Predicting Failure of Woven Composite Laminates
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Daniel Munden↗
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NiCd battery failure analysis
The failure of a nickel cadmium battery undergoing tests is discussed. Reasons for the complete destruction of the battery while undergoing preparation for thermal vacuum testing are given.
Sense, K. A.↗
Battery failure model derived from flaw theory
A previously derived failure model for battery lifetime is discussed in terms of growth rate of the flaw, distribution of flaw sizes, and number of flaws. Equations are presented for determining the failure model for a nickel cadmium battery.
Schulman, I.↗
Failure Modes of Reduced-Order Orbit Determination Filters and Their Remedies
Ways in which failure can occur in reduced-order, orbit determination filter, error covariance calculations are discussed. In the context of this article, reduced-order filters denote nonoptimal filters which include fixed levels of uncertainty in some parameters of the measurement models or in the spacecraft dynamical model which are not explicitly estimated in the filter equations. Failure is defined as an increase in the orbit determination covariance with the addition of data or as an unreasonable growth in the covariance with time, i.e., nonasymptotic behavior of the covariance. Some simple, known cases of failure are discussed along with their traditional remedies. In addition, more modern remedies are discussed which are currently under development at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. The article first describes the known problems of reduced-order filters when they are employed for orbit determination, and their traditional remedies. Then, having defined these, the relevancy and desirability of the more modern remedies are made apparent.
D J Scheeres↗
NiCd space battery test data analysis project, phase 2 Quarterly report, 1 Jan. - 30 Apr. 1967
Cryptanalytic technique for evaluating nickel- cadmium battery cell failure characteristic data
FAILURE↗
Battery Failure Databank
The Battery Failure Databank contains thermal runaway results gathered from nearly 300 small format fractional thermal runaway calorimetry (S-FTRC) experiments. A majority of these experiments were conducted at synchrotron facilities where high-speed x-ray videography was conducted of the cell while tested inside of the S-FTRC. The databank is a two-component system which consists of a Microsoft ExcelTM spreadsheet which provides S-FTRC results in tabular format and a radiographic video library containing the high-speed x-ray videos. Overall, the databank provides thermal results from S-FTRC experiments conducted on a mixture of commercially available lithium-ion (Li-ion) cells and specialized Li-ion test cells with varying cell format (18650, 21700, and D-cell) and trigger mechanism (heaters, heaters plus internal short circuiting device, and nail penetration). The radiography video component provides insight into the initiation and propagation of TR in the cells, in addition to consequences of TR measured by the FTRC. Fractions of mass ejected for the cell types are separated into regimes based on the different failure modes of the cells, such as purely venting, partial ejection, and total ejection. With knowledge of the rate and characterization of the internal degradation of the cells during TR, and the amounts of mass ejected and unrecovered, the extent of TR, and therefore the mitigation of TR, is revealed relative to cell types and failure modes.
Lithium-ion battery↗
Ejecta Management in a Safe Lithium Ion Battery Design
As lithium-ion battery energy densities continue to rise, managing the heat and pressure generated during failure events has become increasingly critical. Safety systems must effectively relieve pressure without releasing sparks, flames, or particulate matter, requiring robust filtration solutions. The challenge is compounded by the reduced free volume available for gas expansion in high-density designs, which increases the demands on these filters. While significant progress has been made through experimental studies and modeling efforts to understand the behavior of ejecta during battery failures, there remains a pressing need for practical, rule-of-thumb sizing parameters. These parameters would help correlate high-energy waste streams with appropriate filter design, ensuring reliable containment and safety. This talk will explore recent experimental findings in this area and discuss the potential pathways for developing these essential sizing guidelines.
