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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

Advanced Human-System Interface Risk Analysis Based on Redundancy-guided Systems-theoretic Hazard Analysis and Human Reliability Analysis

Human-system interfaces (HSIs) play an important role in enabling operators to communicate with the nuclear power plant (NPP) side. Getting the information required to understand a NPP’s current status or perform necessary actions for responding to a given operational context are representative operator tasks performed using HSIs. To date, HSIs have been mainly evaluated in the context of human reliability analysis (HRA). However, the current HSI evaluation that occurs during HRA may be challengeable on two fronts: (1) reflecting the unique characteristics of HSI systems and (2) considering situations in which HSIs are poorly operated due to software/hardware malfunctions. Accordingly, this study proposes an approach for specifically evaluating HSIs for digital instrumentation and controls (DI&C) systems, using Redundancy-guided Systems-theoretic Hazard Analysis (RESHA) and HRA. RESHA is a method for analyzing DI&C systems with redundancy features. In this study, we investigate how HSIs are evaluated in existing HRA methods, and what challenges exist in the current approaches. To better evaluate HSIs for DI&C systems, this study modifies the existing HSI evaluation process by additionally modeling the HSI back- and front- ends. In this paper, a HSI fault tree for the APR1400 DI&C system is introduced through a piping and instrumentation diagram. It then touches upon what aspects of the suggested method must be further researched.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Legacy Well Leakage Risk Analysis at the Farnsworth Unit Site

This paper summarizes the results of the risk analysis and characterization of the CO 2 and brine leakage potential of Farnsworth Unit (FWU) site wells. The study is part of the U.S. DOE’s National Risk Assessment Partnership (NRAP) program, which aims to quantitatively evaluate long-term environmental risks under conditions of significant geologic uncertainty and variability. To achieve this, NRAP utilizes risk assessment and computational tools specifically designed to quantify uncertainties and calculate the risk associated with geologic carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) sequestration. For this study, we have developed a workflow that utilizes physics-based reservoir simulation results as input to perform leakage calculations using NRAP Tools, specifically NRAP-IAM-CS and RROM-Gen. These tools enable us to conduct leakage risk analysis based on ECLIPSE reservoir simulation results and to characterize wellbore leakage at the Farnsworth Unit Site. We analyze the risk of leakage from both individual wells and the entire field under various wellbore integrity distribution scenarios. The results of the risk analysis for the leakage potential of FWU wells indicate that, when compared to the total amount of CO 2 injected, the highest cemented well integrity distribution scenario (FutureGen high flow rate) exhibits approximately 0.01% cumulative CO 2 leakage for a 25-year CO 2 injection duration at the end of a 50-year post-injection monitoring period. In contrast, the highest possible leakage scenario (open well) shows approximately 0.1% cumulative CO 2 leakage over the same time frame.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Risk-Based Dynamic Contingency Analysis Applied to Puerto Rico Electric Infrastructure

The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Electricity and Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy have funded DOE National Laboratories to perform modeling, analysis, and high-level design of resilience-enhancement options for the power grid of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is one of the national laboratories contributing to the DOE effort. Under this funding, PNNL completed Phase I of their analysis in 2018, which identified high-priority transmission enhancements derived from detailed dynamic cascading analysis of severe contingencies, including a hurricane scenario example. This report describes additional analysis completed under Phase II, which was performed over 2019. The PNNL team applied decades of experience making complex power systems more resilient, reliable, secure, flexible, affordable and sustainable, with partners in government and industry. In this report, PNNL presents the Phase II analysis, in which a risk-based dynamic contingency analysis approach to evaluate impact of several hurricane scenarios was developed. This approach was used to identify high-priority enhancements and test resilience mitigation actions, including the evaluation of high-solar scenarios developed as a result of the 2019 Puerto Rico Integrated Resource Plan (IRP).

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2020

Data Requirements for Application of Risk-Based Dynamic Contingency Analysis to Evaluate Hurricane Impact to Electrical Infrastructure in Puerto Rico

This paper presents a risk-based dynamic contingency analysis framework that was used to evaluate the hurricane impact to electrical infrastructure in Puerto Rico. PNNL developed a scalable risk-based framework for identifying high-voltage transmission resilience improvements by classifying and prioritizing high-risk power grid contingencies (system failures) under hurricane impact. The risk-based framework is founded on grid outage definitions with their associated probabilities of occurrence from hurricane events, in combination with an impact assessment derived from detailed dynamic cascading failure analysis. This paper focuses on a discussion around data requirements for transmission resilience planning for hurricane events, derived from the development of the risk-based framework and its application to Puerto Rico. This paper launches an important first step in encouraging the engineering community and power system industry to move towards establishing resilience planning as a routine practice. Since actual results for Puerto Rico contain sensitive information, sample simulation results will be used to illustrate the data requirements and risk-based dynamic cascading framework on the Puerto Rico power grid, as well as demonstrate the potential for such a simulation framework. The paper includes a discussion on the lessons learned, importance and need for improved datasets that are not usually considered in traditional power system planning. The paper will also elaborate on how the scalable simulation framework and datasets might be expanded to larger footprints and leveraged for modelling other types of natural disasters.

