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Determination of a Generic Human Error Probability Distribution, Part 1: A Dynamic Formulation of SPAR-H

In almost all major nuclear power plants (NPP) events include a significant human error component. As an example, in Fukushima Daiichi (2011) nuclear meltdown, the human actions related to the high-pressure injection cooling strongly affected accident evolution. Furthermore, in the Three Mile Island accident (1979) (which was initiated by a stuck open valve and thus was triggered a loss of coolant accident) the unit operators made decisions based upon false assumptions that contributed negatively to the accident. Given these premises, the ability to accurately model human interactions with plant evolution and, in particular, dynamically calculate human error probability (HEP) plays a major role in a probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). Human reliability analysis (HRA) identifies and models the causes of human errors, and quantifies HEP by applying different methodologies. HRA methods identify errors and reflect on the understanding of error-prone people and systems. There are a number of HRA methods available that assist in identifying the vulnerabilities in the system and provide guidance in determining the HEP. HEP is the probability of a human failure event (HFE), and quantification of HEPs under various situations is utilized in PRA of large complex systems. One of the more prominent HRA methods is the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk-Human Reliability Analysis (SPAR-H) method that was developed to estimate HEPs for the use in the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) PRA models employed in U.S. NPPs. SPAR-H is implemented in U.S. NPPs by regulators at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to determine the HEP based on expert estimation through the use of calculation worksheets. In SPAR-H, the nominal HEPs (NHEPs) are multiplied by performance shaping factors (PSF) multiplier values to obtain the overall error probability. PSFs encompass the human components, individual characteristics, their environment, and aspects of the task. With PSFs, the goal is to capture all factors that can affect human performance. In SPAR-H there are eight PSFs used, each having respective levels corresponding to multipliers: Available Time, Stress/Stressors, Complexity, Experience/Training, Procedures, Ergonomics/Human Machine Interface, Fitness for Duty, and Work Processes. The PSF multipliers indicate enhanced, nominal, or degraded human performance. The SPAR-H method estimates the HEP through multiplying a NHEP with PSFs. Hence, SPAR-H is a traditional HRA method that assesses human performance at a fixed, or static, point in time. In a dynamic HRA framework, human performance is assessed on a continuous time basis. SPAR-H can be used within a dynamic PRA framework through the use of simulation and stochastic models. The goal of dynamic HRA is to build a more realistic model of the human-system interaction to enhance calculation of reliability, risk and safety analysis. The progression of events in dynamic SPAR-H considers that some PSFs may experience gradual change, while other change can be sudden due to individualistic differences or rapid plant status changes. The PSF changes are caused by contextual changes in the scenario. For example, as more time passes, the realization that a task should be completed sooner may cause the operator more stress. In another example, a sudden relay of information about sickness of a family member may alter the operator's general stress level and fitness for duty. Each PSF has a different dynamic nature; PSFs like stress and complexity change more quickly over the course of a task than experience and training. While the experience of an operator changes over the course of attaining the objective, the amount that this added experience changes the HEP is very minimal. In contrast, the stress, complexity, and procedures PSFs may change quite a bit over the course of task completion.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Determination of a Generic Human Error Probability Distribution, Part 2: A Dynamic SPAR-H Example Application

Humans are an integral part of a nuclear power plant (NPP) from its construction, to its everyday maintenance and operation. In the nuclear industry there are many approaches to quantifying component reliability, which is called probability risk assessment (PRA). In PRA there are two considerations given to the quantification, static and dynamic. Static is quantified before or after an operation; and dynamic is time dependent, in that the probability changes as real time data are provided. In PRA, the importance of the components is calculated, but what of the importance of the human component? There are several methods for human reliability analysis (HRA), which include but are not limited to: THERP, ATHEANA, CREAM, SPAR-H, ASEP, and SLIM. Each of these methods aims to provide a more accurate and objective human error probability (HEP) quantification. Of the methods listed above, ASEP, THERP, and SPAR-H are all inextricably linked. The Standardized Plant Analysis Risk-Human Reliability Analysis (SPAR-H) method was generated to better generalize the Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) and Accident Sequence Precursor (ASEP). THERP is mapped to specific scenario templates, and ASEP is a simplified screening method, while SPAR-H employs generalizations to describe the spectrum of human behavior while maintaining the same theoretical underpinnings. SPAR-H is a well-known and accepted HRA method that uses performance shaping factors (PSFs) to classify inputs to the human component. PSFs capture a wide variety of input data, including plant status, crew dynamics, task description, and psychological aspects of the human operator. Current efforts have been focused to further generalize SPAR-H in to a dynamic framework. These methods can fit into dynamic NPP simulations such as RAVEN / RELAP-7. In order to do this, a dynamic methodology is applied to model the human as would be applied to the components. This method is applied in part one in the accompanying paper.

