter variability and scenario dynamics on the PSA model for the initiating event. The DET framework couples the stochastic model (number of component/trains that start on demand, operator action timing, etc.) with a Thermal-Hydraulic (TH) model of the plant. This paper explores the use of DET along with a case study on advanced reactor. The initiating event selected for the study was Class IV power supply failure event. The TH analysis considering uncertainty in various parameters was performed using RELAP5 and Reactor Analysis and Virtual control ENvironment (RAVEN) tool. Based on the uncertainty analysis, it is concluded that the peak clad temperatures (PCT) are within the limits in all the code runs implying a high-degree of safety margin. However, variation in time to reach the PCT was observed among the code runs and the mean time to reach the PCT was found to be around 8590sec (approximately 2.4 hours). Hence, sufficient time margin is available for human intervention and the operator might have a relatively stress-free state during such an accident scenario. Due to the static nature of the traditional PSA models, the safety margin available was lesser, whereas, with the help of dynamic PSA models, one can demonstrate that the actual available safety margin is more in the present case study and is valuable input from the design point of view.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment Based Response Surface Approach for FLEX and Accident Tolerant Fuels for Medium Break LOCA Spectrum

After the Fukushima Daiichi Accident, the safety features such as accident tolerant fuel (ATF) and diverse and flexible coping strategies (FLEX) for existing nuclear fleets are being investigated by the US Department of Energy under the Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program. This research is being conducted to quantify the risk-benefit of these safety features. Dynamic probabilistic risk assessment (DPRA)-based response-surface approach has been presented to quantify the FLEX and ATF benefits by estimating the risk associated with each option. ATFs with multilayered silicon carbide (SiC), iron-chromium-aluminum, and chromium-coated zirconium cladding were considered in this study. While these ATF candidates perform better than the current zirconium cladding (Zr), they may introduce additional failure modes in some operating conditions. The fuel failure analysis modules (FAMs) were developed to investigate ATF performance. The dynamic risk assessments were performed using RAVEN, a DPRA tool, coupled with RELAP5 and FAMs. A cumulative distribution function-based index provided a mean of comparing the benefits of safety enhancements. For medium break loss of coolant accidents, FLEX operational timing window for each fuel type was estimated. Among these ATF candidates, SiC-type ATF was the most beneficial candidate for an increased safety margin than Zr-based fuel and was found to complement FLEX strategies in terms of risk and coping time.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Safety Analysis for the Versatile Test Reactor Conceptual Design

Safety analysis simulations have been carried out using the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 safety analysis code system to update the baseline set of results for the Versatile Test Reactor conceptual design. Results from a previous revision of this work provided input for the Conceptual Safety Design Report summarizing the overall safety basis for the VTR. This work will also support future analyses that will be required for Chapter 13, “Accident Analysis,” of a preliminary safety analysis report. A number of transients have been evaluated based on categories of postulated accident sequences suggested for consideration in NUREG-1537. Ultimately, the full spectrum of event initiators and subsequent accident sequences will be defined through a probabilistic risk assessment of the plant design following the implementation of the Licensing Modernization Project guidelines as described in the VTR Safety Design Strategy. Since that process is ongoing, the present analysis addresses several transients that are expected to be bounding accident scenarios that represent the three key ways to perturb a reactor: through changes to the core inlet temperature, mass flow rate, or reactivity. These correspond to a loss of heat sink (LOHS), loss of flow (LOF) or station blackout (SBO), and transient overpower (TOP), respectively. Both Protected and Unprotected versions of these transients have been evaluated, along with additional transients that include transient overpower with one stuck rod, pump coast-down failures, seismic events, and overcooling events. At the current stage of design, transient simulation results for the Versatile Test Reactor indicate that large safety margins exist for many event initiators. However, several “enabling” assumptions have been made, in terms of both design features and design limits, in order to perform the analyses; and these assumptions will need to be revised as the design matures. In addition, a larger spectrum of events needs to be evaluated as part of the on-going probabilistic risk assessment process.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor: Accident Analysis

