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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

The MPACT 2020 Milestone: Safeguards and Security by Design of Future Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities.

The Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) campaign, within the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy, has developed a Virtual Facility Distributed Test Bed for safeguards and security design for future nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The purpose of the Virtual Test Bed is to bring together experimental and modeling capabilities across the U.S. national laboratory and university complex to provide a one-stop-shop for advanced Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD). Experimental testing alone of safeguards and security technologies would be cost prohibitive, but testbeds and laboratory processing facilities with safeguards measurement opportunities, coupled with modeling and simulation, provide the ability to generate modern, efficient safeguards and security systems for new facilities. This Virtual Test Bed concept has been demonstrated using a generic electrochemical reprocessing facility as an example, but the concept can be extended to other facilities. While much of the recent work in the MPACT program has focused on electrochemical safeguards and security technologies, the laboratory capabilities have been applied to other facilities in the past (including aqueous reprocessing, fuel fabrication, and molten salt reactors as examples). This paper provides an overview of the Virtual Test Bed concept, a description of the design process, and a baseline safeguards and security design for the example facility. Parallel papers in this issue go into more detail on the various technologies, experimental testing, modeling capabilities, and performance testing.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2024

The Meaning of Risk for Safety, Security, and Safeguards in the Design of Advanced Nuclear Reactors

What is the meaning of risk as it applies to the design of advanced reactors in the disciplines of safety, security, and safeguards? How can we find common terminology for the concept of risk and how can we find interfaces between these disciplines? These are important questions that should be explored in order that they may be applied in an integrated manner for the most effective and efficient design approaches. Eliminating or minimizing risks is a key design driver that motivates and informs the development of nuclear reactors. For safety, risk is well understood and applied in Probabilistic Risk Assessments. For security, the risk-based concepts of vulnerability assessments and vital areas are all considered in designing security systems. For safeguards, the concept of risk is not formally defined, as it relates to the design and operation of nuclear reactors. International nuclear safeguards seek to reduce the risk of proliferation in the nuclear fuel cycle and as such the concept of risk does exist. Therefore, the current understanding of the “3S’ approach, which seeks to find the interfaces and conflicts between safety, security, and safeguards requires a thorough understanding of the role that the reduction of risk plays in all three disciplines. The intersection of risk for safety and security is now being developed as there is a strong correlation between reactor design and operations and their vulnerability to sabotage. The intersection of risk for security and safeguards has to date chiefly been focused on the nuclear material control and accounting systems, which are relied on by both the operator (State) and the IAEA. This paper explores the concept of risk in each of the three disciplines, how they interact, potential conflicts and interfaces , how these might be addressed and leveraged, and a notional framework for how this could be achieved.

Kovacic, Donald N↗
DOE OSTI2024

Integration of Safety, Security, and Safeguards During Design and Operations: A Technical Assessment and Regulatory Considerations for Advanced Reactor and Advanced Fuel Fabrication Facilities

This report presents the current state of knowledge, technology, methodologies, and tools that could be implemented to realize the robust integration of safety, security, and safeguards (3S) for advanced nuclear reactors (ARs) and advanced nuclear fuel cycle facilities. This report was motivated by the global development of ARs which are expected to play a key role in meeting domestic energy and climate objectives. Domestically, with many ARs in the early design phase, the integration of 3S provides an opportunity to achieve risk reduction while using less resources than traditional light water reactors by leveraging interdependencies and synergies between each domain. In addition, domestic policy considerations encourage the convergence of each 3S domain through facility design and operations. Therefore, there is a need to better understand the interdependencies and integration between 3S across ARs and advanced reactor fuel cycle facilities’ lifecycles including design, construction, and operational phases.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Advanced Facility Design and AI/ML Enabled Safeguards to Establish Secure, Economical Recycling of Fast Reactor Fuels (Final Scientific/Technical Report)

