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NASA NTRS2018

Space System Verification Approach Based on MEAL and Mission Risk Posture

There is no "one size fits all" solution for verifying space avionics systems to ensure safety and mission success. This paper presents a verification approach based on MEAL and risk posture for space systems. MEAL refers to Mission, mission Environment, Application, and Lifetime of the application. In addition to the description of the verification approach, the paper also provides the awareness of the different levels of risks associated with verification tests and inspections when performed at part-, board- and box-level, and discusses the applications of the approach for flight heritage verification, commercial off the shelf (COTS) verification and radiation-effects verification.

Mission Environment Application and Lifetime (MEAL↗

NASA NTRS2018

Space System Verification Approach Based on MEAL and Mission Risk Posture

Mission Environment Application and Lifetime (MEAL↗

NASA NTRS2005

Bridging the Divide between Safety and Risk Management for your Project or Program

This presentation will bridge the divide between these separate but overlapping disciplines and help explain how to use Risk Management as an effective management decision support tool that includes safety. Risk Management is an over arching communication tool used by management to prioritize and effectively mitigate potential problems before they concur. Risk Management encompasses every kind of potential problem that can occur on a program or project. Some of these are safety issues such as hazards that have a specific likelihood and consequence that need to be controlled and included to show an integrated picture of accepted) mitigated, and residual risk. Integrating safety and other assurance disciplines is paramount to accurately representing a program s or projects risk posture. Risk is made up of several components such as technical) cost, schedule, or supportability. Safety should also be a consideration for every risk. The safety component can also have an impact on the technical, cost, and schedule aspect of a given risk. The current formats used for communication of safety and risk issues are not consistent or integrated. The presentation will explore the history of these disciplines, current work to integrate them, and suggestions for integration for the future.

Lutomski, Mike↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Human System Risk Changes in 2021

The Human System Risk Board (HSRB) has the overall responsibility for tracking the evolution of the top ~30 human system risks that it has identified to be associated with human spaceflight. As part of this process, the Board is charged with maintaining a consistent, integrated process to mitigate those risks, and developing evidence-based risk posture recommendations. Risks are re-evaluated in a Continuous Risk Management (CRM) process. This session will summarize the risk posture changes that have occurred in the last year and what high level research, performance, and epidemiologic data have informed those changes. Human System Risks updated in 2021 include: Dynamic Loads, Sensorimotor, EVA, Crew Egress, Behavioral Medicine, Electrical Shock, Human System Integration Architecture (HSIA), Toxic Exposure, Bone Fracture, Cardiovascular, Medical Conditions, Renal Stone, CO2 Exposure, and Pharmacology.

Mary Van Baalen↗

NASA NTRS2014

Managing Research in a Risk World

The Office of Chief Medical Officer (OCHMO) owns all human health and performance risks managed by the Human System Risk Board (HSRB). While the HSRB manages the risks, the Human Research Program (HRP) manages the research portion of the overall risk mitigation strategy for these risks. The HSRB manages risks according to a process that identifies and analyzes risks, plans risk mitigation and tracks and reviews the implementation of these strategies according to its decisions pertaining to the OCHMO risk posture. HRP manages risk research work using an architecture that describes evidence-based risks, gaps in our knowledge about characterizing or mitigating the risk, and the tasks needed to produce deliverables to fill the gaps and reduce the risk. A planning schedule reflecting expected research milestones is developed, and as deliverables and new evidence are generated, research progress is tracked via the Path to Risk Reduction (PRR) that reflects a risk's research plan for a design reference mission. HRP's risk research process closely interfaces with the HSRB risk management process. As research progresses, new deliverables and evidence are used by the HSRB in conjunction with other operational and non-research evidence to inform decisions pertaining to the likelihood and consequence of the risk and risk posture. Those decisions in turn guide forward work for research as it contributes to overall risk mitigation strategies. As HRP tracks its research work, it aligns its priorities by assessing the effectiveness of its contributions and maintaining specific core competencies that would be invaluable for future work for exploration missions.

