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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

Unnamed Pt(Cu 0.67 Sn 0.33 ) from the Bolshoy Khailyk River, Western Sayans, Russia, and a Review of Related Compounds and Solid Solutions

We describe a potentially new species of a platinum cupride–stannide mineral (PCSM) of composition Pt(Cu 0.67 Sn 0.33 ). It occurs in a placer deposit in the River Bolshoy Khailyk, southern Krasnoyarskiy kray, Russia. A synthetic equivalent of PCSM was obtained and characterized. The PCSM occurs as anhedral or subhedral grains up to 15 μm × 30 μm in association with various platinum-group minerals, Rh–Co-rich pentlandite and magnetite, all hosted by a placer grain of Cu–Au–Pt alloy. Synchrotron micro-Laue diffraction studies indicate that the PCSM mineral is tetragonal and belongs to the inferred space-group P4/mmm (#123). Its unit-cell parameters are a = 2.838 (3) Å, c = 3.650 (4) Å, and V = 29.40 (10) Å 3 , and Z = 1. The c:a ratio calculated from the unit-cell parameters is 1.286. These characteristics are in good agreement with those obtained for specimens of synthetic Pt(Cu 0.67 Sn 0.33 ). A review on related minerals and unnamed phases is provided to outline compositional variations and extents of solid solutions in the relevant systems PtNi–PtFe–PtCu, PdCu–PdHg–PdAu, PdHg–PtHg, and AuCu–PtCu. The PCSM-bearing mineralization appears to be related genetically with an ophiolitic source-rock of the Aktovrakskiy complex of the western Sayans. The unnamed phase likely crystallized from microvolumes of a highly fractionated melt rich in Cu and Sn.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2021

Ferrotorryweiserite, Rh 5 Fe 10 S 16 , a New Mineral Species from the Sisim Placer Zone, Eastern Sayans, Russia, and the Torryweiserite–Ferrotorryweiserite Series

Ferrotorryweiserite, Rh 5 Fe 10 S 16 , occurs as small grains (≤20 µm) among droplet-like inclusions (up to 50 μm in diameter) of platinum-group minerals (PGM), in association with oberthürite or Rh-bearing pentlandite, laurite, and a Pt-Pd-Fe alloy (likely isoferroplatinum and Fe-Pd-enriched platinum), hosted by placer grains of Os-Ir alloy (≤0.5 mm) in the River Ko deposit. The latter is a part of the Sisim placer zone, which is likely derived from ultramafic units of the Lysanskiy layered complex, southern Krasnoyarskiy kray, Russia. The mineral is opaque, gray to brownish gray in reflected light, very weakly bireflectant, not pleochroic to weakly pleochroic (grayish to light brown tints), and weakly anisotropic. The calculated density is 5.93 g·cm –3 . Mean results (and ranges) of four WDS analyses are: Ir 18.68 (15.55–21.96), Rh 18.34 (16.32–20.32), Pt 0.64 (0.19–1.14), Ru 0.03 (0.00–0.13), Os 0.07 (0.02–0.17), Fe 14.14 (13.63–14.64), Ni 13.63 (12.58–14.66), Cu 4.97 (3.42–6.41), Co 0.09 (0.07–0.11), S 29.06 (28.48–29.44), and total 99.66 wt.%. They correspond to the following formula calculated for a total of 31 atoms per formula unit: (Rh 3.16 Ir 1.72 Pt 0.06 Ru 0.01 Os 0.01 ) Σ 4.95 (Fe 4.48 Ni 4.11 Cu 1.38 Co 0.03 ) Σ10.00 S 16.05 . The results of synchrotron micro-Laue diffraction studies indicate that ferrotorryweiserite is trigonal; its probable space group is $R\bar{3}m$ (#166) based on its Ni-analog, torryweiserite. The unit-cell parameters refined from 177 reflections are a = 7.069 (2) Å, c = 34.286 (11) Å, V = 1484 (1) Å 3 , and Z = 3. The c:a ratio is 4.8502. The strongest eight peaks in the X-ray diffraction pattern derived from results of micro-Laue diffraction study [d in Å(hkil)(I)] are 2.7950 ($20\bar{2}5$) (100); 5.7143 (0006) (60); 1.7671 ($22\bar{4}0$) (44.4); 3.0486 ($20\bar{2}1$) (39.4); 5.7650 ($10\bar{1}2$) (38.6); 2.5956 ($20\bar{2}7$) (37.8); 3.0058 ($11\bar{2}6$) (36.5); and 1.5029 ($4\bar{2}\bar{2}12$) (35.3). Ferrotorryweiserite and the associated PGM crystallized from microvolumes of residual melt at late stages of crystallization of grains of Os- and Ir-dominant alloys occurred in lode zones of chromitites of the Lysanskiy layered complex. In a particular case, the residual melt is disposed peripherally around a core containing a disequilibrium association of magnesian olivine (Fo 72.9–75.6 ) and albite (Ab 81.6–86.4 ), with the development of skeletal crystals of titaniferous augite: Wo 40.8–43.2 En 26.5–29.3 Fs 20.3–22.6 Aeg 6.9–9.5 (2.82–3.12 wt.% TiO 2 ). Ferrotorryweiserite represents the Fe-dominant analog of torryweiserite. We also report occurrences of ferrotorryweiserite in the Marathon deposit, Coldwell Complex, Ontario, Canada, and infer the existence of the torryweiserite–ferrotorryweiserite solid solution in other deposits and complexes.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Fleetite, Cu 2 RhIrSb 2 , a New Species of Platinum-Group Mineral from the Miass Placer Zone, Southern Urals, Russia

