High-performance spray-foam insulation for application on Saturn S-II stage
Spray foam insulation for Saturn S-2 stage, consisting of phenolic honeycomb core composite purged with helium
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Spray foam insulation for Saturn S-2 stage, consisting of phenolic honeycomb core composite purged with helium
S-II stage of Saturn V launch vehicle, its mission, stage systems, structural components and fabrication techniques
Saturn 5 S-2 stage propellant feedlines and J-2 engines simulating structural longitudinal oscillation by analog computer
Saturn 5 S-2 stage propellant feedlines and V-2 engines simulating structural longitudinal oscillation by analog computer
Flow field comparisons of Saturn S- II stage and spiked hemisphere configuration with emphasis on rocket nozzle heat transfer rate
Ultralight honeycomb development for Saturn S-II STAGE improvement - titanium bonding, core sandwich construction, and testing
Modifications on S-IC, S-II, and S-IVB stages of Saturn V launch vehicle
The Saturn S-II stage and the Apollo spacecraft will include in their design and construction various pressurized tubing systems that will encounter service temperatures of 280° F to -423° F. Design engineering and reliability requirements and weight restrict ions have dictated new concepts to assure leak-tight joints for rocket engine fuel lines, pressurization systems, utility systems, and hydraulic systems. An investigation was initiated at North American Aviation, Inc., Space and Information Systems Division, utilizing the in-place automatically controlled miniaturized fusion-welding equipment originally developed by the Los Angeles Division of NAA and modified to meet the needs of Apollo and Saturn welded tubular systems. The objective was to make circumferential flanged weld joints in any position in 304L stainless for Saturn S-II and sleeve-type joints in 304L for Apollo. Inconel X, commercially pure titanium, 5052-0 aluminum, and 6061 T6 aluminum were also tested experimentally. Extensive environmental, static, and dynamic testing programs were conducted to determine the as-welded mechanical properties, design allowables, and reliability for the tube joints. This paper discusses both the experimental and production phases. Subsequently, the new tube welding process was approved and incorporated into manufacturing fabrication methods for tube joining.
Electromagnetic compatibility acceptance tests for Saturn S-IC stages
Dynamic response of buckled stiffened panels typical of S-II stage forward skirt under acoustic loads
A technique is described by which orthonormal modal vectors, computed from dynamic test response data, are used to derive mass, stiffness, and damping matrices for a discrete model of the distributed elastic system. Matrices thus computed from subsystems tests may be readily incorporated into larger system models. The method has been applied to a test of the Saturn V S-II stage LOX tank-engine support system. The dynamic responses of the discrete model are shown to correlate well with test data throughout the frequency range tested.
At approximately 63 seconds into the flight of Skylab 1 on May 14, 1973, an anomaly occurred which resulted in the complete loss of the meteoroid shield around the orbital workshop. This was followed by the loss of one of the two solar array systems on the workshop and a failure of the inter stage adapter to separate from the S-II stage of the Saturn V launch vehicle. The investigation reported herein identified the most probable cause of this flight anomaly to be the breakup and loss of the meteoroid shield due to aerodynamic loads that were not accounted for in its design. The breakup of the meteoroid shield, in turn, broke the tie downs that secured one of the solar array systems to the workshop. Complete loss of this solar array system occurred at 593 seconds when the exhaust plume of the S-II stage retro-rockets impacted the partially deployed solar array system. Falling debris from the meteoroid shield also damaged the S-II inter stage adapter ordnance system in such a manner as to preclude separation. Of several possible failure modes of the meteoroid shield that were identified, the most probable in this particular flight was internal pressurization of its auxiliary tunnel which acted to force the forward end of the meteoroid shield away from the shell of the workshop and into the supersonic air stream. The pressurization of the auxiliary tunnel was due to the existence of several openings in the aft region of the tunnel. Another possible failure mode was the separation of the leading edge of the meteoroid shield from the shell of the workshop (particularly in the region of the folded ordnance panel) of sufficient extent to admit ram air pressures under the shield.
