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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Verification of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) using Active Well Coincidence Counter (AWCC) and a High Purity Germanium (HPGe) Detector

SNM verification can be accomplished via two methods i.e. destructive analysis (DA) or nondestructive analysis (NDA). The DA modes are much more accurate compared to NDA modes; nevertheless, the sample's physical integrity is destroyed in the process. Techniques such as ICP-MS, ID-ICP-MS, TI-MS are few examples of DA, where a bulk material is ground and mixed with a solution (some form of acid) to acquire a homogenous sample. In contrast, NDA modes utilize signals emitted by the sample such as gamma, neutrons, light, or heat to analyze samples under investigation. HPGe detectors are some of the most frequently used gamma detectors to assay SNM. However, in a high activity scenario it provides a large uncertainty and sometimes becomes unfeasible to measure low energy gamma rays. Meanwhile, neutron detectors are not affected by the gamma background, therefore they can be used in addition to the gamma detectors to verify total fissile mass ({sup 235}U + {sup 239}Pu) of SNM. The AWCC is one of the thermal neutron NDA systems developed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). It consists of 42 {sup 3}He detectors to measure gross neutrons (singles), coincidence neutrons (doubles), higher order multiplicity counting (triples, quadruples, etc.). It can effectively operate in both active and passive neutron interrogation modes. It can utilize AmLi, AmBe, or {sup 252}Cf active interrogation neutron sources. It is used to verify declared fissile mass ({sup 235}U or {sup 239}Pu) present in SNM. Objectives: Calibrate HPGe and AWCC for lightly irradiated (with enough {sup 137}Cs gamma background) ∼93% enriched HEU fuels; Verify fissile mass ({sup 235}U +{sup 239}Pu) content using AWCC and HPGe; Model and benchmark AWCC in MCNP6. Neutron coincidence and multiplicity counting: Two or more neutrons are coincident if they are detected by the system within the specified gate window; In AWCC: Gate window is 128 μsec; Induced fission in fissile material such as {sup 235}U and {sup 239}Pu - emission of time correlated neutrons - Singles, Doubles, Triples, or Quadruples; No induced fission in non-fissile materials- no correlated neutrons - only singles. SNM can be verified with high accuracy and precision using gamma and neutron NDA instruments such as HPGe and AWCC. Interaction with thermal neutrons. Non-fissile atoms - do not emit correlated neutrons. Fissile atoms - emit correlated neutrons during induced fission events. The time correlated neutrons can be detected by using coincidence or multiplicity counters such as AWCC. Likewise, {sup 235}U produces 186 keV gamma peak that can be measured by a HPGe gamma detector. Counts under 186 keV gamma peak provide information about {sup 235}U content. Combining AWCC and HPGe results can provide better understanding of special nuclear material under investigation.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

SNM Radiation Signature Classification Using Different Semi-Supervised Machine Learning Models

The timely detection of special nuclear material (SNM) transfers between nuclear facilities is an important monitoring objective in nuclear nonproliferation. Persistent monitoring enabled by successful detection and characterization of radiological material movements could greatly enhance the nuclear nonproliferation mission in a range of applications. Supervised machine learning can be used to signal detections when material is present if a model is trained on sufficient volumes of labeled measurements. However, the nuclear monitoring data needed to train robust machine learning models can be costly to label since radiation spectra may require strict scrutiny for characterization. Therefore, this work investigates the application of semi-supervised learning to utilize both labeled and unlabeled data. As a demonstration experiment, radiation measurements from sodium iodide (NaI) detectors are provided by the Multi-Informatics for Nuclear Operating Scenarios (MINOS) venture at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) as sample data. Anomalous measurements are identified using a method of statistical hypothesis testing. After background estimation, an energy-dependent spectroscopic analysis is used to characterize an anomaly based on its radiation signatures. In the absence of ground-truth information, a labeling heuristic provides data necessary for training and testing machine learning models. Supervised logistic regression serves as a baseline to compare three semi-supervised machine learning models: co-training, label propagation, and a convolutional neural network (CNN). In each case, the semi-supervised models outperform logistic regression, suggesting that unlabeled data can be valuable when training and demonstrating value in semi-supervised nonproliferation implementations.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2022

Developing a Th Resonance Ionization Scheme: for Future Use in Age Dating SNM by Resonance Ionization Mass Spectrometry

