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NASA NTRS2023

The Hazard Components of Representative Key Risks. The Physical Climate Perspective

The framework of Representative Key Risks (RKRs) has been adopted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working Group II (WGII) to categorize, assess and communicate a wide range of regional and sectoral key risks from climate change. These are risks expected to become severe due to the potentially detrimental convergence of changing climate conditions with the exposure and vulnerability of human and natural systems. Other papers in this special issue treat each of eight RKRs holistically by assessing their current status and future evolution as a result of this convergence. However, in these papers, such assessment cannot always be organized according to a systematic gradation of climatic changes. Often the big-picture evolution of risk has to be extrapolated from either qualitative effects of “low”, “medium” and “high” warming, or limited/focused analysis of the consequences of particular mitigation choices (e.g., benefits of limiting warming to 1.5 or 2C), together with consideration of the socio-economic context and possible adaptation choices. In this study we offer a representation – as systematic as possible given current literature and assessments – of the future evolution of the hazard components of RKRs. We identify the relevant hazards for each RKR, based upon the WGII authors’ assessment, and we report on their current state and expected future changes in magnitude, intensity and/or frequency, linking these changes to Global Warming Levels (GWLs) to the extent possible. We draw on the assessment of changes in climatic impact-drivers relevant to RKRs described in the 6th Assessment Report by Working Group I supplemented when needed by more recent literature. For some of these quantities - like regional trends in oceanic and atmospheric temperature and precipitation, some heat and precipitation extremes, permafrost thaw and Northern Hemisphere snow cover - a strong and quantitative relationship with increasing GWLs has been identified. For others - like frequency and intensity of tropical cyclones and extra-tropical storms, and fire weather - that link can only be described qualitatively. For some processes - like the behavior of ice sheets, or changes in circulation dynamics - large uncertainties about the effects of different GWLs remain, and for a few others - like ocean pH and air pollution - the composition of the scenario of anthropogenic emissions is most relevant, rather than the warming reached. In almost all cases, however, the basic message remains that every small increment in CO2 concentration in the atmosphere and associated warming will bring changes in climate phenomena that will contribute to increasing risk of impacts on human and natural systems, in the absence of compensating changes in these systems’ exposure and vulnerability, and in the absence of effective adaptation. Our picture of the evolution of RKR-relevant climatic impact-drivers complements and enriches the treatment of RKRs in the other papers in at least two ways: by filling in their often only cursory or limited representation of the physical climate aspects driving impacts, and by providing a fuller representation of their future potential evolution, an important component – if never the only one – of the future evolution of risk severity.

Representative Key Risks↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

AgMIP Local, National and Global Assessments of Food System Challenges in A Changing Climate

Food systems connect a diverse network of stakeholders around the world, with complex dynamics governing production, processing, transportation, trade and consumption of food products. Extreme conditions can disrupt multiple components of the food system, with systemic connections providing structure that can both buffer and exacerbate risks. Climate change is shifting current practices in agricultural production and the broader food system, encouraging shifts toward more diverse value chains capable of drawing from multiple food producing regions to reduce the chance that an entire value chain be subject to simultaneous impacts. The IPCC Working Group I report assessed that heat waves, fires, floods and severe storms are becoming more pronounced and widespread with each degree of global warming, increasing food system risk. Food system disruptions can also come from outside the climate system, including from viral outbreaks, geopolitical conflict and socioeconomic changes. This presentation will highlight how the Agricultural Model Intercomparison and Improvement Project (AgMIP) develops modeling approaches that connect climate, biophysical and socioeconomic models in order to capture complex responses of the food system and potential interventions by diverse stakeholders in the public and private sectors. Models are applied on a range of scales that match decision contexts. These include households in specific agricultural production regions (e.g., within a country), national-level policymakers considering policies, sustainability and development priorities for a country’s agricultural sector, and global food market models that balance production and consumption around the world with competition for land, water, energy and sustainability priorities. Models are capable of capturing many important responses, but further development is needed to represent key systemic risks and the possibility for additional interventions beyond the farm gate. Improved food system models will provide important insights into our society’s ability to cope with climate change, as well as our ability to identify agricultural adaptation and mitigation opportunities to reduce overall risk.

