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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2015

Passive safety device and internal short tested method for energy storage cells and systems

A passive safety device for an energy storage cell for positioning between two electrically conductive layers of the energy storage cell. The safety device also comprising a separator and a non-conductive layer. A first electrically conductive material is provided on the non-conductive layer. A first opening is formed through the separator between the first electrically conductive material and one of the electrically conductive layers of the energy storage device. A second electrically conductive material is provided adjacent the first electrically conductive material on the non-conductive layer, wherein a space is formed on the non-conductive layer between the first and second electrically conductive materials. A second opening is formed through the non-conductive layer between the second electrically conductive material and another of the electrically conductive layers of the energy storage device. The first and second electrically conductive materials combine and exit at least partially through the first and second openings to connect the two electrically conductive layers of the energy storage device at a predetermined temperature.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2015

Materials for electrochemical device safety

An electrochemical device includes a thermally-triggered intumescent material or a gas-triggered intumescent material. Such devices prevent or minimize short circuits in a device that could lead to thermal run-away. Such devices may include batteries or supercapacitors.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2022

Radiation-Generating Device Safety Self-Study [Slides]

Self-study slides are included for the following modules: RGD Safety Course Presentation, Radiation Detection, Biological Effects, RGDs, Radiation Protection Principles, Production of X-Rays, Protective Measures, and Responsibilities for X-Ray Safety.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2011

Image-Directed Fine-needle Aspiration Biopsy of the Thyroid with Safety-engineered Devices

Purpose: The purpose of the present study was to integrate safety-engineered devices into outpatient fine-needle aspiration (FNA) biopsy of the thyroid in an interventional radiology practice. Materials and Methods: The practice center is a tertiary referral center for image-directed FNA thyroid biopsies in difficult patients referred by the primary care physician, endocrinologist, or otolaryngologist. As a departmental quality of care and safety improvement program, we instituted integration of safety devices into our thyroid biopsy procedures and determined the effect on outcome (procedural pain, diagnostic biopsies, inadequate samples, complications, needlesticks to operator, and physician satisfaction) before institution of safety devices (54 patients) and after institution of safety device implementation (56 patients). Safety devices included a patient safety technology-the mechanical aspirating syringe (reciprocating procedure device), and a health care worker safety technology (antineedlestick safety needle). Results: FNA of thyroid could be readily performed with the safety devices. Safety-engineered devices resulted in a 49% reduction in procedural pain scores (P < 0.0001), a 56% reduction in significant pain (P < 0.002), a 21% increase in operator satisfaction (P < 0.0001), and a 5% increase in diagnostic specimens (P = 0.5). No needlesticks to health care workers or patient injuries occurred during the study. Conclusions: Safety-engineered devices to improve both patient and health care worker safety can be successfully integrated into diagnostic FNA of the thyroid while maintaining outcomes and improving safety.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗
DOE OSTI2021

REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS, GUIDANCE, AND REVIEW OF EMBEDDED DIGITAL DEVICES IN SAFETY SYSTEMS

Interest in embedded digital devices (EDDs) for monitoring and providing control of components is increasing in the nuclear power market as more and more users both within and outside the nuclear sector are employing EDDs. EDDs in other industries or countries may be known by the related terms as smart devices, devices of limited functionality, or intelligent devices. EDDs can sometimes perform a safety role when embedded in components such as temperature transmitters, pressure transmitters, voltage regulators, gas analyzers, boiler controllers, relays, and radiation monitors. The introduction of EDDs can affect safety by creating new hazards, vulnerabilities, failure modes, triggering mechanisms, and other potential safety concerns at both the component and system levels. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) existing regulations and guidance cover the use of EDDs in safety-related and important to safety systems in nuclear power plants (NPPs). In addition to potential future challenges, the nature of EDDs being implemented in similar or identical manners between different plants and industries opens up the potential of leveraging the reviews of other regulators or utilization of industry certifications.Key words: embedded digital device, firmware

