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Implementing an Objectives-Driven, Risk-Informed, and Case-Assured Approach to Safety and Mission Success at NASA

NASA is developing a “Standard for Assurance of Space Flight Safety and Mission Success” that implements an objectives-driven, risk-informed, and case-assured approach to safety and mission success (S&MS) for NASA space flight programs and projects. The standard aligns with the philosophy of risk leadership that has recently been established in NASA policy to assure acceptable levels of flight crew safety and mission success risk. It is consistent with existing NASA risk management requirements and is compatible with NASA program management and systems engineering requirements. The methodology described in the standard is presented in terms of an S&MS assurance framework that is designed to allow substantial flexibility in the specific means by which programs and projects achieve acceptable mission S&MS risk. Such flexibility is necessary to accommodate the increasingly broad range of acquisition strategies employed by NASA, including commercial transportation services, as well as to accommodate the increasingly rapid evolution of space flight-related technologies and practices. A key feature of the S&MS assurance framework is the specification of S&MS success criteria for each life-cycle review (LCR). The S&MS assurance case is structured around these criteria, the satisfaction of which indicates that the program/project is adhering to the S&MS risk posture. This enables the evolving S&MS assurance case to be used as a fundamental program/project submittal at each LCR, where its inherent structure of argument, supported by evidence, directly supports the evaluation of the program/project with respect to the S&MS success criteria, and by extension, the S&MS risk posture. As such, the S&MS assurance case is integral to program/project systems engineering, risk management, and S&MS oversight activities, and provides the principal basis for S&MS risk acceptance by the Decision Authority throughout the program/project life cycle.

Risk Posture↗

Implementing an Objectives-Driven, Risk-Informed, and Case-Assured Approach to Safety and Mission Success at NASA

NASA is developing a “Standard for Assurance of Space Flight Safety and Mission Success” that implements an objectives-driven, risk-informed, and case-assured approach to safety and mission success (S&MS) for NASA space flight programs and projects. The standard aligns with the philosophy of risk leadership that has recently been established in NASA policy to assure acceptable levels of flight crew safety and mission success risk. It is consistent with existing NASA risk management requirements and is compatible with NASA program management and systems engineering requirements. The methodology described in the standard is presented in terms of an S&MS assurance framework that is designed to allow substantial flexibility in the specific means by which programs and projects achieve acceptable mission S&MS risk. Such flexibility is necessary to accommodate the increasingly broad range of acquisition strategies employed by NASA, including commercial transportation services, as well as to accommodate the increasingly rapid evolution of space flight-related technologies and practices. A key feature of the S&MS assurance framework is the specification of S&MS success criteria for each life-cycle review (LCR). The S&MS assurance case is structured around these criteria, the satisfaction of which indicates that the program/project is adhering to the S&MS risk posture. This enables the evolving S&MS assurance case to be used as a fundamental program/project submittal at each LCR, where its inherent structure of argument, supported by evidence, directly supports the evaluation of the program/project with respect to the S&MS success criteria, and by extension, the S&MS risk posture. As such, the S&MS assurance case is integral to program/project systems engineering, risk management, and S&MS oversight activities, and provides the principal basis for S&MS risk acceptance by the Decision Authority throughout the program/project life cycle.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Modernizing NASA’s Space Flight Safety and Mission Success (S&MS) Assurance Framework In Line With Evolving Acquisition Strategies and Systems Engineering Practices

This paper presents the objectives-driven, case-based safety and mission success (S&MS) assurance framework being developed by the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA), including its motivations and its implementation via a S&MS Assurance Standard that is under development, supplemented by supporting standards including an S&MS Analysis Management Standard that is also under development. A need to evolve NASA’s S&MS assurance framework has emerged in recent years, resulting from the need to accommodate new acquisition models; the need to accommodate evolving systems engineering (SE) practices; the need to stipulate acceptable levels of S&MS risk; the need for improved integration of S&MS into SE; and the need for clearer risk acceptance accountability. The objectives-driven, case-based S&MS assurance framework proposed here is responsive to that need. Its key features include: • The establishment, by NASA Acquirers, of fundamental S&MS performance objectives that define limits of acceptability for the likelihoods that mission technical objectives will be accomplished and that people, assets, and environments put at risk by the mission will not be adversely affected; • The development and approval of Providers’ S&MS plans for meeting Acquirers’ S&MS performance objectives, including commitments to support Acquirer audit, investigation, and reporting needs; • The development, by Providers, of S&MS assurance cases that argue, supported by evidence, that the Provider has met, or is on track to meeting, the fundamental S&MS objectives; • The evaluation, throughout the program/project life cycle, of Provider S&MS assurance cases as the primary S&MS-related technical basis for Acquirer risk acceptance and the granting to the Provider of authority to proceed through the program/project life cycle. This proposed S&MS assurance framework is notable for its lack of prescription of traditional S&MS requirements and strategies such as defined failure tolerances, margins, or analysis requirements. Instead, Providers are given latitude to propose their own strategies for meeting the fundamental S&MS performance objectives, subject to independent review and Acquirer approval. The result is a framework for S&MS assurance that is at once both rigorous and flexible.