Food systems↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Novel Approach to Simulating Diagnostic Capabilities in Medical Resource Risk Assessment

Diagnostics represent a key subset of medical resources considered for helping mitigate and control spaceflight medical risk. Historically, when modeling the medical risk domain for spaceflight, diagnostic resources have been handled like any other medical resource used for treatment. That is to say, the resource being unavailable will result in the related condition having suboptimal treatment outcomes. However in the real world, should a diagnostic resource be unavailable, a more analogous effect would be that the condition might be misdiagnosed, and thus inappropriate treatment applied. This talk presents an alternative means of representing diagnostic resources within the Medical Extensible Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment Tool (MEDPRAT) that can simulate the effect both in risk, resource consumption, and competition for resources of a missing or depleted diagnostic. The scenario where a differential diagnosis may not be possible for abdominal conditions that use an ultrasound machine as a diagnostic tool is considered. Two approaches for modeling the effect of not having a diagnostic capability on the medical system are demonstrated. In the “simple” approach, it is assumed that any abdominal condition requiring the ultrasound machine for diagnosis is mis-diagnosed and treated as an appendicitis. This is represented by replacing the treatment for the affected conditions with the treatment for appendicitis, thereby changing the optimized medical set available for treatment for the remainder of the mission. In the “complex” approach, MEDPRAT treatment clusters are utilized to capture and represent overlapping treatment between the misdiagnosed condition and appendicitis. This elicits both the effect that inappropriate treatment is applied, resulting in wasted resource consumption, and that treatment which was truly needed for the misdiagnosed condition was not applied, which reduces the treatment effectiveness. In this talk, results comparing the simple and complex diagnostic capability approach to a baseline where the diagnostic is treated as a traditional resource is presented. Either approach provides an option for a more analogous representation of diagnostic resources and provides insight into how the modeled spaceflight medical resources and outcomes change when that diagnostic is unavailable.

C. M. Gasiewski↗

NASA NTRS2024

PDC25 Epoch 1 Damage Risk Maps Content Key

These maps represent asteroid impact damage estimates modeled for the PDC25 Hypothetical Asteroid Impact Exercise, as part of the 9th AIAA Planetary Defense Conference (PDC2025). This exercise assesses a realistic but fictitious hypothetical scenario, not a real asteroid threat.

SMD↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Standard Measures During Spaceflight

The key goal of the Spaceflight Standard Measures project is to ensure that a set of measures, representing the Human Research Program’s key risks and acquired with minimal impact on time and resources, is consistently captured from crewmembers through the end of the International Space Station (ISS) Program. Data collected under the Spaceflight Standard Measures project include assessments of sleep/wake cycles, cognition, immune status and function, general blood and urine chemistry (urine is collected only before flight and after landing), microbiome composition (gastrointestinal tract, saliva, and body surface), cardiovascular structure and function (carotid intima-media thickness, orthostatic responses), sensorimotor function, and team processes. Data is collected once or twice before the flight (180 and 90 days before launch), twice during the 6-month missions (fight day 30 and 30 days before return to Earth) with the exception of actigraphy, which is recorded continuously during the mission, and during two-week periods before and after the mission. In this presentation, we will review the data collected to date on twelve ISS crew members. These data are placed in the NASA Life Sciences Data Archive and are available for occupational surveillance (using non-identifiable data) Institutional Review Board-approved data sharing requests, and retrospective data requests. This data repository enables high-level monitoring of the effectiveness of countermeasures and meaningful interpretation of health and performance outcomes for various mission durations. The knowledge gained from this project informs and supports future hypothesis-driven research that will enable the success of planetary missions.