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SPAR-H Step-by-Step Guidance

Step-by-step guidance was developed recently at Idaho National Laboratory for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission on the use of the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk-Human Reliability Analysis (SPAR-H) method for quantifying Human Failure Events (HFEs). This work was done to address SPAR-H user needs, specifically requests for additional guidance on the proper application of various aspects of the methodology. This paper overviews the steps of the SPAR-H analysis process and highlights some of the most important insights gained during the development of the step-by-step directions. This supplemental guidance for analysts is applicable when plant-specific information is available, and goes beyond the general guidance provided in existing SPAR-H documentation. The steps highlighted in this paper are: Step-1, Categorizing the HFE as Diagnosis and/or Action; Step-2, Rate the Performance Shaping Factors; Step-3, Calculate PSF-Modified HEP; Step-4, Accounting for Dependence, and; Step-5, Minimum Value Cutoff.

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Guidance on Dependence Assessment in SPAR-H

As part of the effort to develop the SPAR-H user guidance, particular attention was paid to the assessment of dependence in order to address user questions about proper application of dependence. This paper presents a discussion of dependence from a psychological perspective and provides guidance on applying this information during the qualitative analysis of dependence to ensure more realistic and appropriate dependence assessments with the SPAR-H method. While this guidance was developed with SPAR-H in mind, it may be informative to other human reliability analysis methods that also use a THERP-based dependence approach, particularly if applied at the human failure event level.

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MODIFICATION OF THE SPAR-H METHOD TO SUPPORT HRA FOR LEVEL 2 PSA

Currently, available Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) methods were generally developed to support Level 1 Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) models. There has been an increased emphasis placed on Level 2 PSA in recent years; however, the currently used HRA methods are not ideal for this application, including the SPAR-H method. Challenges that will likely be present during a severe accident such as degraded or hazardous operating conditions, shift in control from the main control room to the technical support center, unavailability of instrumentation, and others are not routinely considered for Level 1 HRA analysis. These factors combine to create a much more uncertain condition to be accounted for in the HRA analysis. While the SPAR-H shaping factors were established to support Level 1 HRA, previous studies have shown it may be used for Level 2 HRA analysis as well. The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) and Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in a joint project are investigating modifications to the SPAR-H method to create more consistency in applying the performance shaping factors used in the method for Level 2 analysis.

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SIMULATED HUMAN ERROR PROBABILITY AND ITS APPLICATION TO DYNAMIC HUMAN FAILURE EVENTS

