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Power MOSFET devices are susceptible to heavy-ion induced Single-Event Gate Rupture. Computer modeling show that intense electric field transients can trigger the SEGR phenomenon.
The relative importance of heavy-ion interaction with the oxide, charge ionized in the epilayer, and charge ionized in the drain substrate, on the bias for SEGR failure is experimentally investigated.
The relative importance of heavy-ion interaction with the oxide, charge ionized in the epilayer, and charge ionized in the drain substrate, on the bias for SEGR failure in vertical power MOSFETs is experimentally investigated. The results indicate that both the charge ionized in the epilayer and the ion atomic number are important parameters of SEGR failure. Implications on SEGR hardness assurance are discussed.
The purpose of this document is two-fold. First, the document lists and discusses many of the issues important to understand when testing power MOSFETs. Second, the recommended approach for using radiation test data to define the device application requirements is presented. These include SEE rate calculation, data analysis, and derating guidelines. A significant amount of work has been done on the basic effects of SEB and SEGR. References are supplied where seminal work has been done on the topic at hand. The reader is urged to review the references if the testing issues or mission application at hand are complex.
The vertical metal oxide semiconductor field-effect transistor (MOSFET) is a widely used power transistor onboard a spacecraft. The MOSFET is typically employed in power supplies and high current switching applications. Due to the inherent high electric fields in the device, power MOSFETs are sensitive to heavy ion irradiation and can fail catastrophically as a result of single event gate rupture (SEGR) or single event burnout (SEB). Manufacturers have designed radiation-hardened power MOSFETs for space applications. These radiation hardened devices are not immune to SEGR or SEB but, rather, can exhibit them at a much more damaging ion than their non-radiation hardened counterparts. See [1] through [5] for more information.This effort was to investigate the SEGR and SEB responses of two power MOSFETs from IR(the IRHN57133SE and the IRHN57250SE) that have recently been produced on a new fabrication line. These tests will serve as a limited verification of these parts, but it is acknowledged that further testing on the respective parts may be needed for some mission profiles.
We present results and analysis investigating the effects of radiation on a variety of candidate spacecraft electronics to proton and heavy ion induced single event effects (SEE), proton-induced displacement damage (DD), and total ionizing dose (TID). Introduction: This paper is a summary of test results.NASA spacecraft are subjected to a harsh space environment that includes exposure to various types of ionizing radiation. The performance of electronic devices in a space radiation environment is often limited by its susceptibility to single event effects (SEE), total ionizing dose (TID), and displacement damage (DD). Ground-based testing is used to evaluate candidate spacecraft electronics to determine risk to spaceflight applications. Interpreting the results of radiation testing of complex devices is quite difficult. Given the rapidly changing nature of technology, radiation test data are most often application-specific and adequate understanding of the test conditions is critical. Studies discussed herein were undertaken to establish the application-specific sensitivities of candidate spacecraft and emerging electronic devices to single-event upset (SEU), single-event latchup (SEL), single-event gate rupture (SEGR), single-event burnout (SEB), single-event transient (SET), TID, enhanced low dose rate sensitivity (ELDRS), and DD effects.
NASA spacecraft are subjected to a harsh space environment that includes exposure to various types of ionizing radiation. The performance of electronic devices in a space radiation environment are often limited by their susceptibility to single event effects (SEE). Ground-based testing is used to evaluate candidate spacecraft electronics to determine risk to spaceflight applications. Interpreting the results of radiation testing of complex devices is and adequate understanding of the test condition is critical. Studies discussed herein were undertaken to establish the application-specific sensitivities of candidate spacecraft and emerging electronic devices to single-event upset (SEU), single-event latchup (SEL), single-event gate rupture (SEGR), single-event burnout (SEB), and single-event transient (SET). For total ionizing dose (TID) and displacement damage dose (DDD) results, see a companion paper submitted to the 2015 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Nuclear and Space Radiation Effects Conference (NSREC) Radiation Effects Data Workshop (REDW) entitled "compendium of Current Total Ionizing Dose and Displacement Damage for Candidate Spacecraft Electronics for NASA by M. Campola, et al.
