Special Purpose Reactors
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Space reactors, defense reactors↗
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FY27 Annual LDRD Call for Proposals - external release
Proposals are now being accepted for the fiscal year 2027 (FY-27) Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) call, the FY-27 Annual LDRD Call for Proposals. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has renewed its research and development (R&D) portfolio to align with its strategy, and this call seeks high-quality proposals that address these renewed research priorities. The LDRD Office encourages proposals that offer the potential to achieve breakthroughs in the three science and technology (S&T) strategic initiatives: • Unleashing America’s Energy Abundance: Enabling the Quadrupling of Nuclear Power by 2050; • Securing America’s Future by Developing Domestic Supply Chains for Critical and Strategic Minerals and Materials (CSMM); and • Delivering Critical National Security Technology. Proposals that support INL’s four strategic thrust areas are also encouraged: • Enabling Future Fusion Energy Systems; • Delivering Small Nuclear Reactor Technology for Space Exploration and Defense Missions; • Accelerating Technologies for Hybrid Energy and Nuclear Applications; and • Securing America’s Energy Future Through Artificial Intelligence (AI).
99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
Nuclear Safety [Vol. 32, No. 4, October-December 1991]
Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 477 Report on the International Symposium on the Use of Probabilistic Safety Assessment for Operational Safety—PSA '91, S. Chakraborty and M. Khatib-Rahbar; 488 Good Relationships Are Pivotal in Nuclear Data Bases, A. S. Heger and B. V. Koen; 494 Technical Note: The Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel's Evaluation of the Ulysses Space Mission, J. A. Sholtis, Jr., D. A. Huff, L. B. Gray, N. P. Klug, and R. O. Winchester; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 502 The Severe Accident Analysis Program for the Savannah River Nuclear Production Reactors, M. L. Hyder; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 511 A Framework for Selecting Suitable Control Technologies for Nuclear Power Plant Systems, R. A. Kisner; DESIGN FEATURES: 521 Containments for Gas-Cooled Power Reactors History and Status, P.W. Williams; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 537 Indoor Radon: A Natural Risk, N. H. Harley and J.H. Harley; On the Importance of the Atmospheric Parameters in the Fission Products Distribution of a Severe Reactor Accident, M. C. Barla and A. R. Bayulken; Book Review: Health Effects of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation BEIR V, C. R. Richmond; WASTE AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: 555 Activities Related to Waste and Spent Fuel Management, M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 567 Effects of Component Aging on the Westhinghouse Control Rod Drive System, K. Sullivan and W. Gunther; 577 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher, 580 Selected Safety-Related Events, Compiled by G. A. Murphy; 582 Operating U 8 Power Reactors, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 596 General Administrative Activities, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; 610 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 614 Proposed Rule Changes as of June 30, 1991; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 520 Workshop on PC PRAISE: A Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics Personal Computer Code for Nuclear Power Plant Piping Reliability Assessment; 536 Fifth Workshop on Nuclear Power Plant Containment Integrity; 624 New OECD "International Information System on Occupational Exposure (ISOE)"; 625 Harvard School of Public Health Announces Short Courses; 625 Eighth Power Plant Dynamics, Control and Testing Symposium; 626 Second Training Course on Off-Site Emergency Planning and Response for Nuclear Accidents; 618 The Authors; 622 Reviewers of Nuclear Safety, Vol 32.
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
Fuel Fabrication Capability Assessment in Support of Advanced Reactor Deployments
More than 30 U.S. companies are designing a variety of advanced reactor concepts, and several companies are planning to demonstrate their reactor designs in the mid-2020s to late 2030s time frame. In 2020, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) announced a series of awards under the Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program (ARDP) to accelerate the successful deployment of 10 of these reactors under three pathways. TerraPower and X-energy were awarded grants under the Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program to deploy their respective Natrium reactor and Xe-100 reactor designs in the next 7–10 years. These demonstrations are in addition to several parallel programs, including the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) interest in the development of microreactors, and interest of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in space nuclear power and propulsion. The National Reactor Innovation Center’s (NRIC’s) mission is to accelerate the demonstration and deployment of advanced reactors; NRIC is partnering with several reactor developers and harnessing the world-class capabilities of the U.S. National Laboratory system to deliver on its mission. Several of these reactor designs will require advanced fuel forms that are not commercially available today, including metal fuel, molten salt fuel, TRi-structural ISOtropic (TRISO) particle fuel, and uranium nitride fuel. Recognizing that there may be potential gaps in the laboratory-scale process development and pilot-scale first-of-a-kind (FOAK) production of these fuel forms leading to delivery of the FOAK cores, NRIC commissioned this study to look at the challenges that need to be overcome for successful deliveries, including the evaluation of existing facilities and the potential need for a new fuel fabrication facility.
