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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

Risk Analysis for Remote Operation of Microreactors

Microreactors are a subset of advanced nuclear reactors that can be factory fabricated, transportable, and self-regulating. They have the potential to be used in microgrids, rural and remote areas, or emergency response applications, replacing fossil fuel sources like diesel generators and enabling sustainable energy generation. In order to make microreactor operation cost-effective, it is likely that remote communications will be needed to reduce the number of personnel required to be on site. While remote operation of energy generation and other industrial control systems is common in other industries, it is not yet adopted in the nuclear community and has many perceived and actual risks. In this paper, the severity of the risks introduced by remote operations for microreactors are explored. The primary changes in the operations involve the addition of a remote communications network and a certification system for data and controls. These changes lend themselves to considerations of cyber risks, whether unintentional or adversarial, but the assessment considers not just cyber risks introduced, but also how physical and human factors-based risks will impact the remote operations system and change the overall risk profile. This initial assessment indicates that there are standard cyber and mitigation measures that can be put in place so the risk of doing remote operations does not dramatically increase compared to local operations. This evaluation is a critical step in the process of evaluating if remote operations of microreactors is a suitable solution to meet future sustainable grid needs

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2025

Dynamic probabilistic risk assessment and game theory for cyber security risk analysis in nuclear power plants

Nuclear Power Plants and energy systems have become more prone to cyber-attacks with their digitalization and the increased use of smart equipment. Hence, it is important to quantify the risk associated with cyber-attacks in such systems. Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment which involves studying the evolution of a system due to random events and operator and attacker actions during a cyber-attack by employing a physics-based model of the system is a suitable framework to quantify cybersecurity risk in nuclear power plants. In addition to the plant dynamics, it is also important to model the strategies of the attackers and plant operators for an effective cybersecurity risk assessment. Game theory provides a set of necessary tools to model such strategic interactions. In this research, a framework that integrates dynamic probabilistic risk assessment with game theory for cybersecurity risk analysis in nuclear power plants is presented. The mathematical formulation is derived based on the theory of continuous event trees. We propose a game theory based action model, that utilizes physics-based rewards to define the strategies of attackers and operators at every decision epoch. As a case study, the risk associated with cyber-attacks on the digital components in the secondary side of a pressurized water reactor is studied using a reduced order model. A set of attacker actions and a set of operator actions are defined for the system. The operator and attacker interactions were modelled using simultaneous game, their action policies were computed using the concept of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and the evolution of the system was studied.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Technical Background and Validation Report on the Residential Water Inhalation Risk Calculator Presented in the Risk Assessment Information System

Indoor air quality (IAQ) is critical for human health. Poor IAQ is linked to respiratory issues, cardiovascular diseases, and cancer. Indoor pollutants are emitted by typical household items such as cleaning products, personal care items, building materials, and tap water - an understudied volatile organic compound (VOC) source. This document presents the Residential Water Inhalation Risk Calculator (RWIRC), which estimates daily VOC exposure concentrations from various household water uses, such as showering and dishwashing, to assess exposure risks for the most vulnerable occupant. Integrated into the Risk Assessment Information System (RAIS) and sponsored by the US Department of Energy (DOE), the calculator divides a house into three compartments: shower, bathroom, and other spaces, accounting for daily water usage patterns and calculating VOC concentrations. Exposure data generated using the calculator can assist health assessors in estimating excess lifetime cancer risk (ELCR) and hazard index (HI) from VOC inhalation. Unlike traditional exposure models that utilize Andelman’s constant, the RWIRC continuously assesses variability in VOC concentrations and environmental conditions using differential equations to track VOC concentrations and air exchange between compartments. The calculator also provides unique volatilization fractions for each chemical and appliance, enhancing accuracy of the exposure concentration estimation. The RWIRC is accessible online and allows users to customize parameters (i.e., number of bathrooms, water temperature, and exhaust fan conditions) and input VOC characteristics (i.e., tap water and ambient air concentrations). This document provides a step-by-step guide on implementing the calculator. It also provides comparisons with the ATSDR-SHOWER calculator, using eight VOCs with varying physicochemical properties to reveal differences in algorithms and output concentrations. Simulations also assess how bathroom door positions and exhaust fan usage affect VOC exposure. The calculator results can enhance EPA risk screening levels for inhalation exposure to VOCs from tap water, offering a sophisticated tool for assessing inhalation risks and improving public health protection.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2025