Halverson, D. S.↗
DOE OSTI2021

OPERATING EXPERIENCE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO EMBEDDED DIGITAL DEVICES IN SAFETY SYSTEMS

Interest in embedded digital devices (EDDs) for monitoring and providing control of components is increasing and the added functionality digital brings such as diagnostics, displays, control functions is welcomed in both the nuclear and other industries. As a result, pure analog-based components continue to disappear from the industrial I&C marketplace. Equipment with EDDs, also known by related terms such as smart devices, intelligent devices, and digital devices of limited functionality, can include sensors, breakers, priority logic modules, time delay relays, pumps, valve actuators, motor control centers, and uninterruptible power supplies. Not only is equipment consisting of analog and older digital technology being replaced with commercial grade products containing EDDs, but EDDs can also be retrofitted to work with existing components. EDDs may be installed physically within a component, such as in a relay. There are also external devices that some would not consider an EDD, but that operate in almost all technical ways identically to one internal to a component such as in a valve controller. In fact, the digital portions may be located hundreds of feet from the actual component.Due to the potential of being used in an identical manner and without alteration from their application in other industries, operating experience (OpE) for EDDs may be much more applicable than in the case of other more system level devices. Clear separation and independence of functionality provided with EDDs may also allow greater applicability of existing OpE from industry for changes that can be shown not to affect its safety function. However, OpE also demonstrates issues with different conditions between other industries and nuclear power plants, such as issues with undeclared changes or undeclared digital devices and the new failure modes they may introduce, issues with the reporting of OpE in industry, and a lack of transparency into OpE for EDDs.Understanding and addressing these issues will be key in the future use of EDDs in nuclear power plants, but failure rate data is difficult to obtain for EDDs, and lessons learned from the use of EDDs are difficult to collect and identify.Key words: embedded digital device, smart device, operating experience, failure modes

Muhlheim, Michael↗
DOE OSTI2012

Power transient analyses of experimental in-reflector devices during safety shutdown in Jules Horowitz Reactor (JHR)

The Jules Horowitz Reactor (JHR) is designed to be a 100 MW material testing reactor (MTR) and it is expected to become the reference facility in the framework of European nuclear research activity. As the core neutron spectrum is quite fast, several experimental devices concerning fuel studies have been conceived to be placed in the reflector in order to exploit a proper thermal neutron flux irradiation. Since the core power is relatively high, the neutronic coupling between the reactor core and the reflector devices has to be taken into account for different rod insertions. In fact the thermal power produced within the fuel samples is considerable. Heat removal during shutdown is a main topic in nuclear safety and it is worth to analyse thermal power transients in fuel samples as well. Here a thermal hydraulic model for JHR core is proposed aiming at a simple and representative description as far as reactivity feedbacks are concerned. Then it is coupled with a neutronic pointwise kinetics analysis by means of the DULCINEE code to compute core power transient calculations. Moreover, some reflector-core coupling evaluations are performed through Monte Carlo method using the TRIPOLI 4.7 code. The JHR equilibrium cycle is considered with respect to four fuel compositions namely Beginning of Cycle (BOC), Xenon Saturation Point (XSP), Middle of Cycle (MOC) and End of Cycle (EOC). Then thermal power transients in the experimental reflector devices are evaluated during safety shutdowns and they are verified for all these cycle steps. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2016

Development of Criteria for Hardware Descripted Language Programmed-Devices for Safety Systems in Nuclear Power Plants in the U.S

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is in the process of developing a regulatory guide (RG) describing a method the staff of the NRC considers acceptable, for use in complying with NRC regulations with respect to the development of hardware description language-programmed device (HPD). Examples include: field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), systems in the power, instrumentation, and control portions of safety systems for nuclear power plants. The regulatory framework that NRC is establishing for nuclear power plants consists of a number of regulations and supporting guidelines applicable to the development of HPD-based safety systems. The NRC issues RGs to describe to the public, methods that the NRC staff considers acceptable for use in implementing specific parts of the agency's regulations; to explain techniques that the NRC staff uses in evaluating specific problems or postulated accidents; and to provide guidance to applicants. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Security-informed safety: integrating security within the safety demonstration of a smart device - 157