Fleetite, Cu 2 RhIrSb 2 , a new species of platinum-group mineral (PGM), was discovered intergrown with an Os–Ir–Ru alloy in the Miass Placer Zone (Au–PGE), southern Urals, Russia. A single grain 50 μm across was found. Osmium, ruthenium, and iridium are the main associated minerals; also present are Pt–Fe alloys, laurite, Sb-rich irarsite, Rh-rich tolovkite, kashinite, anduoite, ferronickelplatinum, heazlewoodite, PGE-bearing pentlandite and digenite, as well as micrometric inclusions of forsterite (Fo 93.7 ), chromite–magnesiochromite, and Mg-rich edenite. In reflected light, fleetite is light gray; it is opaque, isotropic, non-pleochroic, and non-bireflectant. We report reflectance values measured in air. A mean of seven point-analyses (wavelength-dispersive spectrometry) gave Cu 13.93, Ni 8.60, Fe 0.10, Ir 28.07, Rh 7.91, Ru 1.96, Sb 39.28, total 99.85 wt.%, corresponding to (Cu 1.41 Ni 0.58 Fe 0.01 ) Σ2.00 (Rh 0.49 Ni 0.36 Ru 0.12 ) Σ0.97 Ir 0.95 Sb 2.08 on the basis of six atoms per formula unit, taking into account the structural results. The calculated density is 10.83 g/cm 3 . Single-crystal X-ray studies show that fleetite is cubic, space group Fdm (#227), a = 11.6682(8) Å, V = 1588.59(19) Å 3 , and Z = 16. A least-squares refinement of X-ray powder-diffraction data gave a = 11.6575(5) Å and V = 1584.22(19) Å 3 . The strongest five reflections in the powder pattern [d in Å(I)(hkl)] are: 6.70(75)(111), 4.13(100)(220), 3.52(30)(311), 2.380(50)(422), 2.064(40)(440). Results of synchrotron micro-Laue diffraction experiments are consistent [a = 11.66(2) Å]. The crystal structure of fleetite was solved and refined to R = 0.0340 based upon 153 reflections with F o > 4σ(F o ). It is isotypic with Pd 11 Bi 2 Se 2 and best described as intermetallic, with all metal atoms in 12-fold coordination. Fleetite and other late exotic phases were formed by reaction of the associated alloy phases with a fluid phase enriched in Sb, As, and S in circulation in the cooling ophiolite source-rock. The mineral is named after Michael E. Fleet (1938–2017) in recognition of his significant contributions to the Earth Sciences.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
DOE OSTI2022

Luminescence dosimetry for evaluation of the external exposure in Metlino, upper Techa River valley, Southern Urals, Russia: Analysis of new results

Luminescence dosimetry was applied in the former settlement of Metlino, Southern Urals, Russia as part of a full-scale study to validate the Techa River Dosimetry System (TRDS) 2016 for the upper Techa River region. The village, which was evacuated in 1956, was located 7 km downstream of the release point of liquid radioactive waste by the Mayak plutonium facility. Several brick samples were taken from north-eastern and south-eastern walls of the granary, facing the former Techa river shoreline and floodplain. Samples were all taken at the same height and measured at different depths into the brick. For the majority of brick samples, good Optically Stimulated Luminescence properties of the quartz grains were observed. In some cases, however, strong levels of sensitization and/or signal recuperation were encountered which necessitated adjustment in the measurement protocols. Anthropogenic doses in bricks varied from 1.5 to 6.6 Gy and the horizontal profiles along both walls showed significant variation, which is explained on a qualitative basis. Further, a dose depth profile is observed for selected samples, which is different from the dose depth profile measured and simulated for samples from the north-western wall of the granary in previous studies. This is qualitatively explained by the differences in source configuration.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2021