The performance of electronic devices in a space radiation environment is often limited by susceptibility to single-event effects (SEE), total ionizing dose (TID), and displacement damage (DD). Interpreting the results of SEE, TID, and DD testing of complex devices is quite difficult given the rapidly changing nature of both technology and the related radiation issues. Radiation testing is performed to establish the sensitivities of candidate spacecraft electronics to single-event upset (SEU), single-event latchup (SEL), single-event gate rupture (SEGR), single-event burnout (SEB), single-event transients (SETs), TID, and DD effects. Knowing where to search for these test results is a valuable resource for the aerospace engineer or spacecraft design engineer. This poster is intended to be a resource tool for finding radiation test data.
Single-event-effect test results for hi-rel total-dose-hardened power MOSFETs are presented in this report. TheSCF9550 from Semicoa and the IRHM57260SE from International Rectifier were tested to NASA test condition/standards and requirements.The IRHM57260SE performed much better when compared to previous testing. These initial results confirm that parts from the Temecula line are marginally comparable to the El Segundo line. The SCF9550 from Semicoa was also tested and represents the initial parts offering from this vendor. Both parts experienced single-event gate rupture (SEGR) and single-event burnout (SEB). All of the SEGR was from gate to drain.
Single-event gate rupture (SEGR)in vertical power MOSFETs is induced by charge deposited in the epitaxial region (below the gate oxide) in concert with the weakening of the oxide, both are a result of the ion passage.
Space radiation in space systems present unique failure modes and considerations for reliability engineers. Radiation effects is not a one size fits all field. Threat conditions that must be addressed for a given mission depend on the mission orbital profile, the technologies of parts used in critical functions and on application considerations, such as supply voltages, temperature, duty cycle, and redundancy. In general, the threats that must be addressed are of two types-the cumulative degradation mechanisms of total ionizing dose (TID) and displacement damage (DD). and the prompt responses of components to ionizing particles (protons and heavy ions) falling under the heading of single-event effects. Generally degradation mechanisms behave like wear-out mechanisms on any active components in a system: Total Ionizing Dose (TID) and Displacement Damage: (1) TID affects all active devices over time. Devices can fail either because of parametric shifts that prevent the device from fulfilling its application or due to device failures where the device stops functioning altogether. Since this failure mode varies from part to part and lot to lot, lot qualification testing with sufficient statistics is vital. Displacement damage failures are caused by the displacement of semiconductor atoms from their lattice positions. As with TID, failures can be either parametric or catastrophic, although parametric degradation is more common for displacement damage. Lot testing is critical not just to assure proper device fi.mctionality throughout the mission. It can also suggest remediation strategies when a device fails. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. (2) On the NEAR mission a functional failure was traced to a PIN diode failure caused by TID induced high leakage currents. NEAR was able to recover from the failure by reversing the current of a nearby Thermal Electric Cooler (turning the TEC into a heater). The elevated temperature caused the PIN diode to anneal and the device to recover. It was by lot qualification testing that NEAR knew the diode would recover when annealed. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. Single Event Effects (SEE): (1) In contrast to TID and displacement damage, Single Event Effects (SEE) resemble random failures. SEE modes can range from changes in device logic (single-event upset, or SEU). temporary disturbances (single-event transient) to catastrophic effects such as the destructive SEE modes, single-event latchup (SEL). single-event gate rupture (SEGR) and single-event burnout (SEB) (2) The consequences of nondestructive SEE modes such as SEU and SET depend critically on their application--and may range from trivial nuisance errors to catastrophic loss of mission. It is critical not just to ensure that potentially susceptible devices are well characterized for their susceptibility, but also to work with design engineers to understand the implications of each error mode. -For destructive SEE, the predominant risk mitigation strategy is to avoid susceptible parts, or if that is not possible. to avoid conditions under which the part may be susceptible. Destructive SEE mechanisms are often not well understood, and testing is slow and expensive, making rate prediction very challenging. (3) Because the consequences of radiation failure and degradation modes depend so critically on the application as well as the component technology, it is essential that radiation, component. design and system engineers work togetherpreferably starting early in the program to ensure critical applications are addressed in time to optimize the probability of mission success.