Advanced Reactor Designs Security Analysis, Risk, and Recommendations: Risks, Consequences, and Possible by-Design Mitigation Approaches Associated with Select Advanced Reactors

Next-generation advanced reactors (ARs) incorporate enhanced safety systems, have smaller source terms, and feature compact modular designs, which should lessen their collective risk profiles. However, to fully evaluate risk, security needs to be a part of the equation. Without taking security into consideration, safety systems and components in the new ARs may be vulnerable to sabotage. These base attributes, coupled with enhanced security features specific to AR design through sound engineering and security-by-design (SeBD), should provide developers and operators with lower inherent security risk profiles. Building security early into the AR design may remove or passively secure potential critical targets from an adversary’s reach , thereby increasing overall safety and security. An integrated approach and diverse design team that includes engineering, operations, and security experts are fundamental to building security into the design without sacrificing fundamental operational efficiencies and principles. The objective of this project was to evaluate the security and safety interfaces for five classes of reactors, identify potential security vulnerabilities of structures, systems, and components (SSC), and underscore the need to consider security alongside safety in the design o f these concepts. The five reactor classes evaluated in this project and presented in this report are molten-salt reactors (MSR), high temperature gas reactors (HTGR), sodium-fast reactors (SFR), advanced light-water reactors (ALWR), and microreactors. These designs were selected because they reflect the concepts that are closest to market deployment and have received significant resource investments from the public and private sector. This project assesses the inherent security risks posed by common classes of ARs, provides a methodology and framework to assess security along with safety, and offers an analysis of potential mitigation strategies that could be incorporated. For each AR technology, the SSCs that relate to radionuclide source safety functions are discussed to understand the SSC contribution to safety and relative importance in the protective strategy for the design. The assumptions that went into evaluating each reactor concept originated from generic publicly available nonproprietary information and should not directly be used to qualify an absolute risk profile nor to rank specific AR designs. Instead, the purpose of the analysis is to understand and compare the generic inherent security risks of different AR technologies.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗
DOE OSTI2025

2032 and 2036 risk enhancement from NEOs in the Taurid stream: Is there a significant coherent component to impact risk?

Impact risk is normally quantified by summing the product of the probability of an event and some measure of its consequences over the set of all possible events. The probability factor is considered to be more objective and is based on the size frequency distribution of Near Earth objects (NEOs) and an implicit assumption of randomness, which can be described as “stochastic risk”. Impact frequency does change with time, however, and there have been episodes in the deep geological past when the flux has been much higher. The hypothesis of “coherent catastrophism” suggests large variations on shorter timescales. It postulates the existence of a “Taurid resonant swarm” (TRS) of debris associated with Comet Encke that is stabilized by Jupiter and in a 7:2 resonance with it. The hypothetical cluster orbits in the broad Taurid stream, which crosses Earth's orbit twice a year at its nodes. Whereas the most extreme and fanciful versions of coherent catastrophism in recent geologic history have been comprehensively refuted, the possibility of a significant component of coherent (time-dependent) risk, associated with non-random correlated events, remains. This paper incorporates recently published data from observational campaigns associated with the Taurid stream. There is no evidence for objects in the Taurid stream that are above the global catastrophe threshold, but the possibility of a few large objects and a significant population of objects the size of the Chelyabinsk or Tunguska bodies has not been eliminated. Eyewitness accounts and comparison of airburst models to ground truth suggest that the Tunguska object was a Beta Taurid. The Tunguska event is probably an outlier when compared to the size frequency distributions under stochastic assumptions, but if there is a significant coherent component it may be representative of events that take place far more frequently, and risk assessments may have underestimated the contribution from airbursts. If so, the Earth will experience increased risk from objects this size, peaking in November 2032 and June 2036. We recommend targeted survey campaigns during these hypothetical TRS node crossings to quantify the population, search for potentially hazardous objects, and identify imminent impactors.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Recognizing and Assigning Risks and Responsibilities Using the Risk, Responsibility, and Performance (RRP) Matrix

The Risk, Responsibility, and Performance Matrix (RRP Matrix) is the energy savings performance contract (ESPC) document that focuses on 16 areas of risks and responsibilities in an ESPC project. The RRP Matrix summarizes and documents the contractor (energy service company, i.e., ESCO) and ordering agency’s agreements about allocating risks and responsibilities – to the ESCO, to the ordering agency, or shared. Ordering agencies and ESCOs should be mindful, however, that the ESCO remains responsible for achieving energy savings guaranteed under the ESPC, notwithstanding the allocations of risks, responsibilities, and performance.

