SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Risk Analyses”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

SourceResearch connectionFrom yearThrough year

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 19 records

All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

NASA NTRS1995

Probabilistic risk assessment of the Space Shuttle. Phase 3: A study of the potential of losing the vehicle during nominal operation. Volume 5: Auxiliary shuttle risk analyses

Volume 5 is Appendix C, Auxiliary Shuttle Risk Analyses, and contains the following reports: Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Space Shuttle Phase 1 - Space Shuttle Catastrophic Failure Frequency Final Report; Risk Analysis Applied to the Space Shuttle Main Engine - Demonstration Project for the Main Combustion Chamber Risk Assessment; An Investigation of the Risk Implications of Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster Chamber Pressure Excursions; Safety of the Thermal Protection System of the Space Shuttle Orbiter - Quantitative Analysis and Organizational Factors; Space Shuttle Main Propulsion Pressurization System Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Final Report; and Space Shuttle Probabilistic Risk Assessment Proof-of-Concept Study - Auxiliary Power Unit and Hydraulic Power Unit Analysis Report.

Fragola, Joseph R.↗

DOE OSTI2025

Recent evolution of risk analyses in atomic bomb survivor studies: new methods and applications

Abstract Several decades ago a dramatic leap forward occurred in the development and application of statistical methods for modeling radiation risk at the Radiation Effects Research Foundation (RERF). Poisson regression analysis for grouped person-year cohort data and the linear excess relative risk model were introduced, and subsequently a devoted software system, Epicure® (https://www.hirosoft.com), was developed by researchers at RERF and at the U.S. National Cancer Institute. Numerous advancements in understanding radiation effects on humans were made possible with these methods, which are still the state-of-the-art for risk assessment at RERF and have remained part of the standard toolbox for radiation—and other environmental—epidemiological studies worldwide. Nevertheless, as our understanding of radiation risk has increased, so have the breadth and depth of questions that require answers based on emerging data that are not amenable to these conventional methods. This overview briefly recounts the conventional methods and then describes our recent diversification into the use or development of new statistical approaches to meet the challenges of burgeoning biological data and emerging mechanistic information. We briefly discuss the development and application of new methods, current and planned, that are part of the RERF Statistics Department’s role in supporting institution-wide research, especially in our collaborations involving the Life Span Study, Adult Health Study, and First-generation Offspring Clinical Study. Some approaches to modeling and assessing radiation risk with newer methods mentioned herein have already been published, while some are still in development or are only beginning at the proposal stage.

Oncology↗

NASA NTRS1992

Risk analyses for the solar particle events of August through December 1989

The solar particle events of August through December 1989, among the largest ever recorded, are analyzed to assess the potential hazards to humans on interplanetary missions from events of these types. Using the coupled neutron-proton space radiation transport computer code BRYNTRN, risk estimates for the effects of exposures to the skin, ocular lens, and bone marrow are made for nominal thicknesses of the spacecraft aluminum shielding. Risk assessment in terms of absorbed dose is made for each event. Also presented are estimates of organ absorbed dose and dose equivalent for pairs of events which occurred within 30-day periods, and for the cumulative August through December 1989 period.

Townsend, Lawrence W.↗

DOE OSTI2024

A watershed-scale multi-approach assessment of design flood discharge estimates used in hydrologic risk analyses for forest road stream crossings and culverts

Not Available

Mukherjee, Sourav (ORCID:0000000325097622)↗

DOE OSTI2023

Quantitative approaches for including equity in risk and resilience infrastructure planning analyses

Risk and resilience assessments for critical infrastructure focus on myriad objectives, from natural hazard evaluations to optimizing investments. Although research has started to characterize externalities associated with current or possible future states, incorporation of equity priorities at project inception is increasingly being recognized as critical for planning related activities. However, there is no standard methodology that guides development of equity-informed quantitative approaches for infrastructure planning activities. Here, to address this gap, we introduce a logic model that can be tailored to capture nuances about specific geographies and community priorities, effectively incorporating them into different mathematical approaches for quantitative risk assessments. Specifically, the logic model uses a graded, iterative approach to clarify specific equity objectives as well as inform the development of equations being used to support analysis. We demonstrate the utility of this framework using case studies spanning aviation fuel, produced water, and microgrid electricity infrastructures. For each case study, the use of the logic model helps clarify the ways that local priorities and infrastructure needs are used to drive the types of data and quantitative methodologies used in the respective analyses. The explicit consideration of methodological limitations (e.g., data mismatches) and stakeholder engagements serves to increase the transparency of the associated findings as well as effectively integrate community nuances (e.g., ownership of assets) into infrastructure assessments. Such integration will become increasingly important to ensure that planning activities (which occur throughout the lifecycle of the infrastructure projects) lead to long-lasting solutions to meet both energy and sustainable development goals for communities.

