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At least 19 records

Robotic Mars Sample Return: Risk Assessment and Analysis Report

A comparison of the risk associated with two alternative scenarios for a robotic Mars sample return mission was conducted. Two alternative mission scenarios were identified, the Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL) reference Mission and a mission proposed by Johnson Space Center (JSC). The JPL mission was characterized by two landers and an orbiter, and a Mars orbit rendezvous to retrieve the samples. The JSC mission (Direct/SEP) involves a solar electric propulsion (SEP) return to earth followed by a rendezvous with the space shuttle in earth orbit. A qualitative risk assessment to identify and characterize the risks, and a risk analysis to quantify the risks were conducted on these missions. Technical descriptions of the competing scenarios were developed in conjunction with NASA engineers and the sequence of events for each candidate mission was developed. Risk distributions associated with individual and combinations of events were consolidated using event tree analysis in conjunction with Monte Carlo techniques to develop probabilities of mission success for each of the various alternatives. The results were the probability of success of various end states for each candidate scenario. These end states ranged from complete success through various levels of partial success to complete failure. Overall probability of success for the Direct/SEP mission was determined to be 66% for the return of at least one sample and 58% for the JPL mission for the return of at least one sample cache. Values were also determined for intermediate events and end states as well as for the probability of violation of planetary protection. Overall mission planetary protection event probabilities of occurrence were determined to be 0.002% and 1.3% for the Direct/SEP and JPL Reference missions respectively.

Lalk, Thomas R.↗

Risk Analysis and System Trades inthe Mars Sample Return (MSR) Mission

Risk Managenent advocates have long sought to directly influence the early stages of the systems engineering process through a more effective role in system design trade studies. The principal obstacle to this has been the lack of credible ways to represent and quantify mission risk that is, missios return form a probablistic viewpoint-for the project manager and the rest of the design team.

Risk Analysis Mars Sample Return↗

Risk analysis of earth return options for the Mars rover/sample return mission

Four options for return of a Mars surface sample to Earth were studied to estimate the risk of mission failure and the risk of a sample container breach that might result in the release of Martian life forms, should such exist, in the Earth's biosphere. The probabilities calculated refer only to the time period from the last midcourse correction burn to possession of the sample on Earth. Two extreme views characterize this subject. In one view, there is no life on Mars, therefore there is no significant risk and no serious effort is required to deal with back contamination. In the other view, public safety overrides any desire to return Martian samples, and any risk of damaging contamination greater than zero is unacceptable. Zero risk requires great expense to achieve and may prevent the mission as currently envisioned from taking place. The major conclusion is that risk of sample container breach can be reduced to a very low number within the framework of the mission as now envisioned, but significant expense and effort, above that currently planned is needed. There are benefits to the public that warrant some risk. Martian life, if it exists, will be a major discovery. If it does not, there is no risk.

Source record↗

Overview of Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Analysis Process for Mars Sample Return Earth Entry System