G R Clement↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Standard Measures During Spaceflight

The goal of the Spaceflight Standard Measures project is to ensure that a set of measures, representing the Human Research Program’s key risks and acquired with minimal impact on time and resources, is consistently captured from crewmembers through the end of the International Space Station (ISS) Program. Data collected under the Spaceflight Standard Measures project include assessments of sleep/wake cycles, cognition, immune status and function, general blood and urine chemistry (urine is collected only before flight and after landing), microbiome composition (gastrointestinal tract, saliva, and body surface), cardiovascular structure and function (carotid intima-media thickness, orthostatic responses), sensorimotor function, sleep quality, and team processes. Data is collected once or twice before the flight (180 and 90 days before launch), twice during the 6-month missions (flight day 30 and 30 days before return to Earth) with the exception of actigraphy, which is recorded during two-week periods before, during, and after the mission. In this presentation, we will review the data collected to date on 31 ISS crewmembers. These data are placed in the NASA Life Sciences Portal (NLSP) and are available for occupational surveillance (using non-identifiable data), Institutional Review Board-approved data sharing requests, and retrospective data requests. This data repository enables high-level monitoring of the effectiveness of countermeasures and meaningful interpretation of health and performance outcomes for various mission durations. The knowledge gained from this project informs and supports future hypothesis-driven research that will enable the success of planetary missions.

G R Clement↗

NASA NTRS2006

NASA Crew Launch Vehicle Flight Test Options

Options for development flight testing (DFT) of the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) are discussed. The Ares-I Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) is being developed by the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to launch the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) into low Earth Orbit (LEO). The Ares-I implements one of the components of the Vision for Space Exploration (VSE), providing crew and cargo access to the International Space Station (ISS) after retirement of the Space Shuttle and, eventually, forming part of the launch capability needed for lunar exploration. The role of development flight testing is to demonstrate key sub-systems, address key technical risks, and provide flight data to validate engineering models in representative flight environments. This is distinguished from certification flight testing, which is designed to formally validate system functionality and achieve flight readiness. Lessons learned from Saturn V, Space Shuttle, and other flight programs are examined along with key Ares-I technical risks in order to provide insight into possible development flight test strategies. A strategy for the first test flight of the Ares I, known as Ares I-1, is presented.

Cockrell, Charles E., Jr.↗

NASA NTRS2003

Metrics for in-space telescope assembly techniques

Reliable metrics are not yet available for choosing among human and robotic assets for space-based construction and servicing of large space telescopes. Using FAIR-DART as a reference design, we generated example event sequences for telescope assembly scenarios in enough detail to identify infrastructure assumptions and technology requirements. A systems trade among human and robotic techniques (human EVA, on-site telerobotic, ground-in-the- loop robotic, commanded or sequenced robotic, and autonomous/decision-making robotic) helped us to define key metrics in the human-robotic trade space, including quality, time, cost, and risk. Our methodology included examining representative end-member scenarios. Case A treated each step in the assembly sequence as if all other steps have no on-site human involvement, and Case B treated each step as if human EVA is already involved in all other steps. With this trade, we identified key enabling technologies and infrastructure for space-based assembly and servicing of large space telescopes.

space telescopes human and robotic in-space assemb↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lessons Learned in Systems Engineering Availability and Recommendations for Mission Technical Leaders