Walker, Christine↗
DOE OSTI2026

System-Level Integration of Modular Language Models for Real-Time Risk Assessment in Third-Party Risk Management Systems

Large enterprises typically rely on dedicated teams to govern and implement security measures throughout their supply chains, ensuring compliance with enterprise security procedures. There is a significant reliance on Third-Party Risk Management (TPRM) platforms, which often require complete, highly structured information from potential vendors. The review and compliance assurance processes are time- and labor intensive, often requiring several rounds of review between the supply chain security risk management teams, business users, and potential vendors, leading to delays in the supply chain processing and consumer experience. Significant challenges in the risk management paradigm include handling unstructured data in various formats and providing real-time feedback to users to reduce the required review time. This paper presents a novel solution to these challenges. A modular multi-step system architecture is proposed using advances in language processing, specifically for unstructured responses and provides real-time feedback (i.e., 3 seconds) so that users can improve their responses before the TPSRM team review. This novel system architecture will increase information accuracy and significantly reduce time and labor during the review process.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Opportunities for Earth Observation to Inform Risk Management for Ocean Tipping Points

Abstract As climate change continues, the likelihood of passing critical thresholds or tipping points increases. Hence, there is a need to advance the science for detecting such thresholds. In this paper, we assess the needs and opportunities for Earth Observation (EO, here understood to refer to satellite observations) to inform society in responding to the risks associated with ten potential large-scale ocean tipping elements: Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation; Atlantic Subpolar Gyre; Beaufort Gyre; Arctic halocline; Kuroshio Large Meander; deoxygenation; phytoplankton; zooplankton; higher level ecosystems (including fisheries); and marine biodiversity. We review current scientific understanding and identify specific EO and related modelling needs for each of these tipping elements. We draw out some generic points that apply across several of the elements. These common points include the importance of maintaining long-term, consistent time series; the need to combine EO data consistently with in situ data types (including subsurface), for example through data assimilation; and the need to reduce or work with current mismatches in resolution (in both directions) between climate models and EO datasets. Our analysis shows that developing EO, modelling and prediction systems together, with understanding of the strengths and limitations of each, provides many promising paths towards monitoring and early warning systems for tipping, and towards the development of the next generation of climate models.

Wood, Richard A. (ORCID:0000000239609513)↗
DOE OSTI2024

An editorial to the Special Issue on “Severe climate Risks”

