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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Phasing COTS Part Into Low-Risk-Tolerant Missions

A number of activities within NASA and the space community, as well as growing technology needs and supply chain changes have accelerated the need to expand the use of COTS parts within NASA. While the use of COTS has been formally institutionalized and deemed acceptable for Class D space missions and those with greater tolerance for risk, there is still a lack of understanding of how to most effectively use COTS in such high risk-tolerance missions, and no apparent path towards broad use in missions with much less tolerance for risk. However, the reality is that the fundamental limitations of technology associated with the military specification system combined with the need to fly newer technologies in upcoming flagship robotic missions and human space flight missions will ultimately demand a more expansive use of COTS. The infinite nature of COTS gives rise to numerous challenges in the selection, acceptance, testing, and usage of COTS when reliable operation is essential. This presentation will highlight some of the results of a NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) study on the use of COTS parts, as well as many of the historical through current facts about parts assurance within Agency to provide a path forward for reliable use of COTS for a range of space applications and risk postures. In addition this presentation will dispel the myth that expanded use of COTS parts causes a new set of radiation threats to missions.

COTS↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Phasing COTS Part Into Low-Risk-Tolerant Missions

A number of activities within NASA and the space community, as well as growing technology needs and supply chain changes have accelerated the need to expand the use of COTS parts within NASA. While the use of COTS has been formally institutionalized and deemed acceptable for Class D space missions and those with greater tolerance for risk, there is still a lack of understanding of how to most effectively use COTS in such high risk-tolerance missions, and no apparent path towards broad use in missions with much less tolerance for risk. However, the reality is that the fundamental limitations of technology associated with the military specification system combined with the need to fly newer technologies in upcoming flagship robotic missions and human space flight missions will ultimately demand a more expansive use of COTS. The infinite nature of COTS gives rise to numerous challenges in the selection, acceptance, testing, and usage of COTS when reliable operation is essential. This presentation will highlight some of the results of a NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) study on the use of COTS parts, as well as many of the historical through current facts about parts assurance within Agency to provide a path forward for reliable use of COTS for a range of space applications and risk postures. In addition this presentation will dispel the myth that expanded use of COTS parts causes a new set of radiation threats to missions.

COTS↗
NASA NTRS2018

Risk Tolerance and Safety Culture: Minimizing the Risk of Catastrophe by Bringing the Lessons of Space Home

The Johnson Space Center has pursued integrating risk management practices and techniques throughout a large organization with an extraordinarily diverse mission. Past mission and institutional failures have been used to inform NASA's safety culture and a implement a uniform risk management environment. Basics from the loss prevention industry have influenced NASA's approach to sustaining its unique, yet aging, infrastructure. Lessons learned at NASA can augment and enhance occupational safety, health and risk management capabilities within hazardous industries. By focusing on risk informed decision-making, building a pervasive safety culture, and accommodating human factors, NASA's safety capabilities have been specifically developed to minimize the risk of loss of life and loss of mission.

Loyd, David↗
NASA NTRS2018

Risk Tolerance and Safety Culture: Minimizing the Risk of Catastrophe by Bringing the Lessons of Space Home

The Johnson Space Center has pursued integrating safety culture and risk management practices and techniques throughout a large organization with an extraordinarily diverse mission. Past mission and institutional failures have been used to inform NASA's safety culture and a implement a uniform risk management environment. Basics from the loss prevention industry have influenced NASA's approach to sustaining its unique, yet aging, infrastructure. Lessons learned at NASA can augment and enhance occupational safety, health and risk management capabilities within hazardous industries. By focusing on risk informed decision-making, building a pervasive safety culture, and accommodating human factors, NASA's safety capabilities have been specifically developed to minimize the risk of loss of life and loss of mission.

Mishap↗
NASA NTRS2010

LCROSS - Lunar Impactor: Pioneering Risk-Tolerant Exploration in Search for Water on the Moon

The Lunar CRater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS) was launched with the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) on June 18, 2009 to determine the presence of water-ice in a permanently shadowed crater on the south pole of the Moon. However, an equally important purpose was to pioneer low-cost, quick-turnaround NASA missions that could accept a higher-than-normal-level of technical risk. When the LCROSS mission proposal was competitively selected by the NASA Exploration Systems Mission Directorate to design, build, and launch a spacecraft in 31 months with a $79M cost-capped budget and a fixed mass allocation, NASA Ames Research Center and its industry partner, Northrop-Grumman, needed a game-changing approach to be successful. That approach was a ground-breaking combination of having a risk-tolerant NASA Class D mission status and finding the right balance point between the inflexible elements of cost and schedule and the newly-flexible element of technical capability.

