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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

5G Communications in Nuclear: Potential Use Cases and Security Considerations

As fifth-generation (5G) communications continues to revolutionize the future of wireless technology, there is growing demand to utilize its benefits for critical infrastructures such as nuclear power plants (NPPs). In regard to achieving full automation and control in the operation of existing and future nuclear reactors, the unique capabilities of 5G can bring several potential advantages over other wireless technologies. However, a deep investigation is needed for the availability and security of 5G communications under various NPP operational scenarios. This article examines how 5G security capabilities can be architecturally deployed in nuclear applications so as to replace existing communication infrastructures. We discuss the current use of all wireless technologies in NPPs with their key features. Consequently, we investigated several NPP use cases in which 5G offers potential advantages but entails specific security considerations. The present article covers the characteristics of 5G communications, general challenges to its application in nuclear, and the security gaps that need to be addressed. We also highlight certain 5G security-by-design features that can help addressing current stringent NPP requirements. In addition, we discuss some future research direction that can facilitate the implementation of 5G in a nuclear facility. The findings presented herein can help foster 5G deployment in NPPs, thus enabling secured data transmission, cost savings, and increased operational efficiency with enhanced reliability.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Operation and Security Considerations for Heat Pipe Cooled Microreactors

Microreactors and small modular reactors (SMRs) are anticipated to be key elements in the United States' carbon-free energy portfolio, serving as reliable power sources for remote communities, disaster relief zones, extraterrestrial deployments, and backup power needs. Microreactors employ technologies that are substantially more advanced and recent compared to conventional reactors. Furthermore, they are of a drastically smaller scale and are designed to be operated in a diverse set of locations, offering operational flexibility and mobility. In addition, the autonomous or semi-autonomous operation of microreactors with minimal or no on-site staff is anticipated. These factors give rise to specific challenges with regards to their safety and security. The present work investigates considerations related to heat pipe operation, reactor transport, and cyber/cyberphysical security to ensure the indirect and direct consequences of nefarious actors’ actions are understood and can be mitigated by design or through physical security measures. In addition, future directions are proposed for consideration by both HPMR designers and for regulators.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
NASA NTRS2003

Additional Security Considerations for Grid Management

The use of Grid computing environments is growing in popularity. A Grid computing environment is primarily a wide area network that encompasses multiple local area networks, where some of the local area networks are managed by different organizations. A Grid computing environment also includes common interfaces for distributed computing software so that the heterogeneous set of machines that make up the Grid can be used more easily. The other key feature of a Grid is that the distributed computing software includes appropriate security technology. The focus of most Grid software is on the security involved with application execution, file transfers, and other remote computing procedures. However, there are other important security issues related to the management of a Grid and the users who use that Grid. This note discusses these additional security issues and makes several suggestions as how they can be managed.

Eidson, Thomas M.↗
DOE OSTI2025

Integrating Safety, Security, and Nuclear Operations for Advanced Reactors

The traditional separation between safety, security, and operations teams has created significant barriers to achieving optimal outcomes. When security considerations are introduced late in the design process, they often conflict with already-established architectural, operational, or engineering parameters. Retrofitting security measures can lead to increased costs, schedule delays, and compromises in security effectiveness. For instance, the need to retrofit physical barriers or surveillance systems often results in trade-offs that could have been avoided with earlier input from security professionals. Delayed integration can also affect regulatory processes and result in licensing delays. Security reviews conducted at later stages frequently identify gaps that necessitate significant redesign efforts, impacting not only scope, schedule, and budget, but also adding risk and lowering stakeholder confidence in the project. This paper aims to address these challenges by identifying practical opportunities for integrating security considerations seamlessly with design and operations teams throughout the entire lifecycle of nuclear facilities—from conceptual design to commissioning and beyond. The research emphasizes the value of early and continuous collaboration among stakeholders to ensure that security measures are robust, operationally effective, and cost-efficient. By examining case studies, analyzing past incidents, and leveraging best practices from other high-security industries, this study highlights actionable strategies for bridging the gap between safety, security, and operations teams.

