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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2007

NASA Engineering Safety Center NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Working Group 2007 Proactive Task Status

In 2007, the NASA Engineering Safety Center (NESC) chartered the NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Working Group to bring forth and address critical battery-related performance/manufacturing issues for NASA and the aerospace community. A suite of tasks identifying and addressing issues related to Ni-H2 and Li-ion battery chemistries was submitted and selected for implementation. The current NESC funded are: (1) Wet Life of Ni-H2 Batteries (2) Binding Procurement (3) NASA Lithium-Ion Battery Guidelines (3a) Li-Ion Performance Assessment (3b) Li-Ion Guidelines Document (3b-i) Assessment of Applicability of Pouch Cells for Aerospace Missions (3b-ii) High Voltage Risk Assessment (3b-iii) Safe Charge Rates for Li-Ion Cells (4) Availability of Source Material for Li-Ion Cells (5) NASA Aerospace Battery Workshop This presentation provides a brief overview of the tasks in the 2007 plan and serves as an introduction to more detailed discussions on each of the specific tasks.

Manzo, Michelle A.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Introduction to Flight Test Engineering [Introduction Aux Techniques Des Essais En Vol]

Flight test is at the core of what organizations must do in order to validate the operation and systems on an aircraft. While the AGARDograph series 300 and 160 series deal with aspects of this testing, this volume pulls it all together as an introduction to the process required to do effective flight test engineering. This volume was originally published in 1995. Its utility has been proven in that many flight test organizations and universities have requested copies for their engineers and students. It was felt that re-issuing it in a new format designed for electronic publication would be valuable to the community. This second printing changes none of the text, but rather reformats it. All the original references to AGARD (instead of RTO) are left in place so that none of the flavor of the original publication is lost. This is the Introductory Volume to the Flight Test Techniques Series. It is a general introduction to the various activities and aspects of Flight Test Engineering that must be considered when planning, conducting, and reporting a flight test program. Its main intent is to provide a broad overview to the novice engineer or to other people who have a need to interface with specialists within the flight test community. The first two Sections provide some insight into the question of why flight test and give a short history of flight test engineering. Sections 3 through 10 deal with the preparation for flight testing. They provide guidance on the preliminary factors that must be considered; the composition of the test team; the logistic support requirements; the instrumentation and data processing requirements; the flight test plan; the associated preliminary ground tests; and last, but by no means least, discuss safety aspects. Sections 11 through 27 describe the various types of flight tests that are usually conducted during the development and certification of a new or modified aircraft type. Each Section offers a brief introduction to the topic under consideration, and the nature and the objectives of the tests to be conducted. It lists the test instrumentation (and, where appropriate, other test equipment and facilities) required, describes the test maneuvers to be executed, and indicates the way in which the test data is selected, analyzed, and presented. The various activities that should take place between test flights are presented next. Items that are covered are: who to debrief; what type of reports to send where: types of data analysis required for next flight; review of test data to make a comparison to predicted data and some courses of action if there is not good agreement; and comments on selecting the next test flight. The activities that must take place upon completion of the test program are presented. The types of reports and briefings that should take place and a discussion of some of the uses of the flight test data are covered. A brief forecast is presented of where present trends may be leading.

Test facilities↗
NASA NTRS2026

Assessment of Aircraft Electric Engine Regulatory Special Conditions

This report provides a regulatory gap assessment of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Special Conditions (SC) for electric engines. This information is presented to support ongoing international harmonization efforts for electric engine certification, to establish a level of safety consistent across regulatory bodies and equivalent to that of existing combustion engines. HS Advanced Concepts LLC assembled a team of subject-matter experts to develop a comprehensive comparison of the regulatory text of EASA SC E-19 and the FAA special conditions for the certification of electric engines. The team included Mr. Chris Baczynski of BAC Aerospace Inc. and Mr. Zach Kaufman, formerly with magniX.

aircraft certification↗
NASA NTRS1994

Primary battery design and safety guidelines handbook

This handbook provides engineers and safety personnel with guidelines for the safe design or selection and use of primary batteries in spaceflight programs. Types of primary batteries described are silver oxide zinc alkaline, carbon-zinc, zinc-air alkaline, manganese dioxide-zionc alkaline, mercuric oxide-zinc alkaline, and lithium anode cells. Along with typical applications, the discussions of the individual battery types include electrochemistry, construction, capacities and configurations, and appropriate safety measures. A chapter on general battery safety covers hazard sources and controls applicable to all battery types. Guidelines are given for qualification and acceptance testing that should precede space applications. Permissible failure levels for NASA applications are discussed.