Andrews, Daniel R.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Understanding Risk Tolerance and Building an Effective Safety Culture

Estimates range from 65-90 percent of catastrophic mishaps are due to human error. NASA's human factors-related mishaps causes are estimated at approximately 75 percent. As much as we'd like to error-proof our work environment, even the most automated and complex technical endeavors require human interaction... and are vulnerable to human frailty. Industry and government are focusing not only on human factors integration into hazardous work environments, but also looking for practical approaches to cultivating a strong Safety Culture that diminishes risk. Industry and government organizations have recognized the value of monitoring leading indicators to identify potential risk vulnerabilities. NASA has adapted this approach to assess risk controls associated with hazardous, critical, and complex facilities. NASA's facility risk assessments integrate commercial loss control, OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration) Process Safety, API (American Petroleum Institute) Performance Indicator Standard, and NASA Operational Readiness Inspection concepts to identify risk control vulnerabilities.

Loyd, David↗
NASA NTRS2023

Adaptive Mission Assurance (AMA) – A Conceptual Guide for NASA Missions

NASA is well acquainted with and skilled in conducting Risk Class A Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA). Class A missions are characterized as having highly specific performance with an ultra-low risk tolerance for risk and mission failure. But space is rapidly changing, and the space enterprise is challenged to pursue faster more agile mission developments with fewer resources and directed schedules. To meet this demand mission development teams face accepting more risk and trading performance within strict cost and schedule constraints. In responding to this challenge, The Aerospace Corporation has evolved the Adaptive Mission Assurance (AMA) approach. The benefit of an “adaptive” approach is most realized for smaller Research and Development (R&D), or Science and Technology (S&T) demonstration missions constrained by significantly smaller budgets and directed schedules. The challenge for these “risk tolerant, constraints-driven” missions is how to identify the most valuable mission assurance tasks that will fit within strict budgetary and schedule constraints for “gracefully” accepting risk that still achieves an agreeable expectation of mission success. AMA can respond to this challenge with little to no impact to team staffing or existing workload. This conceptual guide introduces AMA as a potential implementation for NASA Risk Class D and Sub-Class D missions.

Douglas A. Harris↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Phasing in COTS EEE parts in NASA

A number of activities within NASA and the space community, as well as growing technology needs and supply chain changes have accelerated the need to expand the use of COTS parts within NASA. While the use of COTS has been formally institutionalized and deemed acceptable for Class D space missions and those with greater tolerance for risk, there is still a lack of understanding of how to most effectively use COTS in such high risk-tolerance missions, and no apparent path towards broad use in missions with much less tolerance for risk. However, the reality is that the fundamental limitations of technology associated with the military specification system combined with the need to fly newer technologies in upcoming flagship robotic missions and human space flight missions will ultimately demand a more expansive use of COTS. The infinite nature of COTS gives rise to numerous challenges in the selection, acceptance, testing, and usage of COTS when reliable operation is essential. This presentation will highlight some of the current artifacts of a NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) study on the use of COTS parts, as well as many of the historical through current facts about parts assurance within Agency to provide a path forward for reliable use of COTS for a range of space applications and risk postures.