Zineddin, Dr. Z. [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000848740725)↗
NASA NTRS2004

Common Operating Picture: UAV Security Study

This initial communication security study is a top-level assessment of basic security issues related to the operation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in the National Airspace System (NAS). Security considerations will include information relating to the use of International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Aeronautical Telecommunications Network (ATN) protocols and applications identifying their maturity, as well as the use of IPV4 and a version of mobile IPV6. The purpose of this assessment is to provide an initial analysis of the security implications of introducing UAVs into the NAS.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1973

Feasibility study of an Integrated Program for Aerospace vehicle Design (IPAD). Volume 4: IPAD system design

The computing system design of IPAD is described and the requirements which form the basis for the system design are discussed. The system is presented in terms of a functional design description and technical design specifications. The functional design specifications give the detailed description of the system design using top-down structured programming methodology. Human behavioral characteristics, which specify the system design at the user interface, security considerations, and standards for system design, implementation, and maintenance are also part of the technical design specifications. Detailed specifications of the two most common computing system types in use by the major aerospace companies which could support the IPAD system design are presented. The report of a study to investigate migration of IPAD software between the two candidate 3rd generation host computing systems and from these systems to a 4th generation system is included.

Goldfarb, W.↗
NASA NTRS1984

Operation of a single-channel, sequential Navstar GPS receiver in a helicopter mission environment

It is pointed out that the future utilization of the Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) by civil helicopters will provide an enhanced performance not obtainable with current navigations systems. GPS will supply properly equipped users with extremely accurate three-dimensional position and velocity information anywhere in the world. Preliminary studies have been conducted to investigate differential GPS concept mechanizations and cost, and to theoretically predict navigation performance and the impact of degradation of the GPS C/A code for national security considerations. The obtained results are encouraging, but certain improvements are needed. As a second step in the program, a single-channel sequential GPS navigator was installed and operated in the NASA SH-3G helicopter. A series of flight tests were conducted. It is found that performance of the Navstar GPS Z-set is quite acceptable to support area navigation and nonprecision approach operations.

Edwards, F. G.↗
NASA NTRS1993

The Database Query Support Processor (QSP)

The number and diversity of databases available to users continues to increase dramatically. Currently, the trend is towards decentralized, client server architectures that (on the surface) are less expensive to acquire, operate, and maintain than information architectures based on centralized, monolithic mainframes. The database query support processor (QSP) effort evaluates the performance of a network level, heterogeneous database access capability. Air Force Material Command's Rome Laboratory has developed an approach, based on ANSI standard X3.138 - 1988, 'The Information Resource Dictionary System (IRDS)' to seamless access to heterogeneous databases based on extensions to data dictionary technology. To successfully query a decentralized information system, users must know what data are available from which source, or have the knowledge and system privileges necessary to find out this information. Privacy and security considerations prohibit free and open access to every information system in every network. Even in completely open systems, time required to locate relevant data (in systems of any appreciable size) would be better spent analyzing the data, assuming the original question was not forgotten. Extensions to data dictionary technology have the potential to more fully automate the search and retrieval for relevant data in a decentralized environment. Substantial amounts of time and money could be saved by not having to teach users what data resides in which systems and how to access each of those systems. Information describing data and how to get it could be removed from the application and placed in a dedicated repository where it belongs. The result simplified applications that are less brittle and less expensive to build and maintain. Software technology providing the required functionality is off the shelf. The key difficulty is in defining the metadata required to support the process. The database query support processor effort will provide quantitative data on the amount of effort required to implement an extended data dictionary at the network level, add new systems, adapt to changing user needs, and provide sound estimates on operations and maintenance costs and savings.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2012

An Evaluation of Protocols for UAV Science Applications

This paper identifies data transport needs for current and future science payloads deployed on the NASA Global Hawk Unmanned Aeronautical Vehicle (UAV). The NASA Global Hawk communication system and operational constrains are presented. The Genesis and Rapid Intensification Processes (GRIP) mission is used to provide the baseline communication requirements as a variety of payloads were utilized in this mission. User needs and desires are addressed. Protocols are matched to the payload needs and an evaluation of various techniques and tradeoffs are presented. Such techniques include utilization rate-base selective negative acknowledgement protocols and possible use of protocol enhancing proxies. Tradeoffs of communication architectures that address ease-of-use and security considerations are also presented.

Ivancic, William D.↗
DOE OSTI2024

UAS IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY

Uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) have been an area of focus for the Office of International Nuclear Security within the US Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration and other foreign and domestic organizations for several years. This emerging technology provides significant capabilities to the nuclear security realm, but there are many things to consider when implementing them into an established security design or network. The goal of this paper is to discuss some of the benefits, challenges, and lessons learned with using UAS at nuclear facilities and during transport of material. Generic examples of UAS implementation will be used to facilitate a publicly releasable paper and presentation. The paper will start with a summary of the types and capabilities of UAS to provide a better understanding for people unfamiliar with current and new capabilities of these systems. Since there are many different types and sizes of UAS, this paper will focus on drones 55 lb and smaller. Then some of the use cases of UAS for security and challenges of employing them will be covered. Finally, lessons learned and some best practices that Oak Ridge National Laboratory has discovered from research, development, testing, and evaluation will be summarized.