Energy System Transitions and Low-Emission Pathways in Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, EU-28, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Russia, and United States

The Paris Agreement invited Parties to submit long-term, low-emission development strategies. This study presents national low-emission scenarios to inform such strategies for Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, EU, India, Indonesia, Japan, Russia, Republic of Korea and the USA. The study uses country-level energy–economy and integrated assessment models (IAMs) that incorporate detailed and disaggregated representations of the energy demand and supply systems that are difficult to capture in global IAMs. Models were used to explore low-carbon pathways up to 2050, providing insights in their implications for country emissions, energy system restructuring, energy–economy indicators and system costs. The analysis shows that the low-carbon scenarios of most economies studied here are consistent with pathways limiting global warming to below 2 °C.

Fragkos, Panagiotis↗
DOE OSTI2022

Practical Pathways: Assessing Potential Formats for Arms Control with Russia and China

Building off foundational analyses done previously at the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, this paper takes on two daunting tasks - to outline the security policy objectives for future strategic arms control agreements and to provide recommendations on the potential form of such an agreement. This is the proper moment for such an undertaking. Arms control faces a doubtful future as a viable national security tool. Many proposals – either gradual modifications of existing regimes or revolutionary departures into new domains – made over the past decade no longer fit today’s security environment, one shaped by China’s massive force expansion and Russia’s war in Ukraine. With the new complexities of the two-peer environment and the complete rupture in U.S.-Russian relations, people have valid questions about arms control’s forms and functions. New thinking is needed, shaped by guidance from the past, an analysis of the impasse, a spectrum of the possible, and a realistic assessment of the feasible. If progress is to be made, either before the expiration of the New START Treaty in 2026 or during the subsequent interregnum, a concrete proposal must be agreed within the U.S. interagency and put in front of allies and negotiating partners to serve as the basis for future work.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Middle and Late-Holocene coastal environments of far Southeastern Russia as inferred from palynological and diatom data

Existing discontinuous palynological records from coastal and river valley exposures, with varying quality of radiocarbon control, suggested that the regional Holocene climate in southern areas of the Russian Far East was characterized by as many as 10 fluctuations in temperature and/or precipitation. In this study, palynological data from Zerkalnoye Lake, located on the western coast of the Sea of Japan, indicate a gradual decline in temperature through the Middle and Late-Holocene with a Holocene thermal maximum between 8800 and 5500 cal yr BP. Three wetter than present intervals, marked by an increase in Pinus koraiensis, occurred c. 3600–3500 cal yr BP, 2340–2050 cal yr BP, and 1830–1800 cal yr BP. The Zerkalnoye record shows the dominance of Quercus-broadleaf forests during the Middle and Early Holocene, although Quercus shows a gradual decrease as climate cooled during this interval. Diatom analysis of the Zerkalnoye sediments documents that the site was a shallow bay or coastal lagoon until c. 3540 cal yr BP. After that time, a freshwater lake was established, which had variable marine influences probably caused by sea level changes following deglaciation. The diatom data indicate a cool water interval between 2900 and 2580 cal yr BP, also noted in other sites in the region. Changes in the basin’s depositional environment do not affect the palynological record, indicating such sites can provide reliable paleovegetational and paleoclimatic records. In conclusion, the discrepancies of the various regional paleoclimatic scenarios indicate the need for the further collection of continuous records from coastal to alpine zones in this region of northeastern Asia.

Environmental sciences↗
DOE OSTI2020

Major Power Rivalry and Nuclear Risk Reduction: Perspectives From Russia, China, and the United States

Since its founding in 1992, the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) has had an abiding interest in nuclear threat reduction. In the 1990s it did some of the leading thinking about cooperative threat reduction with post-Soviet entities. In the early 2000s it focused increasingly on strengthening the nonproliferation regime. Since 2015 one of its primary interests has been exploring the future of cooperative strategies to reduce nuclear/strategic dangers. That future faces many challenges, both technical and geopolitical. By 2020, a rising sense of urgency of nuclear danger had clearly taken shape in the United States and internationally, driven in significant measure by the renewal of major power rivalry and potential military flashpoints among those powers. And that urgency has driven a rising national and international exploration of what can be done to reduce nuclear dangers.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Defending the Homeland: Growing Foreign Challenges to the U.S. Missile Defense Posture