We report the development of a Th resonance ionization scheme (RIS) for analyzing Th isotopes by resonance ionization mass spectrometry (RIMS) to enable age-dating via the 230 Th/ 234 U inter-elemental pair. This report summarizes the work that completes the first of two tasks that are required for developing U-Th dating via RIMS at the Laser Ionization of Neutrals (LION) laboratory at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The first task involves choosing and vetting an appropriate Th RIS for the LION instrument and simultaneous U and Th analysis.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2024

High-Energy Laser Direct Strike Assessment for NIF CryoXNBS Snout and Naiad SNM Container

An experimental IPT performed two NIF shots as an assessment of the effect of a direct laser beam strike impact on the NIF CryoXNBS snout and Naiad container. Four aligned NIF outer cone beams at best focus, 42 kJ total, struck a four millimeter thick stainless plate. In the first shot, the struck plate was followed by a 1.75 mm gap and a 2.0 millimeter stainless plate to create a surrogate geometry for the current CryoXNBS snout and Naiad container. There was minor plastic deformation of the rear plate rear surface with no evidence of bulk failure. The second shot tested a layered glass-filled polycarbonate and titanium shield placed in the gap. Nondestructive assay was sufficient to metrologize the beam strike area and the damage induced to the NIF target assemblies.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2025

Diversion Path Analysis: A Proposed Methodology to Develop an MC&A Approach for Liquid-Fueled Molten Salt Reactors

Nuclear material control and accounting (MC&A) is a critical element of both the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and US Department of Energy (DOE)’s domestic safeguards and security requirements. NRC licensees are required, under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 74 to establish and maintain an MC&A program that captures and records the quantities and locations of special nuclear material (SNM) at the facility. Along with physical protection, MC&A is a key element of domestic nuclear material safeguards that enables the NRC to ensure that SNM is controlled and accounted for. SNM, per 10 CFR Part 74, refers to plutonium, 233 U, and uranium enriched in the isotope 233 U or 235 U, but does not include source material. Periodic physical inventories, coupled with material balance evaluations, are effective and demonstrated tools to account for and detect theft or diversion of SNM in facilities containing SNM in bulk material form (i.e., not in discrete, countable items). Historically in the United States, these types of facilities have included fuel fabrication, conversion, and enrichment facilities. In comparison, reactors have relied on item counting of assemblies and control of SNM while in containment (e.g., a sealed reactor pressure vessel) because, to date, reactor fuel has been in item form. In liquid-fueled molten salt reactors (MSRs), unlike traditional light water reactors (LWRs) or bulk facilities, bulk SNM quantities can change significantly during operation as a result of depletion and transmutation. This introduces challenges to the use of traditional periodic physical inventories and material balance evaluations to detect theft or diversion of SNM in reactors that use SNM in bulk material form. Liquid-fueled (i.e., salt-fueled) MSR facilities are MSRs that use SNM within a salt eutectic as the fuel. The SNM is in a bulk material form any time it is outside of fresh or spent fuel storage containers. Some examples of when SNM will be in bulk form in the facility are during addition of fuel to the reactor system, while fuel is circulating in operation, and while fuel is in a drain tank. Periodic physical inventories and material balance evaluations can likely be effectively applied to many portions of an MSR facility, including all areas where depletion and transmutation are not significantly changing the quantities of SNM within the control area. Within an MSR facility, this would include fresh fuel receipt and loading, waste streams that may contain SNM, irradiated fuel storage outside of the reactor core, and any irradiated fuel processing that may happen after SNM has been removed from the reactor. All of these process steps could rely on measurements of SNM quantities compared with documented inventories. Any discrepancies from predicted (i.e., book) inventories and measured inventories could be quantified as inventory differences, consistent with traditional MC&A guidance from the NRC (e.g., in NUREG-1065 Revision 2, NUREG-2159 Revision 1, and RG 5.29 Revision 2). Within the reactor system, additions and removals to the book inventory include depletion of the SNM (e.g., fission of 235 U), which complicates the use of physical inventories. SNM control, however, can also likely be effectively applied to detect theft of SNM throughout a liquid-fueled MSR facility. To complement these approaches, prior technical reports have identified that a diversion path analysis may be a useful, risk-informed, and performance-based tool to determine suitable elements of an MC&A approach for the reactor system within a liquid-fueled MSR facility.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Comparison of active interrogation methods for source location in a scattering and absorbing medium, consisting of PGNAA, and an AmBe quasi-forward biased directional source