Stockwell, Brandon↗
NASA NTRS1990

Considerations of persistence and security in CHOICES, an object-oriented operating system

The current design of the CHOICES persistent object implementation is summarized, and research in progress is outlined. CHOICES is implemented as an object-oriented system, and persistent objects appear to simplify and unify many functions of the system. It is demonstrated that persistent data can be accessed through an object-oriented file system model as efficiently as by an existing optimized commercial file system. The object-oriented file system can be specialized to provide an object store for persistent objects. The problems that arise in building an efficient persistent object scheme in a 32-bit virtual address space that only uses paging are described. Despite its limitations, the solution presented allows quite large numbers of objects to be active simultaneously, and permits sharing and efficient method calls.

Campbell, Roy H.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate System Security Engineering Approaches

System security engineering (SSE) is a set of formal engineering methods and is considered a subset of systems engineering. It is a relatively new development in systems engineering with the initial NIST (National Institute of Standards) standard published in November of 2016 with updates in 2018, and 2022. The guiding principles in our methodology are based in NIST Special Publication 800-160 Vol. 1 “Systems Security Engineering: Considerations For A Multidisciplinary Approach In The Engineering Of Trustworthy Secure Systems” and integrate methodologies from common IT (Information Technology) threat modeling approaches utilizing MBSE (Model-Based Systems Engineering). The presentation will discuss how our teams utilize SSE and MBSE (Model-Based Systems Engineering) to develop secure architectures for systems under development in our NASA aeronautics research environment. This includes the activities to develop Protection Needs (PN) that, in turn result in security requirements in the design context and policies for the future state operational context for system protection. The process of applying SSE to analyze project architectures and ConOps (Concept of Operations) is intended to ensure the transferred research is both secure and securable in a “real-world” setting.

Systems Security Engineering↗
DOE OSTI2025

Advanced Reactor Designs Security Analysis, Risk, and Recommendations: Risks, Consequences, and Possible by-Design Mitigation Approaches Associated with Select Advanced Reactors

Next-generation advanced reactors (ARs) incorporate enhanced safety systems, have smaller source terms, and feature compact modular designs, which should lessen their collective risk profiles. However, to fully evaluate risk, security needs to be a part of the equation. Without taking security into consideration, safety systems and components in the new ARs may be vulnerable to sabotage. These base attributes, coupled with enhanced security features specific to AR design through sound engineering and security-by-design (SeBD), should provide developers and operators with lower inherent security risk profiles. Building security early into the AR design may remove or passively secure potential critical targets from an adversary’s reach , thereby increasing overall safety and security. An integrated approach and diverse design team that includes engineering, operations, and security experts are fundamental to building security into the design without sacrificing fundamental operational efficiencies and principles. The objective of this project was to evaluate the security and safety interfaces for five classes of reactors, identify potential security vulnerabilities of structures, systems, and components (SSC), and underscore the need to consider security alongside safety in the design o f these concepts. The five reactor classes evaluated in this project and presented in this report are molten-salt reactors (MSR), high temperature gas reactors (HTGR), sodium-fast reactors (SFR), advanced light-water reactors (ALWR), and microreactors. These designs were selected because they reflect the concepts that are closest to market deployment and have received significant resource investments from the public and private sector. This project assesses the inherent security risks posed by common classes of ARs, provides a methodology and framework to assess security along with safety, and offers an analysis of potential mitigation strategies that could be incorporated. For each AR technology, the SSCs that relate to radionuclide source safety functions are discussed to understand the SSC contribution to safety and relative importance in the protective strategy for the design. The assumptions that went into evaluating each reactor concept originated from generic publicly available nonproprietary information and should not directly be used to qualify an absolute risk profile nor to rank specific AR designs. Instead, the purpose of the analysis is to understand and compare the generic inherent security risks of different AR technologies.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗
NASA NTRS2018

Engineering Trade-off Considerations Regarding Design-for-Security, Design-for-Verification, and Design-for-Test

The United States government has identified that application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) and field programmable gate array (FPGA) hardware are at risk from a variety of adversary attacks. This finding affects system security and trust. Consequently, processes are being developed for system mitigation and countermeasure application. The scope of this tutorial pertains to potential vulnerabilities and countermeasures within the ASIC/FPGA design cycle. The presentation demonstrates how design practices can affect the risk for the adversary to: change circuitry, steal intellectual property, and listen to data operations. An important portion of the design cycle is assuring the design is working as specified or as expected. This is accomplished by exhaustive testing of the target design. Alternatively, it has been shown that well established schemes for test coverage enhancement (design-for-verification (DFV) and design-for-test (DFT)) can create conduits for adversary accessibility. As a result, it is essential to perform a trade between robust test coverage versus reliable design implementation. The goal of this tutorial is to explain the evolution of design practices; review adversary accessibility points due to DFV and DFT circuitry insertion (back door circuitry); and to describe common engineering trade-off considerations for test versus adversary threats.

