SEARCH · Search NASA
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
The computer program listing for the reliability block diagram computation program described in Reliability Computation From Reliability Block Diagrams is given. The program is written in FORTRAN 4 and is currently running on a Univac 1108. Each subroutine contains a description of its function.
Computer program computes system reliability for very general class of reliability block diagrams. Four factors are considered in calculating probability of system success: active block redundancy, standby block redundancy, partial redundancy, and presence of equivalent blocks in the diagram.
A method and a computer program are presented to calculate probability of system success from an arbitrary reliability block diagram. The class of reliability block diagrams that can be handled include any active/standby combination of redundancy, and the computations include the effects of dormancy and switching in any standby redundancy. The mechanics of the program are based on an extension of the probability tree method of computing system probabilities.
In order to perform public risk analyses for vehicles containing Flight Termination Systems (FTS), it is necessary for the analyst to know the reliability of each of the components of the FTS. These systems are typically divided into two segments; a transmitter system and associated equipment, typically in a ground station or on a support aircraft, and a receiver system and associated equipment on the target vehicle. This analysis attempts to analyze the reliability of the NASA DFRC flight termination system ground transmitter segment for use in the larger risk analysis and to compare the results against two established Department of Defense availability standards for such equipment.
Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) integrated circuits (IC) are one of the key electronic components in today's sophisticated launch and space vehicle complex avionic systems, largely due to their superb reprogrammable and reconfigurable capabilities combined with relatively low non-recurring engineering costs (NRE) and short design cycle. Consequently, FPGAs are prevalent ICs in communication protocols and control signal commands. This paper will identify reliability concerns and high level guidelines to estimate FPGA total failure rates in a launch vehicle application. The paper will discuss hardware, hardware description language, and radiation induced failures. The hardware contribution of the approach accounts for physical failures of the IC. The hardware description language portion will discuss the high level FPGA programming languages and software/code reliability growth. The radiation portion will discuss FPGA susceptibility to space environment radiation.
No abstract available
This chapter describes some of the building blocks to ensure a higher level of confidence in the predictability and reliability (PAR) of numerical simulation of multiscale complex nonlinear problems. The focus is on relating PAR of numerical simulations with complex nonlinear phenomena of numerics. To isolate sources of numerical uncertainties, the possible discrepancy between the chosen partial differential equation (PDE) model and the real physics and/or experimental data is set aside. The discussion is restricted to how well numerical schemes can mimic the solution behavior of the underlying PDE model for finite time steps and grid spacings. The situation is complicated by the fact that the available theory for the understanding of nonlinear behavior of numerics is not at a stage to fully analyze the nonlinear Euler and Navier-Stokes equations. The discussion is based on the knowledge gained for nonlinear model problems with known analytical solutions to identify and explain the possible sources and remedies of numerical uncertainties in practical computations. Examples relevant to turbulent flow computations are included.
This talk describes some of the building blocks to ensure a higher level of confidence in the predictability and reliability (PAR) of numerical simulation of multiscale complex nonlinear problems. The focus is on relating PAR of numerical simulations with complex nonlinear phenomena of numerics. To isolate sources of numerical uncertainties, the possible discrepancy between the chosen partial differential equation (PDE) model and the real physics and/or experimental data is set aside. The discussion is restricted to how well numerical schemes can mimic the solution behavior of the underlying PDE model for finite time steps and grid spacings. The situation is complicated by the fact that the available theory for the understanding of nonlinear behavior of numerics is not at a stage to fully analyze the nonlinear Euler and Navier-Stokes equations. The discussion is based on the knowledge gained for nonlinear model problems with known analytical solutions to identify and explain the possible sources and remedies of numerical uncertainties in practical computations. Examples relevant to turbulent flow computations are included.
This chapter describes some of the building blocks to ensure a higher level of confidence in the predictability and reliability (PAR) of numerical simulation of multiscale complex nonlinear problems. The focus is on relating PAR of numerical simulations with complex nonlinear phenomena of numerics. To isolate sources of numerical uncertainties, the possible discrepancy between the chosen partial differential equation (PDE) model and the real physics and/or experimental data is set aside. The discussion is restricted to how well numerical schemes can mimic the solution behavior of the underlying PDE model for finite time steps and grid spacings. The situation is complicated by the fact that the available theory for the understanding of nonlinear behavior of numerics is not at a stage to fully analyze the nonlinear Euler and Navier-Stokes equations. The discussion is based on the knowledge gained for nonlinear model problems with known analytical solutions to identify and explain the possible sources and remedies of numerical uncertainties in practical computations.