Assurance Case↗

Use of COTS Batteries on ISS and Shuttle: Payload Safety and Mission Success

Contents: Current program requirements; Challenges with COTS batteries; manned vehicle COTS methodology in use; List of typical flight COTS batteries; Energy content and toxicity; Hazards, failure modes and controls for different battery chemistries; JSC test details; List of incidents from Consumer Protection Safety Commission; Conclusions ans recommendations.

Jeevarajan, Judith A.↗

NASA’s Planetary Protection Program to Assure Mission Safety and Success

NASA’s planetary protection program seeks to understand and control harmful contamination of solar systems targets of exploration by terrestrial contamination and prevent harmful biological contamination of the Earth-Moon system by extraterrestrial life, should it exist. To accomplish these objective’s NASA has developed a balanced safety and mission assurance strategy that leverages COSPAR Policy guidelines, workshops, scientific consensus, partnerships and international working groups to develop policy and implementation guidelines. Upcoming crewed missions to the Moon and Mars, as well as robotic missions to small solar system bodies, Europa, Titan and Mars are some of the driving activities of astrobiological interest that continue to emphasize the importance of planetary protection throughout the project life cycle. Development of a responsive and updated agency planetary protection policy has been a focus area in supporting upcoming mission opportunities for exploration to include Mars sample return and crewed mission concepts. An extensive update of this policy is underway which encompasses crewed and robotic procedural polices, a general technical requirements standard, and an implementation handbook. During this timeframe NASA has been working with the international community to develop scientific consensus, and to identify and fill in knowledge gaps for developing balanced policy guidelines, incorporation of risk informed decision making and quantitative technical standards. NASA has developed a planetary protection roadmap as a technology management strategy to track and monitor the development of each knowledge gaps. The Committee of Space Research (COSPAR) Policy on Planetary Protection and the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine’s Committee of Planetary Protection are used to inform updates to the planetary protection polices and guidelines. This integrated strategy for planetary protection seeks to provide a transparent, structured approach for enabling missions, providing guidance for NASA and NASA partnered missions, and being responsive to the increased interest and activities in space exploration whilst maintaining an understanding and control of harmful contamination.

James Benardini↗

NASA's Planetary Protection Program to Assure Mission Safety and Success

NASA's planetary protection program seeks to understand and control harmful contamination of solar systems targets of exploration by terrestrial contamination and prevent harmful biological contamination of the Earth-Moon system by extraterrestrial life, should it exist. To accomplish these objective's NASA has developed a balanced safety and mission assurance strategy that leverages COSPAR Policy guidelines, workshops, scientific consensus, partnerships and international working groups to develop policy and implementation guidelines. Upcoming crewed missions to the Moon and Mars, as well as robotic missions to small solar system bodies, Europa, Titan and Mars are some of the driving activities of astrobiological interest that continue to emphasize the importance of planetary protection throughout the project life cycle.Development of a responsive and updated agency planetary protection policy has been a focus area in supporting upcoming mission opportunities for exploration to include Mars sample return and crewed mission concepts. An extensive update of this policy is underway which encompasses crewed and robotic procedural polices, a general technical requirements standard, and an implementation handbook. During this timeframe NASA has been working with the international community to develop scientific consensus, and to identify and fill in knowledge gaps for developing balanced policy guidelines, incorporation of risk informed decision making and quantitative technical standards. NASA has developed a planetary protection roadmap as a technology management strategy to track and monitor the development of each knowledge gaps. The Committee of Space Research (COSPAR) Policy on Planetary Protection and the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine's Committee of Planetary Protection are used to inform updates to the planetary protection polices and guidelines. This integrated strategy for planetary protection seeks to provide a transparent, structured approach for enabling missions, providing guidance for NASA and NASA partnered missions, and being responsive to the increased interest and activities in space exploration whilst maintaining an understanding and control of harmful contamination.