Bragg, Bobby J.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Standards Roadmapping for Mission Assurance in Commercial Spaceflight

This paper explores the application of established roadmapping approaches in standards planning and roadmap development to support mission assurance objectives. Mission assurance requires proactive planning across multiple domains including technical, schedule, cost, organizational, and policy. The intersection of these domains happens at the enterprise level, and enterprise systems engineering processes can systematically guide mission assurance activities, including development of standards roadmaps. Standards planning and development is a critical contributor to an effective mission assurance strategy, although standards are often developed and adopted reactively. Technology and standards planning is a key Enterprise Process Management activity, as identified by the Systems Engineering Body of Knowledge, and technology and standards roadmaps are strategic tools used to enable that process. Technology roadmapping has proven effective in guiding enterprise architecture and concept design, and standards planning supports enterprise requirements definition and management. However, there are limited methodologies to guide such standards planning activities. The application of technology roadmapping principles to standards planning formalizes the process and establishes a repeatable framework for standards development and integration. The framework development described in this paper fills a methodological gap by adapting proven roadmapping techniques to standards planning. Through a comparison of roadmapping methodologies and a case study analysis, this approach outlines a systematic process for anticipating and planning standards needs. In the case of developing a standards integration roadmap for NASA’s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA), technology roadmapping principles were adapted to develop a roadmap framework to allow NASA and OSMA to define an agency-wide standards integration plan for commercial and industry safety and mission assurance standards. The outcome highlights key adaptations required for roadmapping in a standards context and describes the process steps to formalize a standards planning activity. The roadmapping framework adapted for standards development and integration enables more strategic, forward-looking standards planning and allows for better alignment between evolving capabilities and mission assurance requirements. Beyond its application to mission assurance, this methodology can be transferred to other domains requiring standards development, providing a systematic approach that integrates systems engineering principles into policy strategy and decision-making processes.

Enterprise Systems Engineering↗
NASA NTRS2008

An Investigation of State-Space Model Fidelity for SSME Data

In previous studies, a variety of unsupervised anomaly detection techniques for anomaly detection were applied to SSME (Space Shuttle Main Engine) data. The observed results indicated that the identification of certain anomalies were specific to the algorithmic method under consideration. This is the reason why one of the follow-on goals of these previous investigations was to build an architecture to support the best capabilities of all algorithms. We appeal to that goal here by investigating a cascade, serial architecture for the best performing and most suitable candidates from previous studies. As a precursor to a formal ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) curve analysis for validation of resulting anomaly detection algorithms, our primary focus here is to investigate the model fidelity as measured by variants of the AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) for state-space based models. We show that placing constraints on a state-space model during or after the training of the model introduces a modest level of suboptimality. Furthermore, we compare the fidelity of all candidate models including those embodying the cascade, serial architecture. We make recommendations on the most suitable candidates for application to subsequent anomaly detection studies as measured by AIC-based criteria.

Space Shuttles↗
NASA NTRS2002

Research Reports: 2001 NASA/ASEE Summer Faculty Fellowship Program

For the thirty-seventh consecutive year, a NASA/ASEE (American Society for Engineering Education) Summer Faculty Fellowship Program was conducted at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). The program was conducted by The University of Alabama in Huntsville and MSFC during the period May 29 - August 3, 2001. Operated under the auspices of the American Society for Engineering Education, the MSFC program, as well as those at other NASA Centers, was sponsored by the University Affairs Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC. The basic objectives of the programs, which are in the thirty-seventh year of operation nationally, are (1) to further the professional knowledge of qualified engineering and science faculty members; (2) to stimulate an exchange of ideas between participants and NASA; (3) to enrich and refresh the research and teaching activities of the participants' institutions; and (4) to contribute to the research objectives of the NASA Centers. The Faculty Fellows spent ten weeks at MSFC engaged in a research project compatible with their interests and background and worked in collaboration with a NASA MSFC colleague. This document is a compilation of Fellows' reports on their research during the summer of 2001.