Licensing Modernization Project (LMP) Risk Informed Approach Selection of Licensing Basis Events (LBEs) Frequency-Consequence Target LBE Cumulative Risk Targets Structures, Systems, and Components (SSC) Safety Categories Classification Evaluation of Defense in Depth (DID) Use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) in LMP Process PRA Policy Statement American Nuclear Society (ANS) Non-Light-Water Reactor (non-LWR) PRA Standard

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Enhancement of Industry Legacy Probabilistic Risk Assessment Methods and Tools

Probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) are integral to nuclear power plant (NPP) operations, having tremendously benefitted the safety of the U.S. reactor fleet for decades. Insights obtained from the models have provided perspectives on a variety of applications, both at the plant and for the regulator. While these models are very useful, they are now being asked to represent and analyze aspects of the plant that were never envisioned by the initial PRA practitioners. Furthermore, heightened demands on the PRA models have led to increased computing power requirements. Additionally, as the complexity of the PRA models increased, the difficulty experienced by non-PRA experts in trying to understand these models, grasp the insights they provide, and effectively use that information has become problematic. The need for research to address key issues regarding PRA tools and methods has never been greater. Although the nuclear power industry has largely been well-served by these tools and methods, the underlying science is dated, remaining mostly unchanged for over two decades. Three areas were identified as most beneficial to address to maintain and improve the usefulness of the current practice legacy PRA tools: improvement in quantification speed, increased ability to efficiently model multi-hazard models, and improvement in modeling human action dependency in PRA. This report provides the outcomes from the FY2021 research into these three areas, identifying potential technical gaps and solutions, and charting the next steps forward to address current PRA challenges.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Development and Validation of a Probabilistic Risk Assessment Model for a Generic Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor

This study looks to develop and validate a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model for the modular high temperature gas-cooled reactor (MHTGR) using INL’s Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) software. Validation against a General Atomics design involves matching event and fault trees to historical frequencies, with a goal of under 15% difference. The research aims to deliver a reliable PRA model to assess the safety of MHTGRs for use within high-temperature industrial applications.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2022

A framework to implement human reliability analysis during early design stages of advanced reactors

Nuclear power plants require human actions throughout their lifecycle from design, construction, operation, and decommissioning. However, for advanced reactors (e.g., Generation IV), the reliance on human intervention in safety-related actions is expected to be reduced or completely replaced by automated actions. The Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Standard for Advanced Non-LWR Nuclear Power Plants requires that the impacts of all operator actions are captured and incorporated in the risk of the modeled plant. Moreover, the Modernization of Technical Requirements for Licensing Advanced Reactors requires human reliability analysis (HRA) to be included throughout all design and PRA development stages. However, due to the lack of details during the early design stages, HRA is often postponed until the design is mature enough. Conducting HRA in later design stages, though it may be adequate in capturing pre-, at-, and post-initiators comes short of informing the design itself in the iterative design lifecycle. Hence, this paper presents a framework to include HRA during the design's early stages, pre-conceptual or conceptual. The proposed framework provides a process for the removal of operator actions that do not contribute to the risk and the identification of all key operator actions that are critical to the safety of the design. The results of this framework are then used to inform the design of those safety-related operator actions to update the design further. Then, using information from the updated design, this framework can be reapplied to investigate the impact of the design update on human reliability. The PRA model of the X-energy's pre-conceptual Xe-100 high-temperature gas-cooled pebble-bed reactor (HTGR-PB) design is used to demonstrate the approach. In the pre-conceptual Xe-100 PRA model, also called Phase 0 PRA model, human actions were considered an integral part of analyzing the plant response to different initiating events. Hence, in this paper, all possible human actions in the Xe-100 PRA model are identified, analyzed, and removed to emulate a design relying only on the available automated control systems. The preliminary results of this assessment show how safe the Xe-100 design is even without crediting any human actions. The results also list necessary sequences in which operator actions are critical to the risk profile of the design.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

