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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

Offshore Wind Workforce Safety Standards and Training Resource

The standardization of safety training requirements for people working at sea to build and operate offshore wind energy projects, adoption of those standards, and alignment with offshore safety training curriculum development was identified as a high-priority workforce gap in the U.S. Offshore Wind Workforce Assessment (Stefek, 2022). Safety is a top priority for the offshore wind industry; however, there has been uncertainty surrounding what unique safety standards and training will be needed and how various offshore wind safety stakeholders will be involved. The scope of safety training for this resource includes workers who build and operate offshore wind energy projects at sea and defines the stakeholders in the complex ecosystem. This fact sheet aims to help reduce these uncertainties by: 1) Delineating jurisdictional lines, while clarifying roles and responsibilities amongst stakeholders; 2) Identifying key actions or partnerships that can encourage further success with safety training and workforce development.

offshore wind↗
NASA NTRS1997

NASA Software Safety Standard

If software is a critical element in a safety critical system, it is imperative to implement a systematic approach to software safety as an integral part of the overall system safety programs. The NASA-STD-8719.13A, "NASA Software Safety Standard", describes the activities necessary to ensure that safety is designed into software that is acquired or developed by NASA, and that safety is maintained throughout the software life cycle. A PDF version, is available on the WWW from Lewis. A Guidebook that will assist in the implementation of the requirements in the Safety Standard is under development at the Lewis Research Center (LeRC). After completion, it will also be available on the WWW from Lewis.

Rosenberg, Linda↗
NASA NTRS2007

NASA's Software Safety Standard

NASA relies more and more on software to control, monitor, and verify its safety critical systems, facilities and operations. Since the 1960's there has hardly been a spacecraft launched that does not have a computer on board that will provide command and control services. There have been recent incidents where software has played a role in high-profile mission failures and hazardous incidents. For example, the Mars Orbiter, Mars Polar Lander, the DART (Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology), and MER (Mars Exploration Rover) Spirit anomalies were all caused or contributed to by software. The Mission Control Centers for the Shuttle, ISS, and unmanned programs are highly dependant on software for data displays, analysis, and mission planning. Despite this growing dependence on software control and monitoring, there has been little to no consistent application of software safety practices and methodology to NASA's projects with safety critical software. Meanwhile, academia and private industry have been stepping forward with procedures and standards for safety critical systems and software, for example Dr. Nancy Leveson's book Safeware: System Safety and Computers. The NASA Software Safety Standard, originally published in 1997, was widely ignored due to its complexity and poor organization. It also focused on concepts rather than definite procedural requirements organized around a software project lifecycle. Led by NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, the NASA Software Safety Standard has recently undergone a significant update. This new standard provides the procedures and guidelines for evaluating a project for safety criticality and then lays out the minimum project lifecycle requirements to assure the software is created, operated, and maintained in the safest possible manner. This update of the standard clearly delineates the minimum set of software safety requirements for a project without detailing the implementation for those requirements. This allows the projects leeway to meet these requirements in many forms that best suit a particular project's needs and safety risk. In other words, it tells the project what to do, not how to do it. This update also incorporated advances in the state of the practice of software safety from academia and private industry. It addresses some of the more common issues now facing software developers in the NASA environment such as the use of Commercial-Off-the-Shelf Software (COTS), Modified OTS (MOTS), Government OTS (GOTS), and reused software. A team from across NASA developed the update and it has had both NASA-wide internal reviews by software engineering, quality, safety, and project management. It has also had expert external review. This presentation and paper will discuss the new NASA Software Safety Standard, its organization, and key features. It will start with a brief discussion of some NASA mission failures and incidents that had software as one of their root causes. It will then give a brief overview of the NASA Software Safety Process. This will include an overview of the key personnel responsibilities and functions that must be performed for safety-critical software.

Ramsay, Christopher M.↗
NASA NTRS2005

NASA's Software Safety Standard

NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) relies more and more on software to control, monitor, and verify its safety critical systems, facilities and operations. Since the 1960's there has hardly been a spacecraft (manned or unmanned) launched that did not have a computer on board that provided vital command and control services. Despite this growing dependence on software control and monitoring, there has been no consistent application of software safety practices and methodology to NASA's projects with safety critical software. Led by the NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, the NASA Software Safety Standard (STD-18l9.13B) has recently undergone a significant update in an attempt to provide that consistency. This paper will discuss the key features of the new NASA Software Safety Standard. It will start with a brief history of the use and development of software in safety critical applications at NASA. It will then give a brief overview of the NASA Software Working Group and the approach it took to revise the software engineering process across the Agency.