This paper presents Helios Critical Design Review Reliability form October 16-20, 1972. The topics include: 1) Reliability Requirement; 2) Reliability Apportionment; 3) Failure Rates; 4) Reliability Assessment; 5) Reliability Block Diagram; and 5) Reliability Information Sheet.
The Proton Improvement Plan -II (PIP-II) is a high intensity and high energy proton accelerator which will be used to support the neutrino program at Fermilab. The accelerator will deliver a 2 mA average beam current at a kinetic energy of 800 MeV. Due to the requirements from experiments, this accelerator is designed to be a highly reliable and available system. A target availability of the complete accelerator facility was prescribed to be 90%. An availability and reliability assessment of the accelerator was carried out to ascertain that the design can meet the target availability specification. The results were estimated for the nominal operational mode, when an 800 MeV beam is delivered on the target and for the critical operational mode, when a 600 MeV output beam was incident on the target. The design of a complete accel-erator system is a complex arrangement of a large number of components. To simplify the analysis, a few components were shortlisted and based on their functions, an accelerator model was created. The model is represented in the form of reliability block diagrams. Availability and reliability were estimated for each operational mode. To increase the availa-bility and reliability of the overall accelerator, redundancy of one cavity per section in the superconducting portion of the Linac was introduced.
Current system reliability methods (typically based on fault trees or reliability block diagrams) can effectively propagate reliability data from the asset to the system level in order to identify system critical points. However, employed asset reliability data are an approximated integral representation of the past industrywide operational experience, and they neglect the present asset health status (available, for example, from online monitoring data and diagnostic assessments) and forecasted health projection (when available from prognostic models). Asset health should be informed solely by that specific asset’s current and historical performance data and should not be an approximated integral representation of the past industrywide operational experience (as currently performed by system reliability models through Bayesian updating processes). Sensor data, diagnostic assessments, and prognostic assessments are in fact not considered in plant reliability models used to inform system engineers on the most critical assets. In addition, the propagation of quantitative health data from the asset to the system level is a challenge given the diverse nature and structure of health data elements (e.g., vibration spectra, temperature readings, expected failure time). Ideally, in a predictive maintenance context, system reliability models should support decision making by propagating available health information from the asset to the system level in order to provide a quantitative snapshot of system health and identify the most critical assets. Here, this paper is directly addressing these two goals by proposing a different approach for reliability modeling that relies on asset diagnostic and prognostic assessments, along with monitoring data to measure asset health. The propagation of health data from the asset to the system level is performed through fault tree models not in probability terms, but in terms of margin where margin is the “distance” between the present status and an undesired event (e.g., failure or unacceptable performance). Through a cause-effect lens, while classical reliability models target the effect associated with asset performance, a margin-based approach focuses on the cause of an undesired asset performance (i.e., its health). Hence, thinking of reliability in terms of margins implies decision-making based on causal reasoning. We will show how fault tree models can be solved using a margin language and how this process can effectively assist system engineers to identify the most critical assets.
The engineering process of Design for Reliability (DfR) is well established in the automotive and aerospace industries. DfR should be useful in the future development of space life support systems. DfR is a sequence of tasks that develop system requirements and plan reliability analysis and testing. First and fundamentally, the reliability requirement is defined. Next the system reliability model is developed, often using a reliability block diagram. The overall system reliability requirement is allocated to the subsystems and an estimate of the attainable reliability is made. This expected reliability can be improved by simplifying the design by removing components or by replacing less reliable components. Improving reliability can require difficult compromises, such as reducing performance requirements, increasing budget, or extending testing. The actual system reliability can be determined only by testing, which should continue long enough to provide the required confidence in the measured value. New systems often have unexpected design errors that cause failures in early testing. The usual reliability improvement process of testing, finding the failure modes, and redesigning to remove them reduces the failure rate and is referred to as “reliability growth.” After redesign has been completed, the system should be further tested to determine the actual achieved reliability more accurately. If the final system failure rate is too high, redundant systems can be used to improve overall operational reliability. Adding redundancy simply to increase the one- or two-fault tolerance metric may sometimes reduce reliability. Reliability can be improved in three ways: redesigning the system to include more reliable subsystems and components, reliability growth testing and failure mode removal, and by using parallel redundant systems. DfR should combine these approaches to achieve the required reliability while managing performance, cost, and schedule.
