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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2017

Security Vulnerability Profiles of NASA Mission Software: Empirical Analysis of Security Related Bug Reports

NASA develops, runs, and maintains software systems for which security is of vital importance. Therefore, it is becoming an imperative to develop secure systems and extend the current software assurance capabilities to cover information assurance and cybersecurity concerns of NASA missions. The results presented in this report are based on the information provided in the issue tracking systems of one ground mission and one flight mission. The extracted data were used to create three datasets: Ground mission IVV issues, Flight mission IVV issues, and Flight mission Developers issues. In each dataset, we identified the software bugs that are security related and classified them in specific security classes. This information was then used to create the security vulnerability profiles (i.e., to determine how, why, where, and when the security vulnerabilities were introduced) and explore the existence of common trends. The main findings of our work include:- Code related security issues dominated both the Ground and Flight mission IVV security issues, with 95 and 92, respectively. Therefore, enforcing secure coding practices and verification and validation focused on coding errors would be cost effective ways to improve mission's security. (Flight mission Developers issues dataset did not contain data in the Issue Category.)- In both the Ground and Flight mission IVV issues datasets, the majority of security issues (i.e., 91 and 85, respectively) were introduced in the Implementation phase. In most cases, the phase in which the issues were found was the same as the phase in which they were introduced. The most security related issues of the Flight mission Developers issues dataset were found during Code Implementation, Build Integration, and Build Verification; the data on the phase in which these issues were introduced were not available for this dataset.- The location of security related issues, as the location of software issues in general, followed the Pareto principle. Specifically, for all three datasets, from 86 to 88 the security related issues were located in two to four subsystems.- The severity levels of most security issues were moderate, in all three datasets.- Out of 21 primary security classes, five dominated: Exception Management, Memory Access, Other, Risky Values, and Unused Entities. Together, these classes contributed from around 80 to 90 of all security issues in each dataset. This again proves the Pareto principle of uneven distribution of security issues, in this case across CWE classes, and supports the fact that addressing these dominant security classes provides the most cost efficient way to improve missions' security. The findings presented in this report uncovered the security vulnerability profiles and identified the common trends and dominant classes of security issues, which in turn can be used to select the most efficient secure design and coding best practices compiled by the part of the SARP project team associated with the NASA's Johnson Space Center. In addition, these findings provide valuable input to the NASA IVV initiative aimed at identification of the two 25 CWEs of ground and flight missions.

vulnerability↗
DOE OSTI2025

Artificial Intelligence for (AI) Nuclear Security: Expert Perspectives on AI Priorities for the Office of International Nuclear Security

Artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to transform nuclear security operations, offering opportunities to enhance effectiveness while simultaneously introducing new challenges. As AI technologies rapidly evolve, agencies across the United States Government (USG) are researching, implementing, and evaluating various AI models and systems. Given the broad capabilities and applications of these technologies, it is essential for each agency to identify and articulate those areas where it can make meaningful contributions aligned with its mission and expertise. To address this need for strategic focus, in late Fiscal Year 2025 (FY2025), the Office of International Nuclear Security (INS) established an AI Task Force (AITF) to gather input from subject matter experts (SMEs) regarding the most appropriate role INS could serve in researching, evaluating, or implementing AI for nuclear security. The AITF engaged 15 experts from national laboratories with backgrounds in cyber security, physical security, transport security, insider threat mitigation, nuclear engineering, human-systems engineering, and AI/ML development. This white paper summarizes the insights gathered from these SMEs and presents a potential roadmap for INS engagement with AI technologies. The recommendations outlined here are intended to inform INS leadership as they make strategic decisions about resource allocation and program direction in this rapidly evolving technological domain.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Fusing Edge Computing with Transport Security by Leveraging the Controller Area Network Transport Security Tracking and Reporting (C-STAR) Unit