DCAT, Puerto Rico, hurricane, Power System Stabili↗
DOE OSTI2020

Milestone Report for MS8: Extend Quantitative Brine and CO 2 Leakage Calculations

This report summarizes results of the risk analysis and characterization of CO 2 and brine leakage potential of Farnsworth Unit (FWU) wells. U.S. DOE’s National Risk Assessment Partnership (NRAP) program works on quantitatively assess long-term environmental risks amidst significant geologic uncertainty and variability. NRAP risk assessment and computational tools are developed to quantify uncertainties and calculate risk associated with geologic sequestration of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ). For this study, we have developed a workflow from University of Utah’s physics-based reservoir simulators to performing leakage calculations using NRAP Tools. NRAP tools (NRAP-IAM-CS, RROM-Gen) are used to conduct leakage risk analysis based on Eclipse simulation results, and characterize wellbore leakage at the Farnworth Site. This report summarizes results of the risk analysis and characterization of CO 2 and brine leakage potential of Farnsworth Unit (FWU) wells.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2024

A graph embedding‐based approach for automatic cyber‐physical power system risk assessment to prevent and mitigate threats at scale

Abstract Power systems are facing an increasing number of cyber incidents, potentially leading to damaging consequences to both physical and cyber aspects. However, the development of analytical methods for the study of large‐scale power infrastructures as cyber‐physical systems is still in its early stages. Drawing inspiration from machine‐learning techniques, the authors introduce a method inspired by the principles of graph embedding that is tailored for quantitative risk assessment and the exploration of possible mitigation strategies of large‐scale cyber‐physical power systems. The primary advantage of the graph embedding approach lies in its ability to generate numerous random walks on a graph, simulating potential access paths. Meanwhile, it enables capturing high‐dimensional structures in low‐dimensional spaces, facilitating advanced machine‐learning applications, and ensuring scalability and adaptability for comprehensive network analysis. By employing this graph embedding‐based approach, the authors present a structured and methodical framework for risk assessment in cyber‐physical systems. The proposed graph embedding‐based risk analysis framework aims to provide a more insightful perspective on cyber‐physical risk assessment and situation awareness for power systems. To validate and demonstrate its applicability, the method has been tested on two cyber‐physical power system models: the Western System Coordinating Council (WSCC) 9‐Bus System and the Illinois 200‐Bus System , thereby showing its advantages in enhancing the accuracy of risk analysis and comprehensiveness of situational awareness.

Sun, Shining↗
DOE OSTI2020

Hydrogen Fuel Cell Vehicles in Tunnels

There are numerous vehicles which utilize alternative fuels, or fuels that differ from typical hydrocarbons such as gasoline and diesel, throughout the world. Alternative vehicles include those running on the combustion of natural gas and propane as well as electrical drive vehicles utilizing batteries or hydrogen as energy storage. Because the number of alternative fuels vehicles is expected to increase significantly, it is important to analyze the hazards and risks involved with these new technologies with respect to the regulations related to specific transport infrastructure, such as bridges and tunnels. This report focuses on hazards presented by hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles that are different from traditional fuels. There are numerous scientific research and analysis publications on hydrogen hazards in tunnel scenarios; however, compiling the data to make conclusions can be a difficult process for tunnel owners and authorities having jurisdiction over tunnels. This report provides a summary of the available literature characterizing hazards presented by hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles, including light-duty, medium and heavy-duty, as well as buses. Research characterizing both worst-case and credible scenarios, as well as risk-based analysis, is summarized. Gaps in the research are identified to guide future research efforts to provide a complete analysis of the hazards and recommendations for the safe use of hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles in tunnels.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Alternate Fuel Vehicles in Tunnels