Detailed description of the test program in which erosion of the spray foam insulation used in the S-II stage of the Saturn-V Apollo launch vehicle was investigated. The behavior of the spray foam was investigated at the elevated temperature and static pressure appropriate to the S-II stage environment, but in the absence of the aerodynamic shear stress.
High energy forming of compound contours and complex cross sections for Saturn S-II program
Heat transfer and ablation rate measurement in Saturn S-II ullage motor exhaust plume
The J-2 engine was unique in many respects. Technology was not nearly as well-developed in oxygen/hydrogen engines at the start of the J-2 project. As a result, it experienced a number of "teething" problems. It was used in two stages on the Saturn V vehicle in the Apollo Program, as well as on the later Skylab and Apollo/Soyuz programs. In the Apollo Program, it was used on the S-II stage, which was the second stage of the Saturn V vehicle. There were five J-2 engines at the back end of the S-II Stage. In the S-IV-B stage, it was a single engine, but that single engine had to restart. The Apollo mission called for the entire vehicle to reach orbital velocity in low Earth orbit after the first firing of the Saturn-IV-B stage and, subsequently, to fire a second time to go on to the moon. The engine had to be man-rated (worthy of transporting humans). It had to have a high thrust rate and performance associated with oxygen/hydrogen engines, although there were some compromises there. It had to gimbal for thrust vector control. It was an open-cycle gas generator engine delivering up to 230,000 pounds of thrust.
During the quarter hour of its operational life, the External Tank must provide the propellants and propellant conditioning for the Orbiter Main Engines, provide the structural support for the two Solid Rocket Boosters, withstand the natural and induced environments, and effect a safe disposal. The External Tank is twice the size of the S-II Stage used in the Saturn V Booster for the Apollo and Skylab Spacecrafts. The External Tank is 182 feet long, 27 feet in diameter, and carries 1,700,000 pounds of liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen propellants. The Shuttle System configuration and the interaction of the system elements pose an intricate system sensitivity which must be analyzed to establish the performance and sizing requirements for the External Tank.
In January 2006, NASA streamlined its U.S. Vision for Space Exploration hardware development approach for replacing the Space Shuttle after it is retired in 2010. The revised CLV upper stage will use the J-2X engine, a derivative of NASA s Apollo Program Saturn V s S-II and S-IVB main propulsion, which will also serve as the Earth Departure Stage (EDS) engine. This paper gives details of how the J- 2X engine effort mitigates risk by building on the Apollo Program and other lessons learned to deliver a human-rated engine that is on an aggressive development schedule, with first demonstration flight in 2010 and human test flights in 2012. It is well documented that propulsion is historically a high-risk area. NASA s risk reduction strategy for the J-2X engine design, development, test, and evaluation is to build upon heritage hardware and apply valuable experience gained from past development efforts. In addition, NASA and its industry partner, Rocketdyne, which originally built the J-2, have tapped into their extensive databases and are applying lessons conveyed firsthand by Apollo-era veterans of America s first round of Moon missions in the 1960s and 1970s. NASA s development approach for the J-2X engine includes early requirements definition and management; designing-in lessons learned from the 5-2 heritage programs; initiating long-lead procurement items before Preliminary Desi& Review; incorporating design features for anticipated EDS requirements; identifying facilities for sea-level and altitude testing; and starting ground support equipment and logistics planning at an early stage. Other risk reduction strategies include utilizing a proven gas generator cycle with recent development experience; utilizing existing turbomachinery ; applying current and recent main combustion chamber (Integrated Powerhead Demonstrator) and channel wall nozzle (COBRA) advances; and performing rigorous development, qualification, and certification testing of the engine system, with a philosophy of "test what you fly, and fly what you test". These and other active risk management strategies are in place to deliver the J-2X engine for LEO and lunar return missions as outlined in the U.S. Vision for Space Exploration.