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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1992

Spacecraft dynamics characterization and control system failure detection. Volume 3: Control system failure monitoring

We discuss the application of Generalized Parity Relations to two experimental flexible space structures, the NASA Langley Mini-Mast and Marshall Space Flight Center ACES mast. We concentrate on the generation of residuals and make no attempt to implement the Decision Function. It should be clear from the examples that are presented whether it would be possible to detect the failure of a specific component. We derive the equations from Generalized Parity Relations. Two special cases are treated: namely, Single Sensor Parity Relations (SSPR) and Double Sensor Parity Relations (DSPR). Generalized Parity Relations for actuators are also derived. The NASA Langley Mini-Mast and the application of SSPR and DSPR to a set of displacement sensors located at the tip of the Mini-Mast are discussed. The performance of a reduced order model that includes the first five models of the mast is compared to a set of parity relations that was identified on a set of input-output data. Both time domain and frequency domain comparisons are made. The effect of the sampling period and model order on the performance of the Residual Generators are also discussed. Failure detection experiments where the sensor set consisted of two gyros and an accelerometer are presented. The effects of model order and sampling frequency are again illustrated. The detection of actuator failures is discussed. We use Generalized Parity Relations to monitor control system component failures on the ACES mast. An overview is given of the Failure Detection Filter and experimental results are discussed. Conclusions and directions for future research are given.

Vanschalkwyk, Christiaan M.↗
DOE OSTI2025

Identification of Important Phenomena for Light Water Reactors During Heat Transport System Failure Events in Integrated Energy Systems

This work adapts historical literature and existing phenomena identification and ranking tables (PIRT) to be applicable to a novel nuclear power plant (NPP) and chemical or thermal process integrated energy system (IES), particularly focusing on the process heat and heat transport system failure events that are not a concern during normal NPP operation but become vital when an IES is considered. Nuclear energy has been suggested to go beyond base-load applications and be used for hydrogen co-generation systems, amongst other IESs. Prior to the implementation of nuclear IESs, sufficient analysis must be performed on accident events to ensure public safety. The events considered were deemed important because of their potential to damage systems, structures, and components (SSCs). Process thermal events of concern include loss of heat load and temperature transient events. Loss of heat load events were characterized as having high importance and being well understood. Temperature transient events may be further categorized by the cyclic loading and harmonics phenomena. Cyclic loading issues were classified as medium to high importance with knowledge gaps existing regarding fatigue and low power operation, while harmonics phenomena were classified as low importance and are well understood. Heat transport system failure events of concern include intermediate and process heat exchanger failures, mass addition to reactor coolant, ingress of material from thermal manifold/energy storage, and loss of intermediate fluid. Furthermore, these events tended to be of high or medium importance, with some knowledge gaps needing to be filled for individual reactor systems due to unique designs.

Integrated Energy System (IES)↗
NASA NTRS1996

Ampoule Failure System

An ampoule failure system for use in material processing furnaces comprising a containment cartridge and an ampoule failure sensor. The containment cartridge contains an ampoule of toxic material therein and is positioned within a furnace for processing. An ampoule failure probe is positioned in the containment cartridge adjacent the ampoule for detecting a potential harmful release of toxic material therefrom during processing. The failure probe is spaced a predetermined distance from the ampoule and is chemically chosen so as to undergo a timely chemical reaction with the toxic material upon the harmful release thereof. The ampoule failure system further comprises a data acquisition system which is positioned externally of the furnace and is electrically connected to the ampoule failure probe so as to form a communicating electrical circuit. The data acquisition system includes an automatic shutdown device for shutting down the furnace upon the harmful release of toxic material. It also includes a resistance measuring device for measuring the resistance of the failure probe during processing. The chemical reaction causes a step increase in resistance of the failure probe whereupon the automatic shutdown device will responsively shut down the furnace.