Anton, W.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA's Identified Risk of Adverse Outcomes due to Inadequate Human Systems Integration Architecture

The NASA Human System Risk Board (HSRB) is responsible for tracking the evolution of the top ~30 human system risks identified to be associated with human spaceflight. As part of this process, the Board is charged with maintaining a consistent, integrated process to evaluate those risks and developing evidence-based risk posture recommendations. Risks are ranked by likelihood and consequence. Intermediate causal relationships between risk contributing factors and countermeasures that link hazards to outcomes are described using Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs). The DAGs are also useful for identifying common factors and countermeasures across the top 30 risks as well as communicating how astronaut exposure to spaceflight hazards leads to meaningful mission-level health and performance outcomes. One of the top risks tracked by the HSRB is The Risk of Adverse Outcomes Due to Inadequate Human-Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA). This risk captures the possibility that due to decreasing real-time ground support during missions beyond LEO, crew will be unable to adequately respond to unanticipated critical malfunctions or detect safety-critical procedural errors. The HSIA risk is ranked red (high) for Lunar surface and Mars missions due to the probability of Loss of Crew and Loss of Mission consequences. This paper describes the evidence that supports the HSIA risk ranking and presents the central narrative of the HSIA risk DAG-- i.e., anomaly detection, diagnosis, intervention, and task performance. Characterizations of the current state of practice for each of the DAG’s central nodes and the future tools needed for successful anomaly response are provided.

human-systems integration architecture↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Exploring Digital Transformation for NASA Nuclear Flight Safety

The U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA)’s Nuclear Flight Safety discipline is exploring opportunities to combine incremental advancements in many contributing areas in a way that produces a transformative change for how work is performed. More specifically, after providing some general NASA and space nuclear policy background, the authors will describe concepts and efforts that enable: (i) the use of objectives-d riven approaches (in concert with internal and external constraints) to establish a mission risk posture; (ii) the use of that risk posture in the planning process to risk-inform the selection of Safety and Mission Success (S&MS) methods and models; (iii) use of model-based and machine-assisted techniques to manage the complex and ponderous amount of information and interfaces that typify spaceflight efforts; (iv ) the means by which that infrastructure can directly feed an assurance case (including use of systems modelling language, ontological formulation, and semantic web technology) so as to address known weaknesses in our ability to communicate and manage that complexity; and (v) use of that case-assured framework to demonstrate that one did the adequate and sufficient S&MS work and that the S&MS work was done competently.

Donald Helton↗

NASA NTRS2022

Directed Acyclic Graph Guidance Documentation

For over a decade, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has tracked and configuration-managed approximately 30 risks to astronaut health and performance that occur before, during and after spaceflight. The Human System Risk Board (HSRB), a Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) Board at NASA Johnson Space Center, is the entity responsible for identifying, assessing, analyzing, and monitoring the official understanding of the risk or risk posture for each of the Human System Risks and determining – based on evaluation of the available evidence – when that risk posture changes. The ultimate purpose of tracking and researching these risks is to find ways to reduce the risk that astronaut crews face during spaceflight. Historically, research, development and operations relevant to one risk have been conducted in isolation from other risks; these individual risk ‘silos’ enabled initial characterization of each specific risk. In spaceflight however, the impact of exposure to risk for astronaut crews is cumulative, and not independent of exposures or other risks, as all the adverse effects of the spaceflight environment begin at launch, continue throughout the duration of the mission and in some cases across the lifetime of the crews. In January of 2020, the HSRB at NASA embarked on a pilot project designed to assess the potential value of causal diagramming as a tool to facilitate understanding these cumulative and interdependent effects as applied within Human System Risk management. This process uses directed acyclic graphs as a means of formalizing a shared mental model of the causal flow of risk among Risk Board stakeholders. Initially this model was to improve communication among those stakeholders, but the potential value exceeds communication alone. Formalization of the process for creating these causal diagrams will enable the creation of a composite risk network that is vetted by members of the NASA community and configuration managed. The causal diagrams are formulated as directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) to function as a type of knowledge graph for reference for the board and its stakeholders. This document outlines the pilot process, the standardized approaches, and guidance for risk custodian teams when creating and updating DAGs as a part of the NASA Human System Risk Management process.

