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At least 19 records

Sealed Source Security Challenges and Solutions: The Impact of Increased Commercial Disposal Access - 16557

Several recent developments have transformed the sealed source disposal landscape in the United States in ways unimaginable just a few years ago, including the initiation of operations at the first new commercial LLRW facility to open in the United States in decades; publication by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of revised commercial low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) disposal guidance; and the development and certification by the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) of new transportation package designs for high-activity sources/devices. These developments will likely enable LLRW generators to dispose of risk-significant radioactive sealed sources that for decades have been without a commercial disposal pathway. However, challenges remain with regard to ensuring that these new commercial disposal pathways are effective, and that sealed source licensees take advantage of the new options in a timely manner. These challenges include costs related to both transportation and disposal that are likely much higher than most generators expected when they purchased their sources. DOE/NNSA is actively engaged with Federal, State, regional, private sector partners to address these challenges, including measures to encourage financial planning for end-of-life management of radioactive sealed sources. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Sealed Source Security and Disposition: Progress and Prospects - 13515

Due to their high activity and portability, unsecured or abandoned sealed sources could cause significant health or environmental damage. Further, some of these sources could be used either individually or in aggregate in radiological dispersal devices commonly referred to as 'dirty bombs', resulting in significant social disruption and economic impacts in the billions of dollars. Disposal access for disused sealed sources, however, has been a serious challenge. From 2008 to 2012, sealed source disposal was available to only 14 states; additionally, waste acceptance criteria for sealed sources at the low-level waste disposal facilities in operation both prior to and after 2012 exclude some common yet potentially dangerous sealed sources. Recent developments, however, suggest that significant improvement in addressing this challenge is possible, although challenges remain. These developments include 1) the initiation of operations at the Waste Control Specialists (WCS) commercial low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) disposal facility in Andrews County, Texas; 2) the potential for significant revisions of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) 1995 'Final Branch Technical Position on Concentration Averaging and Encapsulation' (1995 BTP); and 3) the Utah Department of Environmental Quality's (UDEQ) approval of a license variance for sealed source disposal at the EnergySolutions LLRW disposal facility near Clive, Utah. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Secure passive RFID tag with seal

A secure passive RFID tag system comprises at least one base station and at least one passive RFID tag. The tag includes a fiber optic cable with the cable ends sealed within the tag and the middle portion forming an external loop. The loop may be secured to at least portions of an object. The tag transmits and receives an optical signal through the fiber optic cable, and the cable is configured to be damaged or broken in response to removal or tampering attempts, wherein the optical signal is significantly altered if the cable is damaged or broken. The tag transmits the optical signal in response to receiving a radio signal from the base station and compares the transmitted optical signal to the received optical signal. If the transmitted optical signal and the received optical signal are identical, the tag transmits an affirmative radio signal to the base station.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Container Verification Using Optically Stimulated Luminescence

Containment verification is a high priority for safeguards containment and surveillance. Nuclear material containers, safeguards equipment cabinets, camera housings, and detector cable conduit are all vulnerable to tampering. Even with a high security seal on a lid or door, custom-built hinges and interfaces, and special colors and types of finishes, the surfaces of enclosures can be tampered with and any penetrations repaired and covered over. With today’s technology, these repairs would not be detected during a simple visual inspection. Several suggested solutions have been to develop complicated networks of wires, fiber-optic cables, lasers or other sensors that line the inside of a container and alarm when the network is disturbed. This results in an active system with real time evidence of tampering but is probably not practical for most safeguards applications. A more practical solution would be to use a passive approach where an additional security feature was added to surfaces which would consist of a special coating or paint applied to the container or enclosure. One type of coating would incorporate optically stimulated luminescent (OSL) material. OSL materials are phosphors that luminesce in proportion to the ionizing radiation dose when stimulated with the appropriate optical wavelengths. The OSL fluoresces at a very specific wavelength when illuminated at another, very specific wavelength. The presence of the pre-irradiated OSL material in the coating is confirmed using a device that interrogates the surface of the enclosure using the appropriate optical wavelength and then reads the resulting luminescence. The presence of the OSL indicates that the integrity of the surface is intact. The coating itself could be transparent which would allow the appearance of the container to remain unchanged or the OSL material could be incorporated into certain paints or epoxies used on various types of containers. The coating could be applied during manufacturing, before deployment, or even after the enclosure is already in the field. This presentation will present some preliminary investigations into the use of OSL as an inexpensive, easy to implement, containment verification technique.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