Single-event-effect test results for hi-rel total-dose-hardened power MOSFETs are presented in this report. The 2N7616 and the 2N7425 from Semicoa and the 2N7480 from International Rectifier were tested to NASA test condition standards and requirements. The 2N7480 performed well and the data agree with the manufacture's data. The 2N7616 and 2N7425 were entry parts from Semicoa using a new device architecture. Unfortunately, the device performed poorly and Semicoa is withdrawing power MOSFETs from it line due to these data. Vertical metal-oxide-semiconductor field-effect transistors (MOSFETs) are the most commonly used power transistor. MOSFETs are typically employed in power supplies and high current switching applications. Due to the inherent high electric fields in the device, power MOSFETs are sensitive to heavy ion irradiation and can fail catastrophically as a result of single-event gate rupture (SEGR) or single-event burnout (SEB). Manufacturers have designed radiation-hardened power MOSFETs for space applications. See [1] through [5] for more information. The objective of this effort was to investigate the SEGR and SEB responses of two power MOSFETs recently produced. These tests will serve as a limited verification of these parts. It is acknowledged that further testing on the respective parts may be needed for some mission profiles.
This testing is to characterize the power MOSFETs for single-event gate rupture (SEGR) and single-event burnout (SEB) response. Test results were compared against comparable voltage rated devices.
Several newly available Hi-Rel total dose hardened power MOSFETs manufactured by Fuji Electric Device Technology Co. Ltd (FDT) in conjunction with the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) were tested for single-event gate rupture (SEGR) and single-event burnout (SEB). The safe-operating area (SOA) of the 2SK4217 (a 100 V rated device), 2SK4152 (130 V), 2SK4155 (200 V), and the 2SK4158 (250 V) were tested with silver (Ag) and xenon (Xe) ions having incident LETs of 42.2 and 53.1 MeV cm2/mg, respectively. Test results show these devices are comparable to currently available total dose hardened technology.
Single-event gate rupture (SEGR) is a potentially catastrophic failure mechanism of power MOSFETs biased in the off-state. In part due to the severity of-SEGR consequences and in part due to the difficulty of accurated SEGR rate estimation, SEGR mitigation me1hodologies emphasize risk avoidance, using heavy-ion accelerator testing to define safe operating conditions for a surface-incident linear energy transfer {LET). This "safe-operating area" (SOA) within which the device may be biased without experiencing SEGR is then often derated by a prescribed factor to ensure low risk of SEGR. Although research in 1996 indicated that such LET-based SEGR hardness requiremen1s could provide false assurance of safe operation unless one also considered· ion energy], most mission SEGR requirements are still specified in terms of surface-incident LET. Moreover, terrestrial SEGR tests at a given surface-incident LET are limited by the small number of ion species and energies available at heavy-ion accelerators. In comparison, the on-orbit radiation environment is composed of all of the naturally-occurring elements with peak fluxes at nearly GeV/nucleon energies. The primary objective of this study is to examine whether typical derating of high-energy heavy-ion accelerator test data bounds the risk for SEGR from higher-energy on-orbit ions with the mission LET requirement.
A Technology Computer Aided Design (TCAD) simulation-based method is developed to evaluate whether derating of high-energy heavy-ion accelerator test data bounds the risk for single-event gate rupture (SEGR) from much higher energy on-orbit ions for a mission linear energy transfer (LET) requirement. It is shown that a typical derating factor of 0.75 applied to a single-event effect (SEE) response curve defined by high-energy accelerator SEGR test data provides reasonable on-orbit hardness assurance, although in a high-voltage power MOSFET, it did not bound the risk of failure.