METHODOLOGY AND APPLICATION OF PHYSICAL SECURITY EFFECTIVENESS BASED ON DYNAMIC FORCE-ON-FORCE MODELING

This paper describes ongoing work within the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to optimize security and cost of nuclear power plants (NPPs). It reviews the conservatisms in conventional physical security posture and regulations. It introduces the dynamic risk assessment tool developed at INL, Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD). The dynamic assessment methodology leverages EMRALD to process results of force-on-force (FOF) simulations and crediting safety mitigation actions from probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) models as well as diverse and flexible coping strategies (FLEX) mitigation strategies. Timing information from these simulations are compared against the available time to perform mitigations obtained from Reactor Excursion and Leak Analysis Program (RELAP5) simulations. To illustrate the methodology, a station blackout (SBO) attack scenario was modeled in commercially available FOF simulation tools. The simulation results provide valuable insights into possible attack outcomes and as the probabilistic risk of a core damage event given these outcomes. Safety mitigation procedures were modeled in EMRALD, and were dependent on the attack outcomes by considering human operator uncertainties. RELAP5 simulations incorporating human and hardware uncertainties were performed to estimate the distribution of time-to-core damage. The results demonstrate that, even in the extreme case of a successful adversarial attack, plant mitigation strategies provide significantly high-likelihood of preventing radiological release. The proposed modeling and simulation framework of integrating FLEX equipment with FOF models enables the NPPs to credit FLEX portable equipment in the plant security posture, resulting in an efficient and optimized physical security.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Solutions for Enhanced Legacy Probabilistic Risk Assessment Tools and Methodologies: Improving Efficiency of Model Development and Processing via Innovative Human Reliability Dependency Analysis

Probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) are integral to nuclear power plant (NPP) operations, having tremendously benefitted the safety of the U.S. reactor fleet for decades. Insights obtained from the models have provided perspectives on a variety of applications, both at the plant and for the regulator. While these models are very useful, they are now being asked to represent and analyze aspects of the plant that were never envisioned by the initial PRA practitioners. Furthermore, heightened demands on the PRA models have led to increased computing power requirements. Additionally, as the complexity of the PRA models increased, the difficulty experienced by non-PRA experts in trying to understand these models, grasp the insights they provide, and effectively use that information has become problematic. The need for research to address key issues regarding PRA tools and methods has never been greater. Although the nuclear power industry has largely been well-served by these tools and methods, the underlying science is dated, remaining mostly unchanged for over two decades. Three areas were identified as most beneficial to address to maintain and improve the usefulness of the current practice legacy PRA tools: improved quantification speed, increased ability to efficiently model multi-hazard models, and improved modeling human action dependency in PRA. This report is focused on the third critical area, improvements in dependency analysis of human actions conducted as part of a typical human reliability assessment.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Implications of Safety and Operational Features of Small, Advanced Reactors for the Evaluation of Important Human Actions

The design and operational characteristics of non-light water reactors are likely to change the role of human actions in safety function management and the types of human actions that are deemed important. The objectives of this report are to: • Identify the implications of small, advanced reactor design characteristics on human performance and the changing role of human actions in the management of safety functions. • Identify the methods that may be used to identify important human actions. • Identify how HFE safety reviewers can help ensure that the methods adequately model human actions to identify those that are important to safety. We identified the implications of small, advanced reactor characteristics on the role of personnel in safety function management. Then we addressed how designers can identify which human actions are important to safety using both probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and deterministic analyses. PRA identifies important human actions using risk-importance criteria. Deterministically identified important human actions include those identified by analyses of situations such as transients and accidents and defense in depth. In all cases, the acceptability of the analyses is dependent on the modeling, quantification, and criterion selection to determine which human actions are important. How well the designers address these processes determines the acceptability of their methodology.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Advancing Multi-Hazard Risk and Safety Considerations for Aging Nuclear Facilities (Revision 1)

