Safety, Standards, and Regulations for Electrified Aircraft
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Proceedings of conference on materials for improved fire safety with application to design and development of spacecraft and support equipment
Power is essential for crewed and uncrewed spaceflight operations. Spacecraft batteries are designed and tested to be safe under extreme environmental conditions.
This viewgraph presentation makes several recommendations to ensure the safe and effective design of Lithium ion cell batteries. Large lithium ion cells require pressure switches and small cells require pressure disconnects and other safety devices with the ability to instantly interrupt flow. Other suggestions include specifications for batteries and battery chargers.
User requirements for lithium sulfur batteries are presented. They include careful analysis of design and quality control, along with certain equipment specifications. Some of the specifications include: hermetically sealed cells; lithium limited cells with stoichiometry of lithium to sulfur dioxide as a ratio of one; low moisture content in the cells; and battery capacity.
A reserve Lithium/Thionyl Chloride Battery concept is developed and undergoing feasibility testing in terms of performance, safety and abusive conditions. The feasibility of employing a battery of this type to replace thermal batteries in certain applications is demonstrated. Excellent performance of a Li/SOCl2 reserve battery is obtained across the temperature range from 0 C to +44 C. Performance improvement over the thermal battery usage is greater by a factor of 3 when discharge time and energy density are compared. Performance over an expanded temperature range is also possible. Safety and abusive testing is accomplished successfully on a series of five units. Further performance improvements can be achieved with regard to battery weight and volume reductions.
Lithium cell safety is a major issue with both manufacturers and end users. Most manufacturers have taken great strides to develop the safest cells possible while still maintaining performance characteristics. The combining of lithium cells for higher voltages, currents, and capacities requires the fabricator of lithium battery packs to be knowledgable about the specific electrochemical system being used. Relatively high rate, spirally wound (large surface area) sulfur oxychloride cells systems, such as Li/Thionyl or Sulfuryl chloride are considered. Prior to the start of a design of a battery pack, a review of the characterization studies for the cells should be conducted. The approach for fabricating a battery pack might vary with cell size.
The Crewed Space Vehicle Battery Safety Requirements document has been prepared for use by designers of battery-powered vehicles, portable equipment, and experiments intended for crewed spaceflight. The purpose of the requirements document is to provide battery designers with information on design provisions to be incorporated in and around the battery and on the verification to be undertaken to demonstrate a safe battery is provided. The term "safe battery" means that the battery is safe for ground personnel and crew members to handle and use; safe to be used in the enclosed environment of a crewed space vehicle; and safe to be mounted or used in unpressurized spaces adjacent to habitable areas. Battery design review, approval, and certification is required before the batteries can be used for ground operations and be certified for flight.
A model developed using Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) that aimed to determine the effect of a fire in a spacecraft was validated by data collected during the Saffire campaign. The model used inlet and outlet temperatures and CO 2 concentrations of the Saffire payload where fire spread was taking place to determine the amount of heat and combustion products that made it into Northrop Grumman’s Cygnus vehicle. The model was then validated using six remote sensors in various places in the vehicle, as well as a far field device (FFD) in the open zenith section that was representative of average vehicle values. The current work focuses on using the model to predict fire safety scenarios. One simulation aimed to determine the fate of HCl, which sticks to surfaces. The model prediction showed that the HCl was removed from the atmosphere rapidly. This compared well against the FFD data in the Saffire VI campaign event where a bottle of 5% HCl was released into the vehicle. An additional simulation where the Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) was shut off once the FFD reached 5 ppm of HCl showed that HCl stayed in the atmosphere considerably longer. Continuing the simulation with the ECLSS activated and after temperatures returned to their initial conditions, resulted in a rapid removal of HCL similar to that observed in the original HCl release scenario model. Finally, a simulation that used the heat release rate from a lithium-ion battery test to determine the effect it would have on a spacecraft was performed. This simulation used a heat addition rate that is considerably higher than what was determined from the burning of solid fuels in the Saffire campaign and hence produced a non-trivial temperature increase in more locations within the vehicle.
The generated flow rates of gaseous hydrogen and gaseous oxygen from an electrical vehicle nickel-iron battery system were determined and used to evaluate the flame quenching capabilities of several candidate devices to prevent flame propagation within batteries having central watering/venting systems. The battery generated hydrogen and oxygen gases were measured for a complete charge and discharge cycle. The data correlates well with accepted theory during strong overcharge conditions indicating that the measurements are valid for other portions of the cycle. Tests confirm that the gas mixture in the cells is always flammable regardless of the battery status. The literature indicated that a conventional flame arrestor would not be effective over the broad spectrum of gassing conditions presented by a nickel-iron battery. Four different types of protective devices were evaluated. A foam-metal arrestor design was successful in quenching gaseous hydrogen and gaseous oxygen flames, however; the application of this flame arrestor to individual cell or module protection in a battery is problematic. A possible rearrangement of the watering/venting system to accept the partial protection of simple one-way valves is presented which, in combination with the successful foam-metal arrestor as main vent protection, could result in a significant improvement in battery protection.