Many types of vehicles using fuels that differ from typical hydrocarbons such as gasoline and diesel are in use throughout the world. These include vehicles running on the combustion of natural gas and propane as well as electrical drive vehicles utilizing batteries or hydrogen as energy storage. These alternative fuels pose hazards that are different from traditional fuels and the safety of these vehicles are being questioned in areas such as tunnels and other enclosed spaces. Much scientific research and analysis has been conducted on tunnel and garage hazard scenarios; however, the data and conclusions might not seem to be immediately applicable to highway tunnel owners and authorities having jurisdiction over tunnels. This report provides a comprehensive, concise summary of the literature available characterizing the various hazards presented by all alternative fuel vehicles, including light-duty, medium- and heavy-duty, as well as buses. Research characterizing both worst-case and more plausible scenarios and risk-based analysis is also summarized Gaps in the research are identified in order to guide future research efforts to provide a complete analysis of the hazards and recommendations for the use of alternative fuel vehicles in tunnels.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Simulation-Based Recovery Action Analysis Using the EMRALD Dynamic Risk Assessment Tool

Recovery human action is defined as the action that prevents deviant conditions from producing unwanted effects. Analyzing recovery actions has been a critical part in human reliability analysis (HRA). However, there are a couple of limitations to treating recovery actions using only the current HRA methods available. Representatively, the existing recovery analysis does not specifically consider recovery actions as they have occurred in actual nuclear power plants (NPPs). To handle the challenges in the existing recovery analyses, this study suggests a way to analyze recovery actions under a dynamic HRA method, the Procedure-based Risk Investigation MEthod-Human Reliability Analysis (PRIME-HRA) method. The PRIME-HRA method suggests a way on how to develop dynamic simulation models using dynamic risk assessment tools such as the Event Modeling Risk Assessment Using Linked Diagram (EMRALD) [1] and the Human Unimodel for Nuclear Technology to Enhance Reliability (HUNTER) [2]. EMRALD and HUNTER are the dynamic probabilistic risk assessment and HRA tools developed at Idaho National Laboratory. In this paper, differences on analyzing recovery actions in the Technique for Human Error-Rate Prediction (THERP), the Cause-Based Decision Tree (CBDT) and the Korean Standard HRA (K-HRA) and challenges of these approaches are introduced. How we have developed the PRIME-HRA is also introduced in this paper. Then, the proposed approach to analyzing recovery human actions in dynamic context is partially discussed with an example.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Hazard and risk analysis framework for nuclear power plant–based integrated energy systems

Employing integrated energy systems (IESs) with nuclear power plants (NPPs) can improve NPP utilization by leveraging dedicated thermal and electric power delivery, but it may also increase operational safety risks. This paper presents a framework to identify and quantify hazards and risks for such IESs. The framework combines accidentology to review past industrial accidents with failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) to identify potential future incidents. Hydrogen explosion and toxic chemical release hazards are of particular concern. Explosion consequences are quantified using the Bauwens-Dorofeev (Bauwens) and trinitrotoluene equivalent mass (TNT-EM) methods, while chemical release consequences are computed using the Gaussian atmospheric dispersion method. Operational disturbances from direct electrical and thermal integration that may affect NPP safety are modeled using probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). Hazards and risks are then evaluated for regulatory compliance. The framework is applied to IESs comprising pressurized or boiling water reactors supplying three levels of thermal and electrical power to industrial customers. Case studies include high-temperature steam electrolysis hydrogen plants of varying capacities and a synthetic fuel production plant. Sensitivity analysis examines piping component failures in the PRA model as a precursor to cost estimation for thermal extraction line design. Additionally, Fussel-Vessely (FV) and risk increase importance (RII) measures identify risk-informed design improvements for the thermal extraction system. FMEA highlights hazards such as loss of offsite power, prompt loss of electrical load, loss of thermal output, and immediate steam diversion, in addition to hydrogen explosions and toxic chemical releases. Both Bauwens and TNT-EM methods suggest maintaining several hundred meters of separation between the NPP and hydrogen facility to mitigate explosion risks. PRA results show a maximum initiating event frequency increase of 1.15% and an overall risk increase of 0.28%. Importance measure analysis identifies upstream pipe leak isolation components as critical. Evaluating the results against safety regulations, it is concluded that hazards and risks can be managed to comply with regulations through risk-informed thermal and electrical connection designs, component selection, maintenance programs, and safe separation distances between NPPs and integrated industrial facilities.