Source location of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) encompassing 95% 235 U and 239 Pu is identified by utilizing a directional source from Patent No: US20190013109A1 using Prompt Gamma Neutron Activation Analysis (PGNAA) and neutron spectroscopy simulated with Monte-Carlo N-Particle transport 6.2 (MCNP). BC-408, HPGe, LaBr 3 detector arrays were used to identify the location of the SNM using total counts incident on each detector, and PGNAA photopeaks from HPGe and LaBr 3 detector arrays in a polyethylene shield. The conducted simulations varied the volume and location of the SNM in the MCNP input files to observe how the source location method behaved. PGNAA photopeaks used for source identification include 61 keV from fission, 2.223 MeV prompt gamma from hydrogen, 511 keV annihilation, and a single and double escape peaks from the prompt gamma interaction from hydrogen. The capabilities of each detector systems to acquire well resolved photopeaks with a 1% relative error or less, and total relative error for F4 and F8 tallies were less than 0.015% relative error. Source predictions of the SNM with uneven amounts of polyethylene shielding between the source and detectors was observed to overpredict and give invalid source location predictions. Source locations of the SNM with even amounts of polyethylene material between the source and each detector were found to be valid. With a 1 Ci 241 Am source activity, it was determined that 1630 s were needed to obtain the results for each detector system with the quasi-forward directional AmBe source. Coupling source and material identification together would increase acquisition time but would only require one system to determine.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
DOE OSTI2022

Evaluation of a positron-emission-tomography-based SiPM readout for compact segmented neutron imagers

Gamma-ray emission from special nuclear material (SNM) is relatively easy to shield from detection using modest amounts of high-Z material. In contrast, fast-neutrons are much more penetrating and can escape relatively thick high-Z shielding without losing significant energy. Furthermore, fast neutrons provide a clear and unambiguous signature of the presence of SNM with few competing natural background sources. The challenge of detecting fast neutrons is twofold. First, the neutron flux from SNM are only a fraction of the corresponding gamma-ray flux. Second, fast neutrons can be difficult to differentiate from gamma rays. The ability to discriminate gamma rays from neutrons, combined with a neutron imaging capability, can in some situations enable the localization of SNM neutron sources distinct from background. With the developments of pulse-shape-sensitive plastic scintillators that offer excellent gamma-ray/neutron discrimination, and arrays of silicon photomultipliers combined with highly scalable and fast positron-emission-tomography (PET) multi-channel readout systems, field-deployable neutron imagers suitable for SNM detection might now be within reach. In this paper, we present a characterization of the performance of a recently available commercial PET-scanner readout, including its sensitivity to pulse-shape differences between fast neutrons and gamma rays, energy and timing resolution. Here, we find that, while the pulse-shape discrimination is achievable with stilbene, further improvement of the readout is required to achieve it with the PSD-capable available plastic scintillators.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2023

Detecting and characterizing special nuclear material for nuclear nonproliferation applications

Abstract There is an urgent need for new, better instrumentation and techniques for detecting and characterizing special nuclear material (SNM), i.e., highly enriched uranium and plutonium. The development of improved instruments and techniques requires experiments performed with the SNM itself, which is of limited availability. This paper describes the findings of experiments performed at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center conducted using new instruments and techniques on unclassified, kg-quantity SNM objects. These experiments, performed in the framework of the Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Consortium for Monitoring, Technology, and Verification, focused on detecting, characterizing, and localizing SNM samples with masses ranging from 3.3 to 13.8 kg, including plutonium and highly enriched uranium using prototype detectors and techniques. The work demonstrates SNM detection and characterization using recently-developed prototype detection systems. Specifically, we present new results in passive detection and imaging of plutonium and uranium objects using gamma-ray and dual particle (fast neutron and gamma-ray) imaging. We also present a new analysis of the delayed neutron emissions during active interrogation of uranium using a neutron generator.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2024

Special Nuclear Material Hold-up Measurement

Facilities that process special nuclear material (SNM) generally have a variety of equipment, shielding, and nearby radiation sources, which can pose challenges when performing nondestructive analysis (NDA) within the facility, as shown in Figure 1. In this figure, the left image features two individuals performing a holdup measurement of a large duct at a posting, utilizing a detector probe attached to a yardstick to reduce some aspect of the measurement uncertainty. Note that the distance to the holdup within the pipe from the posting cannot be accounted for. The right image similarly features several individuals guiding a holdup measurement of a ducting pipe several meters overhead, by attaching a detector probe to a long handle and lining that up with a posting on the outside of the pipe. SNM processing begets SNM holdup, and this difficulty with accurate NDA can result in unaccounted accumulation of SNM holdup within a process or area. Normal SNM processing operations can accumulate holdup within filters, pumps, pipes, ducts, other equipment, and facility support systems, as demonstrated by Figure 2. It is important for deactivation and decommissioning (D&D) gloveboxes and their ancillary equipment, material accountability, criticality safety, facility operations, waste management, radiation safety, and security to accurately characterize the location, composition, and quantity of this holdup to minimize these associated risks and potential diversion pathways. Current NDA techniques for assay of holdup are expensive, time consuming, and have high uncertainty.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Ion Mobility – Mass Spectrometry Rapid Imaging of Special Nuclear Materials