Introduction: Micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) risk analyses for the Mars Sample Return (MSR) Earth Entry System (EES) have been significantly more rigorous than previously flown missions because of its categorization as a Class V restricted return mission. This means the returned samples present significant concern for biogenic contamination. These analyses seek to determine if a micrometeoroid or orbital debris strike would result in loss of containment assurance and are summarized in the flowchart in Fig. 1. Methodology: The mission is considered in two MMOD phases: a pre-release phase where the EES is protected by a Micrometeoroid Protection System (MMPS) and a post-release phase called “free-flight” where the EES is exposed directly to the MMOD environment. These phases correspond to interplanetary cruise and imminent re-entry, respectively. To inform the MMPS design, a 30-shot high velocity impact testing (HVIT) series on candidate configurations at NASA White Sands Test Facility was completed in the summer of 2022. Sample post-shot images are shown in Fig 2 [1]. These data are used to baseline the MMPS design and to tune the hydrocode simulations. ALE3D, CTH, and SPHC are the hydrocodes that simulate physics of high-speed impacts [2]. Results generated with these populate a penetration depth versus energy space beyond the testable velocity regime of HVIT (~7 km/s). The penetration depth versus energy space data are used to define a critical projectile diameter function called a Ballistic Limit Equation (BLE), where the projectile “criticality” is determined by zone dependent failure criteria defined a-priori [3]. For example, the nose of the heatshield has a failure criterion of 50% TPS penetration, assigned because the landing loads are concentrated on that region and no substructure damage is permitted. The BLEs for each vehicle material zone are input into the BUMPER 3 code, along with the vehicle surface mesh and the corresponding space environment model, to calculate a probability of penetration or number of penetrations. The environment models, MEM3 for MM and ORDEM 3.2 for OD, simulate the meteoroid environment from 0.2 to 2 au based on the Grün flux equation, and the debris environment up to 40,000 km altitude from Earth surface, respectively [4,5]. Presentation Focus: The presentation or poster will present the results to-date focusing on the full risk analysis process flow seen in Fig. 1. Details on the derivation of the failure criteria will be discussed, along with HVIT results and how these influenced the MMPS configuration baseline decision. Further, results of hydrocode simulations will be presented and the tuning to HVIT outputs will be described. Finally, the strategies that direct the BLE formulation will be reviewed, specifically, for the EES elements that are most exposed to the MMOD environment.

mmod↗

Is Mars Sample Return Required Prior to Sending Humans to Mars?

Prior to potentially sending humans to the surface of Mars, it is fundamentally important to return samples from Mars. Analysis in Earth's extensive scientific laboratories would significantly reduce the risk of human Mars exploration and would also support the science and engineering decisions relating to the Mars human flight architecture. The importance of measurements of any returned Mars samples range from critical to desirable, and in all cases these samples will would enhance our understanding of the Martian environment before potentially sending humans to that alien locale. For example, Mars sample return (MSR) could yield information that would enable human exploration related to 1) enabling forward and back planetary protection, 2) characterizing properties of Martian materials relevant for in situ resource utilization (ISRU), 3) assessing any toxicity of Martian materials with respect to human health and performance, and 4) identifying information related to engineering surface hazards such as the corrosive effect of the Martian environment. In addition, MSR would be engineering 'proof of concept' for a potential round trip human mission to the planet, and a potential model for international Mars exploration.

biohazards↗

A Reliable Earth Return System for Safe Recovery of Mars Samples

The objective of a Mars sample return mission is to bring selected Mars surface materials to Earth. Numerous approaches for the Earth-return segment have been analyzed including propulsive or aerocapture return to low-Earth orbit followed by Space Shuttle rendezvous and direct entry. Of these approaches, ballistic entry of a small capsule terminating in a ground landing has been shown to be the lowest risk strategy. Over the past two years, significant work has been performed towards development of a robust direct entry vehicle for Mars sample return. In June 1999, the NASA Planetary Protection Officer provided initial guidance to the former Mars Sample Return Project. The sample return phase of the mission was assigned a restricted Earth return planetary protection classification. The draft mission requirement states that the total mean probability of release of unsterilized Mars material into the Earth;s biosphere must be less than 1.0E-06 (1 in a million). This strict requirement drives the approach and design of the Earth return system. To meet this requirement, selection of the Earth return strategy and development of the Earth return system must be guided by risk, not performance, based decisions. An initial Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) was performed to address the direct entry Earth return system containment assurance reliability and to identify high-risk elements of this system. The results of this PRA identified risk elements that include thermal protection system performance during entry, spin-eject orientation and aerodynamic stability during entry, structural integrity under atmospheric deceleration and impact loads, and tracking/recovery of this system. This initial probabilistic risk quantification demonstrates that, with the proper development program, a prototypical direct entry design can satisfy the containment assurance reliability requirement. Through the current Mars Sample Return Advanced Technology Development effort, an extensive design, analysis, and test program is presently proceeding with the aim of reducing the containment assurance risk of this system. This technology development effort, guided by a continuing PRA, focuses on key risk areas of a direct entry Earth return system including: the thermal protection system, impact dynamics, structural performance, aerodynamic stability, and ground recovery. This development program will culminate in a system validation flight test, 1-2 years prior to launch of the flight system. This flight test would include the launch, entry, and recovery of a full-scale Earth return system, as a scientific validation of the key risk elements to verify nominal design performance. The results of the initial PRA suggested several dominant failure sequences that can be validated in a flight test. These include: demonstrating the thermal protection system reliability and performance during entry, demonstrating the spin-eject orientation and aero-dynamic stability during entry, demonstrating the structural integrity under atmospheric deceleration and impact loads, and demonstrating tracking and recovery of the Earth return system. This single test will directly address over 50% of the total containment assurance risk elements. This presentation will begin by presenting the relative risk of various Earth return strategies. The results of the initial probabilistic risk assessment will be presented followed by a discussion of the development accomplishments and plans for demonstration of a highly reliable direct entry Earth return system.

