Predicting Safety Rod Reactivity Insertion in the Advanced Test Reactor
see INL/CON-23-73469 This LRS artifact is for the conference presentation associated with an abstract that was previously accepted through the LRS.
42 ENGINEERING↗
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Predicting Safety Rod Reactivity Insertion in the Advanced Test Reactor
The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), and complimentary zero-power ATR Critical (ATRC) reactor, located at Idaho National Labs (INL), are undergoing conversion from Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU). Both have a variety of testing locations that can receive large variations in flux due to its unique serpentine design, consisting of five lobes surrounding nine flux traps (see Figure 1). Initial criticality and power distribution throughout the core are controlled by core-external outer shim control cylinders (OSCCs). Distinct test loops allow for testing at specific temperatures, pressures, and irradiation conditions such as flux and fission density. The ATR is one of the key nuclear engineering research and testing facilities within the DOE National Laboratory Complex, and the ATRC supports its operation [1]. Currently, the Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3) within the National Nuclear Security Administration of the DOE is working to convert the remaining research reactors, including the ATR, from 93% HEU fuel to 19.75% LEU fuel (LEU) to support non-proliferation [2]. Extensive materials testing at INL and internationally has demonstrated that a high-density uranium molybdenum (U 10Mo) alloy can meet the performance requirements of the remaining high powered research reactors. The current LEU fuel element design is named the LOWE element. However, there are many technical challenges to address before the conversion to LEU can be successful, including the accurate characterization of the reactor core physics with LEU fuel. To ensure safe operation of the ATR, reactor engineers prepare a CSAP (Core Safety Assurance Package) before each cycle. The purpose of the CSAP is to verify the reactor performance calculation used to determine if the selected fuel loading meets operational, experimental, and safety criteria. Many of the criteria in the CSAP are limits on reactivity insertion in various accident scenarios.
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Hafnium Absorber Latching Mechanism Redesign
The poster entails the known problems and updated design solutions for the hafnium absorber latching mechanism. The hafnium absorber latching mechanism is a part of the safety rod system located within ATR's core. The latching mechanism's primary function was to attach hafnium absorbers to the safety rod drive system.
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DEMONSTRATION OF MULTI-PHYSICS EVALUATION OF FUEL ROD BURST PROBABILITY WITH BURNUP EXTENSION UNDER LBLOCA CONDITIONS
Extending the fuel discharge burnup level, e.g., from the current limit of rod averaged discharge burnup limit of 62 GWD/MT to a proposed new limit of 75 GWD/MT, can provide significant economic benefits to the current fleet of operating light water reactors (LWRs). It allows for longer operating cycles and improved resource utilization. The major economic gain of longer operating cycles is attributable to the increased capacity factor resulting from decreased refueling time as a fraction of total operating time, as well as fewer assemblies to be discharged for a given amount of energy produced. The main licensing challenges for higher burnup fuel are to ensure fuel rod safety under design basis accident conditions, especially under large-break loss-of-coolant accident (LBLOCA) and reactivity insertion accident (RIA). In this work, two-year cycle core design for a typical 4-loop pressurized water reactor (PWR) is performed with enrichment increased up to 6% and burnup extended to 75 GWD/MT. The fuel rod burst potential evaluations under large-break loss-of-coolant accident (LBLOCA) conditions are subsequently performed using the multi-physics best estimate plus uncertainty analysis framework LOTUS (LOCA Toolkit for the U.S. LWRs) and the preliminary results are presented.
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Conceptual Design of the Transformational Challenge Reactor
The Transformational Challenge Reactor is a 3-MW(thermal) helium-cooled experimental nuclear reactor designed using an additive manufacturing–informed agile design process. This design process leverages rapid prototyping and advanced materials from emerging additive manufacturing technologies, key characteristics that enable rapid design maturation. The resulting core design incorporates a blend of advanced reactor technologies into an intermediate-spectrum microreactor, including conventionally manufactured tristructural isotropic (TRISO) fuel particles in an advanced manufactured SiC fuel element and a solid yttrium hydride moderator encapsulated in steel. Matured during the design effort, these technologies are incorporated with additively manufactured steel support and fluidic structures to form a 75-cm-outer-diameter cylindrical active core region. Below and above the active core region are axial SiC reflectors, which are housed inside the reactor pressure vessel. The reactor is controlled with an annular shroud actuated external to the pressure vessel in the gap between the pressure vessel and a steel radial reflector. A safety rod is at the center of the core to shut down the reactor when necessary. Helium pressurized at 5 MPa is forced into the pressure vessel below the core and around the core to the top plenum before it is forced down through the axial reflectors and the active core region. The primary pressurized helium loop is operated up to 500°C and includes the pressure vessel, the circulator, and the hot side of a helium-to-air heat exchanger. The secondary loop rejects all heat from the primary loop to ambient air through a heat exchanger. A vented temporary confinement building contains the entire primary loop, with penetrations for a stack, cooling, and the secondary ambient air loop. Finally, this is the first advanced nuclear microreactor designed using additive manufacturing technologies, demonstrating their applicability in an accelerated advanced design process.