Ejecta Management↗
Revisiting the Soyuz-1 Parachute Failure in the Context of Safety in the Modern Era
The Soyuz‑1 accident remains one of the most consequential parachute related failures in human spaceflight history and provides enduring lessons for modern Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL) system design. Occurring during the height of the Cold War and the Space Race, the mission unfolded under extraordinary political and schedule pressure as the Soviet Union sought to maintain its early leadership in space achievements following the death of chief designer Sergei Korolev. Despite unresolved propulsion, electrical, and parachute system deficiencies, Soyuz‑1 proceeded to launch and immediately encountered critical inflight anomalies, including a failed solar panel deployment, attitude control issues, and communication dropouts. Upon reentry, a malfunction in the parachute system, driven by a primary main canopy that failed to deploy, and subsequent entanglement of the reserve main canopy with the primary drogue parachute, resulted in insufficient deceleration and the fatal crash of cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov. Subsequent investigations revealed deep rooted cultural and organizational issues within the Soviet space program, including inadequate testing, suppression of dissent, undocumented last minute design changes, and the absence of integrated parachute system verification. More than 200 design flaws were identified after the accident, and firsthand accounts, including those from Yuri Gagarin, highlighted widespread concern prior to launch. Over time, the Soviet program implemented substantial reforms: systematic design corrections, rigorous process documentation, and an extensive series of drop tests that ultimately transformed the Soyuz system into one of the world’s most reliable human-rated return vehicles. This paper examines the technical architecture of the Soyuz‑1 parachute system, reconstructs the likely deployment sequence and failure mechanism, and analyzes the cultural contributors that shaped the accident. The study draws parallels to modern spacecraft parachute development, emphasizing the critical importance of integrated system testing, transparent engineering culture, and continuous hardware surveillance. These lessons remain directly relevant to today’s NASA and Commercial Crew Programs (CCP), where the Government continues to refine its understanding of aggregate risk and strengthen overall astronaut safety in the face of increasingly complex parachute systems.
Aaron L Morris↗
Simplified Aid for Extra-Vehicular Activity Rescue (SAFER) Battery Assessment
In 2013, the Boeing Company model 787-8 Dreamliner commercial aircraft experienced three catastrophic lithium (Li) battery failures. The cause of each failure resulted in a single-cell thermal runaway (TR) condition, which propagated to adjacent battery cells. Two of the failures involved rechargeable lithium-ion (Li-Ion) batteries, and the third event involved a nonrechargeable lithium-manganese dioxide (Li-MnO2) battery. In response to these Li battery failures, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) approved a technical assessment of the International Space Station Simplified Aid for Extra-Vehicular Activity Rescue (SAFER) Li non-rechargeable battery. This assessment was conducted to evaluate the SAFER Li nonrechargeable battery safety design features against Boeing 787 Dreamliner Li battery failure lessons learned. Specifically, this investigation focused on assessing the severity of a SAFER battery TR hazard conditions.
Iannello, Christopher J.↗
Nitrile/Buna N Material Failure Assessment for an O-Ring used on the Gaseous Hydrogen Flow Control Valve (FCV) of the Space Shuttle Main Engine
After the rollout of Space Shuttle Discovery in April 2005 in preparation for return-to-flight, there was a failure of the Orbiter (OV-103) helium signature leak test in the gaseous hydrogen (GH2) system. Leakage was attributed to the Flow Control Valve (FCV) in Main Engine 3. The FCV determined to be the source of the leak for OV-103 is designated as LV-58. The nitrile/Buna N rubber O-ring seal was removed from LV-58, and failure analysis indicated radial cracks providing leak paths in one quadrant. Cracks were eventually found in 6 of 9 FCV O-rings among the three Shuttle Orbiters, though none were as severe as those for LV-58, OV-103. Testing by EM10 at MSFC on all 9 FCV O- rings included: laser dimensional, Shore A hardness and properties from a dynamic mechanical analyzer (DMA) and an Instron tensile machine. The following test data was obtained on the cracked quadrant of the LV-58, OV-103 O-ring: (1) the estimated compression set was only 9.5%, compared to none for the rest of the O-ring; (2) Shore A hardness for the O.D. was higher by almost 4 durometer points than for the rest of the O-ring; and (3) DMA data showed that the storage/elastic modulus E was almost 25% lower than for the rest of the O-ring. Of the 8 FCV O-rings tested on an Instron, 4 yielded tensile strengths that were below the MIL spec requirement of 1350 psi-a likely influence of rubber cracking. Comparisons were made between values of modulus determined by DNA (elastic) and Instron (Young s). Each nitrile/Buna N O-ring used in the FCV conforms to the MIL-P-25732C specification. A number of such O-rings taken from shelf storage at MSFC and Kennedy Space Center (KSC) were used to generate a reference curve of DMA glass transition temperature (Tg) vs. shelf storage time ranging from 8 to 26 years. A similar reference curve of TGA onset temperature (of rubber weight loss) vs. shelf storage time was also generated. The DMA and TGA data for the used FCV O-rings were compared to the reference curves. Correlations were also made between the DMA modulus (at 22 C) and Shore A hardness for all 9 of the FCV O-rings used among the three Shuttle Orbiters. The radial cracking in the FCV O-rings was determined to be due to ozone attack, as nitrile/Buna N rubber is susceptible to such attack. Nitrile/Buna N material under MIL-P25732C should be used in a hydraulic fluid environment to help protect it from cracking. However, the FCV O-rings were used in an air only environment. The FCV design has as much as a 9-mil gap that allows the O.D. of the O-ring to be directly exposed to ozone, pressurized air and some elevated temperatures, accelerating the weathering process that leads to O-ring cracking. Space Shuttle flights will likely not continue past 2010. Therefore, Shuttle management decided to continue using the nitrile/Buna N material for the FCVs, but have each O-ring replaced after 3 years to minimize any chances for crack initiation.