The history of this Special Issue (https://www.sciencedirect.com/special-issue/10JD7LNJNQ0) indirectly dates back to the early 1990s, when the signature of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change kicked-off an international political process based on one overarching and foundational principle: to avoid “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” at the global level. More than three decades later, such a principle remains central, though complementary aims made their way through the climate negotiation process, such as the importance of ensuring equity and justice, to give just one example here. Scientific knowledge also considerably progressed and we know more about the range of risks that climate change imposes and will continue to impose to the biosphere and humankind, worldwide and at all territorial levels. It is also clear that societal responses to these risks —“climate adaptation” as we know it— are increasingly happening, but definitely not at the pace of climate risk trends (Berrang-Ford et al., 2021, Erisken et al., 2021, Olazabal and Ruiz De Gopegui, 2021, Magnan et al., 2023a, Reckien et al., 2023, UNEP, 2023). As a result, concerns have emerged over the recent years in both the scientific and policy arenas around the idea that societies may not be able to address all climate risks, and that limits to adaptation and induced residual risks need to be considered more seriously. Such concerns further highlight the continuing importance of the imperative to minimise dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, at any scale. But what does “dangerous interference” mean? How can we decide that we are entering the “dangerous” space, compared to a broader range of climate risks that would qualify as problematic but not necessarily “dangerous”? Who should make such a decision? Which conditions drive risk severity over time, including in the future? And what would be the environmental, economic, social and cultural implications of prioritising some climate risks over others? The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was a pioneer in addressing such questions through the development of the “Key Risks” framing that describes those climate risks having the potential to become dangerous or “severe” over the course of this century (Schellnhuber et al., 2006, Schneider et al., 2007, Oppenheimer et al., 2014, O’Neill et al., 2022). The Fifth and Sixth assessment cycles (AR5 and AR6) went a step further by identifying about 120 Key Risks across regions and sectors, and clustering them into 8 “Representative Key Risks” covering a range of geographical systems (low-lying coasts, and to terrestrial and ocean ecosystems), sectors (critical infrastructure, living standards, human health, food security, and water security) and human dimensions (peace and mobility) (Oppenheimer et al., 2014, O’Neill et al., 2022). This Special Issue was born of the efforts of a range of authors, during the development of the IPCC AR6 main Assessment Report between 2019 and 2022, to characterise Key Risks and Representative Key Risks, and advance knowledge on what shapes “severe climate risks” conceptually as well as in the real-world. The series of papers forming this Special Issue is not intended to cover the topic exhaustively, but rather to give readers an overview through the following narrative: defining “severe climate risks” is highly challenging (Magnan et al., 2023b), but knowledge is expanding on the driving climate hazards (Tebaldi et al., 2023) and their implications on geographical systems, sectors and human dimensions, using here food security (Mirzabaev et al., 2023), human mobility (Gilmore et al., 2024) and peace (Buhaug et al., 2023) as illustrative examples. The overall intention is to support especially decision-makers, whatever the scale or sector considered, in asking severity-driven questions to identify sector- and context-specific “priority” risks from climate change.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2024

Application of quantitative risk assessment to address stakeholder questions in geologic carbon storage

Ambitious international greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets demand a rapid transformation to a low-carbon economy. This transformation includes the accelerated adoption of carbon dioxide (CO2) capture and storage (CCS) technology. However, as with any large-scale engineering enterprise, the widespread commercial-scale deployment of geologic carbon storage (GCS) raises important questions about technology and cost-effectiveness, safety, environmental risk, and long-term liability. Effectively assessing and managing risks and liability associated with GCS projects is a key technical need throughout the project life cycle-from site selection and permitting to monitoring design, operational risk management, and post-operational site closure. This presentation highlights recent advancements in tools for quantitative risk assessment, being developed by the National Risk Assessment Partnership (NRAP). NRAP is a multi-year, multinational laboratory research collaboration sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management. Our focus will be on these tools' applications in addressing critical stakeholder questions related to supporting permitting to ensure secure and environmentally protective storage; designing effective and efficient monitoring plans; evaluating the effectiveness of remedial actions and risk management alternatives; and informing liability assessment and investment decisions. This paper will detail the key functionality of NRAP’s Open-Source Integrated Assessment Model (NRAP-Open-IAM), a computational framework for assessing leakage risk and containment assurance. This model features streamlined workflows for calculating leakage risk profiles, delineating risk-based area of review, and assessing contingency plans and post-injection site care requirements. ORION is an open-source, observation-based ensemble forecasting toolkit to help operators assess the seismic hazard at a carbon storage site. The State of Stress Analysis Tool (SOSAT), designed to assess subsurface stress conditions and evaluate geomechanical risk resulting from CO2 injection in an area of interest will also be presented. We will also introduce a prototype model to evaluate storage project costs and liability associated with risk management. The Technoeconomic and Liability Evaluation for Storage (TALES) model uses results from forecasts of leakage and induced seismicity risk to estimate the lifecycle cost of managing risk. Finally, a preliminary example of how the NRAP Risk-based Adaptive Monitoring Plan (RAMP) tool can be used to design efficient and effective site monitoring plans and estimate the detectability of fluid leakage will be provided. The relevance of these tools for addressing key stakeholder questions amidst uncertainty will be emphasized.

decision support↗
DOE OSTI2025

Risk Assessment Considerations for Underground Hydrogen Storage in Depleted Gas Reservoirs