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Heat transfer and core neutronics considerations of the heat pipe cooled thermionic reactor
The authors summarize the results of detailed neutronic and thermal-hydraulic evaluations of the heat pipe cooled thermionic (HPTI) reactor design, identify its key design attributes, and quantify its performance characteristics. The HPTI core uses modular, liquid-metal core heat transfer assemblies to replace the liquid-metal heat transport loop employed by in-core thermionic reactor designs of the past. The nuclear fuel, power conversion, heat transport, and heat rejection functions are all combined into a single modular unit. The reactor/converter assembly uses UN fuel pins to obtain a critical core configuration with in-core safety rods and reflector controls added to complete the subassembly. By thermally bonding the core heat transfer assemblies during the reactor core is coupled neutronically, thermally, and electrically into a modular assembly of individual power sources with cross-tied architecture. A forward-facing heat pipe radiator assembly extends from the reactor head in the shape of a frustum of a cone on the opposite side of the power system from the payload. Important virtues of the concept are the absence of any single-point failures and the ability of the core to effectively transfer the TFE waste heat load laterally to other in-core heat transfer assemblies in the event of multiple failures in either in-core and radiator heat pipes.
Determan, W. R.↗
Safety analysis
We are engaged in a research program in safety-critical computing that is based on two case studies. We use these case studies to provide application-specific details of the various research issues, and as targets for evaluation of research ideas. The first case study is the Magnetic Stereotaxis System (MSS), an investigational device for performing human neurosurgery being developed in a joint effort between the Department of Physics at the University of Virginia and the Department of Neurosurgery at the University of Iowa. The system operates by manipulating a small permanent magnet (known as a 'seed') within the brain using an externally applied magnetic field. By varying the magnitude and gradient of the external magnetic field, the seed can be moved along a non-linear path and positioned at a site requiring therapy, e.g., a tumor. The magnetic field required for movement through brain tissue is extremely high, and is generated by a set of six superconducting magnets located in a housing surrounding the patient's head. The system uses two X-ray cameras positioned at right angles to detect in real time the locations of the seed and of X-ray opaque markers affixed to the patient's skull. the X-ray images are used to locate the objects of interest in a canonical frame of reference. the second case study is the University of Virginia Research Nuclear Reactor (UVAR). It is a 2 MW thermal, concrete-walled pool reactor. The system operates using 20 to 25 plate-type fuel assemblies placed on a rectangular grid plate. There are three scramable safety rods, and one non-scramable regulating rod that can be put in automatic mode. It was originally constructed in 1959 as a 1 MW system, and it was upgraded to 2 MW in 1973. Though only a research reactor rather than a power reactor, the issues raised are significant and can be related to the problems faced by full-scale reactor systems.
Knight, John C.↗
BISON Capability, Validation and Demonstration for Reactivity-Initiated Accidents
Reactivity Initiated Accidents (RIA) are design basis accidents that could have adverse impacts on the core coolability. In the unlikely event that sufficient reactivity is inserted into the reactor core by the ejected/dropped control rod, prompt energy deposition into the fuel can occur, which when sufficiently high can lead to fuel rod failure or, at large energy deposition levels, expulsion of UO2 fragments or molten UO2 material from the fuel rod. This results in a release of fission product and fuel into the coolant and has the potential to compromise core coolability and threatening the pressure boundary of the primary coolant system. The design basis RIA is one of the industry challenging problems that the CASL aimed to address; the CASL RIA Challenge Problem Charter [1] states, ?The Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) Rod Ejection Accident (REA) and Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Control Rod Drop Accident (CRDA) are postulated accidents with consequences that are important to nuclear safety (fuel rod integrity and core coolability). Currently each reload core design must be analyzed to meet regulatory acceptance criteria. The goal of CASLs ModSim capability for RIA is to model the event at a higher fidelity, with validation to existing tests, to better model the transient neutronics and the progression of the fuel and cladding thermal-mechanical behavior. These improved analytical capabilities can be used to better inform reload core design, limits on fuel assembly discharge burnup, restrictions on placement of fuel in the reactor, control rod insertion limits, operating margin, and performance sensitivities.? In support of that charter, BISON, the fuel performance code has been used to demonstrate the simulation of thermal-mechanical behavior of LWR fuels during a reactivity-initiated accident. The combination of mechanical, thermal, and thermal-hydraulic phenomena all present during an RIA makes a multi-physics code such as BISON a valuable tool for modeling these scenarios. This paper will highlight many of the activities associated with BISON relevant to reactivity-initiated accident capability development and validation efforts. These efforts have been performed under both CASL and the Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NEAMS) programs.