This book of knowledge (BoK) provides a critical review of the benefits and difficulties associated with using proton irradiation as a means of exploring the radiation hardness of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) systems. This work was developed for the NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Board Level Testing for the COTS task. The fundamental findings of this BoK are the following. The board-level test method can reduce the worst case estimate for a board's single-event effect (SEE) sensitivity compared to the case of no test data, but only by a factor of ten. The estimated worst case rate of failure for untested boards is about 0.1 SEE/board-day. By employing the use of protons with energies near or above 200 MeV, this rate can be safely reduced to 0.01 SEE/board-day, with only those SEEs with deep charge collection mechanisms rising this high. For general SEEs, such as static random-access memory (SRAM) upsets, single-event transients (SETs), single-event gate ruptures (SEGRs), and similar cases where the relevant charge collection depth is less than 10 μm, the worst case rate for SEE is below 0.001 SEE/board-day. Note that these bounds assume that no SEEs are observed during testing. When SEEs are observed during testing, the board-level test method can establish a reliable event rate in some orbits, though all established rates will be at or above 0.001 SEE/board-day. The board-level test approach we explore has picked up support as a radiation hardness assurance technique over the last twenty years. The approach originally was used to provide a very limited verification of the suitability of low cost assemblies to be used in the very benign environment of the International Space Station (ISS), in limited reliability applications. Recently the method has been gaining popularity as a way to establish a minimum level of SEE performance of systems that require somewhat higher reliability performance than previous applications. This sort of application of the method suggests a critical analysis of the method is in order. This is also of current consideration because the primary facility used for this type of work, the Indiana University Cyclotron Facility (IUCF) (also known as the Integrated Science and Technology (ISAT) hall), has closed permanently, and the future selection of alternate test facilities is critically important. This document reviews the main theoretical work on proton testing of assemblies over the last twenty years. It augments this with review of reported data generated from the method and other data that applies to the limitations of the proton board-level test approach. When protons are incident on a system for test they can produce spallation reactions. From these reactions, secondary particles with linear energy transfers (LETs) significantly higher than the incident protons can be produced. These secondary particles, together with the protons, can simulate a subset of the space environment for particles capable of inducing single event effects (SEEs). The proton board-level test approach has been used to bound SEE rates, establishing a maximum possible SEE rate that a test article may exhibit in space. This bound is not particularly useful in many cases because the bound is quite loose. We discuss the established limit that the proton board-level test approach leaves us with. The remaining possible SEE rates may be as high as one per ten years for most devices. The situation is actually more problematic for many SEE types with deep charge collection. In cases with these SEEs, the limits set by the proton board-level test can be on the order of one per 100 days. Because of the limited nature of the bounds established by proton testing alone, it is possible that tested devices will have actual SEE sensitivity that is very low (e.g., fewer than one event in 1 × 10(exp 4) years), but the test method will only be able to establish the limits indicated above. This BoK further examines other benefits of proton board-level testing besides hardness assurance. The primary alternate use is the injection of errors. Error injection, or fault injection, is something that is often done in a simulation environment. But the proton beam has the benefit of injecting the majority of actual SEEs without risk of something being missed, and without the risk of simulation artifacts misleading the SEE investigation.
This paper begins by discussing the potential for scaling down transistors and other components to fit more of them on chips in order to increasing computer processing speed. It also addresses technical challenges to further scaling. Components have been scaled down enough to allow single particles to have an effect, known as a Single Event Effect (SEE). This paper explores the relationship between scaling and the following SEEs: Single Event Upsets (SEU) on DRAMs and SRAMs, Latch-up, Snap-back, Single Event Burnout (SEB), Single Event Gate Rupture (SEGR), and Ion-induced soft breakdown (SBD).