The project, "Advanced Facility Design and AI/ML Enabled Safeguards to Establish Secure, Economical Recycling of Fast Reactor Fuels," represents a significant advancement in nuclear fuel recycling technology. It integrates cutting-edge multimodal sensor fusion, machine learning (ML), and digital twin (DT) technologies to address challenges in material safeguarding, process optimization, and regulatory compliance for pyroprocessing facilities. This research has significantly enhanced the understanding of pyrochemical fuel recycling processes by developing innovative tools and methodologies. The Multimodal Safeguards Monitoring Unit (MSMU) combines electroanalytical techniques, Raman spectroscopy, and differential thermal analysis (DTA) to enable high-fidelity, near-real-time material accountancy measurements. Machine learning techniques, such as Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) autoencoders, are utilized to detect anomalies in material balances and sensor data, improving the reliability of safeguards monitoring. Additionally, digital twin technology has been established to provide real-time system-level monitoring and diagnostics, integrating physics-based models with sensor data to optimize process safety and efficiency.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

U.S. Domestic Pebble Bed Reactor: Security-by-Design

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping cost reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. The past approach has often included implementing security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization, which can lead to cost overruns. Incorporating security in the design process can provide robust, cost effective, and sufficient physical protection systems. The purpose of this work is both to develop a framework for the integration of security into the design phase of High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) that utilize pebble-based fuels and increase the use of modeling and simulation tools to optimize the design of physical protection systems. Specifically, this effort focuses on integrating security into the design phase of a model HTGR that meets current Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) physical protection requirements and providing advanced solutions to improve physical protection and decrease costs. A suite of tools, including SCRIBE3D©, PATHTRACE© and Blender© were used to model a hypothetical, generic domestic HTGR facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, cameras, barriers, and guard forces were added to the model based on best practices for physical protection systems. Multiple outsider sabotage scenarios were examined with four-to eight adversaries to determine security metrics. The results of this work will influence physical protection system designs and facility designs for U.S. domestic HTGRs. This work will also demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex can impact the design of and complete Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for SMRs. The conclusions and recommendations in this document may be applicable to all SMR designs.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2021

U.S. Domestic Microreactor Security-by-Design

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping cost reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. The past approach has often included implementing security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization, which can lead to cost overruns. Incorporating security in the design process can provide robust, cost effective, and sufficient physical protection systems. The purpose of this work is both to develop a framework for the integration of security into the design phase of a microreactor and increase the use of modeling and simulation tools to optimize the design of physical protection systems. Specifically, this effort focuses on integrating security into the design phase of a model microreactor that meets current Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) physical protection requirements and providing advanced solutions to improve physical protection and decrease costs. A suite of tools, including SCRIBE3D©, PATHTRACE© and Blender© were used to model a hypothetical, generic domestic microreactor facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, cameras, barriers, and guard forces were added to the model based on best practices for physical protection systems. Multiple outsider sabotage scenarios were examined with four-to-eight adversaries to determine security metrics. The results of this work will influence physical protection system designs and facility designs for U.S. domestic microreactors. This work will also demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex can impact the design of and complete Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for microreactors. The conclusions and recommendations in this document may be applicable to all microreactor designs.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Advanced Reactor Safeguards: 2022 Program Roadmap

The Advanced Reactor Safeguards (ARS) program was established in 2020 as part of appropriations for the Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program (ARDP) through the Office of Nuclear Energy in the Department of Energy. The goal of this program is to help address near term challenges that advanced nuclear reactor vendors face in meeting domestic Material Control and Accountancy (MC&A) and Physical Protection System (PPS) requirements for U.S. construction. The technical work in the program is meant to (1) support nuclear reactor vendors with advanced MC&A and PPS designs for next generation reactors, (2) provide technical bases for the regulator, and (3) promote the integration of Safeguards and Security by Design early in the design process. Existing domestic regulations for safeguards and security, as outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations, were written for large light water reactors, and rule-making efforts are underway to develop regulations more suited to different reactor designs. The ARS program seeks to remove roadblocks in the deployment of new and advanced reactors by solving regulatory challenges, reducing safeguards and security costs, and utilizing the latest technologies and approaches for robust plant monitoring and protection. This roadmap discusses the goals of the ARS program, current research, and program plan for the next five years.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Safeguards Modeling for Advanced Nuclear Facility Design.