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Determining Reactor Operating Conditions to Prevent Xenon Walkaway Accident
The xenon walk-away is a postulated uncontrolled criticality that could occur if operators are forced to evacuate the control room in certain circumstances. This poster shows how previously held assumptions are not entirely valid and that less restrictions should be placed on operators and engineers than initially assumed.
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Replacement of Legacy Analytical Codes at the Advanced Test Reactor
For each operating cycle of the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at Idaho National Laboratory, a Core Safety Assurance Package (CSAP) is necessary to demonstrate compliance with the safety basis approved by the United State Department of Energy (DOE). Certain computer codes are used in CSAP development, most of them developed in-house. This work describes replacement of a large set of these codes and updates previous work. Replacement of legacy codes is necessary due to computer hardware failure but also has generally improved user-friendliness.
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Replacement of Legacy Analytical Codes at the Advanced Test Reactor
For each operating cycle of the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at Idaho National Laboratory, a Core Safety Assurance Package (CSAP) is necessary to demonstrate compliance with the safety basis approved by the United State Department of Energy (DOE). Certain computer codes are used in CSAP development, most of them developed in-house. This work describes replacement of a large set of these codes and updates previous work. Replacement of legacy codes is necessary due to computer hardware failure but also has generally improved user-friendliness.
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Reactivity-initiated accidents in two pressurized water reactor high burnup core designs
Here, this paper presents a safety analysis of two proposed core loadings for 24-month Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) fuel cycles. This analysis focuses on reactivity-initiated accidents (RIAs) and evaluates core safety performance impacts of rod-averaged burnup limits up to 75 GWD/MTU and less than 7 % enriched UO 2 . The capabilities of Polaris, PARCS, and RELAP5-3D are leveraged to evaluate the core neutronic and thermal–hydraulic behavior for normal-operation, uncontrolled control rod withdrawal (CRW) transients, and control rod ejection (CRE) accidents. The two core designs are compared to identify features of realistic high burnup/extended enrichment core design approaches which have significant safety impact, identify experimental data needs for high-fidelity predictive modeling, and provide recommendations for future high burnup core designs. The first core design evaluated in this study was developed by Southern Nuclear Company and used an ZrB 2 Integral Fuel Burnable Absorber (IFBA) and B 4 C Wet-Annular Burnable Absorber (WABA)-based burnable poison strategy. The second core design assessed in this work used a Gd 2 O 3 -doped UO 2 burnable poison, similar to that used in boiling water reactors or French PWRs. Results indicate that fuel thermal limits are maintained for limiting CRW and hot full power (HFP) CRE transients. Cladding failure is predicted for the highest energy deposition rods in each core during limiting hot zero power (HZP) CRE accidents (where maximum radially averaged enthalpy exceeds 120 cal/g), though licensing may be permissible with a limited number of failed rods. While concerns exist regarding high critical boron concentration during steady state for the IFBA core and large plenum pressures for the gadolinia core design, the analysis demonstrates adequate safety performance during limiting RIA accident scenarios for two representative high burnup core designs. Design changes limiting plenum pressures and implementation of accident tolerant fuel (ATF) cladding features which minimize hydriding and susceptibility to pellet-cladding mechanical interaction (PCMI) are recommended for future high burnup fuel concepts. To support the technical basis for burnup limit increases, high-fidelity fuel performance models are needed to address physical effects not considered in this analysis, and high burnup irradiated fuel tests are required to extend applicability of the fuel failure limits and validate existing and future models.