Rapid advances in embedded system complexity and capability provides exciting opportunities for transportation security deployment. Manufacturers and developers of these embedded systems continue to provide lower cost and more powerful solutions that can be leveraged by researchers and engineers. Furthermore, deploying these devices at the “edge” of the Internet-of-Things (IoT) infrastructure provides opportunities for highly capable applications in transport security. In an edge computation architecture, the device is co-located at the source of the data in the larger IoT structure – this provides computational capability at the location directly where the data is collected. For shipment transport security, this provides a direct compute node for digestion of data and mitigation actions in real-time. In our application, the vehicle provides a significant amount of this data that can be processed in real-time via the Controller Area Network Transport Security Tracking and Reporting (C-STAR) edge device. Utilization of a computational node located on the vehicle, such as the C-STAR, capitalizes on previously discussed opportunities of edge architectures. In this paper, we will discuss this security solution’s usability, current deployments, and scalability to further applications in transport security. First, we will cover the supported vehicle platforms that can leverage the C-STAR technology. This will be particularly relevant to medium- and heavy-duty vehicles transporting high-risk shipments. Second, we will speak to current deployments of the C-STAR that are ongoing. Finally, we will discuss additional areas for expansion such as maturing the onboard algorithms through continuing collaborations.

Cook, Adian [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000160825395)↗
NASA NTRS2004

Using software security analysis to verify the secure socket layer (SSL) protocol

nal Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) have tens of thousands of networked computer systems and applications. Software Security vulnerabilities present risks such as lost or corrupted data, information the3, and unavailability of critical systems. These risks represent potentially enormous costs to NASA. The NASA Code Q research initiative 'Reducing Software Security Risk (RSSR) Trough an Integrated Approach '' offers, among its capabilities, formal verification of software security properties, through the use of model based verification (MBV) to address software security risks. [1,2,3,4,5,6] MBV is a formal approach to software assurance that combines analysis of software, via abstract models, with technology, such as model checkers, that provide automation of the mechanical portions of the analysis process. This paper will discuss: The need for formal analysis to assure software systems with respect to software and why testing alone cannot provide it. The means by which MBV with a Flexible Modeling Framework (FMF) accomplishes the necessary analysis task. An example of FMF style MBV in the verification of properties over the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) communication protocol as a demonstration.

software↗
NASA NTRS2003

Secured Advanced Federated Environment (SAFE): A NASA Solution for Secure Cross-Organization Collaboration

This paper discusses the challenges and security issues inherent in building complex cross-organizational collaborative projects and software systems within NASA. By applying the design principles of compartmentalization, organizational hierarchy and inter-organizational federation, the Secured Advanced Federated Environment (SAFE) is laying the foundation for a collaborative virtual infrastructure for the NASA community. A key element of SAFE is the Micro Security Domain (MSD) concept, which balances the need to collaborate and the need to enforce enterprise and local security rules. With the SAFE approach, security is an integral component of enterprise software and network design, not an afterthought.

Chow, Edward↗
NASA NTRS2015

Applying a Space-Based Security Recovery Scheme for Critical Homeland Security Cyberinfrastructure Utilizing the NASA Tracking and Data Relay (TDRS) Based Space Network

Protection of the national infrastructure is a high priority for cybersecurity of the homeland. Critical infrastructure such as the national power grid, commercial financial networks, and communications networks have been successfully invaded and re-invaded from foreign and domestic attackers. The ability to re-establish authentication and confidentiality of the network participants via secure channels that have not been compromised would be an important countermeasure to compromise of our critical network infrastructure. This paper describes a concept of operations by which the NASA Tracking and Data Relay (TDRS) constellation of spacecraft in conjunction with the White Sands Complex (WSC) Ground Station host a security recovery system for re-establishing secure network communications in the event of a national or regional cyberattack. Users would perform security and network restoral functions via a Broadcast Satellite Service (BSS) from the TDRS constellation. The BSS enrollment only requires that each network location have a receive antenna and satellite receiver. This would be no more complex than setting up a DIRECTTV-like receiver at each network location with separate network connectivity. A GEO BSS would allow a mass re-enrollment of network nodes (up to nationwide) simultaneously depending upon downlink characteristics. This paper details the spectrum requirements, link budget, notional assets and communications requirements for the scheme. It describes the architecture of such a system and the manner in which it leverages off of the existing secure infrastructure which is already in place and managed by the NASAGSFC Space Network Project.

Cybersecurity↗
NASA NTRS2015

Securing the Global Airspace System Via Identity-Based Security

Current telecommunications systems have very good security architectures that include authentication and authorization as well as accounting. These three features enable an edge system to obtain access into a radio communication network, request specific Quality-of-Service (QoS) requirements and ensure proper billing for service. Furthermore, the links are secure. Widely used telecommunication technologies are Long Term Evolution (LTE) and Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) This paper provides a system-level view of network-centric operations for the global airspace system and the problems and issues with deploying new technologies into the system. The paper then focuses on applying the basic security architectures of commercial telecommunication systems and deployment of federated Authentication, Authorization and Accounting systems to provide a scalable, evolvable reliable and maintainable solution to enable a globally deployable identity-based secure airspace system.