EEE parts↗
NASA NTRS1997

Alternative Perspectives on Risk

The goal of the commercial air transport system is to provide air transportation to the flying public at an acceptable cost with minimal risk. in an ideal situation these three goals would support each other. In fact, it is sometimes the case that the goals conflict: getting passengers to their destinations on time may conflict with fixing a minor mechanical malfunction that may or may not impact safety; flying a route that will avoid turbulence, thereby providing passengers with a more comfortable ride, may consume more fuel; managing traffic density may mean aircraft are delayed or must use an approach that will result in a long taxi to their gates, costing time and fuel. Various players in the system--pilots, dispatchers, controllers, as well as managers in the airline carriers and traffic management system--make decisions every day that involve trade-offs of benefits and costs. The prospect of revisions in the air traffic management system, with shifts in responsibilities from controllers to users, including airline operations center personnel and pilots, means that individuals may be performing either new jobs or old jobs under new guidance. It will be essential to know how the various players (a) perceive the risks and benefits associated with the decisions they will make under the old and new control structures, and (b) how much risk they are willing to accept in making decisions. Risk is here defined as the probability and magnitude of negative events (after Slovic, 1987). Of primary interest are risks associated with traffic, weather, and operational factors such as schedule, fuel consumption, and passenger service. Previous research has documented differences between groups in perceptions of risks associated with both everyday and aviation related situations. Risk perception varies as a function of familiarity with the situation, degree to which one is potentially affected by the risk, the level of control one has over the situation, and one's level of experience and responsibility in the situation. In our presentation we will consider several factors that may influence differences in risk perception, risk tolerance and risk management among the three major categories of participants in the aviation system (pilots, dispatchers, and controllers). Primary factors that may affect risk attitudes (the collective term we will use for the three components of risk) include: expertise or job-specific knowledge or training, personal involvement or vulnerability to consequences, goals, time horizon (imminence of consequences), span of control and type of control, and information or technology support. These will be considered in the context of five different types of risk (physical threat, economic, social, legal, and ethical). A study designed to study differences between pilots and controllers in their perceptions and responses to traffic risks under the present and a user-preferred control situation will be described. Future studies involving dispatchers' risk perceptions regarding various types of risk will be discussed.

Davison, Jeannie↗
NASA NTRS2011

NASA System Safety Handbook: System Safety Framework and Concepts for Implementation - Volume 1

System safety assessment is defined in NPR 8715.3C, NASA General Safety Program Requirements as a disciplined, systematic approach to the analysis of risks resulting from hazards that can affect humans, the environment, and mission assets. Achievement of the highest practicable degree of system safety is one of NASA's highest priorities. Traditionally, system safety assessment at NASA and elsewhere has focused on the application of a set of safety analysis tools to identify safety risks and formulate effective controls.1 Familiar tools used for this purpose include various forms of hazard analyses, failure modes and effects analyses, and probabilistic safety assessment (commonly also referred to as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)). In the past, it has been assumed that to show that a system is safe, it is sufficient to provide assurance that the process for identifying the hazards has been as comprehensive as possible and that each identified hazard has one or more associated controls. The NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) has made several statements in its annual reports supporting a more holistic approach. In 2006, it recommended that "... a comprehensive risk assessment, communication and acceptance process be implemented to ensure that overall launch risk is considered in an integrated and consistent manner." In 2009, it advocated for "... a process for using a risk-informed design approach to produce a design that is optimally and sufficiently safe." As a rationale for the latter advocacy, it stated that "... the ASAP applauds switching to a performance-based approach because it emphasizes early risk identification to guide designs, thus enabling creative design approaches that might be more efficient, safer, or both." For purposes of this preface, it is worth mentioning three areas where the handbook emphasizes a more holistic type of thinking. First, the handbook takes the position that it is important to not just focus on risk on an individual basis but to consider measures of aggregate safety risk and to ensure wherever possible that there be quantitative measures for evaluating how effective the controls are in reducing these aggregate risks. The term aggregate risk, when used in this handbook, refers to the accumulation of risks from individual scenarios that lead to a shortfall in safety performance at a high level: e.g., an excessively high probability of loss of crew, loss of mission, planetary contamination, etc. Without aggregated quantitative measures such as these, it is not reasonable to expect that safety has been optimized with respect to other technical and programmatic objectives. At the same time, it is fully recognized that not all sources of risk are amenable to precise quantitative analysis and that the use of qualitative approaches and bounding estimates may be appropriate for those risk sources. Second, the handbook stresses the necessity of developing confidence that the controls derived for the purpose of achieving system safety not only handle risks that have been identified and properly characterized but also provide a general, more holistic means for protecting against unidentified or uncharacterized risks. For example, while it is not possible to be assured that all credible causes of risk have been identified, there are defenses that can provide protection against broad categories of risks and thereby increase the chances that individual causes are contained. Third, the handbook strives at all times to treat uncertainties as an integral aspect of risk and as a part of making decisions. The term "uncertainty" here does not refer to an actuarial type of data analysis, but rather to a characterization of our state of knowledge regarding results from logical and physical models that approximate reality. Uncertainty analysis finds how the output parameters of the models are related to plausible variations in the input parameters and in the modeling assumptions. The evaluation of unrtainties represents a method of probabilistic thinking wherein the analyst and decision makers recognize possible outcomes other than the outcome perceived to be "most likely." Without this type of analysis, it is not possible to determine the worth of an analysis product as a basis for making decisions related to safety and mission success. In line with these considerations the handbook does not take a hazard-analysis-centric approach to system safety. Hazard analysis remains a useful tool to facilitate brainstorming but does not substitute for a more holistic approach geared to a comprehensive identification and understanding of individual risk issues and their contributions to aggregate safety risks. The handbook strives to emphasize the importance of identifying the most critical scenarios that contribute to the risk of not meeting the agreed-upon safety objectives and requirements using all appropriate tools (including but not limited to hazard analysis). Thereafter, emphasis shifts to identifying the risk drivers that cause these scenarios to be critical and ensuring that there are controls directed toward preventing or mitigating the risk drivers. To address these and other areas, the handbook advocates a proactive, analytic-deliberative, risk-informed approach to system safety, enabling the integration of system safety activities with systems engineering and risk management processes. It emphasizes how one can systematically provide the necessary evidence to substantiate the claim that a system is safe to within an acceptable risk tolerance, and that safety has been achieved in a cost-effective manner. The methodology discussed in this handbook is part of a systems engineering process and is intended to be integral to the system safety practices being conducted by the NASA safety and mission assurance and systems engineering organizations. The handbook posits that to conclude that a system is adequately safe, it is necessary to consider a set of safety claims that derive from the safety objectives of the organization. The safety claims are developed from a hierarchy of safety objectives and are therefore hierarchical themselves. Assurance that all the claims are true within acceptable risk tolerance limits implies that all of the safety objectives have been satisfied, and therefore that the system is safe. The acceptable risk tolerance limits are provided by the authority who must make the decision whether or not to proceed to the next step in the life cycle. These tolerances are therefore referred to as the decision maker's risk tolerances. In general, the safety claims address two fundamental facets of safety: 1) whether required safety thresholds or goals have been achieved, and 2) whether the safety risk is as low as possible within reasonable impacts on cost, schedule, and performance. The latter facet includes consideration of controls that are collective in nature (i.e., apply generically to broad categories of risks) and thereby provide protection against unidentified or uncharacterized risks.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