Avionics↗
NASA NTRS1983

The Galileo probe Li/SO2 battery: The safest battery on Jupiter

The unique power requirement of NASA's Galileo Jupiter Probe are most readily met by a Li/SO2 battery; however, because this battery system is not space flight proven, extensive effort was required to qualify this device from the stand point of performance and safety. Due to the rather checkered safety record of the Li/SO2 system, safety has been foremost among the design considerations and has been addressed at the cell, battery and system level. The mission requirements which led to the choice of the Li/SO2 battery and the safety engineering which went into the battery and power system design are described.

Marcoux, L. S.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Revisiting the Soyuz-1 Parachute Failure in the Context of Safety in the Modern Era

The Soyuz‑1 accident remains one of the most consequential parachute related failures in human spaceflight history and provides enduring lessons for modern Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL) system design. Occurring during the height of the Cold War and the Space Race, the mission unfolded under extraordinary political and schedule pressure as the Soviet Union sought to maintain its early leadership in space achievements following the death of chief designer Sergei Korolev. Despite unresolved propulsion, electrical, and parachute system deficiencies, Soyuz‑1 proceeded to launch and immediately encountered critical inflight anomalies, including a failed solar panel deployment, attitude control issues, and communication dropouts. Upon reentry, a malfunction in the parachute system, driven by a primary main canopy that failed to deploy, and subsequent entanglement of the reserve main canopy with the primary drogue parachute, resulted in insufficient deceleration and the fatal crash of cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov. Subsequent investigations revealed deep rooted cultural and organizational issues within the Soviet space program, including inadequate testing, suppression of dissent, undocumented last minute design changes, and the absence of integrated parachute system verification. More than 200 design flaws were identified after the accident, and firsthand accounts, including those from Yuri Gagarin, highlighted widespread concern prior to launch. Over time, the Soviet program implemented substantial reforms: systematic design corrections, rigorous process documentation, and an extensive series of drop tests that ultimately transformed the Soyuz system into one of the world’s most reliable human-rated return vehicles. This paper examines the technical architecture of the Soyuz‑1 parachute system, reconstructs the likely deployment sequence and failure mechanism, and analyzes the cultural contributors that shaped the accident. The study draws parallels to modern spacecraft parachute development, emphasizing the critical importance of integrated system testing, transparent engineering culture, and continuous hardware surveillance. These lessons remain directly relevant to today’s NASA and Commercial Crew Programs (CCP), where the Government continues to refine its understanding of aggregate risk and strengthen overall astronaut safety in the face of increasingly complex parachute systems.

Aaron L Morris↗
NASA NTRS2008

NASA Battery Working Group - 2007-2008: Battery Task Summary Report

This presentation provides a summary of the 2007-2008 NASA Battery Working Group efforts completed in support of the NASA Engineering Safety Center (NESC). The effort covered a series of pro-active tasks that address the following: Binding Procurements -- guidelines related to requirements for the battery system that should be considered at the time of contract award Wet Life of Ni-H2 Batteries -- issues/strategies for effective storage and impact of long-term storage on performance and life Generic Guidelines for Lithium-ion Safety, Handling and Qualification -- Standardized approaches developed and risk assessments (1) Lithium-ion Performance Assessment -- survey of manufacturers and capabilities to meet mission needs. Guidelines document generated (2) Conditions Required for using Pouch Cells in Aerospace Missions -- focus on corrosion, thermal excursions and long-term performance issues. Document defining requirements to maintain performance and life (3) High Voltage Risk Assessment -- focus on safety and abuse tolerance of battery module assemblies. Recommendations of features required for safe implementation (4) Procedure for Determination of Safe Charge Rates -- evaluation of various cell chemistries and recommendation of safe operating regimes for specific cell designs