The role of the Power Branch/EP5 of JSC in primary battery applications is to support those JSC organizations having direct application responsibility with trade studies, battery selection recommendations, and with development, qualification, and provisioning of primary batteries. Battery subsystem management is provided. Payload hazard report preparation is supported, as is the review and comment of such reports for the JSC Payload Safety Panel, who approves the flight safety for all Orbiter payloads. JSC battery users are provided with safety analysis and test support to achieve safety approval. Finally, it is the responsibility of the Power Branch to define and maintain battery safety requirement documentation for JSC.
As lithium-ion battery energy densities continue to rise, managing the heat and pressure generated during failure events has become increasingly critical. Safety systems must effectively relieve pressure without releasing sparks, flames, or particulate matter, requiring robust filtration solutions. The challenge is compounded by the reduced free volume available for gas expansion in high-density designs, which increases the demands on these filters. While significant progress has been made through experimental studies and modeling efforts to understand the behavior of ejecta during battery failures, there remains a pressing need for practical, rule-of-thumb sizing parameters. These parameters would help correlate high-energy waste streams with appropriate filter design, ensuring reliable containment and safety. This talk will explore recent experimental findings in this area and discuss the potential pathways for developing these essential sizing guidelines.
This requirements document is applicable to all batteries on crewed spacecraft, including vehicle, payload, and crew equipment batteries. It defines the specific provisions required to design a battery that is safe for ground personnel and crew members to handle and/or operate during all applicable phases of crewed missions, safe for use in the enclosed environment of a crewed space vehicle, and safe for use in launch vehicles, as well as in unpressurized spaces adjacent to the habitable portion of a space vehicle. The required provisions encompass hazard controls, design evaluation, and verification. The extent of the hazard controls and verification required depends on the applicability and credibility of the hazard to the specific battery design and applicable missions under review. Evaluation of the design and verification program results shall be completed prior to certification for flight and ground operations. This requirements document is geared toward the designers of battery systems to be used in crewed vehicles, crew equipment, crew suits, or batteries to be used in crewed vehicle systems and payloads (or experiments). This requirements document also applies to ground handling and testing of flight batteries. Specific design and verification requirements for a battery are dependent upon the battery chemistry, capacity, complexity, charging, environment, and application. The variety of battery chemistries available, combined with the variety of battery-powered applications, results in each battery application having specific, unique requirements pertinent to the specific battery application. However, there are basic requirements for all battery designs and applications, which are listed in section 4. Section 5 includes a description of hazards and controls and also includes requirements.
The Soyuz‑1 accident remains one of the most consequential parachute related failures in human spaceflight history and provides enduring lessons for modern Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL) system design. Occurring during the height of the Cold War and the Space Race, the mission unfolded under extraordinary political and schedule pressure as the Soviet Union sought to maintain its early leadership in space achievements following the death of chief designer Sergei Korolev. Despite unresolved propulsion, electrical, and parachute system deficiencies, Soyuz‑1 proceeded to launch and immediately encountered critical inflight anomalies, including a failed solar panel deployment, attitude control issues, and communication dropouts. Upon reentry, a malfunction in the parachute system, driven by a primary main canopy that failed to deploy, and subsequent entanglement of the reserve main canopy with the primary drogue parachute, resulted in insufficient deceleration and the fatal crash of cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov. Subsequent investigations revealed deep rooted cultural and organizational issues within the Soviet space program, including inadequate testing, suppression of dissent, undocumented last minute design changes, and the absence of integrated parachute system verification. More than 200 design flaws were identified after the accident, and firsthand accounts, including those from Yuri Gagarin, highlighted widespread concern prior to launch. Over time, the Soviet program implemented substantial reforms: systematic design corrections, rigorous process documentation, and an extensive series of drop tests that ultimately transformed the Soyuz system into one of the world’s most reliable human-rated return vehicles. This paper examines the technical architecture of the Soyuz‑1 parachute system, reconstructs the likely deployment sequence and failure mechanism, and analyzes the cultural contributors that shaped the accident. The study draws parallels to modern spacecraft parachute development, emphasizing the critical importance of integrated system testing, transparent engineering culture, and continuous hardware surveillance. These lessons remain directly relevant to today’s NASA and Commercial Crew Programs (CCP), where the Government continues to refine its understanding of aggregate risk and strengthen overall astronaut safety in the face of increasingly complex parachute systems.
The unique power requirement of NASA's Galileo Jupiter Probe are most readily met by a Li/SO2 battery; however, because this battery system is not space flight proven, extensive effort was required to qualify this device from the stand point of performance and safety. Due to the rather checkered safety record of the Li/SO2 system, safety has been foremost among the design considerations and has been addressed at the cell, battery and system level. The mission requirements which led to the choice of the Li/SO2 battery and the safety engineering which went into the battery and power system design are described.