In spaceflight missions at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), the Mission System Engineer (MSE) is the technical leader of the overall engineering team and also is the Independent Engineering Technical Authority. The responsibility of this role includes the definition of the mission design architecture, concept of operations, and mission requirements, management of risk throughout the development, and verification and validation of the final system performance and function amongst other duties. This responsibility inherently requires time management, enabling focus on a balanced development with appropriate risk. Time is the most valuable resource of the MSE. The system engineer’s availability to interact with the development team (often product or component design leads and technicians, often in different worksites) to discover and mitigate mission risks during development is key to mission success. This paper presents examples from Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter, Landsat 9, and Neutron star Interior Composition ExploreR (NICER) which represent in-house and out-of-house hardware builds. These examples demonstrate how interactions between the Mission Systems Engineers and other project and partner engineers result in discovery of critical risks, leading to early mitigation with significant cost and performance savings. These three missions would have suffered test failures or on-orbit failures had their MSEs not set aside time to visit engineers and technicians that were working on key pieces of space flight hardware. Availability is more than just time; it is openness to listen to concerns and questions. It begins by building a level of trust in the team that it is safe to ask questions or share concerns without the fear of blame or additional workload. It also requires enabling informal conversations (over lunch, coffee, in the clean room, or at the team members desk, etc.) where key information can be exchanged, and team members may even provide an easy-to-implement mitigation idea for another subsystem. Availability is a highly valuable commodity and completely non-obvious to protect and optimize. The natural tendency of engineers is to keep themselves busy with solving problems that they know about. This paper is encouraging MSEs to resist this tendency to try and solve all the complex problems themselves and actively devote daily time to learning and solving problems that are found with informal communications with other team members.

Lessons Learned↗

NASA NTRS1983

Space Station needs, attributes and architectural options. Volume 2, book 1, part 3: Manned Space Station relevance to commercial telecommunications satellites

A document containing a forecast of satellite traffic and revelant technology trends to the year 2000 was prepared which includes those space station capabilities and characteristics that should be provided to make the station useful to commercial satellite owners. The document was circulated to key representative organizations within the commercial telecommunications satellite and related communities of interest, including spacecraft manufacturers, commercial satellite owners, communications carriers, networks and risk insurers. The prospectus document is presented as well as the transmittal letter and the mailing list of the people and companies that were asked to review it. Key commercial telecommunications comments are summarized the actual response letters from the industry are included.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2011

N plus 3 Advanced Concept Studies for Supersonic Commercial Transport Aircraft Entering Service in the 2030-2035 Period

Boeing, with Pratt & Whitney, General Electric, Rolls-Royce, M4 Engineering, Wyle Laboratories and Georgia Institute of Technology, conducted a study of supersonic commercial aircraft concepts and enabling technologies for the year 2030-2035 timeframe. The work defined the market and environmental/regulatory conditions that could evolve by the 2030/35 time period, from which vehicle performance goals were derived. Relevant vehicle concepts and technologies are identified that are anticipated to meet these performance and environmental goals. A series of multidisciplinary analyses trade studies considering vehicle sizing, mission performance and environmental conformity determined the appropriate concepts. Combinations of enabling technologies and the required technology performance levels needed to meet the desired goals were identified. Several high priority technologies are described in detail, including roadmaps with risk assessments that outline objectives, key technology challenges, detailed tasks and schedules and demonstrations that need to be performed. A representative configuration is provided for reference purposes, along with associated performance estimates based on these key technologies.

Welge, H. Robert↗

NASA NTRS2023

Robotic and Crewed Mars Missions Increasing the Demand for Planetary Protection Technology Needs

Planetary protection (PP) policy seeks to avoid harmful contamination by limiting biological and relevant organic contamination from spacecraft as well as preventing adverse changes to Earth’s biosphere when extraterrestial samples are brought back to Earth. The PP policy at NASA was updated in 2021 (NPR 8715.24) and 2022 (NASA-STD-8719.27) to enable missions by expanding the decades old prescriptive requirements to allow for an option of adopting performance-based requirements that are objectivesdriven, risk-informed and case-assured. In parallel, the final PP knowledge gap workshop was completed representing the international consensus on the key areas to be considered in developing crew PP policy. These knowledge gaps focused on key technology development areas in 1) microbial and human health monitoring, 2) technical and operations needed for contamination control and 3) natural transport of contamination on Mars. As robotic missions start to implement performance-based approaches and research and technology efforts commence to inform crew policy the demand for data quality driven verification and validation in relevant space environments. Examples of the types of testing that is envisioned includes test as you fly validation and verification of decontamination systems in a relevant on-orbit and Mars environment, developing lethality curves of terrestrial organisms to further our understanding of the biocidal impacts of Mars and the space environment, and particle transport model validation and verification. Thus, the PP discipline has identified the need for groundbased space environments to perform preliminary testing as validation and verification of flight systems and to advance the technology readiness level prior to further testing on-orbit or lunar environments to prepare for Mars.