Watring, Dale A.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Spacecraft dynamics characterization and control system failure detection, volume 1

The work under this grant has been directed to two aspects of the control of flexible spacecraft: (1) the modeling of deployed or erected structures including nonlinear joint characteristics; and (2) the detection and isolation of failures of the components of control systems for large space structures. The motivation for the first of these research tasks is the fact that very large assemblies in space will have to be built or deployed in situ. A likely scenario is, in fact, a combination of these wherein modules which are folded for transportation into orbit are erected to their final configuration and then jointed with other such erected modules to form the full assembly. Any such erectable modules will have joints. It remains to be seen whether or not joints designed for operational assemblies will have nonlinear properties, but it seems prudent to develop a methodology for dealing with that possibility. The motivation for the second of these research tasks is the fact that we foresee large assemblies in space which will require active control to damp vibrations and/or hold a desired shape. Lightweight structures will be very flexible, with many elastic modes having very low frequencies. In order to control these modes well, the control system will likely require many sensors and many actuators, probably distributed over much of the structure. The combination of a large number of control system components with long operational periods virtually guarantees that these systems will suffer control system component failures during operation. The control system must be designed to tolerate failures of some sensors and actuators, and still be able to continue to perform its function.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1977

The effects of participatory mode and task workload on the detection of dynamic system failures

The ability of operators to detect step changes in the dynamics of control systems is investigated as a joint function of, (1) participatory mode: whether subjects are actively controlling those dynamics or are monitoring an autopilot controlling them, and (2) concurrent task workload. A theoretical analysis of detection in the two modes identifies factors that will favor detection in either mode. Three subjects detected system failures in either an autopilot or manual controlling mode, under single-task conditions and concurrently with a subcritical tracking task. Latency and accuracy of detection were assessed and related through a speed accuracy tradeoff representation. It was concluded that failure detection performance was better during manual control than during autopilot control, and that the extent of this superiority was enhanced as dual-task load increased. Ensemble averaging and multiple regression techniques were then employed to investigate the cues utilized by the subjects in making their detection decisions.

Wickens, C. D.↗
NASA NTRS1995

Electronic systems failures and anomalies attributed to electromagnetic interference

The effects of electromagnetic interference can be very detrimental to electronic systems utilized in space missions. Assuring that subsystems and systems are electrically compatible is an important engineering function necessary to assure mission success. This reference publication will acquaint the reader with spacecraft electronic systems failures and anomalies caused by electromagnetic interference and will show the importance of electromagnetic compatibility activities in conjunction with space flight programs. It is also hoped that the report will illustrate that evolving electronic systems are increasingly sensitive to electromagnetic interference and that NASA personnel must continue to diligently pursue electromagnetic compatibility on space flight systems.

Leach, R. D.↗
NASA NTRS1991

Control system failure monitoring using generalized parity relations

Many applications require that a control system must be tolerant to the failure of its components. This is especially true for large space-based systems that must work unattended and with long periods between maintenance. Fault tolerance can be obtained by detecting the failure of the control system component, determining which component has failed, and reconfiguring the system so that the failed component is isolated from the controller. Component failure detection experiments that were conducted on an experimental space structure, the NASA Langley Mini-Mast are presented. Two methodologies for failure detection and isolation (FDI) exist that do not require the specification of failure modes and are applicable to both actuators and sensors. These methods are known as the Failure Detection Filter and the method of Generalized Parity Relations. The latter method was applied to three different sensor types on the Mini-Mast. Failures were simulated in input-output data that were recorded during operation of the Mini-Mast. Both single and double sensor parity relations were tested and the effect of several design parameters on the performance of these relations is discussed. The detection of actuator failures is also treated. It is shown that in all the cases it is possible to identify the parity relations directly from input-output data. Frequency domain analysis is used to explain the behavior of the parity relations.

Vanschalkwyk, Christiaan Mauritz↗
NASA NTRS1976

Space shuttle orbital maneuvering system failure detection and identification software requirements (uncontrolled)

Candidate designs and their software implementation are presented for the Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) Failure Detection and Identification (FDI) algorithms in the Redundance Management (RM) module of the Space Shuttle Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) software. The OMS engine FDI algorithm monitors OMS engine thrust performance, and the OMS actuator FDI algorithm monitors OMS gimbal actuator performance. The software functional requirements of the algorithms are described along with the objective of each algorithm. A list of the assumptions which have governed its design, input/output requirements, a functional description of the algorithm (including a functional block diagram), and input interface requirements are given. The HAL (the language of the space shuttle flight computer) software formulation of the algorithms is considered including structured flowcharts of the procedures, estimates of flight computer core storage and CPU time, and processing requirements. A glossary of the symbols used to define the software requirements and formulations is included.