Design for reliability (DFR)↗
DOE OSTI2025

Shielding the Quantum Realm: Technical Considerations for Maintaining a Stable and Secure Radio Frequency Environment for Quantum Research

Advancements in quantum technology, which include quantum computing, quantum sensing, quantum communications, and associated research, continue to revolutionize various fields of study by solving challenging problems deemed too difficult or more efficient than those used for classical computers. However, as these systems become ever so complex, it is critical to secure their electromagnetic operational environments and the associated impact on quantum systems and infrastructure. The goal of this synopsis is to bring attention to the susceptibility of quantum technology facilities to potential issues related to the radio frequency (RF) environment within the broader electromagnetic context. A framework is proposed for identifying, mitigating, monitoring, and auditing these often complex operational environments. By establishing best practices in the consideration and evaluation of these criteria, one can enhance the operational integrity, resilience, and security of quantum technology systems and facilities, thereby supporting their continued development and application in research and industry.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Test and Evaluation of Radiofrequency Tamper Indicating Devices for Remote Monitoring of Advanced/Small Modular Reactors

Advanced and small modular reactors (A/SMRs), due to their versatile nature, are likely to be used in remote locations to provide electrical power or other services in regions that are difficult to access or have limited transportation infrastructure. This will result in limited on-site staff, therefore driving A/SMR vendors to consider remote monitoring as a solution to support nuclear security. Maintaining Continuity of Knowledge (CoK) of nuclear material quantities and locations is vital to nuclear security, and remote monitoring of active tamper indicating devices (TIDs) has been well established as a component of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards since the early 2000s. Active TIDs, such as radiofrequency TIDs (RFTIDs), immediately alarm upon unauthorized access attempts, promoting timely detection. In contrast, passive TIDs require a surveillance regime and offer delayed detection. Active TIDs deter insiders and enable prompt detection of malicious acts. They can be used on nuclear material containers and controlled entry points like vaults and toolboxes. Therefore, the implementation of RFTIDs into security programs bolsters overall nuclear material control, and provides a visible deterrent, with primary efficacy in mitigating the insider threat and potentially allowing for Security by Design considerations. They are a strong candidate technology for maintaining nuclear security of A/SMRs but need to be evaluated for feasibility and implementation into the wider physical protection system.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Regulatory Considerations for Domestic Reprocessing Facility Physical Security

U.S. advanced non-light-water reactor vendors may pursue collocated on-site reprocessing activities. Therefore, these facilities are likely to possess formula quantities, or Category I quantities, of special nuclear material (SNM) during normal operations. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S. NRC) has yet to formally establish a regulatory framework for commercial reprocessing. While Category I requirements would explicitly not apply in this circumstance under current regulatory requirements, regulatory certainty does not exist. A novel framework should be developed to ensure public health and safety while also risk-informing the physical security requirements. This report reviews the relevant background of related rulemaking activities and proposes risk-informed physical protection requirements to satisfy these objectives. Insights from NRC security-related rulemaking activities provide a substantial technical basis to approach potential establishment of physical security requirements for reprocessing facilities. If a licensee can provide justification that the material satisfies a sufficient self-protecting radiation dose threshold, the material may not be subject to theft or diversion requirements and only potential sabotage requirements would apply. Furthermore, if the material can be justified to be moderately dilute, a set of risk-informed requirements could provide adequate protection of public health and safety. A revised performance objective for prevention of theft of moderately dilute Category I SNM may be detection to allow prompt recovery by a local law enforcement agency. However, a significant caveat to the proposed categorization scheme is the unknown integration of radiological sabotage with requirements for the protection against theft. Future licensees should consult with the NRC regarding treatment of this regulatory topic. Additionally, the self-protecting radiation dose threshold (either the existing or a proposed future threshold) would need to be considered. An integrated approach may apply graded potential requirements for protection against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage currently applicable to commercial nuclear power plants and Category I SNM facilities defined within 10 CFR 73.1(a).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