A Fruit of Yucca Mountain: The Remote Waste Package Closure System

Was the death of the Yucca Mountain repository the fate of a technical lemon or a political lemon? Without caution, this debate could lure us away from capitalizing on the fruits of the project. In March 2009, Idaho National Laboratory (INL) successfully demonstrated the Waste Package Closure System, a full-scale prototype system for closing waste packages that were to be entombed in the now abandoned Yucca Mountain repository. This article describes the system, which INL designed and built, to weld the closure lids on the waste packages, nondestructively examine the welds using four different techniques, repair the welds if necessary, mitigate crack initiating stresses in the surfaces of the welds, evacuate and backfill the packages with an inert gas, and perform all of these tasks remotely. As a nation, we now have a proven method for securely sealing nuclear waste packages for long term storage—regardless of whether or not the future destination for these packages will be an underground repository. Additionally, many of the system’s features and concepts may benefit other remote nuclear applications.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Safety and Security of Radioactive Sealed and Disused/Orphan Sources in Ukraine - German Contribution - 13359

Within the scope of 'Nuclear Security of Radioactive Sources', the German government implemented the modernization of Ukrainian State Production Company's transport and storage facility for radioactive sources (TSF) in Kiev. The overall management of optimizing the physical protection of the storage facility (including the construction of a hot cell for handling the radioactive sources) is currently carried out by the German Federal Foreign Office (AA). AA jointly have assigned Gesellschaft fuer Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH, Germany's leading expert institution in the area of nuclear safety and waste management, to implement the project and to ensure transparency by financial and technical monitoring. Sealed radioactive sources are widely used in industry, medicine and research. Their life cycle starts with the production and finally ends with the interim/long-term storage of the disused sources. In Ukraine, IZOTOP is responsible for all radioactive sources throughout their life cycle. IZOTOP's transport and storage facility (TSF) is the only Ukrainian storage facility for factory-fresh radioactive sources up to an activity of about 1 million Ci (3.7 1016 Bq). The TSF is specially designed for the storage and handling of radioactive sources. Storage began in 1968, and is licensed by the Ukrainian state authorities. Beside the outdated state of TSF's physical protection and the vulnerability of the facility linked with it, the lack of a hot cell for handling and repacking radioactive sources on the site itself represents an additional potential hazard. The project, financed by the German Federal Foreign Office, aims to significantly improve the security of radioactive sources during their storage and handling at the TSF site. Main tasks of the project are a) the modernization of the physical protection of the TSF itself in order to prevent any unauthorized access to radioactive sources as well as b) the construction of a hot cell to reduce the number of transports of radioactive sources within the city of Kiev. In future, the new established hot cell at IZOTOP's transport and storage facility will be useful for identification and characterization of orphan/disused radioactive sources. The projects implemented are performed in accordance with international recommendations (e. g. IAEA) and national normative documents and will make a crucial contribution towards an improved safety and security management of radioactive sources in Ukraine. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Collaboration and Commitment to Sealed Source Safety, Security, and Disposition - 13627

EnergySolutions, the Division of Radiation Control at the Utah Department of Environmental Quality (UDEQ), the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors (CRCPD), and the Department of Energy's Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) are collaborating on a truly innovative effort to expand opportunities for cost-effective sealed source disposal. These entities have developed a first-of-its-kind initiative to dispose of certain sealed sources at the EnergySolutions disposal facility near Clive, Utah, which normally cannot accept sealed sources of any type. This creative and collaborative effort to improve radiation health, safety, and security exemplifies the spirit and commitment represented by the Richard S. Hodes, M.D. Honor Lecture Award, which is presented annually at the Waste Management Symposia by the Southeast Compact Commission to encourage environmental professionals and political leaders to develop innovative approaches to waste management in the United States. The participants in the collaborative initiative are honored to receive special recognition for their efforts thus far. They also recognize that the hard work remains to be done. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Secure fiber optic seals enabled by quantum optical communication concepts

Described herein are various technologies pertaining to detecting tampering of a seal based upon quantum optical communication via a communications channel comprising the seal. A plurality of pulses of light encoded with random data are transmitted on the communications channel, whereupon they are received and their data values measured. The measured data values of the pulses are then compared to the known transmitted data to determine a correlation statistic between the transmitted and received data values. Tampering with the seal can be detected based upon identifying that the correlation statistic has dropped below a threshold non-tampered level of correlation between transmitted and received values.