community-based↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Historical Overview of International Space Station Extravehicular Activity Meteoroid and Orbital Debris Risk

Nearly 300 spacewalks have been conducted over the last 25 years to help build and maintain the International Space Station (ISS). During the nearly 2,000 hours of extra-vehicular activity (EVA), crew members wear extra-vehicular mobility unit (EMU) “spacesuits” to mitigate hazards of the space environment including impacts from meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particles. NASA includes detailed EMU MMOD risk analyses as part of the ISS EVA review and approval process. This paper provides a general historical overview of the ISS EVA MMOD risks and the associated risk assessment process. The NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Team produces the ISS EVA MMOD risk analyses using the Bumper3 MMOD risk analysis code in conjunction with detailed information about the EVA including crew-member EVA work sites, crew translation paths, suit orientation, and duration. Detailed physical models of the EMU spacesuits and the ISS are included and tailored for each EVA analysis. Two types of MMOD risk are included: (1) Penetration, and (2) Catastrophic. Penetration risk is for any size leak in the EMU suit. Catastrophic risk is a subset of Penetration Risk and only includes penetrations that cause a 4mm diameter hole (or larger) in the inner “bladder” layer of the EMU suit. This size hole will exceed the ability of the EMU suit to compensate. The MMOD risk analyses also utilize the latest orbital debris environment and meteoroid environment models including additional transient factors to account for recent satellite break-ups and annual meteor storms. These additional factors and the associated increase in EVA MMOD risk are considered when scheduling an EVA to reduce EMU MMOD risk.

Dana M. Lear↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Review of International Space Station Extravehicular Activity Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Risk

Nearly 300 spacewalks have been conducted over the last 25 years to support the construction and maintenance of the International Space Station (ISS). During the nearly 2,000 hours of extra-vehicular activity (EVA), crew wore extra-vehicular mobility unit (EMU) “spacesuits” to help mitigate hazards of the space environment including impacts from micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particles. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) conducts detailed EMU MMOD risk analyses as part of the ISS EVA review and approval process. This paper provides a general historical overview of the ISS EVA MMOD risks and the associated risk assessment process. The NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Team produces the ISS EVA MMOD risk analyses using the Bumper MMOD risk analysis code in conjunction with detailed information about the EVA including crew member EVA work sites, crew translation paths, suit orientation, and durations. Detailed physical models of the EMU spacesuit and the ISS are included and tailored for each EVA analysis. Two types of MMOD risk are included: (1) Penetration, and (2) Catastrophic. Penetration risk is for any size leak in the EMU suit. Catastrophic risk is a subset of Penetration Risk and only includes penetrations that cause a 4mm diameter hole (or larger) in the pressure-maintaining “bladder” layer of the EMU suit. This size hole will exceed the ability of the EMU suit to compensate. The MMOD risk analyses also utilize the latest orbital debris environment and meteoroid environment models including additional transient factors to account for recent satellite break-ups and annual meteor storms. These additional factors and the associated increase in EVA MMOD risk are considered when scheduling EVAs to reduce EMU MMOD risk.

Dana M. Lear↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Review of International Space Station Extravehicular Activity Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Risk

Dana M. Lear↗

NASA NTRS2008

Computational Analyses in Support of Sub-scale Diffuser Testing for the A-3 Facility: Unsteady Analyses and Risk Assessment - Part 2

