Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Shared Assurance”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 19 records

The NASA Commercial Crew Program (CCP) Shared Assurance Model for Safety

NASA established the Commercial Crew Program in order to provide human access to the International Space Station and low earth orbit via the commercial (nongovernmental) sector. A particular challenge to NASA is how to determine the commercial provider's transportation system complies with Programmatic safety requirements while at the same time allowing the provider the flexibility to demonstrate compliance. This will be accomplished through the use of Shared Assurance and Risk Based Assessment by NASA thus shifting more responsibility to the Provider. This model will be the focus of this presentation.

Programmatic safety requirements↗

The NASA Commercial Crew Program (CCP) Mission Assurance Process

In 2010, NASA established the Commercial Crew Program in order to provide human access to the International Space Station and low earth orbit via the commercial (non-governmental) sector. A particular challenge to NASA has been how to determine the commercial providers transportation system complies with Programmatic safety requirements. The process used in this determination is the Safety Technical Review Board which reviews and approves provider submitted Hazard Reports. One significant product of the review is a set of hazard control verifications. In past NASA programs, 100 percent of these safety critical verifications were typically confirmed by NASA. The traditional Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) model does not support the nature of the Commercial Crew Program. To that end, NASA SMA is implementing a Risk Based Assurance (RBA) process to determine which hazard control verifications require NASA authentication. Additionally, a Shared Assurance Model is also being developed to efficiently use the available resources to execute the verifications. This paper will describe the evolution of the CCP Mission Assurance process from the beginning of the Program to its current incarnation. Topics to be covered include a short history of the CCP; the development of the Programmatic mission assurance requirements; the current safety review process; a description of the RBA process and its products and ending with a description of the Shared Assurance Model.

Commercial Crew Program↗

The Evolution of the NASA Commercial Crew Program Mission Assurance Process

In 2010, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) established the Commercial Crew Program (CCP) in order to provide human access to the International Space Station and low Earth orbit via the commercial (non-governmental) sector. A particular challenge to NASA has been how to determine that the Commercial Provider's transportation system complies with programmatic safety requirements. The process used in this determination is the Safety Technical Review Board which reviews and approves provider submitted hazard reports. One significant product of the review is a set of hazard control verifications. In past NASA programs, 100% of these safety critical verifications were typically confirmed by NASA. The traditional Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) model does not support the nature of the CCP. To that end, NASA S&MA is implementing a Risk Based Assurance process to determine which hazard control verifications require NASA authentication. Additionally, a Shared Assurance Model is also being developed to efficiently use the available resources to execute the verifications.

Mission Assurance↗

FET commutated current-FED inverter

A shunt switch comprised of a field-effect transistor (Q.sub.1) is employed to commutate a current-fed inverter (10) using thyristors (SCR1, SCR2) or bijunction transistors (Q.sub.2, Q.sub.3) in a full bridge (1, 2, 3, 4) or half bridge (5, 6) and transformer (T.sub.1) configuration. In the case of thyristors, a tapped inverter (12) is employed to couple the inverter to a dc source to back bias the thyristors during commutation. Alternatively, a commutation power supply (20) may be employed for that purpse. Diodes (D.sub.1, D.sub.2) in series with some voltage dropping element (resistor R.sub.12 or resistors R.sub.1, R.sub.2 or Zener diodes D.sub.4, D.sub.5) are connected in parallel with the thyristors in the half bridge and transformer configuration to assure sharing the back bias voltage. A clamp circuit comprised of a winding (18) negatively coupled to the inductor and a diode (D.sub.3) return stored energy from the inductor to the power supply for efficient operation with buck or boost mode.

Rippel, Wally E.↗

Commercial Crew Program Crew Safety Strategy

The purpose of this presentation is to explain to our international partners (ESA and JAXA) how NASA is implementing crew safety onto our commercial partners under the Commercial Crew Program. It will show them the overall strategy of 1) how crew safety boundaries have been established; 2) how Human Rating requirements have been flown down into programmatic requirements and over into contracts and partner requirements; 3) how CCP SMA has assessed CCP Certification and CoFR strategies against Shuttle baselines; 4) Discuss how Risk Based Assessment (RBA) and Shared Assurance is used to accomplish these strategies.