Risk↗

NASA NTRS2022

Directed Acyclic Graphs: A Tool for Understanding the NASA Human Spaceflight System Risks - Human System Risk Board

For over a decade, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has tracked and configuration-managed approximately 30 risks to astronaut health and performance that occur before, during and after spaceflight. The Human System Risk Board (HSRB), a Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) Board at NASA Johnson Space Center, is the entity responsible for identifying, assessing, analyzing, and monitoring the official understanding of the risk or risk posture for each of the Human System Risks and determining – based on evaluation of the available evidence – when that risk posture changes. The ultimate purpose of tracking and researching these risks is to find ways to reduce the risk that astronaut crews face during spaceflight. Historically, research, development and operations relevant to one risk have been conducted in isolation from other risks; these individual risk ‘silos’ enabled initial characterization of each specific risk. In spaceflight however, the impact of exposure to risk for astronaut crews is cumulative, and not independent of exposures or other risks, as all the adverse effects of the spaceflight environment begin at launch, continue throughout the duration of the mission and in some cases across the lifetime of the crews. In January of 2020, the HSRB at NASA embarked on a pilot project designed to assess the potential value of causal diagramming as a tool to facilitate understanding of these cumulative and interdependent effects as applied within Human System Risk management. This process uses directed acyclic graphs as a means of formalizing a shared mental model of the causal flow of risk among Risk Board stakeholders. Initially this model was to improve communication among those stakeholders, but the potential value exceeds communication alone. The causal diagrams are formulated as directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) to function as a type of knowledge graph for reference for the board and its stakeholders. This document is a sister document to NASA/TM 20220006812 Directed Acyclic Graph Guidance Documentation (1). In that document, the basic guidance for creating and standardizing directed acyclic graphs as tools for cross-risk analysis is provided. This document contains the initial configuration managed DAGs that were created as a result of applying those principles. These initial versions were accepted by the HSRB in January of 2022. Each of the Human System Risks are represented by a DAG that has been reviewed by the larger Human Health and Performance community at NASA including life scientists, physical scientists, physicians, nurses, pharmacists, exercise specialists and more. These results show the starting point for Human System Risk DAGs as shared mental models and communication aids across the boundaries of the various expertise needed to understand and mitigate the human risks in spaceflight. Because they are a starting point, each of these DAGs can be expected to change over time as new or refined evidence becomes available. The process for updating these DAGs can be found in the JSC-66705 Human System Risk Management Plan (2) that is publicly available on the NASA Technical Reports Server.

Erik L. Antonsen↗

NASA NTRS2014

Risk Classification and Risk-based Safety and Mission Assurance

Recent activities to revamp and emphasize the need to streamline processes and activities for Class D missions across the agency have led to various interpretations of Class D, including the lumping of a variety of low-cost projects into Class D. Sometimes terms such as Class D minus are used. In this presentation, mission risk classifications will be traced to official requirements and definitions as a measure to ensure that projects and programs align with the guidance and requirements that are commensurate for their defined risk posture. As part of this, the full suite of risk classifications, formal and informal will be defined, followed by an introduction to the new GPR 8705.4 that is currently under review.GPR 8705.4 lays out guidance for the mission success activities performed at the Classes A-D for NPR 7120.5 projects as well as for projects not under NPR 7120.5. Furthermore, the trends in stepping from Class A into higher risk posture classifications will be discussed. The talk will conclude with a discussion about risk-based safety and mission assuranceat GSFC.