Simulation technology can play an important role in rocket engine test facility design and development by assessing risks, providing analysis of dynamic pressure and thermal loads, identifying failure modes and predicting anomalous behavior of critical systems. This is especially true for facilities such as the proposed A-3 facility at NASA SSC because of a challenging operating envelope linked to variable throttle conditions at relatively low chamber pressures. Design Support of the feasibility of operating conditions and procedures is critical in such cases due to the possibility of startup/shutdown transients, moving shock structures, unsteady shock-boundary layer interactions and engine and diffuser unstart modes that can result in catastrophic failure. Analyses of such systems is difficult due to resolution requirements needed to accurately capture moving shock structures, shock-boundary layer interactions, two-phase flow regimes and engine unstart modes. In a companion paper, we will demonstrate with the use of CFD, steady analyses advanced capability to evaluate supersonic diffuser and steam ejector performance in the sub-scale A-3 facility. In this paper we will address transient issues with the operation of the facility especially at startup and shutdown, and assess risks related to afterburning due to the interaction of a fuel rich plume with oxygen that is a by-product of the steam ejectors. The primary areas that will be addressed in this paper are: (1) analyses of unstart modes due to flow transients especially during startup/ignition, (2) engine safety during the shutdown process (3) interaction of steam ejectors with the primary plume i.e. flow transients as well as probability of afterburning. In this abstract we discuss unsteady analyses of the engine shutdown process. However, the final paper will include analyses of a staged startup, drawdown of the engine test cell pressure, and risk assessment of potential afterburning in the facility. Unsteady simulations have been carried out to study the engine shutdown process in the facility and understand the physics behind the interactions between the steam ejectors, the test cell and the supersonic diffuser. As a first approximation, to understand the dominant unsteady mechanisms in the engine test cell and the supersonic diffuser, the turning duct in the facility was removed. As the engine loses power a rarefaction wave travels downstream that disrupts the shock cell structure in the supersonic diffuser. Flow from the test cell is seen to expand into the supersonic diffuser section and re-pressurizes the area around the nozzle along with a upstream traveling compression wave that emanates from near the first stage ejectors. Flow from the first stage ejector expands to the center of the duct and a new shock train is formed between the first and second stage ejectors. Both stage ejectors keep the facility pressurized and prevent any large amplitude pressure fluctuations from affecting the engine nozzle. The resultant pressure loads the nozzle experiences in the shutdown process are small.

Ahuja, Vineet↗

NASA NTRS1986

Cost Risk Analysis Based on Perception of the Engineering Process

In most cost estimating applications at the NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC), it is desirable to present predicted cost as a range of possible costs rather than a single predicted cost. A cost risk analysis generates a range of cost for a project and assigns a probability level to each cost value in the range. Constructing a cost risk curve requires a good estimate of the expected cost of a project. It must also include a good estimate of expected variance of the cost. Many cost risk analyses are based upon an expert's knowledge of the cost of similar projects in the past. In a common scenario, a manager or engineer, asked to estimate the cost of a project in his area of expertise, will gather historical cost data from a similar completed project. The cost of the completed project is adjusted using the perceived technical and economic differences between the two projects. This allows errors from at least three sources. The historical cost data may be in error by some unknown amount. The managers' evaluation of the new project and its similarity to the old project may be in error. The factors used to adjust the cost of the old project may not correctly reflect the differences. Some risk analyses are based on untested hypotheses about the form of the statistical distribution that underlies the distribution of possible cost. The usual problem is not just to come up with an estimate of the cost of a project, but to predict the range of values into which the cost may fall and with what level of confidence the prediction is made. Risk analysis techniques that assume the shape of the underlying cost distribution and derive the risk curve from a single estimate plus and minus some amount usually fail to take into account the actual magnitude of the uncertainty in cost due to technical factors in the project itself. This paper addresses a cost risk method that is based on parametric estimates of the technical factors involved in the project being costed. The engineering process parameters are elicited from the engineer/expert on the project and are based on that expert's technical knowledge. These are converted by a parametric cost model into a cost estimate. The method discussed makes no assumptions about the distribution underlying the distribution of possible costs, and is not tied to the analysis of previous projects, except through the expert calibrations performed by the parametric cost analyst.

Dean, Edwin B.↗

DOE OSTI2025

Deep Cyber-Physical Situational Awareness for Energy Systems: A Secure Foundation for Next-Generation Energy Management

This document provides the final report for the CYPRES project. The purpose is (1) to highlight and summarize its major accomplishments and (2) to provide guidance on how its outcomes have informed and can inform important additional research and technology transfer. The goal of CYPRES was the research, development, and demonstration of a security-oriented next generation cyber-physical EMS for electric power systems that detects malicious and abnormal events through the fusion of cyber and physical data. To achieve this, the CYPRES project team researched, developed, and built a prototype of the solution, referred to as the CYPRES EMS. The CYPRES EMS is a proof-of-concept cyber-physical platform that demonstrates the management of the energy system, communications, security, and cyber-physical grid modeling and analytics. As part of the capabilities of the CYPRES EMS, the team designed and developed a suite of power system applications for monitoring, risk analyses, detection, and control that are inherently cyberaware. At its core, the project aimed to research, develop, and demonstrate a security-oriented next-generation cyber-physical Energy Management System (EMS) capable of detecting malicious and abnormal events through the innovative fusion of cyber and physical data. This approach represents a fundamental shift from traditional EMS, reimagining how critical infrastructure can be protected through unified cyber-aware and physics-aware secure data flow pipelines. The project’s cornerstone deliverable, the CYPRES EMS, serves as a proof-of-concept cyber-physical platform that revolutionizes the management of energy systems, communications, security, and cyber-physical grid modeling and analytics. This prototype implements a comprehensive suite of power system applications for monitoring, risk analyses, detection, and control, all designed with inherent cyber awareness. The system’s architecture extends from end-devices in the field through to control center applications, establishing a secure and resilient control framework that addresses the challenges posed by diverse devices of unknown trustworthiness connecting to modern power systems. Through this innovative approach to deep cyber-physical situational awareness, the CYPRES project not only advances the state-of-the-art in energy infrastructure protection but also establishes a new paradigm for how EMS can be designed, deployed, and operated in an increasingly complex threat landscape. The findings and developments from this project provide crucial insights for stakeholders across the energy sector, offering a blueprint for enhancing the reliability and resilience of our nation’s critical energy infrastructure in the face of evolving cyber threats.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