Safety and security engineering have, over the years, developed their own regulations, standards, cultures, and practices. However, there's a growing realisation that security is closely connected to safety. Safety must be security-informed: if a safety-critical system isn't secure, it isn't safe. A safety demonstration is incomplete and unconvincing unless it considers security. In our work for government and industry, we have used the Claims, Arguments, Evidence (CAE) framework to analyse the impact of security on a safety justification or safety case and identified the significant changes needed to address security explicitly. This will impact the design and implementation process as well as the assurance and V and V approach. In this paper we discuss the impact of integrating security when developing a safety demonstration of a smart device. A smart device is an instrument, device or component that contains a microprocessor (and therefore contains both hardware and software) and is programmed to provide specialised capabilities, often measuring or controlling a process variable. Examples of smart devices include radiation monitors, relays, turbine governors, uninterruptible power supplies and heating ventilation, and air conditioning controllers. (authors)

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2015

Monitoring local heating around an interventional MRI antenna with RF radiometry

Purpose: Radiofrequency (RF) radiometry uses thermal noise detected by an antenna to measure the temperature of objects independent of medical imaging technologies such as magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). Here, an active interventional MRI antenna can be deployed as a RF radiometer to measure local heating, as a possible new method of monitoring device safety and thermal therapy. Methods: A 128 MHz radiometer receiver was fabricated to measure the RF noise voltage from an interventional 3 T MRI loopless antenna and calibrated for temperature in a uniformly heated bioanalogous gel phantom. Local heating (ΔT) was induced using the antenna for RF transmission and measured by RF radiometry, fiber-optic thermal sensors, and MRI thermometry. The spatial thermal sensitivity of the antenna radiometer was numerically computed using a method-of-moment electric field analyses. The gel’s thermal conductivity was measured by MRI thermometry, and the localized time-dependent ΔT distribution computed from the bioheat transfer equation and compared with radiometry measurements. A “H-factor” relating the 1 g-averaged ΔT to the radiometric temperature was introduced to estimate peak temperature rise in the antenna’s sensitive region. Results: The loopless antenna radiometer linearly tracked temperature inside a thermally equilibrated phantom up to 73 °C to within ±0.3 °C at a 2 Hz sample rate. Computed and MRI thermometric measures of peak ΔT agreed within 13%. The peak 1 g-average temperature was H = 1.36 ± 0.02 times higher than the radiometric temperature for any media with a thermal conductivity of 0.15–0.50 (W/m)/K, indicating that the radiometer can measure peak 1 g-averaged ΔT in physiologically relevant tissue within ±0.4 °C. Conclusions: Active internal MRI detectors can serve as RF radiometers at the MRI frequency to provide accurate independent measures of local and peak temperature without the artifacts that can accompany MRI thermometry or the extra space needed to accommodate alternative thermal transducers. A RF radiometer could be integrated in a MRI scanner to permit “self-monitoring” for assuring device safety and/or monitoring delivery of thermal therapy.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2014

Conceptual design of pressure relief systems for cryogenic application

The conceptual design of pressure relief systems is an important aspect in the early phase of any cryogenic system design, because a prudent and responsible evaluation of relief systems involves much more than just relief devices. The conceptual design consists of various steps: At first, hazard scenarios must be considered and the worst-case scenario identified. Next, a staged interaction against pressure increase is to be defined. This is followed by the selection of the general type of pressure relief device for each stage, such as safety valve and rupture disc, respectively. Then, a decision concerning their locations, their capacities and specific features must be taken. Furthermore, it is mandatory to consider the inlet pressure drop and the back pressure in the exhaust line for sizing the safety devices. And last but not least, economic and environmental considerations must be made in case of releasing the medium to the atmosphere. The development of the system's safety concept calls for a risk management strategy based on identification and analysis of hazards, and consequent risk mitigation using a system-based approach in compliance with the standards.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2025