Planetary Protection↗

Acceptance of Safety and Mission Success Risks

NASA has developed an objectives based hierarchy for guiding Reliability and Maintainability (RM) activities. This presentation overviews the hierarchy and proposes to the international trilateral partners to formulate a task force to consider the elements of the NASA RM framework, as captured in the hierarchy of RM considerations, to identify commonalities and differences in the way RM is addressed by the flight projects among the partners.

safety↗

Technical Excellence and Communication: The Cornerstones for Successful Safety and Mission Assurance Programs

The paper describes the role of technical excellence and communication in the development and maintenance of safety and mission assurance programs. The Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) organization is used to illustrate philosophies and techniques that strengthen safety and mission assurance efforts and that contribute to healthy and effective organizational cultures. The events and conditions leading to the development of the MSFC S&MA organization are reviewed. Historic issues and concerns are identified. The adverse effects of resource limitations and risk assessment roles are discussed. The structure and functions of the core safety, reliability, and quality assurance functions are presented. The current organization s mission and vision commitments serve as the starting points for the description of the current organization. The goals and objectives are presented that address the criticisms of the predecessor organizations. Additional improvements are presented that address the development of technical excellence and the steps taken to improve communication within the Center, with program customers, and with other Agency S&MA organizations.

Malone, Roy W.↗

Fault Management in an Objectives-Based/Risk-Informed View of Safety and Mission Success

Theme of this talk: (1) Net-benefit of activities and decisions derives from objectives (and their priority) -- similarly: need for integration, value of technology/capability. (2) Risk is a lack of confidence that objectives will be met. (2a) Risk-informed decision making requires objectives. (3) Consideration of objectives is central to recent guidance.

Groen, Frank↗

Case Studies in Crewed Spacecraft Environmental Control and Life Support System Process Compatibility and Cabin Environmental Impact

Contamination of a crewed spacecraft's cabin environment leading to environmental control and life support system (ECLSS) functional capability and operational margin degradation or loss can have an adverse effect on NASA's space exploration mission figures of merit-safety, mission success, effectiveness, and affordability. The role of evaluating the ECLSS's compatibility and cabin environmental impact as a key component of pass trace contaminant control is presented and the technical approach is described in the context of implementing NASA's safety and mission success objectives. Assessment examples are presented for a variety of chemicals used in vehicle systems and experiment hardware for the International Space Station program. The ECLSS compatibility and cabin environmental impact assessment approach, which can be applied to any crewed spacecraft development and operational effort, can provide guidance to crewed spacecraft system and payload developers relative to design criteria assigned ECLSS compatibility and cabin environmental impact ratings can be used by payload and system developers as criteria for ensuring adequate physical and operational containment. In additional to serving as an aid for guiding containment design, the assessments can guide flight rule and procedure development toward protecting the ECLSS as well as approaches for contamination event remediation.

Perry, J. L.↗

Reliability Model Generator for fault-tolerant systems

This paper discusses an analysis tool, the Reliability Model Generator, that reasons from structural and functional system design specifications to generate a reliability model for the system under investigation. The resultant model defines a system state space sufficient to characterize the effects of single and multiple component failures. This model may then be examined by the analyst or used as input to an existing reliability evaluation tool, the Semi-Markov Unreliability Range Evaluator (SURE), to compute numeric bounds for system reliability (i.e., safety, mission success, availability, etc.). In defining the input to the Reliability Model Generator, a separation of the component function from structural specification is proposed to allow easy modification for analysis of alternative architectures. A hierarchical system description paradigm promotes multiple abstractions, thereby enabling analysis at all phases of the design process. The work described in this paper has been supported under NASA contract NAS1-10899, Integrated Airframe/Propulsion Control System Architecture (IAPSA II). IAPSA II promotes a system engineering methodology and supporting analytical tools to evaluate flight control architecture configuration alternatives during early phases of the design cycle when the cost and schedule impact of design revisions is minimal. Emphasis is placed on traceability to ensure that the requirements drive the resulting design.

Catherine M McCann↗

The Role of System Compatibility and Cabin Environmental Impact Assessment in Environmental Control and Life Support System Design and Flight Operations

Contamination of a crewed spacecraft's cabin environment leading to ECLS system functional capability and operational margin degradation or loss can have an adverse effect on NASA's space exploration mission figures of merit-safety, mission success, effectiveness, and affordability. Experience gained during the International Space Station program has shown the vital role that evaluating ECLS system compatibility and cabin environmental impact serves as a passive trace contaminant control tool which can provide guidance to crewed spacecraft system and payload developers relative to designing for minimum risk. As well, such evaluations can aid in guiding containment design, developing flight rules and procedures suitable for protecting the ECLS system and cabin environment, and defining contamination event remediation approaches. The approach to evaluating ECLS system compatibility and cabin environmental impact developed during the ISS program is presented and its role in future exploration spacecraft design is discussed.

Peery, Jay L.↗