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
First Report of the Nuclear Data Subcommittee of the Nuclear Science Advisory Committee
Accurate, reliable nuclear data is essential for the success of Federal missions such as nonproliferation, nuclear forensics, homeland security, national defense, space exploration, clean energy generation, and scientific research. Data access is also key to innovative commercial developments such as new medicines, automated industrial controls, energy exploration, energy security, nuclear reactor design, and isotope production. The United States Nuclear Data Program (USNDP) is the domestic custodian of nuclear data. In its April 2022 meeting, the DOE/NSF Nuclear Science Advisory Committee was charged with preparing two reports on nuclear data. In this first report, we review recent accomplishments of the USNDP and discuss complementary and collaborative international efforts. Detailed descriptions of nuclear data needs for basic science, nonproliferation, national security, nuclear energy together with medical and space applications are also presented. Lastly, a set of specific cross-cutting nuclear data needs with relevance for multiple applications areas are also identified for further discussion in a follow-on report planned for release at the end of January 2023.
73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
Pillars of Innovation Across Southeast Idaho & the Interstate-15 Corridor
Since 1949, Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has been home to developing civilian and defense nuclear reactor technologies and managing spent nuclear fuel. Today, INL is the nation’s nuclear energy research laboratory, sustaining the safe and efficient operation of existing reactors, powering science in space, and breaking ground on the future fleet of advanced nuclear reactors. INL is only one of many rising technology resources in the region, however. Along the Interstate 15 (I-15) corridor, technology and cybersecurity industries and intellectual assets are rapidly expanding. Creating an innovation hub in this region would unite capabilities to solve current and future challenges in nuclear reactor sustainment and expanded deployment, integrated fuel cycle solutions, integrated energy systems, advanced materials and manufacturing for extreme environments, and secure and resilient cyber-physical systems.
29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
Weighing the Future: Strategic Options for U.S. Space Nuclear Leadership
We believe in speed, strength, and sovereignty. The government’s job is to unlock private sector investment, not micromanage it. Our approach shifts from endless studies to operational deployment, from bureaucratic gridlock to clear timelines and accountability. If done right, this strategy will unleash private capital, create high-tech American jobs, and put the United States back in the lead, not just in space, but in the future of energy and defense.
22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
Supporting Risk-informed Decision-making During Reactor Accidents
Uncertainty in severe accident evolution and outcome is driven by event bifurcations that represent distinctive challenges to defensive layers and tend to promote the emergence of discrete classes of core damage and accident risk. This discrete set of "attractor" states arise from the complex networks of competing physical phenomena and conditional event cascades occurring as the overall system degrades – a process that yields increasing degrees of freedom and accident progression pathways. Characterization of these event spaces has proven elusive to more traditional data interrogation methods, but proves tractable by application of more advanced data collection and machine learning approaches. Through application of these approaches we demonstrate a conceptual framework that enables real-time/robust, risk-informed decision-making support to improve accident mitigation and encourage “graceful exits” during low probability, extreme events limiting accident consequences. In this analysis, we simulated over 8,000 short-term station blackout (STSBO) accidents with the state-of-the-art integral severe accident code, MELCOR, and demonstrate the potential for ML approaches to predict simulation outcomes. We chose to pair ML tools with interpretable and mechanistic event trees for the considered STSBO accident space to predict the likelihood of future event paths along the tree. In addition to the current state of the system, we use information from recent trajectories of temperature, pressure, and other physical features, combining both the current state and past trajectories to forecast future event paths. Finally, we simulate the random injection of variable amounts of water to quantify the efficacy of available actions at reducing risks along the many branches in the event tree. We identify scenarios and windows of opportunity to mitigate risk as well as scenarios in which such actions are unlikely to alter the accident end-state.
22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
A Decade of Innovative Approaches to Treating and Dispositioning Radioactive Waste at the Savannah River Site - 20620
This year marks the 70. anniversary of the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Savannah River Site (SRS), located near Aiken, South Carolina. SRS is a key industrial complex responsible for environmental stewardship, environmental cleanup, waste management, and disposition of nuclear materials. SRS also continues to have a role in critical defense-related activities and the reprocessing of used reactor fuel. The SRS encompasses 803 square kilometers (310 square miles) in parts of Aiken, Barnwell, and Allendale counties. The Liquid Waste Mission starts with the safe receipt and storage of radioactive liquid waste in the waste tanks, which principally includes Cold War legacy waste, but also waste from support of National Aeronautics Space Administration missions, medical isotope production, and research activities. This 133,000 cubic meters (m{sup 3}) (35 million gallons [Mgal]) of high-level radioactive waste (HLW) is currently held in 43 large underground waste tanks. The capacity of each of these tanks range from 2,800 m{sup 3} to 5,000 m{sup 3} (0.75 to 1.33 Mgal) and were placed in operation between 1954 and 1986. In July 2009, the DOE awarded a stand-alone contract to execute the Liquid Waste Mission at SRS. The Liquid Waste Contractor selected was Savannah River Remediation LLC1 (SRR), which is responsible for receipt, storage, retrieval and treatment of all HLW, disposal of the decontaminated low-activity waste fraction, as well as operationally closing cleaned HLW tanks. Since July 2009, SRR has successfully grouted and operationally closed six large underground tanks, poured 1,476 canisters of vitrified HLW (a stable glass waste form), treated approximately 34,200 m{sup 3} (9.0 Mgal) of HLW, and dispositioned over 41,200 m{sup 3} (10.9 Mgal) of decontaminated salt solution as low-level waste (LLW) into the Saltstone Disposal Units (SDUs) being constructed by SRR on site. The innovative work performed by SRR in the LLW portion of its mission has earned it the Richard S. Hodes Award. The work conducted by SRR is the same work championed by the late Richard S. Hodes, a respected physician, statesmen, and Chairman of the Southeast Compact Commission for Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management. (authors)