Abstract Objectives: Human reliability analysis (HRA) methods typically analyze human failure events (HFEs) at the overall task level. For dynamic HRA, it is important to model human activities at the subtask level. There exists a disconnect between dynamic subtask level and static task level that presents issues when modeling dynamic scenarios. For example, the SPAR-H method is typically used to calculate the human error probability (HEP) at the task level. As demonstrated in this paper, quantification in SPAR-H does not translate to the subtask level. Methods: Two different discrete distributions were generated for each SPAR-H Performance Shaping Factor (PSF) to define the frequency of PSF levels. The first distribution was a uniform, or uninformed distribution that assumed the frequency of each PSF level was equally likely. The second non-continuous distribution took the frequency of PSF level as identified from an assessment of the HERA database. These two different approaches were created to identify the resulting distribution of the HEP. The resulting HEP that appears closer to the known distribution, a log-normal centered on 1E-3, is the more desirable. Each approach then has median, average and maximum HFE calculations applied. To calculate these three values, three events, A, B and C are generated from the PSF level frequencies comprised of subtasks. The median HFE selects the median PSF level from each PSF and calculates HEP. The average HFE takes the mean PSF level, and the maximum takes the maximum PSF level. The same data set of subtask HEPs yields starkly different HEPs when aggregated to the HFE level in SPAR-H. Results: Assuming that each PSF level in each HFE is equally likely creates an unrealistic distribution of the HEP that is centered at 1. Next the observed frequency of PSF levels was applied with the resulting HEP behaving log-normally with a majority of the values under 2.5% HEP. The median, average and maximum HFE calculations did yield different answers for the HFE. The HFE maximum grossly over estimates the HFE, while the HFE distribution occurs less than HFE median, and greater than HFE average. Conclusions: Dynamic task modeling can be perused through the framework of SPAR-H. Identification of distributions associated with each PSF needs to be defined, and may change depending upon the scenario. However it is very unlikely that each PSF level is equally likely as the resulting HEP distribution is strongly centered at 100%, which is unrealistic. Other distributions may need to be identified for PSFs, to facilitate the transition to dynamic task modeling. Additionally discrete distributions need to be exchanged for continuous so that simulations for the HFE can further advance. This paper provides a method to explore dynamic subtask to task translation and provides examples of the process using the SPAR-H method.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Multi-Unit Considerations for Human Reliability Analysis

This paper uses the insights from the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk-Human Reliability Analysis (SPAR-H) methodology to help identify human actions currently modeled in the single unit PSA that may need to be modified to account for additional challenges imposed by a multi-unit accident as well as identify possible new human actions that might be modeled to more accurately characterize multi-unit risk. In identifying these potential human action impacts, the use of the SPAR-H strategy to include both errors in diagnosis and errors in action is considered as well as identifying characteristics of a multi-unit accident scenario that may impact the selection of the performance shaping factors (PSFs) used in SPAR-H. The lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi reactor accident will be addressed to further help identify areas where improved modeling may be required. While these multi-unit impacts may require modifications to a Level 1 PSA model, it is expected to have much more importance for Level 2 modeling. There is little currently written specifically about multi-unit HRA issues. A review of related published research will be presented. While this paper cannot answer all issues related to multi-unit HRA, it will hopefully serve as a starting point to generate discussion and spark additional ideas towards the proper treatment of HRA in a multi-unit PSA.

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The HUNTER Dynamic Human Reliability Analysis Tool: Development of a Module for Performance Shaping Factors

Human Unimodel for Nuclear Technology to Enhance Reliability (HUNTER) is a framework to support dynamic human reliability analysis (HRA) in communication with a variety of methods and tools. In this paper, how we have developed one of the HUNTER modules, the individual module for evaluating performance shaping factors (PSFs), is introduced. The PSF refers to any factor that influences human performance such as workload or complexity. It has been used for highlighting human errors and adjusting the error probabilities in the existing HRA. We consider the eight PSFs suggested in the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk-HRA (SPAR-H) method, which is the representative HRA method widely used in the nuclear field. To support our dynamic modeling using the eight SPAR-H PSFs, we reviewed human performance literature and developed data-based mathematical models to rate and quantify PSFs in the context of dynamic HRA. We also design the individual module composed of the two functions: 1) the PSF qualification function that automatically or manually evaluates a PSF level, and 2) the PSF quantification function that dynamically or statically determines the PSF multiplier values and integrate them to adjust human error probabilities (HEPs). How each function works with the SPAR-H PSFs and how the PSFs adjust the HEPs are investigated through literature and discussed in this paper.

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The HUNTER Dynamic Human Reliability Analysis Tool: Development of a Module for Performance Shaping Factors

The Human Unimodel for Nuclear Technology to Enhance Reliability (HUNTER) is a framework to support dynamic human reliability analysis (HRA) in communication with a variety of methods and tools. This paper explores how we developed one of the HUNTER modules: namely, the Individual module for evaluating performance shaping factors (PSFs). A PSF is any factor that influences human performance (e.g., workload or complexity). In the existing HRA, they are used to highlight human errors and adjust error probabilities. We consider the eight PSFs suggested in the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk-HRA (SPAR-H) method, a representative HRA method widely used in the nuclear field. To support our dynamic modeling using the eight SPAR-H PSFs, we reviewed the human performance literature and developed data-based mathematical models to rate and quantify PSFs in the context of dynamic HRA. We also designed the Individual module to consist of two functions: (1) the PSF qualification function for automatically or manually evaluating PSF levels, and (2) the PSF quantification function for dynamically or statically determining PSF multiplier values and integrating them to adjust human error probabilities (HEPs). How each function works in regard to the SPAR-H PSFs, and how the PSFs serve to adjust the HEPs, were investigated via literature review and are discussed in this paper.