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for Policy requested that Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory conduct a Congressionally directed study on homeland missile defense, pursuant to Section 1692 of the fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act. In accordance with the statutory language, this study considers whether the security benefits obtained by deployment of homeland missile defenses of the United States are undermined or counterbalanced by adverse reactions of potential adversaries, and considers the effectiveness of homeland missile defense efforts of the United States to deter the development of ballistic missiles. Almost a half-century has elapsed since the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and almost two decades since the former withdrew. Since withdrawing, the United States has sought to develop and deploy a layered missile defense system to defend against regional threats to U.S. and allied interests abroad and to counter limited threats to the U.S. homeland. As such, missile defense supports key national defense policy objectives. Protecting the U.S. homeland, forces abroad, allies, and partners. Deterring attacks against the United States, its allies, and partners. Assuring allies an strengthening U.S. diplomatic activities in peacetime and crisis. We offer five key findings: 1. The primary benefit of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system is the protection it provides the U.S. homeland against a limited but evolving rogue-state missile threat. While this system has never been tested in combat, it appears thus far to have effectively paced North Korea’s development and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In the absence of such a defensive capability, the United States would likely have been more heavily exposed to North Korean actions, would have operated at a much higher-risk posture, and would have had less negotiating room with which to navigate coercive tactics and crises. Its allies would have been more concerned about U.S. willingness in time of crisis and war to run the risks of protecting them. The GMD system also serves as a hedge against Iranian breakout. 2. Potential adversaries continue to develop long-range ballistic missiles despite deployment of a U.S. homeland missile defense system. This includes both rogue states and major power rivals whose long-range missile programs predated the deployment of U.S. missile defenses. While North Korea has continued its long-range missile developments and achieved an intercontinental capability, Iran has not yet reached this threshold. The broader proliferation of long-range missiles anticipated in the late 1990s has not materialized. 3. While Russia has used the existence of a U.S. homeland missile defense system as a justification for its substantial and continuing weapon modernization program, neither Russian force modernization nor the limited U.S. homeland missile defense system has altered the strategic balance. Russia has long considered U.S. missile defenses—both theater and homeland—as directed against its strategic forces and as a capability that could rapidly advance, thereby eroding Russian confidence in its nuclear deterrent. Russia’s political and military actions appear excessive and negatively impact areas such as arms control, but they do not undermine the primary benefit of the U.S. system cited in Key Finding 1. 4. China’s expansion and diversification of nuclear and missile forces has been influenced by its concerns about U.S. homeland missile defense, but those concerns are only one of many factors in China’s force planning. Although China’s actions to preserve and expand its assured retaliation prospects have not fundamentally altered the strategic balance, its buildup and lack of transparency about its force modernization goals are troubling. Taken together, the aggregate pattern of China’s modernization activities over the past two decades strongly suggests a concerted effort to develop a modern military force commensurate with its intended geopolitical status. Whatever China’s legacy concerns over the survivability of its strategic nuclear forces, its ability to overwhelm the GMD system appears intact today and will be further strengthened in the years ahead as it continues its long-term modernization program. China’s political and military actions negatively affect U.S. security interests but do not undermine the primary benefit of the U.S. system cited in Key Finding 1. 5. The basic finding that benefits have not so far been undermined by adverse reactions is a function of circumstances that are increasingly in flux. The existing GMD-centered system is under increasing pressure from the pace and scope of North Korean missile deployments. The proposed “layered” system seeks to mitigate this impending capability gap in the near term and to complement future capabilities, such as the Next Generation Interceptor, when they come online. Given the pace of U.S. missile defense developments since 2000, it is possible that adversary advances in capability will outpace the U.S. system’s ability to adapt. Additionally, because this layered system is in principle more readily scaled, it will almost certainly be viewed skeptically by China and Russia. In a context of growing great-power security competition, the Department of Defense (DoD) should consider undertaking a broader net assessment of the U.S., Russian, and Chinese force balance.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Geothermal Energy and Resilience in Arctic Countries