Braun, R.↗

SMART: A Propositional Logic-Based Trade Analysis and Risk Assessment Tool for a Complex Mission

This paper introduces a new trade analysis software called the Space Mission Architecture and Risk Analysis Tool (SMART). This tool supports a high-level system trade study on a complex mission, such as a potential Mars Sample Return (MSR) mission, in an intuitive and quantitative manner. In a complex mission, a common approach to increase the probability of success is to have redundancy and prepare backups. Quantitatively evaluating the utility of adding redundancy to a system is important but not straightforward, particularly when the failure of parallel subsystems are correlated.

Ono, Masahiro↗

An Earth Entry Vehicle For Returning Samples From Mars

The driving requirement for design of a Mars Sample return mission is assuring containment of the returned samples. The impact of this requirement on developmental costs, mass allocation, and design approach of the Earth Entry Vehicle is significant. A simple Earth entry vehicle is described which can meet these requirements and safely transport the Mars Sample Return mission's sample through the Earth's atmosphere to a recoverable location on the surface. Detailed analysis and test are combined with probabilistic risk assessment to design this entirely passive concept that circumvents the potential failure modes of a parachute terminal descent system. The design also possesses features that mitigate other risks during the entry, descent, landing and recovery phases. The results of a full-scale drop test are summarized.

Mitcheltree, R.↗

Earth Entry Vehicle for Mars Sample Return

The driving requirement for design of a Mars Sample return mission is assuring containment of the returned samples. The impact of this requirement on developmental costs, mass allocation, and design approach of the Earth Entry Vehicle is significant. A simple Earth entry vehicle is described which can meet these requirements and safely transport the Mars Sample Return mission's sample through the Earth's atmosphere to a recoverable location on the surface. Detailed analysis and test are combined with probabilistic risk assessment to design this entirely passive concept that circumvents the potential failure modes of a parachute terminal descent system. The design also possesses features that mitigate other risks during the entry, descent, landing and recovery phases. The results of a full-scale drop test are summarized.

Mitcheltree, R. A.↗

Mars Surface Mobility Leading to Sustainable Exploration

A Mars rocket-propelled hopper concept was evaluated for feasibility through analysis and experiments. The approach set forth in this paper is to combine the use of in-situ resources in a new Mars mobility concept that will greatly enhance the science return while providing the first opportunity towards reducing the risk of incorporating ISRU into the critical path for the highly coveted, but currently unaffordable, sample return mission. Experimental tests were performed on a high-pressure, self-throttling gaseous oxygen/methane propulsion system to simulate a two-burn-with-coast hop profile. Analysis of the trajectory, production plant requirements, and vehicle mass indicates that a small hopper vehicle could hop 2 km every 30 days with an initial mass of less than 60 kg. A larger vehicle can hop 15 km every 30 to 60 days with an initial mass of 300 to 430 kg.