Future nuclear fuel cycle facilities will see a significant benefit from considering materials accountancy requirements early in the design process. The Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) working group is demonstrating Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for a notional electrochemical reprocessing facility as part of a 2020 Milestone. The idea behind SSBD is to consider regulatory requirements early in the design process to provide more optimized systems and avoid costly retrofits later in the design process. Safeguards modeling, using single analyst tools, allows the designer to efficiently consider materials accountancy approaches that meet regulatory requirements. However, safeguards modeling also allows the facility designer to go beyond current regulations and work toward accountancy designs with rapid response and lower thresholds for detection of anomalies. This type of modeling enables new safeguards approaches and may inform future regulatory changes. The Separation and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM) has been used for materials accountancy system design and analysis. This paper steps through the process of designing a Material Control and Accountancy (MC&A) system, presents the baseline system design for an electrochemical reprocessing facility, and provides performance metrics from the modeling analysis. The most critical measurements in the electrochemical facility are the spent fuel input, electrorefiner salt, and U/TRU product output measurements. Finally, material loss scenario analysis found that measurement uncertainties (relative standard deviations) for Pu would need to be at 1% (random and systematic error components) or better in order to meet domestic detection goals or as high as 3% in order to meet international detection goals, based on a 100 metric ton per year plant size.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

U.S. Domestic Small Modular Reactor Security by Design

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting evolving security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping cost reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. The addition of security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization (the past approach) can lead to cost overruns. Incorporating security in the design process can provide robust, cost effective, and sufficient physical protection systems. The purpose of this work is to develop a framework for the integration of security into the design phase of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and the use of modeling and simulation tools to optimize the design of physical protection systems. This effort will intend to integrate security into the design phase of a model SMR that meets current NRC physical protection requirements and provide advanced solutions to improve physical protection and decrease costs. A suite of tools, including SCRIBE3D, PATHTRACE and Blender were used to model a hypothetical generic domestic SMR facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, cameras, portal monitors, barriers, and guard forces were added to the model based on best practices for physical protection systems. One outsider sabotage scenario was examined with 4-8 adversaries to determine security metrics. This work will influence physical protection system designs and facility designs for U.S. domestic SMRs. The purpose of this project is to demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the Department of Energy Complex can impact the design of U.S. domestic SMRs and the complete Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for SMRs.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Physical Security Model Development of an Electrochemical Facility

Nuclear facilities in the U.S. and around the world face increasing challenges in meeting evolving physical security requirements while keeping costs reasonable. The addition of security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization (the approach of the past) can easily lead to cost overruns. Instead, security should be considered at the beginning of the design process in order to provide robust, yet efficient physical security designs. The purpose of this work is to demonstrate how modeling and simulation can be used to optimize the design of physical protection systems. A suite of tools, including Scribe3D and Blender, were used to model a generic electrochemical reprocessing facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, portal monitors, barriers, and guard forces were added to the model based on best practices for physical security. Two theft scenarios (an outsider attack and insider diversion) as well as a sabotage scenario were examined in order to optimize the security design. Security metrics are presented. This work fits into a larger Virtual Facility Distributed Test Bed 2020 Milestone in the Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program through the Department of Energy (DOE). The purpose of the milestone is to demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the DOE complex provide the capabilities to demonstrate complete Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for nuclear facilities.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Nontraditional Sensors for Aqueous Separation Research & Workforce Development

Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL) nuclear fuel cycle capabilities enable the deployment of technologies that sustain the current reactor fleet, support demonstration and deployment of new advanced reactors, and facilitate management and disposition of existing and future radiological waste materials. INL focuses on deploying nuclear energy systems with confidence by decreasing proliferation risk through research that demonstrates process transparency and supports safeguards and security by design. An example of these capabilities is the Beartooth test bed, set to begin operations toward the end of fiscal year 2026. Beartooth will include a cascade of centrifugal contactors, glove box lines, and solidification and dissolution equipment to aid in the progression of novel separation techniques and to provide hands-on experience to cultivate and maintain a robust workforce of experts. To support Beartooth’s enhanced instrumentation and monitoring equipment needs, several nontraditional sensors are being considered for future deployment. The non-traditional sensors include accelerometers, acoustic microphones, and infrared cameras. These nontraditional sensors have the potential to not only help monitor the process but also enhance nuclear safeguards.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗
DOE OSTI2022

Development of a Multi-Sensor Data Science System Used for Signature Development on Solvent Extraction Processes in support of safeguards- an overview

A new nuclear fuel cycle test bed is being built at Idaho National Laboratory to support the purification of special nuclear material recovered from used fuel. The test bed provides an opportunity to research process flow and the application of computational tools in solvent extraction processes. A deeper understanding of process and equipment behavior coupled with real time data collection can indicate whether a process failure is accidental or purposeful. The goal of this project is to develop a system that utilizes non-traditional measurement sources such as vibration, acoustics, current, light, flow, and temperature in conjunction with data-based, machine learning techniques that will allow for signal discovery. This multi-sensor data can support the development of safeguards by design and security by design measures for such a facility. Additionally, it can aid in early detection and identification of removed materials indicating diversion, which is essential for initiating material recovery and actor identification. This overview encompasses the current research and testing of sensors to develop a spectrum of process signatures. To be followed by planned experiments aimed to characterize said signatures and study potential feature extraction techniques to identify a fault in the system (i.e. flow diversion).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Material Control & Accountancy for Molten Salt Reactors (FY2021 Report)

There is significant domestic and international interest, investment, and research and development momentum to pursue advanced nuclear reactor technologies. Molten salt reactor (MSR) concepts display the largest variability in fuel type and design features among the current advanced concepts. MSRs have been proposed with various core designs, sizes (power), and fuel cycles. Salt-fueled molten salt systems represent the only advanced reactor type with fuel that is not in a solid form during operation. These “liquid-fueled” MSRs are unique from perspectives of fuel fabrication, spent irradiated fuel and waste components, licensing, and material control and accountability (MC&A) including the potential of fissile material holdup. The liquid fuel salt is the defining distinction in comparison to other advanced reactors that propose TRI-structural ISOtropic particle fuel pebbles, various coolant options (e.g., molten salts or metals, high temperature gas), or small modular alternatives using solid fuel variants including both light water reactors and non-light water reactors. MSRs are appealing to the nuclear energy industry because of the diverse reactor characteristics they can support including various neutron energy spectra, fueling requirements, fuel cycles, and/or fuel utilization. However, because of the significant deviation and diversity of a salt-fueled system compared to traditional solid fuel light water-cooled reactors (LWRs), the history, regulatory licensing framework, modeling capabilities, and supporting engineering technology are either lacking or, in some cases, nonexistent. Therefore, the research community is actively supporting advanced MSR development on many of these fronts in particular to assist MSR vendors with licensing requirements. ORNL is leading the research and development of respective MC&A approaches for salt-fueled MSRs. This report summarizes the research performed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) under the US Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy, Advanced Reactor Safeguards (ARS) program to investigate safeguards and security by design concepts, licensing and regulatory considerations, and dynamic system-level modeling to understand radioisotope concentrations for salt-fueled MSRs. The report builds upon the previous research and literature, identifies the MC&A challenges inherent to a salt-fueled MSR, reviews current regulatory frameworks for LWRs and their applicability towards salt-fueled MSRs, summarizes the status and progress of an MSR dynamic modeling tool, and discusses a prospective MC&A approach based on the Molten Salt Demonstration Reactor (MSDR) model.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Nuclear Material Control & Accounting for Pebble Bed Reactors (FY 2023 Summary Report)