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Preliminary design of control rods in the single-fluid double-zone thorium molten salt reactor (SD-TMSR)
Recent studies on Molten Salt Reactors (MSRs) showed that the excess reactivity at the beginning of the operation is large for many fueling strategies and must be compensated by a reactivity control system. The current work introduces a reliable safety system based on control rods in addition to the online feed system reactivity control in the Single-fluid Double-zone Thorium-based Molten Salt Reactor (SD-TMSR). Three different initial fissile loadings are considered: 233 U, reactor-grade Pu, and transuranic (TRU) elements as a startup fuel. We applied six different absorbing materials to investigate the main operational and safety parameters in the SD-TMSR: natural B 4 C, enriched B 4 C with 90% 10 B, HfB 2 , HfH 1.62 , Eu 2 O 3 , and Gd 2 O 3 . The present work focuses on control rod design, integral and differential control rod worth, shutdown margin, and shadowing effects at steady-state. We employed the SERPENT-2 Monte-Carlo code to calculate the reactivity worth and analyze the performance of the reactivity control system. We showed that 233 U and reactor-grade Pu startup cores maintain adequate shutdown margin with all considered absorbers. Finally, this report proposes a design of control rod clusters that compensate the excess reactivity of the SD-TMSR loaded with different initial fissile material.
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Benchmark Exercise for the Control Rod Swelling Evaluation
The VTR core has six reactivity control assemblies and three safety assemblies. The control assemblies or primary control rods are adjusted during the normal operation to balance the core reactivity and to control the reactor power. A typical control assembly radial layout is presented in Figure 1. The figure shows the swelled absorber (B 4 C) rod. Initially, helium gas fills the gap between the pin and the cladding before irradiation swelling takes place. For VTR, HT9 steel was selected as the cladding and duct material. The main neutron absorbing material used in the VTR is B 4 C. When residing in the core, the neutronics, thermophysical, and mechanical properties of the materials used in a control assembly will degrade due to accumulated neutron damage. Material degradation limits how long a control assembly can reside in the core. Many phenomena affect the control assembly lifetime, such as the loss of reactivity worth due to B 4 C depletion, the mechanical interaction of the absorber rod and the cladding due to B 4 C swelling, the helium gas buildup in the pin due to B-10 capture, etc. B 4 C swelling, which causes closure of the gap between the absorber rod and the cladding, is usually considered as the main limiting factor from past experience. An initial study was conducted at PNNL to evaluate the irradiation behavior of a VTR control assembly. The evaluation was performed using the CNRD2 code that was initially developed for the FFTF. The study also included an assessment of the VTR control assembly and focused on a 61-pin control assembly design, which is different from that used (37-pin design) in the core design study. The study conducted by PNNL was reviewed independently by ANL. A Python script referred to as the Control Assembly Evaluation Script (CAES) was developed for the independent review and additional assessment of 37-pin control assembly design. The script has focused on the assessment of the absorber rod swelling for its importance in determining the control assembly lifetime. CAES uses geometry, neutronics, materials data as input to predict the swelling of the absorber rod during its residence in the reactor core. The results from CAES showed some non-negligible differences against the PNNL results. Some of the differences can be attributed to the different interpretation of the control rod assembly dimensions. To resolve this issue, a benchmark exercise was proposed. The benchmark specification was developed by PNNL. The benchmark exercise was performed independently at PNNL and ANL using different codes/scripts (CRND2 and CAES). This memo documents the results calculated using the different codes. However, this report is limited to presenting the results obtained. Further investigation of the cause of the observed difference will be performed as part of future activities, pending continuation of the VTR program.