Linne, Diane L.↗

Pharmaceuticals Exposed to the Space Environment: Problems and Prospects

The NASA Human Research Program (HRP) Health Countermeasures Element maintains ongoing efforts to inform detailed risks, gaps, and further questions associated with the use of pharmaceuticals in space. Most recently, the Pharmacology Risk Report, released in 2010, illustrates the problems associated with maintaining pharmaceutical efficacy. Since the report, one key publication includes evaluation of pharmaceutical products stored on the International Space Station (ISS). This study shows that selected pharmaceuticals on ISS have a shorter shelf-life in space than corresponding terrestrial controls. The HRP Human Research Roadmap for planetary exploration identifies the risk of ineffective or toxic medications due to long-term storage during missions to Mars. The roadmap also identifies the need to understand and predict how pharmaceuticals will behave when exposed to radiation for long durations. Terrestrial studies of returned samples offer a start for predictive modeling. This paper shows that pharmaceuticals returned to Earth for post-flight analyses are amenable to a Weibull distribution analysis in order to support probabilistic risk assessment modeling. The paper also considers the prospect of passive payloads of key pharmaceuticals on sample return missions outside of Earth's magnetic field to gather additional statistics. Ongoing work in radiation chemistry suggests possible mitigation strategies where future work could be done at cryogenic temperatures to explore methods for preserving the strength of pharmaceuticals in the space radiation environment, perhaps one day leading to an architecture where pharmaceuticals are cached on the Martian surface and preserved cryogenically.

pharmacology↗

A Risk-Constrained Multi-Stage Decision Making Approach to the Architectural Analysis of Mars Missions

This paper presents a novel risk-constrained multi-stage decision making approach to the architectural analysis of planetary rover missions. In particular, focusing on a 2018 Mars rover concept, which was considered as part of a potential Mars Sample Return campaign, we model the entry, descent, and landing (EDL) phase and the rover traverse phase as four sequential decision-making stages. The problem is to find a sequence of divert and driving maneuvers so that the rover drive is minimized and the probability of a mission failure (e.g., due to a failed landing) is below a user specified bound. By solving this problem for several different values of the model parameters (e.g., divert authority), this approach enables rigorous, accurate and systematic trade-offs for the EDL system vs. the mobility system, and, more in general, cross-domain trade-offs for the different phases of a space mission. The overall optimization problem can be seen as a chance-constrained dynamic programming problem, with the additional complexity that 1) in some stages the disturbances do not have any probabilistic characterization, and 2) the state space is extremely large (i.e, hundreds of millions of states for trade-offs with high-resolution Martian maps). To this purpose, we solve the problem by performing an unconventional combination of average and minimax cost analysis and by leveraging high efficient computation tools from the image processing community. Preliminary trade-off results are presented.

entry, descent, and landing (EDL)↗

MARS Orbiter Sample Return Power Design

This paper considers the aspect and conclusion that went into the design of the power system that achieves the maximum power with the minimum risk. The power output for the spherical orbiting canister was modeled and plotted in various views of the orbit by the Satellite Orbit Analysis Program (SOAP).

solar↗

Sample Return Containerization and Planetary Protection Using Brazing for Breaking the Chain of Contact to Mars

Planetary protection of Mars samples returned to Earth in a future NASA mission is a critical part of preventing uncontrolled biological materials being released from the samples. The planetary protection process requires addressing the potential risks and would involve “breaking the chain of contact (BTC)”, where any returned material reaching Earth for further analysis would have to be sealed inside a container with extremely high confidence. The sterilization process would require destroying any potential biological materials that may contaminate the external surface of the container. A novel process for containing the returned samples has been conceived and developed at JPL. The process consists of using induction heated brazing to synchronously sterilize, separate, seam and seal the container. In this case. the braze material is heated to the level of melting at temperatures higher than 500°C to assure sterilizing exposed areas since carbon bonds are broken above this temperature. The container that encloses the samples consists of double walls with interstitial space that is Earth-clean. The process consists of two-steps, where one was intended to be prepared on Earth and the second potentially executed on orbit around Mars. The latest results of this study that established the needed capability are described and discussed in this manuscript.