Manzo, Michelle↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Fire-Resistant Textile Development for Exploration Vehicles With Enriched-Oxygen Cabin Environments

Material selection is a key part of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) spacecraft fire safety management plan. Non-flammable textiles are necessary to ensure large-scale flame propagation events do not occur inside a spacecraft. An increased use of textiles and other softgood material is crucial to the pursuit of exploration spaceflight to reduce mass and volume. Exploration spaceflight missions benefit from enriched oxygen cabin environments (>21% O2) by allowing a reduced prebreathe protocol before Extravehicular Activity (EVA). However, materials become exponentially more flammable the higher the O2 levels become. Recent testing within the agency has revealed the lack of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) materials that can meet safety requirements in oxygen-enriched environments. Most of the fibers and textiles developed during Apollo (100% O2 cabin environment) and Skylab (>70% O2 cabin environment) are no longer commercially available due to those Programs ending and the discontinuation of raw materials or closure of the original manufacturers. As NASA returns to higher oxygen concentrations inside spacecraft, non-flammable textile development efforts have begun to meet the agency’s needs. This paper discusses those efforts including overall fire safety approach, state-of-the-art textile review and testing, an agency-wide assessment of textile needs performed by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC), the textile development strategy and expected challenges.

Mary Walker↗
NASA NTRS1994

What to Do Until the Money Runs Out: A Refinement Framework for Cognitive Engineering in the Real World

A case study is presented to illustrate some of the problems of applying cognitive science to complex human-machine systems. Disregard for facts about human cognition often undermines the safety, reliability, and cost-effectiveness of complex systems. Yet single-point methods (for example, better user-interface design), whether rooted in computer science or in experimental psychology, fall far short of addressing systems-level problems in a timely way using realistic resources. A model-based methodology is proposed for organizing and prioritizing the cognitive engineering effort, focusing appropriate expertise on major problems first, then moving to more sophisticated refinements if time and resources permit. This case study is based on a collaborative effort between the Human Factors Division at NASA-Ames and the Spaceborne Imaging Radar SIR-C/X-Band Synthetic Aperture Radar (SIR-C/X-SAR) Project at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), California institute of Technology. The first SIR-C/X-SAR Shuttle mission flew successfully in April, 1994. A series of such missions is planned to provide radar data to study Earth's ecosystems, climatic and geological processes, hydrologic cycle, and ocean circulation. In addition to JPL and NASA personnel, the SIR-C/X-SAR operations team included Scientists and engineers from the German and Italian space agencies.

Shafto, Michael G.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Simplified Aid for Extra-Vehicular Activity Rescue (SAFER) Battery Assessment

In 2013, the Boeing Company model 787-8 Dreamliner commercial aircraft experienced three catastrophic lithium (Li) battery failures. The cause of each failure resulted in a single-cell thermal runaway (TR) condition, which propagated to adjacent battery cells. Two of the failures involved rechargeable lithium-ion (Li-Ion) batteries, and the third event involved a nonrechargeable lithium-manganese dioxide (Li-MnO2) battery. In response to these Li battery failures, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) approved a technical assessment of the International Space Station Simplified Aid for Extra-Vehicular Activity Rescue (SAFER) Li non-rechargeable battery. This assessment was conducted to evaluate the SAFER Li nonrechargeable battery safety design features against Boeing 787 Dreamliner Li battery failure lessons learned. Specifically, this investigation focused on assessing the severity of a SAFER battery TR hazard conditions.

Iannello, Christopher J.↗
NASA NTRS2026

Glenn Research Center Propulsion Systems Laboratory 2026 Customer Guide

This guide describes the Propulsion Systems Laboratory (PSL) at the NASA Glenn Research Center. It was written to help customers understand the various components involved in conducting a test program within the PSL. The PSL complex supports two large-engine test cells that simulate altitude flight conditions for a wide range of research and experimental tests. These test cells operate at altitudes up to 90,000 ft and speeds from subsonic to above supersonic. Test points such as pressure, temperature, and Mach number can be set at the engine or test article inlet based on customer requirements. The facility’s support systems include the heated and cooled combustion air systems; altitude exhaust system; hydraulic system; nitrogen, oxygen, and hydrogen systems; thrust measurement system, which includes the facility’s single- and multi-axis thrust stands; inlet system; and electrical systems. In addition to providing a detailed description of PSL systems and capabilities, this guide discusses the facility’s history and past tests and addresses facility safety procedures, pretest requirements, and test operation standards.