Flight test is at the core of what organizations must do in order to validate the operation and systems on an aircraft. While the AGARDograph series 300 and 160 series deal with aspects of this testing, this volume pulls it all together as an introduction to the process required to do effective flight test engineering. This volume was originally published in 1995. Its utility has been proven in that many flight test organizations and universities have requested copies for their engineers and students. It was felt that re-issuing it in a new format designed for electronic publication would be valuable to the community. This second printing changes none of the text, but rather reformats it. All the original references to AGARD (instead of RTO) are left in place so that none of the flavor of the original publication is lost. This is the Introductory Volume to the Flight Test Techniques Series. It is a general introduction to the various activities and aspects of Flight Test Engineering that must be considered when planning, conducting, and reporting a flight test program. Its main intent is to provide a broad overview to the novice engineer or to other people who have a need to interface with specialists within the flight test community. The first two Sections provide some insight into the question of why flight test and give a short history of flight test engineering. Sections 3 through 10 deal with the preparation for flight testing. They provide guidance on the preliminary factors that must be considered; the composition of the test team; the logistic support requirements; the instrumentation and data processing requirements; the flight test plan; the associated preliminary ground tests; and last, but by no means least, discuss safety aspects. Sections 11 through 27 describe the various types of flight tests that are usually conducted during the development and certification of a new or modified aircraft type. Each Section offers a brief introduction to the topic under consideration, and the nature and the objectives of the tests to be conducted. It lists the test instrumentation (and, where appropriate, other test equipment and facilities) required, describes the test maneuvers to be executed, and indicates the way in which the test data is selected, analyzed, and presented. The various activities that should take place between test flights are presented next. Items that are covered are: who to debrief; what type of reports to send where: types of data analysis required for next flight; review of test data to make a comparison to predicted data and some courses of action if there is not good agreement; and comments on selecting the next test flight. The activities that must take place upon completion of the test program are presented. The types of reports and briefings that should take place and a discussion of some of the uses of the flight test data are covered. A brief forecast is presented of where present trends may be leading.
This paper explores the application of established roadmapping approaches in standards planning and roadmap development to support mission assurance objectives. Mission assurance requires proactive planning across multiple domains including technical, schedule, cost, organizational, and policy. The intersection of these domains happens at the enterprise level, and enterprise systems engineering processes can systematically guide mission assurance activities, including development of standards roadmaps. Standards planning and development is a critical contributor to an effective mission assurance strategy, although standards are often developed and adopted reactively. Technology and standards planning is a key Enterprise Process Management activity, as identified by the Systems Engineering Body of Knowledge, and technology and standards roadmaps are strategic tools used to enable that process. Technology roadmapping has proven effective in guiding enterprise architecture and concept design, and standards planning supports enterprise requirements definition and management. However, there are limited methodologies to guide such standards planning activities. The application of technology roadmapping principles to standards planning formalizes the process and establishes a repeatable framework for standards development and integration. The framework development described in this paper fills a methodological gap by adapting proven roadmapping techniques to standards planning. Through a comparison of roadmapping methodologies and a case study analysis, this approach outlines a systematic process for anticipating and planning standards needs. In the case of developing a standards integration roadmap for NASA’s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA), technology roadmapping principles were adapted to develop a roadmap framework to allow NASA and OSMA to define an agency-wide standards integration plan for commercial and industry safety and mission assurance standards. The outcome highlights key adaptations required for roadmapping in a standards context and describes the process steps to formalize a standards planning activity. The roadmapping framework adapted for standards development and integration enables more strategic, forward-looking standards planning and allows for better alignment between evolving capabilities and mission assurance requirements. Beyond its application to mission assurance, this methodology can be transferred to other domains requiring standards development, providing a systematic approach that integrates systems engineering principles into policy strategy and decision-making processes.
For the thirty-seventh consecutive year, a NASA/ASEE (American Society for Engineering Education) Summer Faculty Fellowship Program was conducted at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). The program was conducted by The University of Alabama in Huntsville and MSFC during the period May 29 - August 3, 2001. Operated under the auspices of the American Society for Engineering Education, the MSFC program, as well as those at other NASA Centers, was sponsored by the University Affairs Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC. The basic objectives of the programs, which are in the thirty-seventh year of operation nationally, are (1) to further the professional knowledge of qualified engineering and science faculty members; (2) to stimulate an exchange of ideas between participants and NASA; (3) to enrich and refresh the research and teaching activities of the participants' institutions; and (4) to contribute to the research objectives of the NASA Centers. The Faculty Fellows spent ten weeks at MSFC engaged in a research project compatible with their interests and background and worked in collaboration with a NASA MSFC colleague. This document is a compilation of Fellows' reports on their research during the summer of 2001.