Underground hydrogen storage (UHS) in depleted reservoirs presents a promising solution for large-scale energy storage as hydrogen demand grows. As the UHS industry emerges, robust risk assessments are critical to ensuring safe operation of the storage facilities and minimizing the risk of accidents. This work explores risk assessment protocols for underground natural gas storage (UGS) in depleted reservoirs and identifies key considerations for repurposing these facilities for UHS. By examining the differences in physical and chemical properties between hydrogen and natural gas, this work highlights new and modified hazards that merits a reevaluation of traditional natural gas risk assessment practices. This investigation synthesizes insights from previous literature reviews and interviews with UGS industry experts and operators to identify key areas for adapting risk assessment methodologies for hydrogen. The insights gleaned from expert interviews indicate that existing risk assessment standards are non-prescriptive, leading to diverse company-specific risk assessment methodologies requiring substantial additions to become practical. Due to a lack of concrete risk assessment requirements, experience, and relevant data, this uncertainty is expected to be magnified considerably when considering hydrogen. This study identifies several areas for potential modification of existing risk assessment practices that could be considered by those developing standards or performing risk assessments for UHS. Specifically, risk assessments may be improved by including risks unique to hydrogen in existing standards, changing the magnitude of different risk factors in existing risk assessment protocols, and improving methods of data collection and communication across the industry to address large areas of uncertainty.

08 HYDROGEN↗
DOE OSTI2025

Quantitative Risk Assessment for Fuel Cell Electric Bus Hydrogen Storage and Refueling Facility

It is necessary to understand the safety implications and risk mitigation options for fuel cell electric bus fleet deployment, especially for related facilities responsible for operations such as production, storage, compression, and dispensing of hydrogen for use by the buses. In this report, we present a quantitative risk assessment for a potential fuel cell electric bus fleet that was motivated by efforts to improve resilience at the Portland International Airport but can be applicable to a range of hydrogen case studies and use cases. We estimated risk for a facility that produces, stores, compresses, and dispenses hydrogen for the fleet of buses, with a focus on individual risk to people in terms of annual frequency of fatality. We considered the frequency of hydrogen leaks that could result in harmful physical outcomes like jet fires or explosions, and the consequences of those outcomes for people. We created customized fault trees to calculate the frequencies of different sizes of leaks and event sequence diagrams to calculate ignition probabilities for the various leak sizes. We also leveraged the HyRAM+ toolkit to use these inputs to calculate overall risk for the facility, which we separated into one section responsible for producing, storing, and compressing hydrogen, and one section responsible for dispensing the hydrogen to the buses. We found that the dispensing area seemed to have a higher risk than the production/storage/compression area of the facility, largely because of the inclusion of a component with a high leak frequency (the heat exchanger used to cool the hydrogen before entering the vehicle, to prevent overheating and expansion of hydrogen in the onboard tank). For the example production and refueling facility we evaluated and the data we used for the analysis, the leak frequency had a larger impact on the risk differences between the two sections on the facility, compared to the physical outcome consequence, which was slightly different due to the varying fuel conditions, but not substantially different. Actions can be taken to prevent these hazards (e.g., lowering leak frequencies in system components) or to mitigate the consequences if they do occur (e.g., installing barriers to protect people if ignition events occur). The choice of which actions to take depends not only on safety considerations but also on space, time, staffing, feasibility, and financial constraints. Therefore, the quantitative risk assessment approach can help understand relative risk contributions from different components, leak sizes, consequences, and human actions, to prioritize risk reduction strategies and balance these parameters. The outcomes of this report may be useful for a variety of stakeholders working in the hydrogen, transportation, vehicle, and aviation sector, including those responsible for aspects like facility design, operations, and regulations. There is not a single value of risk that determines whether a hypothetical system is “safe” or not. The insights about risk mitigations may be leveraged, and the quantitative risk assessment approach can be applied to other case studies to understand risk priorities and contributions specific to different FCEB and hydrogen facility uses.