The eight Arctic countries - Iceland, Canada, Denmark (Greenland and the Faroe Islands) Norway, Sweden, Finland, Russia, and the United States (Alaska) - have diverse energy systems, but can be split into two distinct groups based on energy characteristics. The first group includes systems in Europe (Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Iceland), which are heavily grid-connected. The second group includes the United States (Alaska), Canada, Russia, and Greenland, which have grid-connected energy systems in their more densely populated southern regions, but are also defined by the prevalence of remote microgrids. Energy sources for heat and power vary across grid-connected communities in the Arctic nations. The primary energy source for remote communities, on the other hand, is almost exclusively diesel. This is true for both heat and power. Despite these and other key distinctions, Arctic countries share many commonalities with regard to their energy systems. One is a fundamental need for heat. Heat and electric energy are linked in most communities - remote, rural, and urban - and those linked systems are increasingly vulnerable to disruptions. Several of the Arctic countries use baseload renewable energy resources for heat and power. Iceland uses geothermal and hydroelectric; Canada, the United States, Sweden, Norway, and Finland use hydroelectric. Utilization of baseload renewable energy resources on-site for combined heat and power appears to enhance the resilience of communities in Arctic countries with high penetration of those resources. On the other hand, reliance on diesel by remote communities in other Arctic countries may be amplifying vulnerabilities. Although geothermal energy is currently used in all eight Arctic countries, resources are poorly mapped, and details can be difficult to come by. Despite this, geothermal energy provides heat and sometimes electricity at both utility scales and at the microgrid scale. Geothermal electricity is produced in Iceland, Russia, and the United States (Alaska). Direct use of geothermal heat is used in Iceland, Russia, United States, Canada, and Norway. Geo-exchange is used in Sweden, Finland, Norway, Canada, and the United States. In this paper, we reframe geothermal heat and power systems as integrated energy systems, asking the question: are integrated geothermal energy systems - where available and economic - resilient solutions for communities in Arctic countries? We identify resilience attributes of integrated geothermal energy systems, with a focus on microgrids and small-scale applications. Based on the high-level, qualitative analysis presented in this paper, the answer appears to be yes. Further work should prioritize refining our understanding of geothermal resources in Arctic countries, because development of the most economic geothermal resources in Arctic countries has the potential to enhance the energy resilience of its residents, whether in a grid-connected or remote off-grid context.

15 GEOTHERMAL ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2023

The Effects of the War in Ukraine on National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Missions

While the challenge from a risen and revisionist China may prove greater and more enduring, Russia’s war on Ukraine profoundly changes the strategic context, importance, and requirements of the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) missions. The world changed as much in February of 2022 as it did in November of 1989 or December of 1991 , when the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union fell apart. These changes will not likely be ephemeral. Russia is preparing for a long war and a prolonged period of isolation from and hostility toward the West. Although Russia has many political, economic, and military weaknesses, it retains the world’s largest arsenal of nuclear weapons. Russia is therefore central to deterrence, arms control, nonproliferation, and nuclear security issues. Furthermore, Moscow’s permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council affords it a veto potentially affecting all these issues.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

The 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine: Nuclear Supply Chains vs. Sanctions

The United States and European countries are unlikely to collectively approve of sanctions against Russian exports of nuclear fuel assemblies and uranium in the near term despite the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Rather than bearing the costs that cutting off Russian imports would have on domestic nuclear energy production, the United States and European countries are more likely to prefer developing alternative supply chains of nuclear fuel and enriched uranium to reduce dependence on Russian resources. This outlook is primarily based on two areas of evaluation: (1) comparison of the Russian-made reactor fuel supply chain within the European Union (EU) in 2014 following the annexation of Crimea and in 2022 following the invasion of Ukraine, and (2) the dependence of France and the United States on Russia’s exports of enriched uranium. Additionally, the potential impacts to Kazakh uranium exports if trade routes for nuclear resources through Russia became unavailable were considered as an additional factor in the push for disentanglement from Russian nuclear resources. This work utilized BACI, a database of harmonized international trade data at the product level drawn from the United Nations Comtrade Database and created by the French international economics research institute CEPII.1 Comparisons of imports and exports were based on the trade value in U.S. dollars as reported in BACI instead of the quantity of the traded product. This evaluation only considers import and export data up until 2021, since the trade data for 2022 is incomplete within the Comtrade Database for several of the key countries presented in this work, including Australia, Canada, Namibia, Niger, and Russia.