Doug Wingard↗
Impact Testing of 410 Stainless Steel for Material Impact Model Development
A project is underway to develop a consistent set of material properties, impact test data, and failure analysis for a variety of metallic aircraft materials that can be used to develop improved impact failure and deformation models. This project is jointly funded by the NASA Glenn Research Center and the Federal Aviation Administration William J. Hughes Technical Center. Particular features of this set of data are that all material property and impact test data are obtained using traceable material, the test methods and procedures are extensively documented, and all the raw data are available. Four parallel efforts are currently underway: measurement of material deformation and failure response over a wide range of strain rates and temperatures, failure analysis of material property specimens and impact test articles, development of improved numerical modeling techniques for deformation and failure, and impact testing of flat panels and substructures for model validation. This report describes impact testing performed on 410 stainless steel sheet and plate samples of different thicknesses with two different types of projectiles, one a regular cylinder and one with a more complex geometry incorporating features representative of a jet engine fan blade. Data from this testing will be used in validating material models developed under this program. The material tests and the material models developed in this program will be published in separate reports.
410 Stainless Steel↗
In-Orbit Earth Radiation Budget Satellite (ERBS) Battery Switch
A viewgraph presentation outlines the Earth Radiation Budget Satellite (ERBS) power system and battery history. ERBS spacecraft and battery cell failures are listed with the reasons for failure. The battery management decision and stabilization of the batteries is discussed. Present battery operations are shown to be successful.
Ahmad, Anisa↗
Influences of Introduced Yttrium Oxide Particles on Superalloy 718
Additive manufacturing has proven useful for introducing oxide particles into superalloys, to provide oxide dispersion strengthening (ODS) at high temperatures. This study screened how such an approach can influence microstructure and failure modes for superalloy 718. The objective of this study was to compare tensile and creep failure modes for additively manufactured superalloy 718 having introduced oxide particles. Fine yttrium-oxide (yttria) particles were introduced into 718 powder using two different powder mixing methods. Additive manufacturing by laser powder bed fusion was then used to prepare specimen blanks for each case, oriented parallel and transverse to the building direction. These were subsequently given consistent stress relief, hot isostatic pressurization, and final heat treatments, then subjected to tensile and creep tests at varied temperatures. Additively manufactured 718 without ODS (“no-ODS”) had nearly equiaxed grains at 50 μm in width. Roll-mixed ODS material had a bimodal grain size distribution, with fine grains at 9 μm and coarse grains at 66 μm in average width. The fine grains were elongated about 5x in the building direction. Acoustic-mixed ODS materials had grains at 10 μm in width that were elongated about 10x in the build direction. Compared to no-ODS, roll-mixed and acoustic mixed ODS materials did not show improved tensile strengths at room temperature, 760 °C, and 1093 °C. The tensile failure strains parallel to the building direction of roll-mixed ODS material were lowest in these tests. Flattened clumps of yttria had formed transverse to the building direction in roll-mixed material, which were easily cracked. Creep rupture response at 760 °C in the building direction was highest for acoustic-mixed material test. Creep tests at 1093 °C showed varied results, with low rupture lives associated with enhanced cavitation at grain boundaries and surface oxidation. Transverse to the building direction, all three materials had low failure strains in tests at 760 °C. The elongated grain boundaries failed readily in all transverse specimens tested at 760 °C and 1093 °C.
oxide dispersion strengthening↗
Deployment and retrieval mechanism redesigned for Spartan spacecraft on the STS
The Spartan Release Engage Mechanism (REM) is a system designed to restrain the Spartan spacecraft during Space Transportation System (STS) launch and landing. The mechanism is designed to allow deployment and retrieval of the Spartan free flyer spacecraft from the shuttle payload bay. Because current Spartan spacecraft payloads are much heavier than payloads intended for the original REM, an extensive redesign, analysis, and test program was necessary. Also, increased emphasis on safety in the post-Challenger era prompted a reevaluation of possible failures. Much of the design effort focused on improving the latch mechanism gearbox. Key concerns were effective gear lubrication, thermal gradients at the gearbox mounts, operation at thermal extremes, and gear-train failure contingencies. Increased concern for reliability led to the design of an Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA) backup latch system.