How to Educate Decision Makers on the Value and Necessity of Modal Testing and Model Correlation: Tips for Young Engineers

Engineers need to effectively communicate the justification and value of their modal testing and model correlation in terminology familiar to decision makers as it relates to the program’s risk tolerance. This communication must relate to the program’s risk tolerance and the metrics used to judge the performance of both the program and individual decision makers. The challenge is the terminologies familiar to engineers and decision makers are quite different and seemingly unrelated. The engineering profession has developed a specific terminology to solve highly technical issues, which are many times themselves unique to very specific engineering problems. It is all too easy for engineers to believe that everyone in their organization, including the decision makers, has an intrinsic understanding of what they do and the value it brings to the program’s success. This is especially true for young engineers who have recently spent the last four plus years in an academic engineering learning environment, which has a highly technical research oriented atmosphere. Effective communication with decision makers is increasingly important as the technical breadth and practical program and project experience level for up and coming decision makers diminishes. It is not unusual for the decision makers to have technical knowledge in a domain different from structural dynamics (e.g., electronics or systems). Competition among satellite manufactures has increased the focus on programmatic cost and ability to deliver on schedule. NASA programs are also seeing more restrictive programmatic cost and schedule constraints, which impact both analysis and testing. It should also be noted that a comprehensive suite of tests are required to verify a satellite’s design capability with some margin. These tests include static strength verification tests, shock, acoustic, and vibration tests (sine and random) of systems, subsystems, and components. Each of these verification tests provide opportunities for model correlation and risk reduction. It is important to recognize dynamic loads/modal test models may not include all of the flight hardware (i.e., harness, coax, waveguides, connectors, etc.) and the previously mentioned tests are still required for qualification/verification of the design. This paper provides tips to young engineers on how to bridge this communications gap, have a better understanding of the environment in which decision makers operate, and assist them to better support successful missions. While this paper primarily focuses on modal testing and model correlation as related to spacecraft missions, the concepts and recommendations presented here are equally applicable to other fields such as aeronautics, automotive, power generation, etc.