08 HYDROGEN↗
DOE OSTI2024

Marine Energy Technology Development Risk Management Framework

Over the past decades, the global marine energy industry has suffered a number of serious technological and commercial setbacks. To help reduce the risks of industry failures and advance the development of new technologies, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) developed a Marine Energy Risk Management Framework in 2015, with this revision published in 2024. This risk management framework shall be utilized on all DOE Water Power Technologies Office (WPTO) projects that require system testing in the open water. By addressing uncertainties, the Marine Energy Risk Management Framework increases the likelihood of successful development of marine energy converter technology. It covers projects of any technology readiness level technology performance level (TPL) and all risk types (e.g. technological risk, regulatory risk, commercial risk) over the development cycle. This risk framework is not a substitute for other risk management procedures that may be required for marine operations, such as installations at sea, hoisting and rigging, safe diver operations, and other safety requirements. This risk framework is intended to meet DOE's risk management expectations for marine energy technology research and development efforts from WPTO. It also provides an overview of other relevant risk management tools and documentation.

16 TIDAL AND WAVE POWER↗
DOE OSTI2024

The Meaning of Risk for Safety, Security, and Safeguards in the Design of Advanced Nuclear Reactors

What is the meaning of risk as it applies to the design of advanced reactors in the disciplines of safety, security, and safeguards? How can we find common terminology for the concept of risk and how can we find interfaces between these disciplines? These are important questions that should be explored in order that they may be applied in an integrated manner for the most effective and efficient design approaches. Eliminating or minimizing risks is a key design driver that motivates and informs the development of nuclear reactors. For safety, risk is well understood and applied in Probabilistic Risk Assessments. For security, the risk-based concepts of vulnerability assessments and vital areas are all considered in designing security systems. For safeguards, the concept of risk is not formally defined, as it relates to the design and operation of nuclear reactors. International nuclear safeguards seek to reduce the risk of proliferation in the nuclear fuel cycle and as such the concept of risk does exist. Therefore, the current understanding of the “3S’ approach, which seeks to find the interfaces and conflicts between safety, security, and safeguards requires a thorough understanding of the role that the reduction of risk plays in all three disciplines. The intersection of risk for safety and security is now being developed as there is a strong correlation between reactor design and operations and their vulnerability to sabotage. The intersection of risk for security and safeguards has to date chiefly been focused on the nuclear material control and accounting systems, which are relied on by both the operator (State) and the IAEA. This paper explores the concept of risk in each of the three disciplines, how they interact, potential conflicts and interfaces , how these might be addressed and leveraged, and a notional framework for how this could be achieved.

Kovacic, Donald N↗
DOE OSTI2026

Hazard and risk analysis framework for nuclear power plant–based integrated energy systems

Employing integrated energy systems (IESs) with nuclear power plants (NPPs) can improve NPP utilization by leveraging dedicated thermal and electric power delivery, but it may also increase operational safety risks. This paper presents a framework to identify and quantify hazards and risks for such IESs. The framework combines accidentology to review past industrial accidents with failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) to identify potential future incidents. Hydrogen explosion and toxic chemical release hazards are of particular concern. Explosion consequences are quantified using the Bauwens-Dorofeev (Bauwens) and trinitrotoluene equivalent mass (TNT-EM) methods, while chemical release consequences are computed using the Gaussian atmospheric dispersion method. Operational disturbances from direct electrical and thermal integration that may affect NPP safety are modeled using probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). Hazards and risks are then evaluated for regulatory compliance. The framework is applied to IESs comprising pressurized or boiling water reactors supplying three levels of thermal and electrical power to industrial customers. Case studies include high-temperature steam electrolysis hydrogen plants of varying capacities and a synthetic fuel production plant. Sensitivity analysis examines piping component failures in the PRA model as a precursor to cost estimation for thermal extraction line design. Additionally, Fussel-Vessely (FV) and risk increase importance (RII) measures identify risk-informed design improvements for the thermal extraction system. FMEA highlights hazards such as loss of offsite power, prompt loss of electrical load, loss of thermal output, and immediate steam diversion, in addition to hydrogen explosions and toxic chemical releases. Both Bauwens and TNT-EM methods suggest maintaining several hundred meters of separation between the NPP and hydrogen facility to mitigate explosion risks. PRA results show a maximum initiating event frequency increase of 1.15% and an overall risk increase of 0.28%. Importance measure analysis identifies upstream pipe leak isolation components as critical. Evaluating the results against safety regulations, it is concluded that hazards and risks can be managed to comply with regulations through risk-informed thermal and electrical connection designs, component selection, maintenance programs, and safe separation distances between NPPs and integrated industrial facilities.

08 - HYDROGEN↗