Engine Icing Test Facility↗
NASA NTRS2026

Flammability Testing Configuration and Approach of Barrier Material Assemblies Designed for Space Flight Applications

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) partnered with Materials and Processes and Flammability subject matter experts from the Johnson Space Center, White Sands Test Facility, and the Marshall Space Flight Center to design and develop a test for evaluating the effectiveness of material assemblies to serve as a barrier between a potential cabin ignition source based on typical flammable materials in the habitable volume of spacecraft.

Morgan Abney↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Preliminary Findings of the Experimental Development Unit Cold Flow Test for a Generation Zero Nuclear Propulsion Engine

Nuclear thermal propulsion (NTP) technology will greatly benefit human travel to Mars by significantly shortening transit times, improving crew safety, and providing more mission flexibility than traditional chemical rockets. As part of DRACO follow-on work to develop, build, and fly a generation zero NTP engine, a full scale flight-like experimental design unit (EDU) reactor was constructed to collect sufficient on-ground performance data to characterize flow induced vibrations (FIV) of critical reactor structures/components, inform development of the engine and reactor control algorithm, and collect pressure drop and flow distribution data across the reactor. The fluid conditions for the test program were designed to achieve system responses equivalent to that of an operational engine through all phases of engine operation including reactor startup, mainstage operation, reactor shutdown, and reactor cooldown. Over 100 tests were executed, flowing either GN2 or GHe through the EDU at varying flow rates and pressures. This experiment provided early validation of flow behavior and vibration risks before nuclear testing, boosted critical subsystem TRLs, informed design iterations, and reduced future test costs. The steady-state flow parameters for the experiment were modeled in Ansys Thermal Desktop, allowing rapid tuning and experiment-informed updates to a flight-like test matrix. The EDU dynamic environment was characterized with accelerometers, strain gauges, and high-frequency pressure transducers all sampled at 20 kHz. While many narrow-band oscillations were identified, no significant FIV occurred; the reactor structural responses tend to be enveloped by typical launch vehicle ascent vibration environments (defined up to 2 kHz), although significant energy is also present at higher frequencies.

Flow Induced Vibration↗
NASA NTRS2003

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report: Volume One

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board's independent investigation into the February 1, 2003, loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and its seven-member crew lasted nearly seven months. A staff of more than 120, along with some 400 NASA engineers, supported the Board's 13 members. Investigators examined more than 30,000 documents, conducted more than 200 formal interviews, heard testimony from dozens of expert witnesses, and reviewed more than 3,000 inputs from the general public. In addition, more than 25,000 searchers combed vast stretches of the Western United States to retrieve the spacecraft's debris. In the process, Columbia's tragedy was compounded when two debris searchers with the U.S. Forest Service perished in a helicopter accident. This report discusses the attributes of an organization that could more safely and reliably operate the inherently risky Space Shuttle, but does not provide a detailed organizational prescription. Among those attributes are: a robust and independent program technical authority that has complete control over specifications and requirements, and waivers to them; an independent safety assurance organization with line authority over all levels of safety oversight; and an organizational culture that reflects the best characteristics of a learning organization. This report concludes with recommendations, some of which are specifically identified and prefaced as "before return to flight." These recommendations are largely related to the physical cause of the accident, and include preventing the loss of foam, improved imaging of the Space Shuttle stack from liftoff through separation of the External Tank, and on-orbit inspection and repair of the Thermal Protection System. The remaining recommendations, for the most part, stem from the Board's findings on organizational cause factors. While they are not "before return to flight" recommendations, they can be viewed as "continuing to fly" recommendations, as they capture the Board's thinking on what changes are necessary to operate the Shuttle and future spacecraft safely in the mid- to long-term.

CAIB↗