Sarovar, Mohan↗

Panel Session 16: Hot Topics and Emerging Issues in US Commercial LLRW Management and Disposal

This panel focused on emerging issues in commercial LLW management in the US from the perspective of active members of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Forum, Inc. State, compact, federal and industry officials will share their views on a variety of timely and significant topics related to low-level radioactive waste management, disposal and related issues. Presentations proposed include: 1 - Overview of NRC Activities and Initiatives (John Tappert, US NRC (USA)); 2 - Advocates for Responsible Disposal in Texas (Edward Selig, Advocates for Responsible Disposal in Texas (ARDT) (USA)); 3 - Hot Topics and Emerging Issues in U.S. Commercial LLW Management and Disposal (Joe Weismann, US Ecology (USA)); 4 - DOE/NNSA Office of Radiological Security (ORS) Sealed Source Management and Disposal (David Martin, Energetics Incorporated (USA), Temeka Taplin, US DOE NNSA (USA))

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Triple acting radial seal

A triple acting radial seal used as an interstage seal assembly in a gas turbine engine, where the seal assembly includes an interstage seal support extending from a stationary inner shroud of a vane ring, the interstage seal support includes a larger annular radial inward facing groove in which an outer annular floating seal assembly is secured for radial displacement, and the outer annular floating seal assembly includes a smaller annular radial inward facing groove in which an inner annular floating seal assembly is secured also for radial displacement. A compliant seal is secured to the inner annular floating seal assembly. The outer annular floating seal assembly encapsulates the inner annular floating seal assembly which is made from a very low alpha material in order to reduce thermal stress.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Transducer Signal Noise Analysis for Sensor Authentication

The abstract is being passed through STIMS for submision to the conference. International safeguards organizations charged with promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy employ unattended and remote monitoring systems supplemented with onsite inspections to ensure nuclear materials are not diverted for weaponization purposes. These systems are left unattended for periods of several months between inspections. During these periods physical security means are the main deterrent used to detect intentional monitoring system tampering. The information gathering components are locked in secure and sealed rooms. The sensor components (i.e. neutron and gamma detectors) are located throughout the plant in unsecure areas where sensor tampering could take place during the periods between inspections. Sensor tampering could allow the diversion of nuclear materials from the accepted and intended use to uses not consistent with the peaceful use of nuclear energy. A method and an apparatus is presented that address the detection of sensor tampering during the periods between inspections. It was developed at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) for the Department of Energy (DOE) in support of the IAEA. The method is based on the detailed analysis of the sensor noise floor after the sensor signal is removed. The apparatus consists of a 2.1” x 2.6” electronic circuit board containing all signal conditioning and processing components and a laptop computer running an application that acquires and stores the analysis results between inspection periods. The sensors do not require any modification and are remotely located in their normal high radiation zones. The apparatus interfaces with the sensor signal conductors using a simple pass through connector at the normal sensor electronics interface package located in the already secure and sealed rooms. The apparatus does not require hardening against the effects of radiation due to its location. Presented is the apparatus design, the analysis method, and the test results as applied to tamper detection using three HE3 neutron sensors and two gamma sensors designed and built for safeguards monitoring.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