NASA NTRS1991

Analyses of risks associated with radiation exposure from past major solar particle events

Radiation exposures and cancer induction/mortality risks were investigated for several major solar particle events (SPE's). The SPE's included are: February 1956, November 1960, August 1972, October 1989, and the September, August, and October 1989 events combined. The three 1989 events were treated as one since all three could affect a single lunar or Mars mission. A baryon transport code was used to propagate particles through aluminum and tissue shield materials. A free space environment was utilized for all calculations. Results show the 30-day blood forming organs (BFO) limit of 25 rem was surpassed by all five events using 10 g/sq cm of shielding. The BFO limit is based on a depth dose of 5 cm of tissue, while a more detailed shield distribution of the BFO's was utilized. A comparison between the 5 cm depth dose and the dose found using the BFO shield distribution shows that the 5 cm depth value slightly higher than the BFO dose. The annual limit of 50 rem was exceeded by the August 1972, October 1989, and the three combined 1989 events with 5 g/sq cm of shielding. Cancer mortality risks ranged from 1.5 to 17 percent at 1 g/sq cm and 0.5 to 1.1 percent behind 10 g/sq cm of shielding for five events. These ranges correspond to those for a 45 year old male. It is shown that secondary particles comprise about 1/3 of the total risk at 10 g/sq cm of shielding. Utilizing a computerized Space Shuttle shielding model to represent a typical spacecraft configuration in free space at the August 1972 SPE, average crew doses exceeded the BFO dose limit.

Weyland, Mark D.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Epidemiologic Analyses of Risk Factors for Bone Loss and Recovery Related to Long-Duration Space Flight

AIM 1: To investigate the risk of microgravity exposure on long-term changes in bone health and fracture risk. compare data from crew members ("observed") with what would be "expected" from Rochester Bone Health Study. AIM 2: To provide a summary of current evidence available on potential risk factors for bone loss, recovery & fracture following long-duration space flight. integrative review of all data pre, in-, and post-flight across disciplines (cardiovascular, nutrition, muscle, etc.) and their relation to bone loss and recovery

Sibonga, Jean↗

NASA NTRS2014

Conceptual Launch Vehicle and Spacecraft Design for Risk Assessment

One of the most challenging aspects of developing human space launch and exploration systems is minimizing and mitigating the many potential risk factors to ensure the safest possible design while also meeting the required cost, weight, and performance criteria. In order to accomplish this, effective risk analyses and trade studies are needed to identify key risk drivers, dependencies, and sensitivities as the design evolves. The Engineering Risk Assessment (ERA) team at NASA Ames Research Center (ARC) develops advanced risk analysis approaches, models, and tools to provide such meaningful risk and reliability data throughout vehicle development. The goal of the project presented in this memorandum is to design a generic launch 7 vehicle and spacecraft architecture that can be used to develop and demonstrate these new risk analysis techniques without relying on other proprietary or sensitive vehicle designs. To accomplish this, initial spacecraft and launch vehicle (LV) designs were established using historical sizing relationships for a mission delivering four crewmembers and equipment to the International Space Station (ISS). Mass-estimating relationships (MERs) were used to size the crew capsule and launch vehicle, and a combination of optimization techniques and iterative design processes were employed to determine a possible two-stage-to-orbit (TSTO) launch trajectory into a 350-kilometer orbit. Primary subsystems were also designed for the crewed capsule architecture, based on a 24-hour on-orbit mission with a 7-day contingency. Safety analysis was also performed to identify major risks to crew survivability and assess the system's overall reliability. These procedures and analyses validate that the architecture's basic design and performance are reasonable to be used for risk trade studies. While the vehicle designs presented are not intended to represent a viable architecture, they will provide a valuable initial platform for developing and demonstrating innovative risk assessment capabilities.