Communications↗
DOE OSTI2025

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) Infrastructure Security Division (ISD) Assessment Prioritization Project

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s Infrastructure Security Division (CISA ISD) manages a diverse portfolio of assessments across the nation’s critical infrastructure sectors. These assessments—ranging in type, scope, and complexity—are essential for identifying vulnerabilities and strengthening national security. However, the wide variation in assessment offerings and the increasing demand for limited resources have highlighted the need for a transparent, structured approach to prioritizing assessment activities. To address this challenge, CISA ISD partnered with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) to review current assessment methodologies, analyze existing prioritization practices, and develop a comprehensive, national-security-focused prioritization framework. This report summarizes the project’s approach, key findings, and actionable recommendations for enhancing ISD’s assessment program.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
NASA NTRS2004

Security engineering: systems engineering of security through the adaptation and application of risk management

Information Technology (IT) Security Risk Management is a critical task in the organization, which must protect its resources and data against the loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. As systems become more complex and diverse, and more vulnerabilities are discovered while attacks from intrusions and malicious content increase, it is becoming increasingly difficult to manage IT security. This paper describes an approach to address IT security risk through risk management and mitigation in both the institution and in the project life cycle.

security↗
NASA NTRS2011

Computer Network Security- The Challenges of Securing a Computer Network

This article is intended to give the reader an overall perspective on what it takes to design, implement, enforce and secure a computer network in the federal and corporate world to insure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information. While we will be giving you an overview of network design and security, this article will concentrate on the technology and human factors of securing a network and the challenges faced by those doing so. It will cover the large number of policies and the limits of technology and physical efforts to enforce such policies.

Scotti, Vincent, Jr.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Security Vulnerability Profiles of Mission Critical Software: Empirical Analysis of Security Related Bug Reports

While some prior research work exists on characteristics of software faults (i.e., bugs) and failures, very little work has been published on analysis of software applications vulnerabilities. This paper aims to contribute towards filling that gap by presenting an empirical investigation of application vulnerabilities. The results are based on data extracted from issue tracking systems of two NASA missions. These data were organized in three datasets: Ground mission IVV issues, Flight mission IVV issues, and Flight mission Developers issues. In each dataset, we identified security related software bugs and classified them in specific vulnerability classes. Then, we created the security vulnerability profiles, i.e., determined where and when the security vulnerabilities were introduced and what were the dominating vulnerabilities classes. Our main findings include: (1) In IVV issues datasets the majority of vulnerabilities were code related and were introduced in the Implementation phase. (2) For all datasets, around 90 of the vulnerabilities were located in two to four subsystems. (3) Out of 21 primary classes, five dominated: Exception Management, Memory Access, Other, Risky Values, and Unused Entities. Together, they contributed from 80 to 90 of vulnerabilities in each dataset.

Goseva-Popstojanova, Katerina↗
NASA NTRS2003

Reducing software security risk through an integrated approach research initiative model based verification of the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) Protocol

This document discusses the verification of the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) communication protocol as a demonstration of the Model Based Verification (MBV) portion of the verification instrument set being developed under the Reducing Software Security Risk (RSSR) Trough an Integrated Approach research initiative. Code Q of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) funds this project. The NASA Goddard Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) facility manages this research program at the NASA agency level and the Assurance Technology Program Office (ATPO) manages the research locally at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (California institute of Technology) where the research is being carried out.

software security↗
NASA NTRS2000

Endpoint Security Using Biometric Authentication for Secure Remote Mission Operations

We propose a flexible security authentication solution for the spacecraft end-user, which will allow the user to interact over Internet with the spacecraft, its instruments, or with the ground segment from anywhere, anytime based on the user's pre-defined set of privileges. This package includes biometrics authentication products, such as face, voice or fingerprint recognition, authentication services and procedures, such as: user registration and verification over the Internet and user database maintenance, with a configurable schema of spacecraft users' privileges. This fast and reliable user authentication mechanism will become an integral part of end-to-end ground-to-space secure Internet communications and migration from current practice to the future. All modules and services of the proposed package are commercially available and built to the NIST BioAPI standard, which facilitates "pluggability" and interoperability.

Donohue, John T.↗