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A Bayesian method for using simulator data to enhance human error probabilities assigned by existing HRA methods

In the past several years, several international organizations have begun to collect data on human performance in nuclear power plant simulators. The data collected provide a valuable opportunity to improve human reliability analysis (HRA), but these improvements will not be realized without implementation of Bayesian methods. Bayesian methods are widely used to incorporate sparse data into models in many parts of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), but Bayesian methods have not been adopted by the HRA community. In this paper, we provide a Bayesian methodology to formally use simulator data to refine the human error probabilities (HEPs) assigned by existing HRA methods. We demonstrate the methodology with a case study, wherein we use simulator data from the Halden Reactor Project to update the probability assignments from the SPAR-H method. The case study demonstrates the ability to use performance data, even sparse data, to improve existing HRA methods. Furthermore, this paper also serves as a demonstration of the value of Bayesian methods to improve the technical basis of HRA.

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An Approach to Dependence Assessment in Human Reliability Analysis: Application of Lag and Linger Effects

Dependence assessment refers to an approach used in human reliability analysis (HRA) to adjust a human error probability (HEP) for the following action by considering the impact of the preceding action. It has been known to significantly affect the overall results of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). If the dependence assessment is not adequate, the result could be unconvincing for explaining the operator failures in the context of PSA. To date, several methods and some recent research have identified suggestions for treating dependence issues in HRA; however, these are still exclusively based on the intrinsic approach of the Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP), an HRA method. THERP inevitably has a challenge with the subjectivity of expert evaluation as well as the requirement for PSA and HRA expertise with resource-intensive and time-consuming processes. This paper suggests an approach to dependence assessment that could not only minimize the influence of expert judgment, but also saves time to perform the analysis with reasonable manpower. It modifies existing HRA methods with considering lag and linger effects to apply dependence effects for them. Based on a representative HRA method, i.e., Standardized Plant Analysis Risk - HRA (SPAR-H), guidance for how to apply lag and linger effects for the HRA method is suggested. Then, an investigation is carried out to compare quantification results of the revised HRA method with that of the original approach based on experimental data.

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A Multi-Methods Approach to HRA and Human Performance Modeling: A Field Assessment

The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) is a research reactor at the Idaho National Laboratory is primarily designed and used to test materials to be used in other, larger-scale and prototype reactors. The reactor offers various specialized systems and allows certain experiments to be run at their own temperature and pressure. The ATR Canal temporarily stores completed experiments and used fuel. It also has facilities to conduct underwater operations such as experiment examination or removal. In reviewing the ATR safety basis, a number of concerns were identified involving the ATR canal. A brief study identified ergonomic issues involving the manual handling of fuel elements in the canal that may increase the probability of human error and possible unwanted acute physical outcomes to the operator. In response to this concern, that refined the previous HRA scoping analysis by determining the probability of the inadvertent exposure of a fuel element to the air during fuel movement and inspection was conducted. The HRA analysis employed the SPAR-H method and was supplemented by information gained from a detailed analysis of the fuel inspection and transfer tasks. This latter analysis included ergonomics, work cycles, task duration, and workload imposed by tool and workplace characteristics, personal protective clothing, and operational practices that have the potential to increase physical and mental workload. Part of this analysis consisted of NASA-TLX analyses, combined with operational sequence analysis, computational human performance analysis (CHPA), and 3D graphical modeling to determine task failures and precursors to such failures that have safety implications. Experience in applying multiple analysis techniques in support of HRA methods is discussed.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Development of Simplified Probabilistic Risk Assessment Model for Seismic Initiating Event