Launch Vehicle↗

NASA NTRS1997

Environmental Impact Statement for the Cassini Mission

This Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (FSEIS) to the 1995 Cassini mission Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) focuses on information recently made available from updated mission safety analyses. This information is pertinent to the consequence and risk analyses of potential accidents during the launch and cruise phases of the mission that were addressed in the EIS. The type of accidents evaluated are those which could potentially result in a release of plutonium dioxide from the three Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGS) and the up to 129 Radioisotope Heater Units (RHUS) onboard the Cassini spacecraft. The RTGs use the heat of decay of plutonium dioxide to generate electric power for the spacecraft and instruments. The RHUs, each of which contains a small amount of plutonium dioxide, provide heat for controlling the thermal environment of the spacecraft and several of its instruments. The planned Cassini mission is an international cooperative effort of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the European Space Agency (ESA), and the Italian Space Agency (ASI) to conduct a 4-year scientific exploration of the planet Saturn, its atmosphere, moons, rings, and magnetosphere.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS1992

Soviet space nuclear reactor incidents - Perception versus reality

Since the Soviet Union reportedly began flying nuclear power sources in 1965 it has had four publicly known accidents involving space reactors, two publicly known accidents involving radioisotope power sources and one close call with a space reactor (Cosmos 1900). The reactor accidents, particularly Cosmos 954 and Cosmos 1402, indicated that the Soviets had adopted burnup as their reentry philosophy which is consistent with the U.S. philosophy from the 1960s and 1970s. While quantitative risk analyses have shown that the Soviet accidents have not posed a serious risk to the world's population, concerns still remain about Soviet space nuclear safety practices.

Bennett, Gary L.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Analysis of a Hypergolic Propellant Explosion During Processing of Launch Vehicles in the VAB

NASA is developing launch vehicles to support missions to Low Earth Orbit (LEO), the moon and deep space. Whether manned or unmanned, the vehicle components will likely be integrated in the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and typically include a fueled spacecraft (SC) that sits on top of one or more stages. The processing of a fueled SC involves hazardous operations when it is brought into the VAB Transfer Aisle and lifted a significant height for mating with lower stages. Accidents resulting from these hazardous operations could impact unrelated personnel working in buildings adjacent to the VAB. Safe separation distances based on the DOD Explosives Standards Quantity-Distance (Q-D) approach result in large IBD arcs. This paper presents site-specific air blast and fragmentation hazard analyses for comparison with the Q-D arcs as well as consequence and risk analyses to provide added information for the decision maker. A new physics-based fragmentation model is presented that includes: a) the development of a primary fragment list (which defines the fragment characteristics) associated with a hypergolic propellant explosion, b) a description of a 3D fragment bounce model, c) the results of probabilistic Monte-Carlo simulations (that include uncertainties in the fragment characteristics) to determine: i) the hazardous fragment density distance, ii) the expected number of wall/roof impacts and penetrations to over 40 buildings adjacent to the VAB, and iii) the risk to building occupants.

Chrostowski, Jon D.↗

NASA NTRS1997

The Space Shuttle Program Pre-Flight Meteoroid and Orbital Debris Risk/Damage Predictions and Post-Flight Damage Assessments

The pre-flight predictions and postflight assessments carried out in relation to a series of Space Shuttle missions are reviewed, and data are presented for the meteoroid and orbital debris damage observed on the Hubble Space Telescope during the 1994 Hubble repair mission. Pre-flight collision risk analyses are carried out prior to each mission, and in the case of an unacceptable risk, the mission profile is altered until the risk is considered to be acceptable. The NASA's BUMPER code is used to compute the probability of damage from debris and meteoroid particle impacts based on the Poisson statistical model for random events. The penetration probability calculation requires information concerning the geometry of the critical systems, the penetration resistance and mission profile parameters. Following each flight, the orbiter is inspected for meteoroid and space debris damage. The emphasis is on areas such as the radiator panels, the windows and the reinforced carbon-carbon structures on the leading wing edges and on the nose cap. The contents of damage craters are analyzed using a scanning electron microscope to determine the nature and origin of the impactor. Hypervelocity impact tests are often performed to simulate the observed damage and to estimate the nature of the damaging particles. The number and type of damage observed provides information concerning the orbital debris environment.

Levin, George M.↗