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Development of a new control rod drive mechanism design for the ISU AGN-201M reactor
The Aerojet General Nucleonics (AGN) model 201-Modified, known as the AGN-201M reactor, plays an essential role in the educational and research activities at Idaho State University (ISU). The ISU AGN-201M's original Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) has been in operation for more than fifty years with no large-scale redesigns. The CRDM is required to eject the fuel rods within one second during a SCRAM event (also known as a 'reactor trip') and adjust the control rods' insertion speed, and keeps the rod insertion sequence correct. The existing control rod drive mechanisms meet these criteria but experience a few concerns due to aging. Concerns include complex maintenance and costly repairs for old electromechanical components, rod position feedback errors, and the impediment of the plate during a SCRAM due to binding of the lead screws of the existing mechanism. During a binding event, the drive mechanism becomes locked, preventing the control rod's magnetic plate from moving in or out under the reactor's normal and emergency operating conditions. Although, the binding has no effect on the ability of the rod to exit the core during the SCRAM. To counteract the concerns and issues with the current CRDM, a new design has been proposed using newer components and a simplified design. The new design utilizes more advanced electric and mechanical components that are commercially available. The new CRDM system is divided into four main aspects: (1) control rod movement design (motor, lead screw, guide rods), (2) control rod ejection (springs, electromagnet), (3) control rod position and feedback (position transducer, microswitches), and (4) material selection and structural analysis. The new design aims to reduce the overall complexity and probability of failure to improve the reactor's overall reliability. With proper material selection and improved structural design, the new drives are lighter with little to no change in structural integrity. The new control rod drive mechanism eliminates binding scenarios by using a single lead screw and implementing additional guide rods. An advanced linear position sensor and microswitches replace the existing and aging synchro system for accurate rod position feedback resulting in better reactivity control. The new design meets the reactor's operational limits by having an average reactivity insertion of 0.065% Δk/k per second, which corresponds to a total control rod insertion time of 19.23 s, while the control rod's ejection time remains less than one second during a SCRAM event. The new design ensures the reactor's long-term viability for educational and research activities by increasing the reliability and safety of operation for years to come.
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Physical and thermal property changes under uniform oxidation in nuclear graphite
Material property changes of fine- and medium-grain nuclear graphite grades were measured after subjection to uniform oxidation. The cores of high temperature reactors are composed of large nuclear graphite block components. Here, these large core components are designed to provide neutron moderation and reflection, create a large thermal sink to assist in operational control, and form the solid core structure containing the nuclear fuel, coolant channels, and the safety critical channels for control rod insertion. Oxidation is a principle degradation mechanism affecting all aspects of the nuclear graphite component functions. This study addresses the underlying physical property changes of nuclear-graphite components for oxidized mass loss ranges beyond the current recommended ASME code rule limits to ensure structural integrity within the graphite components (a maximum mass loss = 10%).
11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
Advanced Fuels Campaign Time-at-Temperature Irradiation Campaign and Post-Irradiation Examination Plan
With increasing per capita energy consumption and rapidly growing energy consumption predicted for data centers, the US faces challenges in meeting projected energy demands. The current administration is attempting to accelerate the deployment of new nuclear construction by providing significant investments in advanced nuclear and by modernizing regulatory approaches for the licensing new reactors. However, enabling extended power uprates (EPUs) for the current nuclear reactor fleet would provide a shorter-term solution to better calibrate near-term energy generation capacity to the ever-growing energy demands of the modern era. One pathway to achieve power uprates is to increase the operational window by reassessing fuel safety limits around anticipated transients. Existing light-water reactors (LWRs) utilize a targeted operational window with well-defined operational efficiencies, yet this window is also often bound by conservative safety limits that result in suboptimal operational performance. For example, the operation of the existing fleet is highly constrained by safeguards to operation related to anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs), which are moderate-frequency transients expected with a frequency greater than 0.01 per reactor-year. These AOOs include temperature excursions where the critical heat flux for the system is exceeded, resulting in a departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) at the cladding surface. This DNB event is a thermohydraulic condition that, with current conservative fuel safety limits, results in the fuel rods being classified as “failed,” meaning that the cladding may not be returned to service.
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
Advanced Fuels Campaign Time-at-Temperature Irradiation Campaign and Post-Irradiation Examination Plan
With increasing per capita energy consumption and rapidly growing energy consumption predicted for data centers, the US faces challenges in meeting projected energy demands. The current administration is attempting to accelerate the deployment of new nuclear construction by providing significant investments in advanced nuclear and by modernizing regulatory approaches for the licensing new reactors. However, enabling extended power uprates (EPUs) for the current nuclear reactor fleet would provide a shorter-term solution to better calibrate near-term energy generation capacity to the ever-growing energy demands of the modern era. One pathway to achieve power uprates is to increase the operational window by reassessing fuel safety limits around anticipated transients. Existing light-water reactors (LWRs) utilize a targeted operational window with well-defined operational efficiencies, yet this window is also often bound by conservative safety limits that result in suboptimal operational performance. For example, the operation of the existing fleet is highly constrained by safeguards to operation related to anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs), which are moderate-frequency transients expected with a frequency greater than 0.01 per reactor-year. These AOOs include temperature excursions where the critical heat flux for the system is exceeded, resulting in a departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) at the cladding surface. This DNB event is a thermohydraulic condition that, with current conservative fuel safety limits, results in the fuel rods being classified as “failed,” meaning that the cladding may not be returned to service.
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