An ideal sealed source life-cycle

In the last 40 years, barriers to compliant and timely disposition of radioactive sealed sources have become apparent. The story starts with the explosive growth of nuclear gauging technologies in the 1960s. Dozens of companies in the US manufactured sources and many more created nuclear solutions to industrial gauging problems. Today they do not yet know how many Cat 1, 2, or 3 sources there are in the US. There are, at minimum, tens of thousands of sources, perhaps hundreds of thousands of sources. Affordable transportation solutions to consolidate all of these sources and disposition pathways for these sources do not exist. The root problem seems to be a lack of necessary regulatory framework that has allowed all of these problems to accumulate with no national plan for solving the problem. In the 1960s, Pu-238 displaced Pu-239 for most neutron and alpha source applications. In the 1970s, the availability of inexpensive Am-241 resulted in a proliferation of low energy gamma sources used in nuclear gauging, well logging, pacemakers, and X-ray fluorescence applications for example. In the 1980s, rapid expansion of worldwide petroleum exploration resulted in the expansion of Am-241 sources into international locations. Improvements of technology and regulation resulted in a change in isotopic distribution as Am-241 made Pu-239 and Pu-238 obsolete. Many early nuclear gauge technologies have been made obsolete as they were replaced by non-nuclear technoogies. With uncertainties in source end of life disposition and increased requirements for sealed source security, nuclear gauging technology is the last choice for modern process engineering gauging solutions. Over the same period, much was learned about licensing LLW disposition facilities as evident by the closure of early disposition facilities like Maxey Flats. The current difficulties in sealed source disposition start with adoption of the NLLW policy act of 1985, which created the state LLW compact system they we have today. This regulation created a new regulatory framework seen as promising at the time. However, now they recognize that, despite the good intentions, the NIJWP/85 has not solved any source disposition problems. The answer to these sealed source disposition problems is to adopt a philosophy to correct these regulatory issues, determine an interim solution, execute that solution until there is a minimal backlog of sources to deal with, and then let the mechanisms they have created solve this problem into the foreseeable future. The primary philosophical tenet of the ideal sealed source life cycle follows. You do not allow the creation (or importation) of any source whose use cannot be justified, which cannot be affordably shipped, or that does not have a well-delinated and affordable disposition pathway. The path forward dictates that we fix the problem by embracing the Ideal Source Life cycle. In figure 1, we can see some of the elements of the ideal source life cycle. The life cycle is broken down into four portions, manufacture, use, consolidation, and disposition. These four arbitrary elements allow them to focus on the ideal life cycle phases that every source should go through between manufacture and final disposition. As we examine the various phases of the sealed source life cycle, they pick specific examples and explore the adoption of the ideal life cycle model.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Safe and Secure Management of Disused Radioactive Sealed Sources in Egypt - 19063

Radioactive sources offer many benefits in medicine, industry and education but the lack of appropriate long-term management when they eventually become disused has led to accidents, in some cases with serious consequences, and increased their vulnerability for use in a malicious act. This lack is evident in the absence of clearly defined policy and strategy, responsibilities and resources to meet those responsibilities for safe, secure and sustainable management of disused sources. The strengthening of national legislative and regulatory infrastructures globally has led to major improvements in the protection and control of radioactive sources. Nevertheless, in many countries, radioactive sources were in use before such infrastructures had been developed or adequately strengthened and were therefore not under regulatory control. The paper presents some aspects from Egyptian experience related to safe and secure measures for management of Cs-137, Ra-226 and Co-60 sealed sources. Data relating to the disused radioactive sealed sources, DSRS inventory as well as the arrangements made in order to prepare for conditioning of sources is presented. The efforts made by technical staff and radiation protection team for all arrangements and details such as conditioning set-up, working area, leakage test, certified stainless capsules, radiation protection measures and sources characterization in addition to all security measures for stored DSRS are also presented. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Applicability of Developed Calculation Models to Predict Long-term Behavior of Metal Seals - Necessary Scope of Tests - 19311

The long-term sealing behavior of metal seals, assembled in the lid system of casks for transportation and storage of radioactive materials, has been investigated. For that purpose, phenomenological models describing the time- and temperature dependent behavior have been introduced by BAM since 2016, e.g. by using the time-temperature superposition principle. Results have shown that these models describe the relaxation behavior adequately and are suitable for extrapolations. In this work, the applicability of these models is checked by analyzing the necessary scope of tests, which must be carried out to get sufficient information about the long-term behavior of metal seals based on short-term tests. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Technical Review Report for the Application for Contents Amendment for Shipping Isentropic Compression Experiment (ICE) Apparatus in 9977 Packaging