This report discusses the work done under the US Department of Energy NE-5 Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security Program during FY 2023. It provides a summary of material control and accounting (MC&A) for pebble bed reactors (PBRs) and addresses some of the main challenges with current PBR MC&A approaches that will inform safeguards and security by design efforts. The efforts to date have focused on tristructural isotropic (TRISO) pebble fuel material accounting and control including working with partners in industry, loss and production of nuclear material as part of reactor operations, burnup modeling and measurements, uncertainty quantifications for such modeling and measurements, statistical approaches needed, and measurement methods. The unique fuel management and utilization in a PBR, where the fuel in spherical form is introduced and circulates through the reactor, poses special challenges for MC&A. This contrasts with traditional water-cooled reactors in which the fuel is contained in large assemblies and can be easily identified and counted. Even online fueled reactors, such as the CANDU reactors (none of which operate in the United States), are significantly different because the fuel is still contained in relatively large assemblies, is uniquely identified, and the number of assemblies that pass through the core on an annual basis is much fewer than the hundreds of thousands that circulate in a PBR, none of which are uniquely identified. Additionally, the nature of the TRISO fuel results in very low heavy metal loading with each pebble containing less than 10 g of uranium and on the order of less than 1 g of fissile material. This low fuel density and the robustness of the TRISO particles are major features of the TRISO fuel from a safety basis as each TRISO particle and pebble acts as a containment for the nuclear material and fission products during normal and accident conditions. This also results in very low plutonium loading per pebble during normal operations, which is on the order of 0.1 g at full burnup. A major feature of PBRs is that they will allow for significantly higher burnup, on the order of 160 GWd/THM compared to the burnup of traditional LWRs, which is on the order of 45 GWd/THM. This is achieved by monitoring the pebbles as they circulate through the reactor and allowing them to be reintroduced into the core until the desired burnup is achieved and they are removed from the reactor and enter the spent fuel storage areas.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Advanced Reactor Safeguards & Security 2024 Program Roadmap

The Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security (ARSS) program was established to provide research support addressing near term challenges that advanced nuclear reactor vendors face in meeting domestic Material Control and Accounting (MC&A), Physical Protection System (PPS), and Cybersecurity requirements for U.S. construction. The technical work in the program is meant to (1) support nuclear reactor vendors with advanced MC&A, PPS, and Cybersecurity designs for next generation reactors, (2) provide technical bases for the regulator, and (3) promote the integration of Safeguards and Security by Design early in the design process. Existing domestic regulations for safeguards and security, as outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations, were written for large light water reactors, and rule-making efforts are underway to develop regulations more suited to different reactor designs. The ARSS program seeks to remove roadblocks in the deployment of new and advanced reactors by solving regulatory challenges, reducing safeguards and security costs, and utilizing the latest technologies and approaches for robust plant monitoring and protection. This roadmap discusses the goals of the ARSS program, current research, and program plan for the next five years.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Advanced Reactor Safeguards Program Roadmap

The Advanced Reactor Safeguards (ARS) program was established in 2020 as part of appropriations for the Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program (ARDP) through the Office of Nuclear Energy in the Department of Energy. The goal of this program is to help address near term challenges that advanced nuclear reactor vendors face in meeting domestic Material Control and Accountancy (MC&A) and Physical Protection System (PPS) requirements for U.S. construction. Existing regulations for safeguards and security, as outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations, were written for large light water reactors, and some of the requirements are not suited to smaller, safer advanced reactor designs. The ARS program seeks to remove roadblocks in the deployment of new and advanced reactors by solving regulatory challenges, reducing safeguards and security costs, and utilizing the latest technologies and approaches for robust plant monitoring and protection. Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD), or the consideration of safeguards and security requirements early in the design process, is an overarching principle that guides this program. This roadmap discusses the goals of the ARS program, current research, and program plan for the next five years.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