Crew Safety↗

Integrating International Engineering Organizations For Successful ISS Operations

The International Space Station (ISS) is a multinational orbiting space laboratory that is built in cooperation with 16 nations. The design and sustaining engineering expertise is spread worldwide. As the number of Partners with orbiting elements on the ISS grows, the challenge NASA is facing as the ISS integrator is to ensure that engineering expertise and data are accessible in a timely fashion to ensure ongoing operations and mission success. Integrating international engineering teams requires definition and agreement on common processes and responsibilities, joint training and the emergence of a unique engineering team culture. ISS engineers face daunting logistical and political challenges regarding data sharing requirements. To assure systematic information sharing and anomaly resolution of integrated anomalies, the ISS Partners are developing multi-lateral engineering interface procedures. Data sharing and individual responsibility are key aspects of this plan. This paper describes several examples of successful multilateral anomaly resolution. These successes were used to form the framework of the Partner to Partner engineering interface procedures, and this paper describes those currently documented multilateral engineering processes. Furthermore, it addresses the challenges experienced to date, and the forward work expected in establishing a successful working relationship with Partners as their hardware is launched.

Blome, Elizabeth↗

NASA Support for Commercial Crew Launch Capabilities

Since the earliest days of U.S. human spaceflight, NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, has played a key role in American crew launch capability, from engineering support for the first Mercury-Redstone launches, to the Saturn launches to the Moon, through Shuttle and now Artemis. Today, Marshall brings that expertise gained through decades of crewed space launches to NASA’s Commercial Crew Program (CCP), providing launch vehicle engineering and programmatic support. The team’s responsibilities have included human certification of commercial launch systems for the CCP missions, including Atlas V and Falcon 9, and verifying each launch vehicle complies with flight certification. MSFC provides expertise in nearly all aspects of launch vehicle design and performance including solid motors and liquid engines, stage propulsion, thrust vector control, structural and dynamics, safety and mission assurance. During each commercial crew launch, an engineering support team is on console at Marshall’s Huntsville Operations Support Center, which has provided launch operations support since Apollo, providing real-time oversight to safety standards for the vehicle and verifying data. Launch vehicle support for Commercial Crew has come as a paradigm shift for the MSFC team, inspiring new approaches that leverage expertise and best practices from past NASA-developed launch vehicle missions, while at the same time providing new synergies from work with commercial partners on CCP. This paper will explore the role that the Marshall launch vehicle services team plays in the Commercial Crew Program, as well as lessons learned from the program that will continue to benefit a new era of spaceflight partnerships.

Commercial Crew↗

Separation Assurance in Urban Air Mobility Systems Using Shared Scheduling Protocols

Ensuring safe separation between aircraft is a critical challenge in air traffic management, particularly in urban air mobility (UAM) environments where high traffic density and low altitudes require precise control. In these environments, conflicts often arise at the intersections of flight corridors, posing significant risks. We propose a tactical separation approach leveraging shared scheduling protocols, originally designed for Ethernet networks and operating systems, to coordinate access to these intersections. Using a decentralized Markov decision process framework, the proposed approach enables aircraft to autonomously adjust their speed and timing as they navigate these critical areas, maintaining safe separation without a central controller. We evaluate the effectiveness of this approach in simulated UAM scenarios, demonstrating its ability to reduce separation violations to zero while acknowledging trade-offs in flight times as traffic density increases. Additionally, we explore the impact of non-compliant aircraft, showing that while shared scheduling protocols can no longer guarantee safe separation, they still provide significant improvements over systems without scheduling protocols.

Separation Assurance↗

Separation Assurance in Urban Air Mobility Systems Using Shared Scheduling Protocols

Ensuring safe separation between aircraft is a critical challenge in air traffic management, particularly in urban air mobility (UAM) environments where high traffic density and low altitudes require precise control. In these environments, conflicts often arise at the intersections of flight corridors, posing significant risks. We propose a tactical separation approach leveraging shared scheduling protocols, originally designed for Ethernet networks and operating systems, to coordinate access to these intersections. Using a decentralized Markov decision process framework, the proposed approach enables aircraft to autonomously adjust their speed and timing as they navigate these critical areas, maintaining safe separation without a central controller. We evaluate the effectiveness of this approach in simulated UAM scenarios, demonstrating its ability to reduce separation violations to zero while acknowledging trade-offs in flight times as traffic density increases. Additionally, we explore the impact of non-compliant aircraft, showing that while shared scheduling protocols can no longer guarantee safe separation, they still provide significant improvements over systems without scheduling protocols.

system safety↗

An Application of UAV Attitude Estimation Using a Low-Cost Inertial Navigation System