08 - HYDROGEN↗
DOE OSTI2020

Fossil Power Plant Cyber Security Life-Cycle Risk Reduction, A Practical Framework for Implementation

Market conditions are forcing fossil electricity generation facility owners and operators to implement advanced digital technologies. These technologies enable efficiencies, operational flexibility, operations and maintenance efficiencies, and adapting to a transitioning workforce. These digital technologies, however, can increase the cybersecurity attack surface. The purpose of this research was to develop a holistic cybersecurity risk reduction framework for fossil generation facilities. The framework begins with assessing how cyber risk changes across facility life cycles, including plant, system, vendor, and business life cycles. The next phase performs consequence analysis to prioritize high consequence events. Focusing on high consequence events allows owners to use a graded, risk-informed approach to prioritize cybersecurity efforts. The final phase identifies the digital asset attack surface in sensors and instrumentation and control equipment. After the vulnerabilities are identified, the owner selects mitigating cybersecurity control measures (or countermeasures) based on the risk analysis from the previous phases. This report describes the current industry cybersecurity best practices in fossil generation that are based on the first principles for cybersecurity engineering. The report is divided into five sections that describe the implementation of the risk reduction framework and present identified research, methodological, and technology gaps that were identified through this course of research and development.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗
DOE OSTI2020

Fossil Power Plant Cyber Security Life-Cycle Risk Reduction: A Practical Framework for Implementation

Market conditions are forcing fossil electricity generation facility owners and operators to implement advanced digital technologies. These technologies enable efficiencies, operational flexibility, operations and maintenance efficiencies, and adapting to a transitioning workforce. These digital technologies, however, can increase the cybersecurity attack surface. The purpose of this research was to develop a holistic cybersecurity risk reduction framework for fossil generation facilities. The framework begins with assessing how cyber risk changes across facility life cycles, including plant, system, vendor, and business life cycles. The next phase performs consequence analysis to prioritize high consequence events. Focusing on high consequence events allows owners to use a graded, risk-informed approach to prioritize cybersecurity efforts. The final phase identifies the digital asset attack surface in sensors and instrumentation and control equipment. After the vulnerabilities are identified, the owner selects mitigating cybersecurity control measures (or countermeasures) based on the risk analysis from the previous phases. This report describes the current industry cybersecurity best practices in fossil generation that are based on the first principles for cybersecurity engineering. The report is divided into five sections that describe the implementation of the risk reduction framework and present identified research, methodological, and technology gaps that were identified through this course of research and development.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Fossil Power Plant Cyber Security Life-Cycle Risk Reduction: A Practical Framework for Implementation

Market conditions are forcing fossil electricity generation facility owners and operators to implement advanced digital technologies. These technologies enable efficiencies, operational flexibility, operations and maintenance efficiencies, and adapting to a transitioning workforce. These digital technologies, however, can increase the cybersecurity attack surface. The purpose of this research was to develop a holistic cybersecurity risk reduction framework for fossil generation facilities. The framework begins with assessing how cyber risk changes across facility life cycles, including plant, system, vendor, and business life cycles. The next phase performs consequence analysis to prioritize high consequence events. Focusing on high consequence events allows owners to use a graded, risk-informed approach to prioritize cybersecurity efforts. The final phase identifies the digital asset attack surface in sensors and instrumentation and control equipment. After the vulnerabilities are identified, the owner selects mitigating cybersecurity control measures (or countermeasures) based on the risk analysis from the previous phases. This report describes the current industry cybersecurity best practices in fossil generation that are based on the first principles for cybersecurity engineering. The report is divided into five sections that describe the implementation of the risk reduction framework and present identified research, methodological, and technology gaps that were identified through this course of research and development.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Simulation-Based Recovery Action Analysis Using the EMRALD Dynamic Risk Assessment Tool

A recovery action is defined as the action that prevents deviant conditions from producing unwanted effects. It generally indicates a kind of countermeasure performed in response to a failure of human action. The recovery actions especially play an important role in complex systems like nuclear power plants (NPPs), which consist of highly sophisticated controllers to ensure that desired performance and safety must be achieved and maintained. This is because a combination of human error and its recovery failure may be able to cause a catastrophic effect on a system. Analyzing recovery actions has been a critical part of HRA, which is a technique to evaluate human errors and provide human error probabilities (HEPs) for application in probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). If recovery actions are not adequately analyzed and applied to PSA models, the PSA results may be under-estimated or be not able to reasonably account for the failure of human actions in the context of PSA. For this reason, some regulatory documents such as ASME/ANS RA-Sb-2013 by the American Society for Mechanical Engineers and the American Nuclear Society and NUREG-1792 by U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission have emphasized the importance of recovery analysis within the HRA. A couple of existing HRA methods, such as the Technique for Human Error-Rate Prediction (THERP), the Cause-Based Decision Tree (CBDT), and the Korean Standard HRA (K-HRA), have respectively suggested their own approaches to the HRA recovery analysis. However, there are a couple of limitations to treating recovery actions using only the current HRA methods available. The biggest limitation is that the existing recovery analysis does not explicitly consider a variety of recovery action types and recovery sequences as they occur in actual NPPs. To handle the limitations of existing recovery analysis, this study proposes a simulation-based recovery analysis method using the Event Modeling Risk Assessment Using Linked Diagram (EMRALD) software. The EMRALD software is a dynamic simulation tool for PSA. It supports realistic and dynamic modeling of human actions as they would be performed at NPPs. It is also favorable to simultaneously model the specific moment at which an action is performed, the time it takes to perform the action, and the failure probability of that action. In this paper, a detailed methodology for modeling recovery actions in the simulation platform is proposed with a couple of examples. Then, outputs from the simulation are discussed as reviewing if this novel approach can complement the challenges of existing recovery analyses.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Alcohol consumption and breast cancer risk in Japan: A pooled analysis of eight population‐based cohort studies