Foundational Research for Fusion Systems Safety Assessment Overview

Presentation detailing work package to develop comprehensive fusion device safety models over the course of the next three years, including references to a blanket, divertor and magnet design, and statistical reliability models

70 - PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗
DOE OSTI2018

Reliable and Efficient Way of Explosion Protection

The article highlights the current state of the issue and offers new patented technical solutions that eliminate shortcomings of the existing ones. A distinguishing feature of the new design solutions is the coexistence in safety devices (SD) of both blowout diaphragms and nonstandard safety valves, the moving masses of which do not affect the SD operation speed. Because of this, it is fully leakproof in normal situation and it opens fast enough in explosive scenario.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2014

HC-NIDS: signatures and simulations for detecting cyber-attacks aiming to cause damage against cyber-physical energy systems

Physical device safety is typically implemented locally using embedded controllers, while operations safety is primarily performed in control centers. Safe operations can be enhanced by correct design of device-level control algorithms, and protocols, procedures and operator training at the control-room level, but all can fail. Moreover, these elements exchange data and issue commands via vulnerable communication layers. In order to secure these gaps and enhance operational safety, we believe monitoring of command sequences must be combined with an awareness of physical device limitations and automata models that capture safety mechanisms. One way of doing this is by leveraging specification-based intrusion detection to monitor for physical constraint violations. The method can also verify that physical infrastructure state is consistent with monitoring information and control commands exchanged between field devices and control centers. This additional security layer enhances protection from both outsider attacks and insider mistakes. We implemented specification-based SCADA command analyzers using physical constraint algorithms directly in the Bro framework and Broccoli APIs for three separate scenarios: a water heater, an automated distribution system, and an over-current protection scheme. To accomplish this, we added low-level analyzers capable of examining control system-specific protocol packets for both Modbus TCP and DNP3, and also higher-level analyzers able to interpret device command and data streams within the context of each device's physical capabilities and present operational state. Thus the software that we are making available includes the Bro/Broccoli scripts for these three scenarios, as well as simulators, written in C, of those scenarios that generate sample traffic that is monitored by the Bro/Broccoli scripts. In addition, we have also implemented systems to directly pull cyber-physical information from the OSIsoft PI historian system. We have included the Python scripts used to perform that monitoring.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2014

HC-NIDS: signatures and simulations for detecting cyber-attacks aiming to cause damage against cyber-physical energy systems

Physical device safety is typically implemented locally using embedded controllers, while operations safety is primarily performed in control centers. Safe operations can be enhanced by correct design of device-level control algorithms, and protocols, procedures and operator training at the control-room level, but all can fail. Moreover, these elements exchange data and issue commands via vulnerable communication layers. In order to secure these gaps and enhance operational safety, we believe monitoring of command sequences must be combined with an awareness of physical device limitations and automata models that capture safety mechanisms. One way of doing this is by leveraging specification-based intrusion detection to monitor for physical constraint violations. The method can also verify that physical infrastructure state is consistent with monitoring information and control commands exchanged between field devices and control centers. This additional security layer enhances protection from both outsider attacks and insider mistakes. We implemented specification-based SCADA command analyzers using physical constraint algorithms directly in the Bro framework and Broccoli APIs for three separate scenarios: a water heater, an automated distribution system, and an over-current protection scheme. To accomplish this, we added low-level analyzers capable of examining control system-specific protocol packets for both Modbus TCP and DNP3, and also higher-level analyzers able to interpret device command and data streams within the context of each device's physical capabilities and present operational state. Thus the software that we are making available includes the Bro/Broccoli scripts for these three scenarios, as well as simulators, written in C, of those scenarios that generate sample traffic that is monitored by the Bro/Broccoli scripts. In addition, we have also implemented systems to directly pull cyber-physical information from the OSIsoft PI historian system. We have included the Python scripts used to perform that monitoring.

Source record↗