J. Nick Benardini↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Robotic and Crewed Mars Missions Increasing the Demand for Planetary Protection Technology Needs

Planetary protection (PP) policy seeks to avoid harmful contamination by limiting biological and relevant organic contamination from spacecraft as well as preventing adverse changes to Earth’s biosphere when extraterrestrial samples are brought back to Earth. The PP policy at NASA was updated in 2021 (NPR 8715.24) and 2022 (NASA-STD-8719.27) to enable missions by expanding the decades old prescriptive requirements to allow for an option of adopting performance-based requirements that are objectives-driven, risk-informed and case-assured. In parallel, the final PP knowledge gap workshop was completed representing the international consensus on the key areas to be considered in developing crew PP policy. These knowledge gaps focused on key technology development areas in 1) microbial and human health monitoring, 2) technical and operations needed for contamination control and 3) natural transport of contamination on Mars. As robotic missions start to implement performance-based approaches and research and technology efforts commence to inform crew policy the demand for data quality driven verification and validation in relevant space environments. Examples of the types of testing that is envisioned includes test as you fly validation and verification of decontamination systems in a relevant on-orbit and Mars environment, developing lethality curves of terrestrial organisms to further our understanding of the biocidal impacts of Mars and the space environment, and particle transport model validation and verification. Thus, the PP discipline has identified the need for ground-based space environments to perform preliminary testing as validation and verification of flight systems and to advance the technology readiness level prior to further testing on-orbit or lunar environments to prepare for Mars.

J Nick Benardini↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Metal Additive Manufacturing for Rocket Engines: Successes and Failures

NASA has been developing additive manufacturing (AM) for various technical and programmatic advantages for complex rocket engine and aerospace components. This maturation has focused on various AM processes, new alloys, characterizing material properties, developing standards, producing demonstrator parts, and integrating AM hardware in liquid rocket engines through test-fail-fix cycles, as well as application and dissemination of lessons learned of the AM lifecycle. The importance of proper AM processing was made evident in the failure of a Laser Powder Bed Fusion (L-PBF) copper-alloy combustion chamber during a hot-fire test due to a degraded material quality. The hot-fire test aimed to demonstrate high duty cycle under a risk-tolerant development project, where consequences of component failure would be minimal. However, the unintentional component failure emphasized the necessity of robust material characterization and rigorous process control procedures for the safe use of AM components in critical applications. This presentation provides an overview of the development failure, a discussion on the evaluation of the failed chamber and supplemental chambers produced at the same time, a representative material samples that included intentional build witness lines, and a summary of the key results and recommendations from the evaluations. NASA continues to approach AM processes and designs with a level of risk and acceptance of failures that is appropriate for the project objectives, with the overall goal of safe implementation of AM technology and transferring AM technology into commercial space applications. This presentation with provide critical awareness to the community lessons learned on proper implementation of AM.

L-PBF↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Successes and Failures of Metal Additive Manufacturing for Rocket Engines

Additive Manufacturing↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Having a Come-Apart: Lessons Learned from Additively Manufactured Hardware Failures