Political science↗
DOE OSTI2021

Erratum to: Search for phenomena beyond the Standard Model in events with large b -jet multiplicity using the ATLAS detector at the LHC

In the original HTML version of this article, one affiliation of the author V. O. Tikhomirov was missing. He is affiliated to the following two affiliations: P.N. Lebedev Physical Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia and National Research Nuclear University MEPhI, Moscow, Russia. The original article has been corrected.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗
DOE OSTI2023

GEFSv12 High- and Low-Skill Day-10 Tornado Forecasts

Abstract On average, modern numerical weather prediction forecasts for daily tornado frequency exhibit no skill beyond day 10. However, in this extended-range lead window, there are particular model cycles that have exceptionally high forecast skill for tornadoes because of their ability to correctly simulate the future synoptic pattern. Here, model initial conditions that produced a more skillful forecast for tornadoes over the United States were exploited while also highlighting potential causes for low-skill cycles within the Global Ensemble Forecasting System, version 12 (GEFSv12). There were 88 high-skill and 91 low-skill forecasts in which the verifying day-10 synoptic pattern for tornado conditions revealed a western U.S. thermal trough and an eastern U.S. thermal ridge, a favorable configuration for tornadic storm occurrence. Initial conditions for high skill forecasts tended to exhibit warmer sea surface temperatures throughout the tropical Pacific Ocean and Gulf of Mexico, an active Madden–Julian oscillation, and significant modulation of Earth-relative atmospheric angular momentum. Low-skill forecasts were often initialized during La Niña and negative Pacific decadal oscillation conditions. Significant atmospheric blocking over eastern Russia—in which the GEFSv12 overforecast the duration and characteristics of the downstream flow—was a common physical process associated with low-skill forecasts. This work helps to increase our understanding of the common causes of high- or low-skill extended-range tornado forecasts and could serve as a helpful tool for operational forecasters. Significance Statement This research provides a framework for the anticipation of a more (or less) skillful 10-day tornado forecast in an operational numerical weather prediction system. High-skill forecasts were associated with substantial tropical convection and warm sea surface temperature throughout the Pacific Ocean and Gulf of Mexico, whereas the underlying cause of low-skill forecasts were typically associated with a blocking anticyclone over eastern Russia. These findings are important because they permit increased or decreased confidence in a long-range forecast of tornado occurrence based on a dynamical prediction system.

Meteorology & Atmospheric Sciences↗
DOE OSTI2020

Understanding Structures of Cyber Competition in an Era of Major Power Rivalry

Over the past two decades, the cyber domain has emerged and evolved into a key strategic domain for nations across the globe. Security strategies are espoused by heads of state that focus on how to manage the increasingly enormous, crosscutting impact that the cyber domain has on national security across economic, military, intelligence, intellectual property, and countless other facets. These strategies frequently evolve, and even change entirely, as leaders adapt to new technologies and administrations change. Even if these strategies did not change at all, they would take inordinate amounts of time to effectively implement within the organizational structures of government. The time required to go from setting department and agency-level goals, to the time small teams have well-oiled processes and expertise to accomplish tactical objectives that meet the strategic vision is lengthy. With near certainty, by the time objectives and vision are implemented, the landscape, strategy, or both has changed entirely. While this churn will likely never cease due to the rapidly changing nature of the cyber domain, this problem raises an important question: can governmental structures be organized to rapidly adapt to changing cyber strategies? As offices responsible for particular missions in cyberspace shuffle about within the bureaucracy, are technical capabilities enabled or enhanced? No matter how advanced a particular technical capability is or how adept the staff is at solving problems, they will be ineffective if placed haphazardly within the organization: the right authorities may not exist for their office, the correct lines of interpersonal communication may not be established properly, or insufficient resources have not been allocated to effectively deploy a brilliant technical solution. This concept of organizational agility in the context of national cyber capabilities is important when taking into account the National Defense Strategy’s emphasis on cyber capability and the ability of the United States to compete and rapidly adapt to new challenges posed by rivals. As a nation, we are at a point where technology evolves rapidly enough to warrant thoughtful and nimble changes to the bureaucratic structures that support how cyber operations are carried out. Taking these questions and cross-comparing them to the organizational structures across China, Russia, and the United States provides for an interesting thought experiment. As non-democratic regimes, China and Russia have differing priorities and internal power dynamics than the United States and thus organize their governments differently. By combining known and broadcasted strategies of these nations with the observed technical capabilities demonstrated in the public domain, we can begin to see how organizational structures map to strategic goals and directly enable technical capabilities. Insight can be gained by introducing organizational structures into traditional analysis focusing solely around strategies and capabilities; additionally, otherwise unknown capabilities or intents might be discovered or inferred by analyzing organizational structures alone. Analyzing cyber operations from this oft-overlooked perspective could potentially provide useful insight and more concrete actions that can be undertaken to realize the National Defense Strategy’s goals.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