Damario, L. A.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Spacecraft dynamics characterization and control system failure detection

Two important aspects of the control of large space structures are studied: the modeling of deployed or erected structures including nonlinear joint characteristics; and the detection and isolation of failures of the components of control systems for large space structures. The emphasis in the first task is on efficient representation of the dynamics of large and complex structures having a great many joints. The initial emphasis in the second task is on experimental evaluation of FDI methodologies using ground-based facilities in place at NASA Langley Research Center and Marshall Space Flight Center. The progress to date on both research tasks is summarized.

Vandervelde, Wallace E.↗
NASA NTRS1990

The Hubble Space Telescope optical systems failure report

The findings of the Hubble Space Telescope Optical Systems Board of Investigation are reported. The Board was formed to determine the cause of the flaw in the telescope, how it occurred, and why it was not detected before launch. The Board conducted its investigation to include interviews with personnel involved in the fabrication and test of the telescope, review of documentation, and analysis and test of the equipment used in the fabrication of the telescope's mirrors. The investigation proved that the primary mirror was made in the wrong shape (a 0.4-wave rms wavefront error at 632.8 nm). The primary mirror was manufactured by the Perkin-Elmer Corporation (Hughes Danbury Optical Systems, Inc.). The critical optics used as a template in shaping the mirror, the reflective null corrector (RNC), consisted of two small mirrors and a lens. This unit had been preserved by the manufacturer exactly as it was during the manufacture of the mirror. When the Board measured the RNC, the lens was incorrectly spaced from the mirrors. Calculations of the effect of such displacement on the primary mirror show that the measured amount, 1.3 mm, accounts in detail for the amount and character of the observed image blurring. No verification of the reflective null corrector's dimensions was carried out by Perkin-Elmer after the original assembly. There were, however, clear indications of the problem from auxiliary optical tests made at the time. A special optical unit called an inverse null corrector, designed to mimic the reflection from a perfect primary mirror, was built and used to align the apparatus; when so used, it clearly showed the error in the reflective null corrector. A second null corrector was used to measure the vertex radius of the finished primary mirror. It, too, clearly showed the error in the primary mirror. Both indicators of error were discounted at the time as being themselves flawed. The Perkin-Elmer plan for fabricating the primary mirror placed complete reliance on the reflective null corrector as the only test to be used in both manufacturing and verifying the mirror's surface with the required precision. This methodology should have alerted NASA management to the fragility of the process and the possibility of gross error. Such errors had been seen in other telescope programs, yet no independent tests were planned, although some simple tests to protect against major error were considered and rejected. During the critical time period, there was great concern about cost and schedule, which further inhibited consideration of independent tests.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1972

Space tug propulsion system failure mode, effects and criticality analysis

For purposes of the study, the propulsion system was considered as consisting of the following: (1) main engine system, (2) auxiliary propulsion system, (3) pneumatic system, (4) hydrogen feed, fill, drain and vent system, (5) oxygen feed, fill, drain and vent system, and (6) helium reentry purge system. Each component was critically examined to identify possible failure modes and the subsequent effect on mission success. Each space tug mission consists of three phases: launch to separation from shuttle, separation to redocking, and redocking to landing. The analysis considered the results of failure of a component during each phase of the mission. After the failure modes of each component were tabulated, those components whose failure would result in possible or certain loss of mission or inability to return the Tug to ground were identified as critical components and a criticality number determined for each. The criticality number of a component denotes the number of mission failures in one million missions due to the loss of that component. A total of 68 components were identified as critical with criticality numbers ranging from 1 to 2990.

Boyd, J. W.↗
NASA NTRS2000

Lubrication System Failure Baseline Testing on an Aerospace Quality Gear Mesh

Aerospace drive systems are required to survive a loss-of-lubrication test for qualification. In many cases emergency lubrication systems need to be designed and utilized to permit the drive system to pass this difficult requirement. The weight of emergency systems can adversely affect the mission capabilities of the aircraft. The possibility to reduce the emergency system weight through the use of mist lubrication will be described. Mist lubrication involves the delivery of a minute amount of an organic liquid as a vapor or fine mist in flowing compressed air to rubbing surfaces. At the rubbing surface, the vapor or mist reacts to form a solid lubricating film. The aim of this study was to establish a baseline for gear behavior under oil depleted conditions. A reactive vapor-mist lubrication method is described and proposed as a candidate emergency lubrication system.

Handschuh, Robert F.↗