Risk Management↗

NASA NTRS2022

Recommendations on the Use of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts for NASA Missions - Phase II

This assessment had two Phases. Phase I captured NASA Centers’ current practices for commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) parts 1 used in spaceflight systems and ground support equipment (available at https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20205011579) [ref. 1]. The Phase II report provides guidance for selecting and using COTS parts in NASA missions. The approaches proposed in this report differ from current agency practices. This top-level executive summary touches on these new approaches for using COTS parts but does not provide the detailed information that is critical in understanding the rationale behind these new approaches. Readers will need to read the entire report to gain full understanding and effectively use the recommendations herein. NASA’s historical approach to selecting and applying parts has been to define certain parts, primarily specific classes of military specification (MIL-SPEC) parts, as “standard”, leaving all others, including COTS parts, as nonstandard. Standard parts typically are used without further testing (“use-as-is”). Nonstandard parts are subjected to initial screening and subsequent lot acceptance testing of representative samples from each procured lot per MIL-SPEC or similar requirements. Decades later, top-tier commercial part manufacturers have evolved significant manufacturing, statistical control, and technological improvements that can now provide parts as reliable or more reliable than MIL-SPEC parts, when used within their datasheet limits. Concurrently, the space science and exploration community’s needs demand technological advances unavailable with MIL-SPEC parts. This ongoing change necessitates using COTS parts for space missions. Properly selected COTS parts in appropriate applications can offer performance and supply availability advantages compared to MIL-SPEC parts. Their utility and demonstrated reliability result from large volumes and automated production and testing processes. However, careful review and a thorough understanding of their specifications (i.e., datasheet limitations) is needed, and verifying that manufacturer specifications and reliability meet space hardware application needs are necessary. This report recommends MIL-SPEC screening and non-radiation-related lot acceptance testing be reduced or eliminated in cases where evidence of sufficient quality and reliability exists for COTS parts. The extent of NASA's insight into COTS manufacturers and the amount and nature of the needed evidence will differ by mission and will likely be driven by a mission's resources and associated risk posture. To facilitate this goal, two new terminologies have been defined and described: “Industry Leading Parts Manufacturer (ILPM)” and “Established COTS parts.” An ILPM is a COTS manufacturer that produces high quality and reliable parts. Some parts produced by ILPMs, defined as Established COTS parts, do not need any additional MIL-SPEC or NASA screening and lot acceptance testing to be used in space applications. This report provides guidance for selecting, procuring, and applying COTS parts and for performing part-, board-, and system-level COTS parts verification. The recommendation to select Established COTS parts from ILPMs will assure those COTS parts will have comparable quality to corresponding MIL-SPEC parts. Selecting, applying, and verifying Established COTS parts from ILPMs requires a holistic team approach, engaging parts engineers, circuit designers, quality, reliability, and systems engineers, procurement specialists, radiation specialists, avionics leads, and program/project managers. A mission-specific approach tailored to a project’s Mission, Environment, Applications and Lifetime (MEAL) [ref. 2] requirements should be developed and approved by program/project managers. Any associated risks should be clearly identified, quantified, mitigated, and/or accepted. Different approaches are recommended according to program/project Risk Classes A, B, C, and D [ref. 3] and human-rated missions [ref. 4]: 1. Recommend Classes A and B and human-rated missions consider a “MIL-SPEC parts- based design” approach. ”MIL-SPEC parts-based design” approach is one in which most parts are MIL-SPEC parts and Established COTS parts from ILPMs are used only when an equivalent MIL-SPEC part does not meet functional or size, weight, and power (SWaP) or performance requirements, or is not available. 2. Recommend Classes D and Sub-D missions consider a “System of COTS” approach. “System of COTS” approach is one which most parts are Established COTS parts from ILPMs. 3. Recommend Class C missions determine which approach is the best for their projects; that is, use either a “MIL-SPEC parts-based design” approach, “System of COTS” approach, or a combined approach utilizing elements of both. This report intends to provide guidance in using COTS parts for NASA missions with risk classifications of A through D and human-rated missions; but it does not address the costs of using COTS parts. Costs of using COTS parts in different NASA mission classes can vary significantly even if the same parts are used in different risk postures, due to differing verification levels needed. The guidance does not distinguish between critical or non-critical systems, and a given project will need to apply the appropriate guidance based on their risk posture. The intended audience of this report are NASA personnel and commercial practitioners who support NASA’s spaceflight missions, including spaceflight program or project managers, parts engineers, parts manufacturers, radiation engineers, avionics engineers, system engineers, circuit design engineers, reliability engineers, safety and mission assurance (SMA) personnel, and parts procurement specialists. The NEPP Program will perform a pathfinder study to explore implementing the guidance in this NESC report. An ILPM verification process is not the same as conventional vendor qualification processes performed according to military standards and specifications. This NESC report intends to provide guidance in utilizing available parts data from ILPM manufacturers for parts assurance assessments needed for NASA missions. The report also captured the current practices from DoD and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in Section 10. Note each DoD and FAA report was provided by the corresponding agencies regarding their practices, which are independent from the NESC recommendations in the report.

