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Results for “Shutdown Initiating Event”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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9 records
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NASA NTRS1988

Plume spectrometry for liquid rocket engine health monitoring

An investigation of Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) testing failures identified optical events which appeared to be precursors of those failures. A program was therefore undertaken to detect plume trace phenomena characteristic of the engine and to design a monitoring system, responsive to excessive activity in the plume, capable of delivering a warning of an anomalous condition. By sensing the amount of extraneous material entrained in the plume and considering engine history, it may be possible to identify wearing of failing components in time for a safe shutdown and thus prevent a catastrophic event. To investigate the possibilities of safe shutdown and thus prevent a monitor to initiate the shutdown procedure, a large amount of plume data were taken from SSME firings using laboratory instrumentation. Those data were used to design a more specialized instrument dedicated to rocket plume diagnostics. The spectral wavelength range of the baseline data was about 220 nanometers (nm) to 15 micrometer with special attention given to visible and near UV. The data indicates that a satisfactory design will include a polychromator covering the range of 250 nM to 1000 nM, along with a continuous coverage spectrometer, each having a resolution of at least 5A degrees. The concurrent requirements for high resolution and broad coverage are normally at odds with one another in commercial instruments, therefore necessitating the development of special instrumentation. The design of a polychromator is reviewed herein, with a detailed discussion of the continuous coverage spectrometer delayed to a later forum. The program also requires the development of applications software providing detection, variable background discrimination, noise reduction, filtering, and decision making based on varying historical data.

Powers, William T.↗
NASA NTRS1991

Isothermal thermogravimetric data acquisition analysis system

The description of an Isothermal Thermogravimetric Analysis (TGA) Data Acquisition System is presented. The system consists of software and hardware to perform a wide variety of TGA experiments. The software is written in ANSI C using Borland's Turbo C++. The hardware consists of a 486/25 MHz machine with a Capital Equipment Corp. IEEE488 interface card. The interface is to a Hewlett Packard 3497A data acquisition system using two analog input cards and a digital actuator card. The system provides for 16 TGA rigs with weight and temperature measurements from each rig. Data collection is conducted in three phases. Acquisition is done at a rapid rate during initial startup, at a slower rate during extended data collection periods, and finally at a fast rate during shutdown. Parameters controlling the rate and duration of each phase are user programmable. Furnace control (raising and lowering) is also programmable. Provision is made for automatic restart in the event of power failure or other abnormal terminations. Initial trial runs were conducted to show system stability.

Cooper, Kenneth, Jr.↗
NASA NTRS1975

Jupiter orbiter lifetime: The hazard of Galilean satellite collision

The four Galilean satellites of Jupiter present a long-term collision hazard to an uncontrolled orbiting spacecraft that repeatedly enters the spatial region occupied by the satellites. Satellite close encounters and the likelihood of collision over a wide range of initial orbit conditions were analyzed. The effect of orbit inclination was of key interest. The scope of the analysis was restricted to orbital dynamic considerations alone, i.e. the question of biological contamination given the event of collision was not considered. A quarantine or orbiter lifetime of 50 years was assumed. This time period begins at spacecraft shutdown following completion of the mission objectives. A numerical approach was adopted wherein each initial orbit is propagated for 50 years, and satellite closest encounter distances recorded on every revolution. The computer program includes approximations of the three major perturbation effects on the long-term motion of the orbiter: (1) Jupiter oblateness, (2) solar gravity, and (3) satellite gravity.

Friedlander, A. L.↗
NASA NTRS1970

Combustion anomalies in stop-restart firing of hybrid rocket engines

An experimental investigation of the restart process of an oxygen-Plexiglas hybrid rocket demonstrated that preheating the fuel (as a consequence of a previous ignition and a temporary extinguishment) significantly increases the rate of chamber pressurization and produces regression rate overshoots during reignition. Higher rates of chamber pressurization measured during the restart transient imply faster instantaneous regression rates of the fuel during restart. Transient periods following the initial ignition and the restart after a two-second shutdown were observed for four experimental tests. Thermocouples were embedded in the fuel to record subsurface temperature histories. A mathematical model of the thermal processes in the fuel and the events that occur during an experimental firing was developed to calculate the regression rate transients. Quantitative agreement with experimental results was obtained by making nominal corrections to the calculated convective and radiative heating rates.