This report documents the review of Application for Contents Amendment for Shipping Isentropic Compression Experiment (ICE) Apparatus in 9977 Packaging, prepared by Savannah River Packaging Technology (SRPT) of Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) of Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, LLC, -- the Submittal -- at the request of the Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Agency's (NNSA) Albuquerque Facility Operations Division, for the shipment of the ICE apparatus from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), to Sandia National Laboratory (SNL). The ICE apparatus consists of a stainless steel assembly containing about 8 grams of {sup 239}Pu or its dose equivalent as noted in Table 1, Comparison of 9977 Content C.1 and the ICE Radioactive Contents, of the Submittal. The ICE target is mounted on the transport container assembly base. A Viton{sup R} O-ring seals the transport container base to the transport container body. Another Viton{sup R} O-ring seals the transport container handle to the transport container body. The ICE apparatus weighs less than 30 pounds and has less than 0.6 watts decay heat rate. For the Model 9977 Package, the maximum payload weight is 100 pounds and the maximum decay heat rate is 19 watts. Thus, the maximum payload weight and the maximum decay heat rate for the Model 9977 Package easily bound those for the ICE apparatus. This Addendum supplements the Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP), Revision 2, for the Model 9977 Package and Addendum 1, Revision 2, to Revision 2 of the Model 9977 Package SARP. The ICE apparatus is considered as part of Content Envelope C.6, Samples and Sources, under the submittal for the Model 9978 Package SARP currently under review. The Staff at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) recommends that the Submittal be approved by the DOE-Headquarters Certifying Official (EM-60), and incorporated into a subsequent revision to the current Certificate of Compliance (CoC), to the Model 9977-96 Packaging.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Coupled Flow and Deformation Modeling of Carbon Dioxide Migration in the Presence of a Caprock Fracture during Injection

Understanding the transport of carbon dioxide (CO{sub 2}) during long-term CO{sub 2} injection into a typical geologic reservoir, such as a saline aquifer, could be complicated because of changes in geochemical, hydrogeological, and hydromechanical behavior. While the caprock layer overlying the target aquifer is intended to provide a tight, impermeable seal in securing injected CO{sub 2}, the presence of geologic uncertainties, such as a caprock fracture or fault, may provide a channel for CO{sub 2} leakage. There could also be a possibility of the activation of a new or existing dormant fault or fracture, which could act as a leakage pathway. Such a leakage event during CO{sub 2} injection may lead to a different pressure and ground response over a period of time. In the present study, multiphase fluid flow simulations in porous media coupled with geomechanics were used to investigate the overburden geologic response and plume behavior during CO{sub 2} injection in the presence of a hypothetical permeable fractured zone in a caprock, existing or activated. Both single-phase and multiphase fluid flow simulations were performed. The CO{sub 2} migration through an existing fractured zone leads to changes in the fluid pressure in the overburden geologic layers and could have a significant impact on ground deformation behavior. Results of the study show that pressure signatures and displacement patterns are significantly different in the presence of a fractured zone in the caprock layer. The variation in pressure and displacement signatures because of the presence of a fractured zone in the caprock at different locations may be useful in identifying the presence of a fault/fractured zone in the caprock. The pressure signatures can also serve as a mechanism to identify the activation of leakage pathways through the caprock during CO{sub 2} injection. Pressure response and ground deformation behavior from sequestration modeling could be useful in the development of smart technologies to monitor safe CO{sub 2} storage and understand CO{sub 2} transport, with limited field instrumentation.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DEVELOPMENT OF A CERAMIC TAMPER INDICATING SEAL: SRNL CONTRIBUTIONS

Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) are collaborating on development of a Ceramic Seal, also sometimes designated the Intrinsically Tamper Indicating Ceramic Seal (ITICS), which is a tamper indicating seal for international safeguards applications. The Ceramic Seal is designed to be a replacement for metal loop seals that are currently used by the IAEA and other safeguards organizations. The Ceramic Seal has numerous features that enhance the security of the seal, including a frangible ceramic body, protective and tamper indicating coatings, an intrinsic unique identifier using Laser Surface Authentication, electronics incorporated into the seal that provide cryptographic seal authentication, and user-friendly seal wire capture. A second generation prototype of the seal is currently under development whose seal body is of Low Temperature Co-fired Ceramic (LTCC) construction. SRNL has developed the mechanical design of the seal in an iterative process incorporating comments from the SNL vulnerability review team. SRNL is developing fluorescent tamper indicating coatings, with recent development focusing on optimizing the durability of the coatings and working with a vendor to develop a method to apply coatings on a 3-D surface. SRNL performed a study on the effects of radiation on the electronics of the seal and possible radiation shielding techniques to minimize the effects. SRNL is also investigating implementation of Laser Surface Authentication (LSA) as a means of unique identification of each seal and the effects of the surface coatings on the LSA signature.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