Shirajian, Nareg↗

Integration of Planetary Protection Activities

Research and activities under this grant have focused on a systematic examination and analysis of critical questions likely to impact planetary protection (PP) controls and implementation for Mars sample return missions (MSR). Four areas in the non-scientific and social realms were selected for special attention because of their importance to future mission planning and concern about critical timing or possible economic impacts on MSR mission implementation. These include: (1) questions of legal uncertainty and the decision making process, (2) public perception of risks associated with sample return, (3) risk communication and Education/Public Outreach , and (4) planetary protection implications of alternative mission architectures, for both robotic and human sample return missions. In its entirety, NAG 2-986 has encompassed three categories of activity: (1) research and analysis (Race), (2) subcontracted research (MacGregor/Decision Research), and (3) consulting services.

Race, Margaret S.↗

Integrated Design Results for the MSR SRC Mars Ascent Vehicle

The primary mission of the NASA Mars Sample Return (MSR) Campaign is to return samples of the Martian surface to Earth for scientific study. As part of this campaign, NASA is developing a Mars Ascent Vehicle (MAV). This vehicle must survive an approximate two-year journey to the Martian surface as a payload aboard a separate lander spacecraft. After residing on the surface for another year, the MAV will carry a payload of samples into orbit. From there, following ejection from the MAV, the samples will rendezvous with an Earth return spacecraft for capture, and ultimately, return to Earth. The design of the MAV represents a number of unique challenges, as no launch vehicle has ever left the surface of a planet other than Earth. Although conceptual designs for a MAV have been in various levels of development since the 1970s, none have achieved the level of fidelity and support that exists in the current MSR-MAV design. Early MSR-MAV concept studies examined multiple methods of propulsion, ultimately deciding that a Two-Stage-to-Orbit (TSTO) solid propulsion vehicle would provide the most capable performance in a Martian environment. Following this key architecture decision, the vehicle design was further matured to a Solid-Solid Guided-Guided (SSGG) architecture for NASA Key Decision Point A (KDP-A). Although the SSGG design was able to meet all mission constraints, concerns were raised regarding limited mass margin on other elements of the MSR campaign at such an early phase. A design challenge was issued to reduce MAV total mass by as much as possible. It was ultimately determined that by moving a number of components of the vehicle second stage to the first stage, the overall vehicle mass could be reduced significantly. The new design features a much smaller and completely unguided second stage. This paper describes the resultant Solid-Solid Guided-Unguided (SSGU) MAV design concept developed as part of the Systems Requirement Cycle (SRC). This design was developed primarily by NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), in association with NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) and NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC). The TSTO vehicle includes one solid rocket motor per stage. As the vehicle second stage is unguided, it features spin-stabilization to maintain vehicle stability during flight. An electromechanically actuated Thrust Vector Control (TVC) system and a monopropellant Reaction Control System (RCS) are employed for active guidance on the first stage. The vehicle is designed to deliver up to 0.47kg of Martian samples to a Mars circular orbit of 380km at 27° inclination. Due to the extremely unique design constraints of this mission, and a recent transition to a Risk Class A posture, the MAV team was compelled to devise unconventional solutions to the vehicle design. The detailed design and analysis of these subsystems and the vehicle as a whole are discussed in this paper relative to all of the engineering disciplines involved.

MAV↗

MSL Entry, Descent, and Landing Instrumentation: Return on Investment

On Aug 5, 2012 the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) Entry, Descent, and Landing Instrumentation (MEDLI) suite on MSL entry vehicle heatshield suc-cessfully returned surface pressure and in-depth temperature data.1,2 The MEDLI data has given scientists and engineers an unprecedented ability to reconstruct entry environment, atmospheric density, and flight trajectory, and flight validation of predic-tions vehicle aerodynamics and thermal protection system (TPS) performance. This presentation will dis-cuss key findings from MEDLI, some of which are being applied to improve definition of aerothermal environment and TPS sizing margins for existing NASA entry missions. The postflight analysis has shown that a significant thermal protection mass saving upon redesign is possible for an MSL-class vehicle. The success of MEDLI has also demonstrated and qualified robust flight instrumentation technologies at very low risk to the mission. The potential benefits of MEDLI to planetary exploration and sample return missions, as well as to exploration class missions to Mars will be presented.

MEDLI↗