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) are playing an increasing role in aviation. Various methods exist for the computation of UAV attitude based on low cost microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) and Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers. There has been a recent increase in UAV autonomy as sensors are becoming more compact and onboard processing power has increased significantly. Correct UAV attitude estimation will play a critical role in navigation and separation assurance as UAVs share airspace with civil air traffic. This paper describes attitude estimation derived by post-processing data from a small low cost Inertial Navigation System (INS) recorded during the flight of a subscale commercial off the shelf (COTS) UAV. Two discrete time attitude estimation schemes are presented here in detail. The first is an adaptation of the Kalman Filter to accommodate nonlinear systems, the Extended Kalman Filter (EKF). The EKF returns quaternion estimates of the UAV attitude based on MEMS gyro, magnetometer, accelerometer, and pitot tube inputs. The second scheme is the complementary filter which is a simpler algorithm that splits the sensor frequency spectrum based on noise characteristics. The necessity to correct both filters for gravity measurement errors during turning maneuvers is demonstrated. It is shown that the proposed algorithms may be used to estimate UAV attitude. The effects of vibration on sensor measurements are discussed. Heuristic tuning comments pertaining to sensor filtering and gain selection to achieve acceptable performance during flight are given. Comparisons of attitude estimation performance are made between the EKF and the complementary filter.

Eure, Kenneth W.↗

Method and apparatus for hybrid position/force control of multi-arm cooperating robots

Two or more robotic arms having end effectors rigidly attached to an object to be moved are disclosed. A hybrid position/force control system is provided for driving each of the robotic arms. The object to be moved is represented as having a total mass that consists of the actual mass of the object to be moved plus the mass of the moveable arms that are rigidly attached to the moveable object. The arms are driven in a positive way by the hybrid control system to assure that each arm shares in the position/force applied to the object. The burden of actuation is shared by each arm in a non-conflicting way as the arm independently control the position of, and force upon, a designated point on the object.

Hayati, Samad A.↗

Emotional/Mental Challenges Pre-, In-, and Post-Flight

Dr. Voss has flown aboard the Space Shuttle five times. She knows well her inner concerns, emotions, and mental challenges attending such highly demanding and risky adventures. And she has shared those ideas with her colleagues. She notes that their busy training schedules and fully committed on orbit time allow little time for dwelling on most of these issues. However, they are nonetheless real and may not be ignored with impunity. She thinks that perhaps they are more striking for rookie space farers, but all spacecrew members share them and can profit by assuring proper support and unique solutions for their own specific situation, which could vary with the mission. In her own experience, she found notable benefit from sharing with close members of her family, both before flight and during. The latter has proved of great value to all crew persons in the form of their personal ground contact time with family and friends. In addition, how one arranges and what one provides in the on board personal space and time goes far toward keeping a confident and upbeat view of the big picture. The type and amount of off duty diversions (e.g., music, reading material) are important, as are how one participates in group time. And it is universally agreed that viewing time at the spacecraft windows offers great joy and calm. Dr. Voss conjectures that there could be a difference in how people deal with these matters on busy, short-duration (Shuttle type) missions versus those of longer ones, particularly out of low earth orbit, where the options in the advent of mishap are fewer. Her final opinion is one of optimism and assurance that the human person will do well in coping with this new environment.

Voss, Janice↗

NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange (NNBE). Volume 1. Interim Report. Navy Submarine Program Safety Assurance

The NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange (NNBE) was undertaken to identify practices and procedures and to share lessons learned in the Navy's submarine and NASA's human space flight programs. The NNBE focus is on safety and mission assurance policies, processes, accountability, and control measures. This report is an interim summary of activity conducted through October 2002, and it coincides with completion of the first phase of a two-phase fact-finding effort.In August 2002, a team was formed, co-chaired by senior representatives from the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance and the NAVSEA 92Q Submarine Safety and Quality Assurance Division. The team closely examined the two elements of submarine safety (SUBSAFE) certification: (1) new design/construction (initial certification) and (2) maintenance and modernization (sustaining certification), with a focus on: (1) Management and Organization, (2) Safety Requirements (technical and administrative), (3) Implementation Processes, (4) Compliance Verification Processes, and (5) Certification Processes.

SUBSAFE PROGRAM↗

Orbital Debris and the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office

This submission includes 11 presentations prepared by NASA for the Trilateral Safety & Mission Assurance (SMA) Conference from June 24-26th at the ESA Centre for Earth Observation. These presentations encompass various safety & mission assurance topics focused on the conference themes of lunar exploration, space sustainability, new commercial partners & challenges, digital engineering, and the assurance of new technologies. These presentations will be shared amongst an international community of SMA practitioners & leadership to promote mutual dialogue on initiatives & challenges of SMA in an evolving spaceflight field.

OSIRIS↗

Human factors in mission assurance

Space projects rely completely on people for development and implementation - but project-related risk list rarely include human factors as significant sources of risk. The paper notes mitigation techniques for risks associated with the human factors - readers are encouraged to come up with as many mitigation strategies as possible, and share them with each other.

human factors mission assurance risk management↗