Decision Maker↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

How to Educate Decision Makers on the Value and Necessity of Modal Testing and Model Correlation: Tips for Young Engineers

Engineers need to effectively communicate the justification and value of their modal testing and model correlation in terminology familiar to decision makers as it relates to the program’s risk tolerance. This communication must relate to the program’s risk tolerance and the metrics used to judge the performance of both the program and individual decision makers. The challenge is the terminologies familiar to engineers and decision makers are quite different and seemingly unrelated. The engineering profession has developed a specific terminology to solve highly technical issues, which are many times themselves unique to very specific engineering problems. It is all too easy for engineers to believe that everyone in their organization, including the decision makers, has an intrinsic understanding of what they do and the value it brings to the program’s success. This is especially true for young engineers who have recently spent the last four plus years in an academic engineering learning environment, which has a highly technical research oriented atmosphere. Effective communication with decision makers is increasingly important as the technical breadth and practical program and project experience level for up and coming decision makers diminishes. It is not unusual for the decision makers to have technical knowledge in a domain different from structural dynamics (e.g., electronics or systems). Competition among satellite manufactures has increased the focus on programmatic cost and ability to deliver on schedule. NASA programs are also seeing more restrictive programmatic cost and schedule constraints, which impact both analysis and testing. It should also be noted that a comprehensive suite of tests are required to verify a satellite’s design capability with some margin. These tests include static strength verification tests, shock, acoustic, and vibration tests (sine and random) of systems, subsystems, and components. Each of these verification tests provide opportunities for model correlation and risk reduction. It is important to recognize dynamic loads/modal test models may not include all of the flight hardware (i.e., harness, coax, waveguides, connectors, etc.) and the previously mentioned tests are still required for qualification/verification of the design. This paper provides tips to young engineers on how to bridge this communications gap, have a better understanding of the environment in which decision makers operate, and assist them to better support successful missions. While this paper primarily focuses on modal testing and model correlation as related to spacecraft missions, the concepts and recommendations presented here are equally applicable to other fields such as aeronautics, automotive, power generation, etc.

Decision Maker↗
NASA NTRS2022

Assurance Equations: A Cost and Criticality Model for Optimizing Quality Assurance Surveillance

The cost of quality vs cost of failure correction has been a long-running topic of discussion within the Aerospace community. It leads directly to concepts of “risk tolerance”, and risk-based decision-making. It would be valuable if there was a way to compute the optimal investment in customer-executed quality assurance activities using defect significance with respect to performance objectives, the activities’ defect detection effectiveness, and the cost-penalty for late discovery of impactful defects. This optimization is particularly of interest to projects whose budget constraints significantly limit their risk management options.The cost to fix defects (i.e., failure correction) escalates as the project matures. There have been studies attempting to determine the relative cost of fixing defects discovered during various phases of a project life cycle with important implications, all of which suggest growth factors are large. The commonly referred to 1:10:100 rule represents a cost multiplier for repair/rework across the Design to Fab to Test hardware development phases. Cost premiums for QA activities also accumulate when they are treated as mandatory (due to schedule drag) or are performed later than their assigned phase.This paper describes the modeling of development phase -dependencies in the conduct of typical customer-executed quality assurance activities. Our initial modeling encompasses:• Distinct phases of the production lifecycle• Multiple kinds of Defects, each with some a-priori likelihood of being present• Each defect’s impact on performance Objectives for a type of hardware• The cost and efficacy of assurance techniques at detecting such Defects• The costs of fixing those Defects detected in a given phase of the production lifecycleThe model captures assurance activities’ abilities to Detect defects. Upon detection it is assumed that the Defect is immediately fixed. Defects that “escape” detection by some activity may thereafter be detected by a later activity, but by then the cost of fixing the Defect may have escalated. Defects are related to the performance Objectives they would detract from, were those Defects to remain present in the operating system.We have constructed and are exploring, a model that relates the importance of hardware system elements to mission objectives, the impact of types of Defects on those hardware types, the cost of customer-executed assurance activities (i.e., supplier controls) and their effectiveness towards reducing an impactful quality escape, and the cost of Defect correction across production phase. We describe the approach taken to select the key model aspects, why they are relevant to our NASA mission, and our efforts to populate it with relevant and contemporary data. We use a notional example to illustrate model design and function.