Commercial-Off-The-Shelf↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Implementing an Objectives-Driven, Risk-Informed, and Case-Assured Approach to Safety and Mission Success at NASA

NASA is developing a “Standard for Assurance of Space Flight Safety and Mission Success” that implements an objectives-driven, risk-informed, and case-assured approach to safety and mission success (S&MS) for NASA space flight programs and projects. The standard aligns with the philosophy of risk leadership that has recently been established in NASA policy to assure acceptable levels of flight crew safety and mission success risk. It is consistent with existing NASA risk management requirements and is compatible with NASA program management and systems engineering requirements. The methodology described in the standard is presented in terms of an S&MS assurance framework that is designed to allow substantial flexibility in the specific means by which programs and projects achieve acceptable mission S&MS risk. Such flexibility is necessary to accommodate the increasingly broad range of acquisition strategies employed by NASA, including commercial transportation services, as well as to accommodate the increasingly rapid evolution of space flight-related technologies and practices. A key feature of the S&MS assurance framework is the specification of S&MS success criteria for each life-cycle review (LCR). The S&MS assurance case is structured around these criteria, the satisfaction of which indicates that the program/project is adhering to the S&MS risk posture. This enables the evolving S&MS assurance case to be used as a fundamental program/project submittal at each LCR, where its inherent structure of argument, supported by evidence, directly supports the evaluation of the program/project with respect to the S&MS success criteria, and by extension, the S&MS risk posture. As such, the S&MS assurance case is integral to program/project systems engineering, risk management, and S&MS oversight activities, and provides the principal basis for S&MS risk acceptance by the Decision Authority throughout the program/project life cycle.

Risk Posture↗

NASA NTRS2019

Method for Tracking and Communicating Aggregate Risk Through the Use of Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) Tools