Robot Nose will use new fast data throughput methods and experience with laser microfocus to dramatically improve the speed and spatial resolution of an established instrument, making it a useful tool for imaging special nuclear materials (SNM). Mass spectrometry imaging instruments have traditionally been too slow and mass alone is generally an insufficient measurement for organic analyses. This situation was markedly improved by Ionwerks Inc., who pioneered the combination of ion mobility with mass spectrometry imaging. In 2D mobility-mass plots, clearly identifiable trend lines can be selected and reduced to 1D mass spectra without isobaric interferences. This is a major advantage over other imaging mass spectrometers that generally cannot distinguish isobars without custom-built lasers or high voltage accelerators. Special nuclear material (SNM) contains substantial fissile isotopes, particularly 233U, 235U, and 239Pu. A complete forensic analysis of SNM therefore requires quantitative isotopic measurement – often through some form of mass spectrometry. SNM contaminated with inclusions such as pollen grains can help identify its prior locations. The project team is presently working on an approach to allow rapid screening of 1-3 cm diameter thin samples of such material.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2022

Traditional Forensic Examinations on Bulk Special Nuclear Material

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Laboratory at Quantico, Virginia is responsible for the forensic examination of radiological evidence and evidence contaminated with radioactive materials. Due to these unique hazards and the necessary specialized safety protocols, the FBI has developed a network of Partner Laboratories (PLs) across the United States of America to support conventional forensic examinations of radiological evidence and evidence contaminated with radioactive materials. In support of this, the FBI Laboratory has established the Hazardous Evidence Analysis Team (HEAT), a group of qualified forensic examiners, scientists, technicians, and photographers who can deploy to laboratories outside of the FBI Laboratory at Quantico, VA to perform conventional forensics on evidence containing/contaminated with hazardous materials. One of the FBI’s PLs, the United States Department of Energy’s Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), in Los Alamos, New Mexico, has unique facilities, personnel, and procedures to secure, safely handle, and process significant quantities of special nuclear material (SNM). While LANL’s procedures for working with SNM are well established, working with SNM under evidentiary controls is not. Close cooperation between LANL and FBI HEAT is required due to FBI policies on evidence handling, as well as the challenges associated with the exploitation and preservation of conventional forensics (fingerprints, trace evidence, and photography) on SNM evidence.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Deployment of a double scatter system for directional detection of background neutron radiation

The detection of special nuclear materials (SNM) requires the understanding of nuclear signatures that allow the discrimination against background. In particular, understanding neutron background characteristics such as count rates and energies and their correlations with environmental conditions and surroundings of measurement locations is important in enhancing SNM detection capabilities. The Mobile Imager of Neutrons for Emergency Responders (MINER) was deployed for 8 weeks in downtown San Francisco (CA) to study such neutron background characteristics in an urban environment. Of specific interest was the investigation of the impact of surrounding buildings on the neutron background count rates and to answer the question whether buildings act as absorber of neutrons or as sources via the so-called ship effect. MINER consists of 16 liquid scintillator detector elements and can be operated as a neutron spectrometer, as a neutron imager, or simply as a counter of fast neutrons. As expected, the neutron background rate was found to be inversely proportional to the atmospheric pressure. In the energy range where MINER is most sensitive, approximately 1–10 MeV, it was found that the shape of the detected background spectrum is similar to that of a detected fission spectrum, indicating the limited discrimination power of the neutron energy. The similarities between the detected background neutron spectrum and fission sources makes it difficult to discriminate SNM from background based solely on the energies observed. The images produced using maximum likelihood expectation maximization revealed that neutrons preferentially are coming from areas in the environment that have open sky, indicating that the surrounding buildings act as absorbers of neutrons rather than sources as expected by the ship effect. Here, the inherent properties of a neutron scatter camera limit the achievable image quality and the effective deployment to systematically map neutron background signatures due to the low count rate.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2023