This project will demonstrate a multi-hazard time-dependent probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) approach for nuclear facilities considering aging-related deterioration of structures. A generic pressurized water reactor (PWR) reactor subjected to seismic mainshock-aftershock sequences considering the aging of the containment structure will be used as a case study to demonstrate the multi-hazard PRA approach. Using advanced modeling and simulation, seismic mainshock-aftershock fragility functions will be simulated for the containment structure considering aging effects. A multi-hazard PRA model for a generic PWR reactor will be built to quantify the multi-hazard core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF) with explicit time-dependent modeling of event sequences. To date, the cascading impacts of multi-hazards are not adequately accounted for in the PRA models for nuclear facilities. In addition, for both initial and periodic evaluation of facilities to withstand natural phenomena hazards (NPH), deterioration of the SSCs due to aging and other effects is not adequately considered. By advancing multi-hazard considerations accounting for aging effects, this project will contribute to improved understanding of the safety of aging nuclear facilities. Project outcomes such as the multi-hazard CDF and LERF will also allow facility owners to optimize upgrade and retrofit protocols. This project is divided into two components: (1) advanced modeling and simulations; and (2) multi-hazard PRA. For the first component, Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL) Multi-hazard Analysis for STOchastic time-DOmaiN phenomena (MASTODON) and BlackBear codes will be used to simulate the seismic response and damage of a containment structure under cascading mainshock-aftershock sequences with aging effects. Uncertainties related to the seismic inputs, material parameters, and environmental factors such as temperature and humidity will be identified and propagated to the fragility functions. These fragility functions, which consider aging effects, will be time dependent. The second component will take the fragility information from the first component to build a multi-hazard time-dependent PRA model starting from a generic PWR model to evaluate the multi-hazard CDF and LERF and characterize the associated consequences. For this component, OpenPRA Web Application and SAPHIRE code will be used. Events such as the Fukushima Daiichi accident have highlighted the importance of considering the cascading impacts of multi-hazards for PRA. Moreover, many of the reactors in the current nuclear fleet in the United States (US) are already operating well beyond their initially planned design life, and applications for further extensions to operating licenses are being considered. Therefore, considering multi-hazard effects and aging deterioration in the NPH risk assessment process will contribute to the safety of both existing and future nuclear facilities. Outcomes of this project will thus directly benefit the standards DOE-STD-1020-16 and DOE-HDBK-1224-18.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Cost- and Risk-Based Seismic Design Optimization of Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems

Seismic analysis, design, and qualification of systems, structures, and components (SSCs) is a significant contributor to the capital cost of a nuclear power plant. To reduce capital costs of advanced nuclear power plants and make commercial nuclear energy more competitive, innovations are needed in their structural design and construction, and not just in the reactor core and associated systems. Seismic isolation has been identified as an important cost-cutting technology that enables standardization of equipment across various sites. This paper develops and demonstrates a cost- and risk-based seismic design optimization of a representative safety system in a nuclear power plant with the dual goals of minimizing overnight capital cost and meeting safety goals. The design optimization can also include component seismic isolation, in which case, the optimized design includes a set of equipment that needs to be seismically isolated to minimize capital cost. The open-source codes MASTODON and Dakota are used for seismic probabilistic risk assessment and design optimization, respectively. A generic nuclear facility with a safety system comprising SSCs that are common to nuclear power plants is considered for the demonstration of the design optimization and is assumed to be located at the Idaho National Laboratory site. Generic costs and seismic design cost functions are assumed for the SSCs of the safety system. The sum of the costs of the SSCs is minimized in the optimization process, while the risk of failure of the safety system is provided as a constraint. Furthermore, results show that the optimization process reduces capital costs significantly while automatically prioritizing the safety of SSCs that contribute most to the risk of the safety system.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Optimization of Mitigating System Performance Index to Improve Nuclear Power Plant Safety and Efficiency

MSPI (Mitigation System Performance Index) is one of the risk-informed, plant-specific performance indicators of NRC’s Reactor Oversight Process. MSPI is used by the regulator and nuclear industry to monitor and assess the performance of plant mitigating systems. In this project, a calculation tool has been developed by incorporating the plant operation data, Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) data, and industry baseline values to automate the calculation process of MSPI and the generation of the report. This is the first stage in an effort to optimize the MSPI through advanced artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) techniques to improve nuclear power plant safety and efficiency.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