NASA has been engaged with additively manufactured (AM) process and component development since the 2000’s. AM offers various technical advantages, such as enhanced hardware design complexity, part consolidation, and processing of novel alloys in addition to programmatic advantages for reduction in processing time and cost. The focus of much of the AM development at NASA has been to mature the various processes, characterize material properties, develop standards, produce demonstrator parts, and integrate AM hardware in liquid rocket engines. These aspects have been demonstrated through process and design iterations using a methodical characterization, test-fail-fix cycles, as well as application and dissemination of lessons learned. In addition to these fundamental demonstrations of the AM process and hardware development, alloys that provide performance advantages in the high temperature and high-pressure environments have been matured for use in rocket engines. These environments are challenging for any alloy and any design, and the AM process is required to fully meet the intended design requirements. The importance of proper AM process was made evident in the failure of a Laser Powder Bed Fusion (L-PBF) copper-alloy combustion chamber during a hot-fire test due to a degraded material quality resulted from an AM process issue. The hot-fire test aimed to demonstrate high duty cycle under a risk-tolerant development project, where consequences of component failure would be minimal. However, the unintentional component failure emphasized the necessity of robust material characterization and rigorous process control procedures for the safe use of AM components in critical applications. In part, such concerns motivate the AM certification approach that NASA has recently adopted in NASA-STD-6030 “Additive Manufacturing Requirements for Spaceflight Systems”. This presentation provides an overview of the previously mentioned failure, a discussion on the evaluation of the failed chamber and supplemental chambers produced at the same time, a representative material samples that included intentional build witness lines, and a summary of the key results and recommendations from the evaluations. NASA continues to approach AM processes and designs with a level of risk and acceptance of failures that is appropriate for the project objectives, with the overall goal of safe implementation of AM technology and transferring AM technology into commercial space applications. The objective of this presentation is to provide awareness to the community working critical and non-critical AM components and the lessons learned on proper implementation of AM.

Additive Manufacturing↗

NASA NTRS2024

Integrated Systems Engineering, Safety, Reliability and Risk Management – Minimizing Black Swan Events

This paper examines key barriers that can possibly inhibit safe and reliable mission execution and, in the worst case, result in loss of human life due to many unknown contributory factors that can lead to Black Swan events. Some of the representative contributory factors include decision errors, overconfidence and a host of common causes including cultural and human factors. Decisions are always easy to criticize in hindsight when more information is available after a major accident. Depending on the type and complexity of the project and/or mission, the catastrophic risks of drifting into failure can be alleviated by implementing uniquely and strategically tailored Integrated-System-of-Systems, dynamic, risk-informed decision management processes. This paper presents some of the lessons learned from James Webb Space Telescope (JWST), NASA’s Human Space Flight program, and industry that provide motivation to organizations working on mega-complex missions to prudently accomplish targeted mission success. These lessons are important for future human Lunar, Mars and Beyond missions planned to be pursued by NASA through a public-private partnership using nimble but effective safety-conscious, proven sound engineering practices including implementation of integrated risk mitigation practices.

SLS↗

NASA NTRS1994

Design of a walking robot

Carnegie Mellon University's Autonomous Planetary Exploration Program (APEX) is currently building the Daedalus robot; a system capable of performing extended autonomous planetary exploration missions. Extended autonomy is an important capability because the continued exploration of the Moon, Mars and other solid bodies within the solar system will probably be carried out by autonomous robotic systems. There are a number of reasons for this - the most important of which are the high cost of placing a man in space, the high risk associated with human exploration and communication delays that make teleoperation infeasible. The Daedalus robot represents an evolutionary approach to robot mechanism design and software system architecture. Daedalus incorporates key features from a number of predecessor systems. Using previously proven technologies, the Apex project endeavors to encompass all of the capabilities necessary for robust planetary exploration. The Ambler, a six-legged walking machine was developed by CMU for demonstration of technologies required for planetary exploration. In its five years of life, the Ambler project brought major breakthroughs in various areas of robotic technology. Significant progress was made in: mechanism and control, by introducing a novel gait pattern (circulating gait) and use of orthogonal legs; perception, by developing sophisticated algorithms for map building; and planning, by developing and implementing the Task Control Architecture to coordinate tasks and control complex system functions. The APEX project is the successor of the Ambler project.

Whittaker, William↗