Saraniero, M. A.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Revalidation of the Volatile Organic Analyzer Following a Major On-Orbit Maintenance Activity

The Volatile Organic Analyzer (VOA) contributes to the assessment of air quality aboard the International Space Station (ISS) by identifying and quantifying target airborne volatile organic contaminants in the module air. This on-orbit contaminant monitoring capability becomes particularly important during an air quality degradation event such as a system leak. During several ISS air quality degradations, the VOA has generated near real-time data that was used to make decisions or to better understand the contingency. The VOA was operational from January 2002 through June 2003, during which time it was validated by comparing VOA data to simultaneously acquired grab sample containers (GSCs). In January 2003, one of the two analytical channels of the VOA was shutdown because of a component failure, but a redundant channel continued to supply the necessary analytical data. In June 2003, the sole remaining channel was deactivated. Initial assessments of the channel shutdowns pointed to failed fuses or heaters, but neither was considered repairable on orbit. In 2005, it was determined that failed fuses could be replaced on orbit and the crew conducted a diagnostic procedure to identify the failed component. The crew discovered that both channels incurred failed fuses, which lead to a subsequent on orbit maintenance activity and return of the VOA to operational status in December 2005. The VOA has been providing data on the ISS atmosphere since its reactivation in 2005 and this paper will present the VOA data collected during 2006. Special emphasis will be placed upon the revalidation of the repaired VOA using GSCs as well as a summary of the diagnostic and repair procedures.

Limero, Thomas↗
NASA NTRS1993

Mars Observer Press Conference JPL

The Mars Observer mission spacecraft was primarily designed for exploring Mars and the Martian environment. The Mars Observer was launched on September 25, 1992. The spacecraft was lost in the vicinity of Mars on August 21, 1993 when the spacecraft began its maneuvering sequence for Martian orbital insertion. This videotape shows a press briefing, held after the spacecraft had not responded to attempts to communicate with it, to explain to the press the problems and the steps that were being taken to re-establish communication with the spacecraft. The communications had been shutdown prior to the orbital insertion burn to protect the instruments. At the time of the press conference, the communications system was still not operational, and attempts were being made to re-establish communication. Bob McMillan of the Public Affairs Office at JPL gives the initial announcement of the continuing communication problem with the spacecraft. Mr. McMillan introduces William Piotrowski, acting director of solar system exploration, who reiterates that there is indeed no communication with the Observer spacecraft. He is followed by Glenn Cunningham, the Project Manager of the Mars Observer who speaks about the attempts to re-establish contact. Mr. Cunningham is followed by Satenios Dallas, the Mission Manager for the Mars Observer Project, who speaks about the sequence of events leading up to the communication failure, and shows an animated video presenting the orbital insertion maneuvers. The briefing was then opened up for questions from the assembled press, both at JPL and at the other NASA Centers. The questions are about the possible reasons for the communication failure, and the attempts to restore communications with the spacecraft. Dr. Arden L. Albee, chief scientist for the Mars Observer Mission, joins the other panel members to answer questions. At the end of the press briefing the animation of the Mars orbital insertion is shown again.

Source record↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

High Pressure Vent Line Mishap: Investigation Summary

During testing on the E-1 Test Stand, the High Pressure (HP) Liquid Hydrogen (LH) vent line was displaced off its supports, damaging the expansion joints (EJ), piping, and pipe supports of the line. The damage to the vent line is believed to have occurred during Cell 3 testing on Thursday, September 21, during the first test of the day. The fuel systems being used for Cell 3 testing are connected to the LP and HP LH Vent systems and are being used in Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) service. The Cell 3 interface bleed valve that discharges to the HP LH Vent system was inadvertently left at 100% open during the chill-in process for longer than the typical amount of time. Since this valve is usually at a lower set point or intermittently closed during the chill-in process, more than the typical amount of LNG flowed into the vent line as pre-test procedures continued as normal. The open bleed valve was noticed before test preparations were completed and prior to refilling of the HP LH Tank before test. The test sequence was started, run, and shutdown normally. Video of the flare stack showed an atypical discharge of liquid at the flare stack exit. Pressure downstream of the Cell 3 interface bleed valve (a valve connected to the southernmost part of the vent system) spiked to a higher-than-normal level. No evidence of damage was captured at the time of the event. The system was used in a typical fashion after the event and for 4 subsequent tests on Thursday and Friday, before the damage was observed. A drive-by inspection of the flare stack was performed on Friday (September 22nd) morning before sunrise and before test activities began, but no damage of the vent line was observed at that time. No abnormal system behavior was observed during testing on Friday. The damage was discovered and reported to NASA Test Operations on Monday, initiating the Incident Response Team. The Mishap appointment letter was issued September 27th to formally initiate the Mishap Investigation.