Development of a compact fast-neutron spectrometer for nuclear emergency response applications

We have developed a Compact Fast Neutron Spectrometer (CFNS) for passive assay of special nuclear material (SNM) through the observation of fast neutrons. The CFNS consists of eight organic glass scintillators (OGS) coupled to silicon photomultipliers and a waveform digitizer, which are integrated within a human-portable box. The CFNS determines the neutron energy profile by spectrum unfolding using the Maximum-Likelihood Expectation Maximization method. The detector acquisition system was optimized to have a dynamic range of up to 10 MeV neutron energy. Bulk special nuclear material (SNM) measurements from the National Criticality Experiments Research Center were analyzed for SNM validation/examination. Additionally, the results show that the CFNS can be used to distinguish between fission and (α, n) neutron emitters, regardless of intervening material type (Cu and polyethylene) and thickness, by taking the ratio of neutron counts at different regions in the unfolded energy spectrum. Additionally, by fitting an exponential curve to the unfolded energy spectrum of PuO 2 and Pu neutron emitters, the CFNS showed the ability of distinguishing between pure Pu oxide, pure Pu metal and mixed oxide-metal configurations.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2021

Bayesian inference of the incompressibility, skewness and kurtosis of nuclear matter from empirical pressures in relativistic heavy-ion collisions

Within the Bayesian statistical framework we infer the incompressibility K 0 , skewness J 0 and kurtosis Z 0 parameters of symmetric nuclear matter (SNM) at its saturation density ρ 0 using the constraining bands on the pressure in cold SNM in the density range of 1.3ρ 0 to 4.5ρ 0 from transport model analyses of kaon production and nuclear collective flow in relativistic heavy-ion collisions. As the default option assuming the K 0 , J 0 and Z 0 have Gaussian prior probability distribution functions (PDFs) with the means and variances of 235±30, -200±200 and -146±1728 MeV, their posterior most probable values are narrowed down to 192$^{+12}_{-16}$ MeV, -180$^{+100}_{-110}$ MeV and ${\mathrm{200}}_{-250}^{+250}$ at 68% confidence level, respectively. The results are largely independent of the prior PDFs of J 0 and Z 0 used. However, if one adopts the strong belief that the incompressibility K 0 has a uniform prior PDF within its absolute boundary of 220–260 MeV as one can find easily in the literature, the posterior most probable values of K 0 , J 0 and Z 0 shift to ${K}_{0}=22{0}_{-0}^{+6}$ MeV, ${J}_{0}=-39{0}_{-70}^{+60}$ MeV and ${Z}_{0}=60{0}_{-200}^{+200}$ MeV, respectively. While the posterior PDFs of the SNM EOS parameters depend somewhat on the prior PDF of K 0 used, the results from using different prior PDFs are qualitatively consistent. The uncertainties of all three parameters are significantly reduced especially for the J 0 and Z 0 parameters compared to their current values.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Intrinsic correlations among characteristics of neutron-rich matter imposed by the unbound nature of pure neutron matter

The unbound nature of pure neutron matter (PNM) requires intrinsic correlations between the symmetric nuclear matter (SNM) EOS parameters (incompressibility K 0 , skewness J 0 and kurtosis I 0 ) and those (slope L, curvature K sym and skewness J sym ) characterizing the symmetry energy independent of any nuclear many-body theory. We investigate these intrinsic correlations and their applications in better constraining the poorly known high-density behavior of nuclear symmetry energy. Several novel correlations connecting the characteristics of SNM EOS with those of nuclear symmetry energy are found. In particular, at the lowest-order of approximations, the bulk parts of the slope L, curvature K sym and skewness J sym of the symmetry energy are found to be L ≈ K 0 /3, K sym ≈ LJ 0 /2K 0 and J sym ≈ I 0 L/3K 0 , respectively. High-order corrections to these simple relations can be written in terms of the small ratios of high-order EOS parameters. The resulting intrinsic correlations among some of the EOS parameters reproduce very nicely their relations predicted by various microscopic nuclear many-body theories and phenomenological models constrained by available data of terrestrial experiments and astrophysical observations in the literature. Here, the unbound nature of PNM is fundamental and the required intrinsic correlations among the EOS parameters characterizing both the SNM EOS and symmetry energy are universal. These intrinsic correlations provide a novel and model-independent tool not only for consistency checks but also for investigating the poorly known high-density properties of neutron-rich matter by using those with smaller uncertainties.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