The engineering process of Design for Reliability (DfR) is well established in the automotive and aerospace industries. DfR should be useful in the future development of space life support systems. DfR is a sequence of tasks that develop system requirements and plan reliability analysis and testing. First and fundamentally, the reliability requirement is defined. Next the system reliability model is developed, often using a reliability block diagram. The overall system reliability requirement is allocated to the subsystems and an estimate of the attainable reliability is made. This expected reliability can be improved by simplifying the design by removing components or by replacing less reliable components. Improving reliability can require difficult compromises, such as reducing performance requirements, increasing budget, or extending testing. The actual system reliability can be determined only by testing, which should continue long enough to provide the required confidence in the measured value. New systems often have unexpected design errors that cause failures in early testing. The usual reliability improvement process of testing, finding the failure modes, and redesigning to remove them reduces the failure rate and is referred to as “reliability growth.” After redesign has been completed, the system should be further tested to determine the actual achieved reliability more accurately. If the final system failure rate is too high, redundant systems can be used to improve overall operational reliability. Adding redundancy simply to increase the one- or two-fault tolerance metric may sometimes reduce reliability. Reliability can be improved in three ways: redesigning the system to include more reliable subsystems and components, reliability growth testing and failure mode removal, and by using parallel redundant systems. DfR should combine these approaches to achieve the required reliability while managing performance, cost, and schedule.
The Space Shuttle Orbiter is the only space reentry vehicle in which the crew is seated upright. This position presents some physiological effects requiring countermeasures to prevent a crewmember from becoming incapacitated. This also introduces a potential need for automated vehicle landing capability. Autoland is a primary procedure that was identified as a requirement for landing following and extended duration orbiter mission. This report documents the results of the reliability analysis performed on the hardware required for an automated landing. A reliability block diagram was used to evaluate system reliability. The analysis considers the manual and automated landing modes currently available on the Orbiter. (Autoland is presently a backup system only.) Results of this study indicate a +/- 36 percent probability of successfully extending a nominal mission to 30 days. Enough variations were evaluated to verify that the reliability could be altered with missions planning and procedures. If the crew is modeled as being fully capable after 30 days, the probability of a successful manual landing is comparable to that of Autoland because much of the hardware is used for both manual and automated landing modes. The analysis indicates that the reliability for the manual mode is limited by the hardware and depends greatly on crew capability. Crew capability for a successful landing after 30 days has not been determined yet.
Here, this paper presents a series of methods designed to incorporate classical Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) models such as Event Trees (ETs) and Fault Trees (FTs) into dynamic PRA. In contrast to classical PRA, dynamic PRA couples stochastic methods with system simulators to determine the risks associated with complex systems such as nuclear power plants. Compared with classical PRA methods, they can evaluate with higher resolution the safety impact of timing and sequencing of events on the progression of the accident. As part of a dynamic PRA analysis, it is not uncommon that parts of the system to be analyzed might not require a computationally expensive simulation model. These parts could be in fact modeled by employing classical PRA models (e.g., a FT). Here, we present a set of methods and tools that can be used to link the most common classical PRA models (ETs, FTs, reliability block diagrams and Markov models) to simulation codes such as RELAP5-3D: creating a “hybrid PRA.” In order to show the potential of such an hybrid PRA we employ this method to verify ET modeling assumptions (e.g., success criteria) using a large break loss of coolant accident initiating event as a test case. In this respect, we link a set of FTs from the original PRA to the RELAP5-3D code and perform a hybrid PRA. The FTs are employed to model the control logic of several safety systems and to propagate component failures throughout the system. Provided the generated dynamic PRA data, we show how conservative assumptions in the original PRA can be identified and how such original PRA can be modified by updating success criteria captured by the set of RELAP5-3D simulation runs.
A preliminary failure mode, failure effect, and criticality analysis of the major subsystems of nuclear electric propulsion is presented. Simplified reliability block diagrams are also given. A computer program was used to calculate the reliability of the heat rejection subsystem.
Computer program to calculate probability of system success from arbitrary reliability block diagram using IBM 1620