Ramsay, Christopher M.↗
NASA NTRS1997

An overview of revised NASA safety standard 1740.14

Following a broad review of the debris control guidelines outside of NASA and according to additional feedback on the guidelines from within NASA, revisions were made to the NASA safety standard 1740.14. The NASA policy to limit the generation of orbital debris on NASA missions, stated in the NASA management instruction 1700.8 and implemented in the form of the NASA safety standard (NSS) 1740.14 is described together with the revisions implemented. The overall direction of the guidelines is the same, but the details of many of the guidelines were changed, including: changes for tether programs and for the control of operational debris. The NASA will continue to review the guidelines as new measurements and improved models of the environment are obtained.

Reynolds, Robert↗
NASA NTRS1990

NASA safety standard for lifting devices and equipment

NASA's minimum safety requirements are established for the design, testing, inspection, maintenance, certification, and use of overhead and gantry cranes (including top running monorail, underhung, and jib cranes), mobile cranes, derrick hoists, and special hoist supported personnel lifting devices (these do not include elevators, ground supported personnel lifts, or powered platforms). Minimum requirements are also addressed for the testing, inspection, and use of Hydra-sets, hooks, and slings. Safety standards are thoroughly detailed.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2023

Conduct of Operations and Nuclear Criticality Safety Standards

Since the beginning of the nuclear age in 1943, there have been 22 criticality accidents in process facilities worldwide in which fissionable materials were processed by hand for various purposes. Of these 22 process criticality accidents, 16 involved faulty or flawed conduct of operations. Most of these process accidents (17 of 22) occurred before 1970, mostly due to the implementation of formal conduct of operations—such as the use of operating procedures and training—and the use of consensus standards for nuclear criticality safety (NCS). Obviously, the nuclear facilities applied lessons learned from their accident history, and the rate of criticality accidents was significantly reduced as a result. Over the years, it has been emphasized in NCS training courses and other venues in the United States that the consensus standards, such as ASA N6.1-1964, were the key contributors to this reduction in accidents. The formality of operations required to implement and apply the standards at a facility is also a crucial prerequisite that must be sufficiently robust to ensure NCS. This prerequisite is crucial to success fully implement the NCS consensus and other safety standards at a site.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Evaluation of Safety Standards for Fuel System and Fuel Container Integrity of Alternative Fuel Vehicles

There are two Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) in place that specify requirements for integrity of the fuel system and fuel container on compressed natural gas (CNG) fuel vehicles. These are FMVSS Nos. 303, “Fuel system integrity of compressed natural gas vehicles,” and FMVSS No. 304, “CNG fuel container integrity.” At this time, no FMVSS are defined for the fuel system and fuel container integrity of propane and liquefied natural gas (LNG) vehicles or fuel system integrity requirements for heavy-duty CNG vehicles on the road. However, there are voluntary industry design standards and best practices, as well as regulations defined in other countries. FMVSS No. 303 specifies requirements for the integrity of the CNG fuel system of light-duty vehicles and school buses, and FMVSS No. 304 specifies requirements for fuel container integrity on all CNG vehicles. FMVSS No. 304 applies to containers used for vehicle propulsion, whereas containers used to transport CNG and transportation of CNG containers are regulated by the DOT Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. FMVSS Nos. 303 and 304 are performance-based standards to consistently test and validate equipment and are not design restrictive. Despite the increasing number of natural gas and propane medium- and heavy-duty vehicles on the road, there are no FMVSS fuel system integrity requirements beyond light-duty and school buses for CNG vehicles and no FMVSS fuel system integrity requirements for propane vehicles. NHTSA is researching fuel system safety for medium- and heavy-duty natural gas and propane vehicles to update FMVSS Nos. 303 and 304. NHTSA is also researching current best practices and standards for high pressure fuel tanks in motor vehicles as they may apply to FMVSS No. 304.

30 DIRECT ENERGY CONVERSION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Formality of Operations and Nuclear Criticality Safety Standards [Slides]

This presentation is on the formality of operations and nuclear criticality safety standards. This lecture starts with an Introduction then leads into a conversation on the dependencies of formality of operations. Secondly the presentation includes a review of past issues. Included is a Discussion about “credible” and “unlikely” – variables for process analysis in ANS-8.1, Section 4.1.2, and the double contingency principle, Section 4.2.2, respectively. The presentation finishes with some conclusions.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
NASA NTRS1997

Safety Standard for Hydrogen and Hydrogen Systems: Guidelines for Hydrogen System Design, Materials Selection, Operations, Storage and Transportation