ABSTRACT This paper discusses a simplified method to evaluate seismic risk using a methodology built on dividing the seismic intensity spectrum into multiple discrete bins. The seismic probabilistic risk assessment model uses Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) full power Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) model as the starting point for development. The seismic PRA models are integrated with their respective internal events at-power SPAR model. This is accomplished by combining the modified system fault trees from the full power SPAR model with seismic event tree logic. The peak ground acceleration is divided into five bins. The g-value for each bin is estimated using the geometric mean of lower and upper values of that particular bin and the associated frequency for each bin is estimated by taking the difference between upper and lower values of that bin. The component’s fragilities are calculated for each bin using the plant data, if available, or generic values of median peak ground acceleration and uncertainty values for the components. For human reliability analysis (HRA), the SPAR HRA (SPAR-H) method is used which requires the analysts to complete relatively straight forward worksheets that include the performance shaping factors (PSFs). The results are then used to estimate human error probabilities (HEPs) of interest. This work is expected to improve the NRC’s ability to include seismic hazards in risk assessments for operational events in support of the reactor oversight program (e.g., significance determination process).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Defining Human Failure Events for Petroleum Risk Analysis

In this paper, an identification and description of barriers and human failure events (HFEs) for human reliability analysis (HRA) is performed. The barriers, called target systems, are identified from risk significant accident scenarios represented as defined situations of hazard and accident (DSHAs). This report serves as the foundation for further work to develop petroleum HFEs compatible with the SPAR-H method and intended for reuse in future HRAs.

02 PETROLEUM↗

INVESTIGATION OF HUMAN RELIABILITY ANALYSIS METHODS FOR ANALYZING PRE-INITIATORS

As a type of human actions defined in human reliability analysis (HRA), pre-initiator refers to the human actions that may lead to the unavailability of systems, typically committed during maintenance, test, or calibration. This paper investigates representative HRA methods used for analyzing pre-initiators. The HRA methods are Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP), Korean Standard HRA (K-HRA) and Standard Plant Risk HRA (SPAR-H). In this paper, characteristics of each HRA method are compared for qualitative and quantification aspects. Two pre-initiators, i.e., a calibration task and a valve restoration task, are analyzed using the HRA methods to compare human error probabilities. Then, insights from the analysis and additional research requirements are discussed in this paper.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

INVESTIGATION OF HUMAN RELIABILITY ANALYSIS METHODS FOR ANALYZING PRE-INITIATORS

As a type of human actions defined in human reliability analysis (HRA), pre-initiator refers to the human actions that may lead to the unavailability of systems, typically committed during maintenance, test, or calibration. This paper investigates representative HRA methods used for analyzing pre-initiators. The HRA methods are Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP), Korean Standard HRA (K-HRA) and Standard Plant Risk HRA (SPAR-H). In this paper, characteristics of each HRA method are compared for qualitative and quantification aspects. Two pre-initiators, i.e., a calibration task and a valve restoration task, are analyzed using the HRA methods to compare human error probabilities. Then, insights from the analysis and additional research requirements are discussed in this paper.

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EVALUATION OF HRA METHODOLOGIES FOR APPLICATION IN SDP WORK

This study critically evaluates human reliability analysis (HRA) methodologies applicable to regulatory probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) model, with a particular focus on their role in supporting the significance determination process (SDP) in nuclear safety assessment. Firstly, three widely utilized HRA methods – IDHEAS-ECA, SPAR-H, and ASEP/THERP – were qualitatively and quantitatively assessed. Qualitative assessments were conducted using attributes from the NEA/CSNI/R(2015)1 report, while quantitative evaluations employed regression and correlation analyses to compare predicted human error probabilities (HEPs) against empirical data. Results reveal distinct strengths, for example, IDHEAS-ECA’s robust predictive accuracy and K-HRA’s alignment with operational practices. In addition, dependency analysis and recovery analysis were critically evaluated. For dependency analysis, the methods’ handling of inter-task dependencies and their impact on HEPs were examined, while recovery analysis highlighted strategies for mitigating failure events. Furthermore, strategies were proposed to evaluate performance-shaping factors under conditions of reduced human performance, such as stress, fatigue, or cognitive overload, addressing specific challenges faced in SDP evaluations. Human errors from KINS’s operational performance information system event reports were evaluated as a case study. This study identifies gaps and provides actionable insights to ensure their validity and applicability in SDP HRA applications. This paper is a part of research conducted by KINS, and it should be noted that this result does not represent the regulatory position of KINS.

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