Greg Galloway↗
Analytical modeling of battery cycle life
An analytical model related to the physical and chemical processes involved in battery wear and failure is discussed. The model is described using the data from the Crane tests.
Gross, S.↗
Hubble Space Telescope On-orbit NiH2 Battery Performance
This paper summarizes the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) nickel-hydrogen (NiH2) battery performance from launch to the present time. Over the life of HST vehicle configuration, charge system degradation and failures together with thermal design limitations have had a significant effect on the capacity of the HST batteries. Changes made to the charge system configuration in order to protect against power system failures and to maintain battery thermal stability resulted in undercharging of the batteries. This undercharging resulted in decreased usable battery capacity as well as battery cell voltage/capacity divergence. This cell divergence was made evident during on-orbit battery capacity measurements by a relatively shallow slope of the discharge curve following the discharge knee. Early efforts to improve the battery performance have been successful. On-orbit capacity measurement data indicates increases in the usable battery capacity of all six batteries as well as improvements in the battery cell voltage/capacity divergence. Additional measures have been implemented to improve battery performance, however, failures within the HST Power Control Unit (PCU) have prevented verification of battery status. As this PCU fault prevents the execution of on-orbit capacity testing, the HST Project has based the battery capacity on trends, which utilizes previous on-orbit battery capacity test data, for science mission and servicing mission planning. The Servicing Mission 38 (SM-3B) in March 2002 replaced the faulty PCU. Following the servicing mission, on-orbit capacity test resumed. A summary of battery performance is reviewed since launch in this paper.
Rao, Gopalakrishna M.↗
A Review of Pump Package Assembly Anomalies and Demonstration to Gain Motor Controller Replacement Capability
The International Space Station (ISS) generates heat within the US modules from systems used to operate the station, maintain crew health, and conduct science experiments in the orbiting laboratory. The Internal Thermal Control System (ITCS) collects this heat in water loops and transfers it to the external ammonia system for rejection to space. The ITCS uses six Pump Package Assemblies (PPA) as the motive force to circulate the water within the Lab, Node 2, and Node 3 (Node 1 is parasitic to the Lab and Node 3 ITCS loops). In the life of ISS, 3 PPAs have had to be replaced and 2 PPAs are currently showing signs of degradation. The first PPA to fail in 2003 was due to early coolant chemistry issues; the remaining pump failures and current pump degradations are determined to be related to the Pump/Fan Motor Controller (PFMC), with their individual signatures all being unique to this point. The PFMC of one of the failed PPAs was returned and testing confirmed its sub-components to be the root cause of the PPA failure. Due to the relative size and weight of the standalone PFMC in comparison to the integrated assembly, it is desired, from a launch and on-orbit stowage perspective, to replace the PFMC component of the degraded PPA instead of the entire PPA. The PPA was not designed for this capability, so on the ground demonstrations are planned using crew tools to show that the PFMC can be replaced on-orbit while maintaining full functionality. This paper will focus on the signatures of the two most recent PPA failures and the two PPAs showing signs of degradation, in addition to presenting the findings from the PFMC demonstration effort.
Aaron Rodriguez↗
A Review of Pump Package Assembly Anomalies and Demonstration to Gain Motor Controller Replacement Capability
The International Space Station (ISS) generates heat within the US modules from systems used to operate the station, maintain crew health, and conduct science experiments in the orbiting laboratory. The Internal Thermal Control System (ITCS) collects this heat in water loops and transfers it to the external ammonia system for rejection to space. The ITCS uses six Pump Package Assemblies (PPA) as the motive force to circulate the water within the Lab, Node 2, and Node 3 (Node 1 is parasitic to the Lab and Node 3 ITCS loops). In the life of ISS, 3 PPAs have had to be replaced and 2 PPAs are currently showing signs of degradation. The first PPA to fail in 2003 was due to early coolant chemistry issues; the remaining pump failures and current pump degradations are determined to be related to the Pump/Fan Motor Controller (PFMC), with their individual signatures all being unique to this point. The PFMC of one of the failed PPAs was returned and testing confirmed its sub-components to be the root cause of the PPA failure. Due to the relative size and weight of the standalone PFMC in comparison to the integrated assembly, it is desired, from a launch and on-orbit stowage perspective, to replace the PFMC component of the degraded PPA instead of the entire PPA. The PPA was not designed for this capability, so on the ground demonstrations are planned using crew tools to show that the PFMC can be replaced on-orbit while maintaining full functionality. This paper will focus on the signatures of the two most recent PPA failures and the two PPAs showing signs of degradation, in addition to presenting the findings from the PFMC demonstration effort.
Aaron Rodriguez↗