The NASA Safety Standard, which establishes a uniform process for hydrogen system design, materials selection, operation, storage, and transportation, is presented. The guidelines include suggestions for safely storing, handling, and using hydrogen in gaseous (GH2), liquid (LH2), or slush (SLH2) form whether used as a propellant or non-propellant. The handbook contains 9 chapters detailing properties and hazards, facility design, design of components, materials compatibility, detection, and transportation. Chapter 10 serves as a reference and the appendices contained therein include: assessment examples; scaling laws, explosions, blast effects, and fragmentation; codes, standards, and NASA directives; and relief devices along with a list of tables and figures, abbreviations, a glossary and an index for ease of use. The intent of the handbook is to provide enough information that it can be used alone, but at the same time, reference data sources that can provide much more detail if required.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2021

Comparison of ISO and ANSI/ANS Nuclear Criticality Safety Standards

This paper provides a high-level comparison between the international and domestic Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) standards, as requested by members of the Nuclear Criticality Safety Division. Currently, there are 18 enacted American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/American National Standards (ANS) and 1 ANSI/ANS standard in progress. There are 11 NCS standards from the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), Technical Committee 85 (TC85) on Nuclear Energy, Subcommittee 5 (SC5) on Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Working Group 8 (WG8). There are NCS standard revisions in progress for both standards organizations.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Comparison of ISO and ANSI/ANS Nuclear Criticality Safety Standards [Slides]

This paper provides a high-level comparison between the international and domestic nuclear criticality safety (NCS) standards, as requested by members of the Nuclear Criticality Safety Division. Currently, there are 18 enacted American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/American National Standards (ANS) standards, and 1 ANSI/ANS standard, in progress. There are 11 NCS standards from the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), Technical Committee 85 (TC85) on Nuclear Energy, Subcommittee 5 (SC5) on Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Working Group 8 (WG8). NCS standard revisions are in progress for both standards organizations. The key differences between the ISO TC85/SC5/WG8 and ANSI/ANS-8 consensus NCS standards are summarized. The hard work done by the ANS-8 and WG8 volunteers allows for applicable, high-quality consensus standards for use by the NCS community. This paper defines the current status of each ANSI/ANS and ISO standard, the work in in progress, the revisions/amendments in progress, and WG8/ANS-8 non-standard business in progress. A forthcoming paper will compare the development process for ISO and ANSI/ANS standards.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Offshore Wind Electrical Safety Standards Harmonization (Workshop Proceedings)

Offshore wind (OSW) development activity is accelerating in the United States, with over 10 gigawatts (GW) of capacity likely to be installed on the Atlantic coast before 2030. In addition, states have committed to procure over 29 GW of offshore wind. Experienced European offshore wind energy developers are beginning to make large investments into offshore wind projects in American waters, and some U.S. developers have submitted key design documents for regulatory review. European offshore wind developers possess extensive experience in other geographic markets, which greatly increases confidence that the U.S. offshore wind industry will be successful. Nonetheless, existing U.S. electrical standards and European electrical standards are significantly different. If not addressed, these differences could potentially impact worker safety.

17 WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2024

Process Safety Standards and Regulations

The list of standards, best practice, and regulations below are intended to give insight into what resources are available for developing a chemical control regime as well as information on what regulations other countries have used to implement such a regime. This list is not intended to be all inclusive and other regulations and standards related to controlling hazardous chemicals exist and should be consulted.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
NASA NTRS1995

NASA Safety Standard: Guidelines and Assessment Procedures for Limiting Orbital Debris

Collision with orbital debris is a hazard of growing concern as historically accepted practices and procedures have allowed man-made objects to accumulate in orbit. To limit future debris generation, NASA Management Instruction (NMI) 1700.8, 'Policy to Limit Orbital Debris Generation,' was issued in April of 1993. The NMI requires each program to conduct a formal assessment of the potential to generate orbital debris. This document serves as a companion to NMI 1700.08 and provides each NASA program with specific guidelines and assessment methods to assure compliance with the NMI. Each main debris assessment issue (e.g., Post Mission Disposal) is developed in a separate chapter.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2009

NASA Space Safety Standards and Procedures for Human Rating Requirements

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration of the United States of America (NASA) has arguably led this planet in space exploration and certainly has been one of two major leaders in those endeavors. NASA governance is institutionalized and managed in a series documents arranged in a hierarchy and flowing down to the work levels. A document tree of NASA s documentation in its totality would likely overwhelm and not be very informative. Taken in segments related to the various business topics and focusing in those segments, however, provides a logical and understandable relationship and flow of requirements and processes. That is the nature of this chapter, a selection of NASA documentation pertaining to space exploration and a description of how those documents together form the plan by which NASA business for space exploration is conducted. Information presented herein is taken from NASA publications and is available publicly and no information herein is protected by copyright or security regulations. While NASA documents are the source of information presented herein, any and all views expressed herein and any misrepresentations of NASA data that may occur herein are those of the author and should not be considered NASA official positions or statements, nor should NASA endorsement of anything presented in this work be assumed.

Shivers, C. Herbert↗