Large, complex projects can identify a significant number and variety of risks, throughout the project life cycle. These risks are analyzed, mitigated, closed or accepted as independent uncertainties. Once closed or accepted, it is easy for projects to lose awareness of their impact. In reality, each of these risks contributes some amount to the overall risk posture of the project. The ability to track and effectively communicate this aggregate risk has represented a challenge to project management. There have been previous attempts to create a schema to communicate the aggregate effect of risks, without notable success. Most of these attempts have centered on some additive metric derived from the scoring of likelihood and consequence values. This, in and of itself, is a logical approach, but all too often the scores were then aggregated to a level where all context was lost. One weakness has been a lack of attempt to create linkages or logical groups of the risks upon which useful aggregation could then occur. The overall move to model-based (systems) engineering (MBSE) has opened up a vast frontier of opportunities to better integrate all project data. MBSE provides an underlying layer that links data items to each other. Objectives link to requirements, which then link to functions, functions to physical architecture items, and so on, as far down as projects want to model. While it started with a focus on modeling requirements based on things like use cases, efforts are now underway to integrate safety and mission assurance (S&MA) information and analyses, such as risks. This effort, called Model Based Mission Assurance (MBMA), is yielding models that are more useful and are a more accurate representations of the systems. MBSE models, with this ability to link related items, provide a new means of tracking and communicating aggregate risks. In the proposed method, risks are added into the models as distinct items, having attributes that communicate a scoring derived from the likelihood and consequence values as charted on the standard NASA 5x5 risk matrix. Like earlier efforts, each box in the 5x5 has an associated scoring, which may include both a current score and potential post-mitigation/control score. The risk items are then linked to elements of the model, such as system objectives/goals, requirements, functions, or physical architecture items, with "Risk to" relationships. These risks will then be communicated by use of reports generated from the model, detailing all risks and/or hazards linked to model elements. These reports can include aggregate impacts, including a current scoring and potential future state scoring based on the planned mitigations and/or controls. These reports will show all risks, open, accepted, and closed, linked to project objectives or requirements. When run as part of an upcoming risk acceptance discussion, these reports will serve to remind the team of all previous risks that relate to the effected portion of the system. When included as part of periodic program or project reviews, risk reviews, and safety reviews, this method can improve the overall understanding of the system's true risk posture. This proposed method takes full advantage of the advances that modern modeling techniques provide, with a minimal investment of additional time. Utilizing the model environment also enables a near constant access to current state of aggregate risks.

model based mission assurance↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

High Value Risk Targets in Human System Risk

The Human System Risk Board (HSRB) has the overall responsibility for tracking the evolution of the top ~30 human system risks that it has identified to be associated with human spaceflight. The Board is also charged with maintaining a consistent, integrated process to mitigate those risks, and developing evidence-based risk posture recommendations. Each Risk Custodian Team (RCT) identifies High Value Risk Mitigation Targets (HVRMT) that have the highest likelihood or greatest impact in reducing their risk. These typically include areas where there are major gaps in knowledge or capability; or other targets that promise to yield returns worthy of investments in time, money and other resources by stakeholders interested in reducing Human System Risk. As part of the review of each risk the Board members consider and discuss the HVRMT statements, which are then approved by the Board Chair. High Value Risk Mitigation Targets can include research activities funded by the Human Research Program, but often involve recommending standards, monitoring, or other operational goals to reduce risk. This presentation will discuss common themes and highlights of the approved HVRTs to inform IWS attendees and the wider research community.

D M Buckland↗

NASA NTRS2009

An Effective Health and Medical Technical Authority

The NASA Governance model directed the formation of three Technical Authorities, Engineering; Safety and Mission Assurance; and Health and Medical, to ensure that risks are identified and adjudicated efficiently and transparently in concert with the spaceflight programs and projects. The Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) has been implemented at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) and consists of the Chief Medical Office (CMO), the Deputy CMO, and HMTA Delegates. The JSC HMTA achieves the goals of risk identification and adjudication through the discharge of the appropriate technical expertise to human space flight programs and projects and the escalation of issues within program and technical authority boards. The JSC HMTA relies on subject matter experts (SMEs) in the Space Life Sciences Directorate at JSC as well as experts from other Centers to work crew health and performance issues at the technical level, develop requirements, oversee implementation and validation of requirements, and identify risks and non-compliances. Once a risk or potential noncompliance has been identified and reported to the programs or projects, the JSC HMTA begins to track it and closely monitor the program's or project's response. As a risk is developed or a non-compliance negotiated, positions from various levels of decision makers are sought at the program and project control boards. The HMTA may support a program or project position if it is satisfied with the decision making and vetting processes (ex. the subject matter expert voiced his/her concerns and all dissenting opinions were documented) and finds that the position both acknowledges the risk and cost of the mitigation and resolves the issue without changing NASA risk posture. The HMTA may disagree with a program or project position if the NASA risk posture has been elevated or obfuscated. If the HMTA does disagree with the program or project position, it will appeal to successively higher levels of authority so that risk acceptance and risk trades will be acknowledged and sanctioned at the highest appropriate level; this includes Program Managers, Mission Directorate Associate Administrators and the Agency Administrator.