Abstract Although alcohol consumption is reported to increase the incidence of breast cancer in European studies, evidence for an association between alcohol and breast cancer in Asian populations is insufficient. We conducted a pooled analysis of eight large‐scale population‐based prospective cohort studies in Japan to evaluate the association between alcohol (both frequency and amount) and breast cancer risk with categorization by menopausal status at baseline and at diagnosis. Estimated hazard ratios (HR) and 95% confidence intervals were calculated in the individual cohorts and combined using random‐effects models. Among 158 164 subjects with 2 369 252 person‐years of follow‐up, 2208 breast cancer cases were newly diagnosed. Alcohol consumption had a significant association with a higher risk of breast cancer in both women who were premenopausal at baseline (regular drinker compared to nondrinker: HR 1.37, 1.04‐1.81, ≥23 g/d compared to 0 g/d: HR 1.74, 1.25‐2.43, P for trend per frequency category: P = .017) and those who were premenopausal at diagnosis (≥23 g/d compared to 0 g/d: HR 1.89, 1.04‐3.43, P for trend per frequency category: P = .032). In contrast, no significant association was seen in women who were postmenopausal at baseline or at diagnosis, despite a substantial number of subjects and long follow‐up period. Our results revealed that frequent and high alcohol consumption are both risk factors for Asian premenopausal breast cancer, similarly to previous studies in Western countries. The lack of a clear association in postmenopausal women in our study warrants larger investigation in Asia.

Iwase, Madoka↗
DOE OSTI2021

A Risk-Informed Performance-Based Methodology to Manage Fire Protection Systems in Nuclear Facilities

Fire protection systems (FPSs) and features are installed in U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 nuclear facilities to protect property (maximum possible fire loss thresholds), life, and nuclear safety (i.e., structures, systems, and components). These FPSs and features are designed and maintained in accordance with the prescriptive guidance provided in applicable building codes and National Fire Protection Association codes and standards. Management, operations, and maintenance activities of FPSs involve significant effort. A DOE facility’s documented safety analysis or other safety basis document could also rely on FPSs to provide either a safety significant or safety class function to mitigate fire hazards and minimize radiological consequences. In some cases, the designation of safety significant or safety class may be determined to provide a layer of defense-in-depth to minimize nuclear safety risks independent of the fire risk. DOE standards allow the use of performance-based design alternatives developed by the fire industry but do not consider the defense-in-depth layers of protection provided in DOE facilities to prevent or mitigate the risks associated with unintended release of radioactive materials into the environment. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory developed a decision-making methodology tailored for DOE non-reactor nuclear facilities to manage FPSs and features by integrating nuclear safety risk insights into a performance-based analysis. This risk-informed, performance-based (RIPB) methodology can be used to provide the technical basis for classifying an FPS as safety class and safety significant, tailoring administrative controls (e.g., technical safety requirements), and ranking the importance of FPSs to prioritize maintenance, upgrades, and replacement activities. The RIPB methodology is a graded approach to inform DOE facility owners and Fire Protection Program managers of the most risk-significant FPSs and equipment, and those systems would be cost-beneficial to relax rigor if there is a need to re-design the FPS coverage or deviate from DOE and National Fire Protection Association standards for those systems that would be less significant. This paper describes the framework used to develop the RIPB methodology and the outcome of implementing this methodology in a use-case nuclear facility. This paper also discusses the impact to DOE policies and standards and the safety margins and defense-in-depth measures credited in nuclear safety assessments in a facility’s documented safety analysis and the benefits of implementing an RIPB methodology in lieu of a prescriptive method to comply with fire protection requirements.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