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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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7 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Exploring Methods to Collect and Analyze Data on Human Contributions to Aviation Safety: A Panel Discussion

Focusing on undesired operator behaviors is pervasive in system design and safety management cultures in aviation. This focus limits the data that are collected, the questions that are asked during data analysis, and therefore our understanding of what operators do in everyday work. Human performance represents a significant source of aviation safety data that includes both desired and undesired actions. When safety is characterized only in terms of errors and failures, the vast majority of human impacts on system safety and performance are ignored. The outcomes of safety data analyses dictate what is learned from those data, which in turn informs safety policies and safety-related decision making. When learning opportunities are systematically restricted by focusing only on rare failure events, not only do we learn less (and less often), but we can draw misleading conclusions by relying on a non-representative sample of human performance data. Changes in how we define and think about safety can highlight new opportunities for collection and analysis of safety-relevant data. Developing an integrated safety picture to better inform safety-related decision making and policies depends upon identifying, collecting, and interpreting safety-producing behaviors in addition to safety-reducing behaviors. Opportunities and challenges in collecting and analyzing the largely unexploited data on desired, safety-producing operator behaviors are discussed.

Aviation Safety↗
NASA NTRS2021

Resilience Engineering's Potential for Advanced Air Mobility (AAM)

The national airspace (NAS) will rapidly evolve in the next ten to twenty years. Plans for Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) during that period envision highly automated airspace management systems and electrically powered vehicles. AAM concepts also anticipate limited human roles. The goal of limiting the human role is to minimize the potential for misadventures, yet how the human role is limited needs to be carefully considered in order to also preserve the potential for human successes. The field of resilience engineering (RE) focuses on how systems can change in order to seize an opportunity or withstand an unforeseen challenge. RE methods rely on the use of empirical data to optimize the ability of any system to adapt. RE studies have shown how individual and team initiatives ensure resilient system performance by creating safety through flexibility. Benefits of the RE approach include improved awareness of operational circumstances and how system elements depend on each other, and the ability to allocate limited resources and prepare for surprise. RE offers the ability to account for and incorporate the human role as an essential element in order to ensure NAS systems’ resilient performance. Data on the human contribution to safe and resilient system performance, which is termed “work as done,” are available but are not being considered as the NAS evolves. We present an approach that describes how use of RE can enable the evolving NAS to adapt, and perform, in a resilient manner.

Aviation Safety↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Exploring Methods to Collect and Analyze Data on Human Contributions to Aviation Safety: A Panel Discussion

Focusing on undesired operator behaviors is pervasive in system design and safety management cultures in aviation. This focus limits the data that are collected, the questions that are asked during data analysis, and therefore our understanding of what operators do in everyday work. Human performance represents a significant source of aviation safety data that includes both desired and undesired actions. When safety is characterized only in terms of errors and failures, the vast majority of human impacts on system safety and performance are ignored. The outcomes of safety data analyses dictate what is learned from those data, which in turn informs safety policies and safety-related decision making. When learning opportunities are systematically restricted by focusing only on rare failure events, not only do we learn less (and less often), but we can draw misleading conclusions by relying on a non-representative sample of human performance data. Changes in how we define and think about safety can highlight new opportunities for collection and analysis of safety-relevant data. Developing an integrated safety picture to better inform safety-related decision making and policies depends upon identifying, collecting, and interpreting safety producing behaviors in addition to safety reducing behaviors. The panel will discuss opportunities and challenges in collecting and analyzing the largely unexploited data on desired, safety-producing operator behaviors.

aviation safety↗