Plante, Jeannette↗
NASA NTRS2015

Resource Prospector (RP): A Cost-Effective Lunar Resource Pathfinder

Resource Prospector (RP) is an in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) technology demonstration mission under study by the NASA Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorates (HEOMD). This clever mission is currently planned to launch in 2020 and will demonstrate extraction of oxygen, water and other volatiles, as well measure mineralogical content such as silicon and light metals, like aluminum and titanium, from lunar regolith. Expanding human presence beyond low-Earth orbit to asteroids and Mars will require the maximum possible use of local materials, so-called in-situ resources, and the moon presents a unique destination to conduct robotic investigations that advance ISRU capabilities, as well as providing significant exploration and science value. This mission is equally important; however, for how it executes as a risk-tolerant, cost-effective mission. RP follows on the path-finding approaches of the Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS) mission. The LCROSS mission confirmed the presence of water-ice on the moon, but also established a new lightweight-approach to project and mission execution which was considerably cheaper and faster than traditional NASA missions. RP has been designated as a Class D mission, just as LCROSS. This mission classification is the most risk-tolerant class of mission within the NASA risk framework and as such, is given more latitude to accept higher-levels of residual risk. The intention is that by saving monies normally spent attempting to assure a single missions success, more missions can be funded. A well-designed portfolio can accept occasional mission failure, as it still gets more done for the same investment of resources. This classification enables tailoring the NASA Policy Requirements (NPRs) to lighter-weight approaches to mission management and execution. RP is also studying both international and commercial partnerships as a means to maximize return on the investment. International partnerships provide both capabilities synergies and cost-sharing opportunities, while the evolving new space commercial options are revealing new approaches to acquiring cost-effective services, including the benefits of bundling services. Even the world of launch vehicles is changing, offering much less expensive access to space, especially if NASA is able to be flexible in how it approaches mission assurance. Finally, leveraging investments being made elsewhere within a program portfolio, can enable cost-savings by enabling two applications with one investment. RP will be the next pathfinder mission to both enable exploration capabilities for future missions, and continue to evolve cost-effective approaches for NASA.

Lunar↗
NASA NTRS2015

New York City Panel on Climate Change 2015 Report: Climate Observations and Projections - Chapter 1

During 2013 and 2014, numerous international (IPCC, 2013) and national (Melillo et al., 2014; Gordon, 2014) reports have concluded that human activities are changing the climate, leading to increased vulnerability and risk. Since the industrial revolution, fossil fuel burning, industrial activity, and land use changes have led to a 40% increase in heat-trapping carbon dioxide (CO2), and an approximately 150% increase in methane (CH4), another powerful greenhouse gas (GHG), has been observed. Global temperatures have increased by close to 1 C since 1880 as the upper oceans have warmed and polar ice has retreated. These and other climate changes are projected to accelerate as greenhouse gas concentrations continue to rise. In the coming decades, climate change is extremely likely to bring warmer temperatures in the New York metropolitan region (see Box. 1.1 and Fig.1.1 for key definitions and terms). Heat waves are very likely to increase; total annual precipitation will likely increase and brief, intense rainstorms are very likely to increase. Because of incomplete knowledge about exactly how much climate change will occur, choosing among policies for reducing future damages requires prudent risk management (Yohe and Leichenko, 2010; Kunreuther et al., 2013). Given differing risk tolerances among stakeholders, a risk management approach allows for a range of possible climate change outcomes to be examined with associated uncertainties surrounding their likelihoods. The New York City Panel on Climate Change 2 (NPCC2) projections can be used to inform planning across multiple governmental scales (e.g., city, county, state) in the New York metropolitan region. Such coordinated efforts can serve as test cases for successful local, state, and federal coordination for integrated climate adaptation initiatives. This chapter describes the global climate system, and presents observed temperature and precipitation trends and projections for the region. Chapter 2 (NPCC, 2015) focuses on sea level rise and possible changes in coastal storms. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 (NPCC, 2015) describe efforts to better understand the region's vulnerability to coastal flooding during coastal storms. The treatment of likelihood related to the NPCC projections is similar to that developed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth and Fifth Assessment Reports (IPCC, 2007; 2013), with six likelihood categories (Box 1.1 and Fig. 1.1). The assignment of climate hazards to these categories is based on observed data, global climate model simulations, published literature, and expert judgment.

climate change↗
NASA NTRS2016

Risk-based SMA for Cubesats

This presentation conveys an approach for risk-based safety and mission assurance applied to cubesats. This presentation accompanies a NASA Goddard standard in development that provides guidance for building a mission success plan for cubesats based on the risk tolerance and resources available.

Small Satellites↗