LNG↗
NASA NTRS1993

STS-51 pad abort. OV103-engine 2033 (ME-2) fuel flowmeter sensor open circuit

The STS-51 initial launch attempt of Discovery (OV-103) was terminated on KSC launch pad 39B on 12 Aug. 1993 at 9:12 AM E.S.T. due to a sensor redundancy failure in the liquid hydrogen system of ME-2 (Engine 2033). The event description and time line are summarized. Propellant loading was initiated on 12 Aug. 1993 at 12:00 AM EST. All space shuttle main engine (SSME) chill parameters and Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) were nominal. At engine start plus 1.34 seconds a Failure Identification (FID) was posted against Engine 2033 for exceeding the 1800 spin intra-channel (A1-A2) Fuel Flowrate sensor channel qualification limit. The engine was shut down at 1.50 seconds followed by Engines 2032 and 2030. All shut down sequences were nominal and the mission was safely aborted. SSME Avionics hardware and software performed nominally during the incident. A review of vehicle data table (VDT) data and controller software logic revealed no failure indications other than the single FID 111-101, Fuel Flowrate Intra-Channel Test Channel A disqualification. Software logic was executed according to requirements and there was no anomalous controller software operation. Immediately following the abort, a Rocketdyne/NASA failure investigation team was assembled. The team successfully isolated the failure cause to an open circuit in a Fuel Flowrate Sensor. This type of failure has occurred eight previous times in ground testing. The sensor had performed acceptably on three previous flights of the engine and SSME flight history shows 684 combined fuel flow rate sensor channel flights without failure. The disqualification of an Engine 2 (SSME No. 2033) Fuel Flowrate sensor channel was a result of an instrumentation failure and not engine performance. All other engine operations were nominal. This disqualification resulted in an engine shutdown and safe sequential shutdown of all three engines prior to ignition of the solid boosters.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1993

STS-55 pad abort: Engine 2011 oxidizer preburner augmented spark igniter check valve leak

The STS-55 initial launch attempt of Columbia (OV102) was terminated on KSC launch pad A March 22, 1993 at 9:51 AM E.S.T. due to violation of an ME-3 (Engine 2011) Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) limit exceedance. The event description and timeline are summarized. Propellant loading was initiated on 22 March, 1993 at 1:15 AM EST. All SSME chill parameters and launch commit criteria (LCC) were nominal. At engine start plus 1.44 seconds, a Failure Identification (FID) was posted against Engine 2011 for exceeding the 50 psia Oxidizer Preburner (OPB) purge pressure redline. The engine was shut down at 1.50 seconds followed by Engines 2034 and 2030. All shut down sequences were nominal and the mission was safely aborted. The OPB purge pressure redline violation and the abort profile/overlay for all three engines are depicted. SSME Avionics hardware and software performed nominally during the incident. A review of vehicle data table (VDT) data and controller software logic revealed no failure indications other than the single FID 013-414, OPB purge pressure redline exceeded. Software logic was executed according to requirements and there was no anomalous controller software operation. Immediately following the abort, a Rocketdyne/NASA failure investigation team was assembled. The team successfully isolated the failure cause to the oxidizer preburner augmented spark igniter purge check valve not being fully closed due to contamination. The source of the contaminant was traced to a cut segment from a rubber O-ring which was used in a fine clean tool during valve production prior to 1992. The valve was apparently contaminated during its fabrication in 1985. The valve had performed acceptably on four previous flights of the engine, and SSME flight history shows 780 combined check valve flights without failure. The failure of an Engine 3 (SSME No. 2011) check valve to close was sensed by onboard engine instruments even though all other engine operations were normal. This resulted in an engine shutdown and safe sequential shutdown of all three engines prior to ignition of the solid boosters.

Source record↗