Fogarty, Jennifer A.↗

NASA NTRS2007

All Source Solution Decision Support Products Created for Stennis Space Center in Response to Hurricane Katrina

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and in response to the needs of SSC (Stennis Space Center), NASA required the generation of decision support products with a broad range of geospatial inputs. Applying a systems engineering approach, the NASA ARTPO (Applied Research and Technology Project Office) at SSC evaluated the Center's requirements and source data quality. ARTPO identified data and information products that had the potential to meet decision-making requirements; included were remotely sensed data ranging from high-spatial-resolution aerial images through high-temporal-resolution MODIS (Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer) products. Geospatial products, such as FEMA's (Federal Emergency Management Agency's) Advisory Base Flood Elevations, were also relevant. Where possible, ARTPO applied SSC calibration/validation expertise to both clarify the quality of various data source options and to validate that the inputs that were finally chosen met SSC requirements. ARTPO integrated various information sources into multiple decision support products, including two maps: Hurricane Katrina Inundation Effects at Stennis Space Center (highlighting surge risk posture) and Vegetation Change In and Around Stennis Space Center: Katrina and Beyond (highlighting fire risk posture).

Ross, Kenton W.↗

DOE OSTI2024

Implementing an Objectives-Driven, Risk-Informed, and Case-Assured Approach to Safety and Mission Success at NASA

42 ENGINEERING↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Ejectable Data Recorder: A Lean, Risk-Informed Approach for Hardware Development

NASA is developing the Orion spacecraft to transport crew from the Earth to the Moon as part of the Artemis series of missions. To provide a crew escape capability from pre-launch through ascent, the Orion vehicle is equipped with a Launch Abort System (LAS), built by Lockheed Martin, which pulls the capsule away from the launch vehicle in the event of an abort scenario. The Ascent Abort 2 (AA-2) test flight occurred on July 2, 2019,and tested a production version of the LAS to ensure that it can operate as intended, and to collect a large data set from hundreds of sensors on the vehicle to support Orion flight certification. In the original AA-2 architecture, a single-string set of communications antennas on the LAS would downlink all of the in-flight test data to ground stations. However, that communications architecture was predicted to have data dropouts during abort and jettison of the LAS, and would not support data transmission at all after LAS jettison. As a result, a comprehensive trade study was completed, yielding the addition of antennas on the crew module (CM), a buffer/rebroadcast capability for key portions of the flight, and an ejectable data recorder (EDR) subsystem. This EDR subsystem would serve as a backup to the radio frequency (RF) communications system, and would be non-flight critical, providing a unique capability that enabled management to take a different approach with the hardware and software development. The Crew Module and Separation Ring were developed as “Class 1”Flight Hardware, albeit with some tailoring approaches to enable efficiencies. The Class 1 designation requires full rigor for flight hardware and software, documenting everything that happens to a piece of hardware from procurement through disposal, requiring a full spectrum of acceptance tests, and the highest rigor of quality assurance processes. At the other end of the spectrum, Class 3hardware is controlled, but not intended for flight, and leaves the level of rigor up to the project manager. This classification is often used for research and development projects. Similarly,Class-1E has been recently defined at NASA for ISS payloads and technology development projects that are not flight critical and do not need the full rigor of Class 1 to be successful. The EDR subsystem was challenged at commencement to adopt a skunkworks and agile-like approach to hardware development, allowing for a different risk posture than the rest of the AA-2 hardware. After initially pursuing Class 1 processes, the EDR subsystem design evolved to incorporating numerous commercial components, leading to re-designation as a Class-1E subsystem. The resulting EDR subsystem was fully successful in meeting all flight system requirements, and achieved 100% retrieval of flight test data. This paper will discuss the risk posture of the EDR subsystem and the subsequent tailoring that was enacted as part of its Class-1E status.

EDR↗