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
Regulatory and Licensing Strategy for Microreactor Technology
With electricity demand on the rise, an increase in the use of nuclear energy is needed in order to meet future energy demands. The use of nuclear energy will not only begin to positively address this demand, but will also mitigate the negative impacts of carbon-induced climate change and provide energy security to the United States. An appropriate option to address the increasing energy demand is the use of advanced reactor systems like microreactors. Microreactors, often referred to as special-purpose reactors or vSMRs, are neutronically simple, factory manufacturable, easily transportable, and designed to produce less than 20 MWt (for classification as Hazard Category 2 per 10 CFR 830, DOE STD 1027). These reactors are decentralized energy sources that have the ability to provide sustainable and affordable power to remote communities and to industrial users, while having self-contained geometry that requires very low maintenance care. In order for microreactors to be approved for operation, they must abide by and successfully complete a rigorous regulatory and licensing process monitored by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Department of Energy (DOE), or the Department of Defense (DoD). Because microreactors are a relatively new and disruptive technology, there is no clear licensing path for them to follow. Current licensing frameworks are tailored specifically to large, traditional light water reactors (LWRs) that have been developed and understood by the nuclear industry for many years. Unlike LWRs, microreactors have major design differences, specifically in the materials, coolant, reflectors and potential technology applications used. They also have higher in-core operating temperatures, which have the potential to push the materials used past their allowable limits. Because they are much smaller, safety margins, the amount of space required for assembly, and the distances required to meet dose-based regulatory criteria can technically be altered to better fit their new size. The following strategies and recommendations are intended to assure that key licensing issues do not influence the path to microreactor development, demonstration, and commercialization: Nuclear Regulatory Commission • The NRC should address the lack of knowledge and support of risk informed decision-making concepts from staff members and continue to advance and communicate risk initiatives using their Risk Informed Steering Committee • More research should be done into whether or not microreactors, which are small Class 103 facilities, can be licensed using Class 104-type guidance (e.g., NUREG 1537) • The NRC should use frequency-consequence curves to incrementally reduce regulatory uncertainty and risk to facilitate future construction and operation of advanced reactor designs Department of Energy • The DOE should continue to implement their multi-step Phenomena Identification and Ranking Table process in order to help detect and recommend the major design and technology work needed for licensing future reactor systems • The DOE should consider a joint licensing approach with the NRC where microreactors first go through the DOE process, then finish with the NRC process, providing an advantage for both applicants and NRC staff Department of Defense • The DoD should invest in personnel with sufficient expertise, incorporate their military reactors into tactical power systems, and self-regulate using Section 91b of the Atomic Energy Act Transportation • Licensees should convert enriched uranium hexafluoride into metal or oxide at an enrichment facility and then transport them to a fabrication facility • To avoid transportation issues altogether, licensees should consider positioning the enrichment and fabrication facilities on the same site • The DOE should provide their support in developing new shipping packages for safe transport, criticality benchmark data needed to license high-assay low-enriched uranium fuel facilities and transport packages, and provide financial and technical help to the Department of Transportation; and, • The NRC should help transportation efforts by finalizing and developing guidance for implementing 10 CFR 73 and 10 CFR 74 specifically for Category 2 Special Nuclear Material.
21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
Autonomous System Subversion Tactics: Prototypes and Recommended Countermeasures
One of the fielding requirements for Advanced and Small Modular Reactors (AR/SMR) is the ability to support remote and autonomous operations. Autonomous Control Systems (ACS) are found on platforms such as Autonomous Space Vehicles, Cruise Missiles, and advanced driver-assistance systems. Each of these ACS implementations depends upon a set of decision support subsystems responsible for supporting Autonomous Mission Managers (names vary based upon field and author preferences). These Autonomous Mission Managers receive inputs from system sensors (e.g., LIDAR collection from an automobile travelling down a street; transients from a nuclear reactor), and perform a set of classifications (e.g., Red Traffic Light; Small Pedestrian at 10m; Load Rejection; Single Coolant Pump Trip), and then use these classifications in combination with recommendation algorithms to achieve platform goals (e.g., Stop the Vehicle at the Traffic Light, Avoid the Small Pedestrian; Trip the Reactor to prevent a Safety Event). The design, implementation, and fielding of an ACS capability will alter the cyber-attack surface such that existing risk management plans will need to be updated to include how to protect and defend against data-science and decision-support-system attack classes. These attack classes would include protection of the design and training environments where algorithm selection and testing and training data would be obvious attack vectors. These attack classes would also require an informed set of detection and response procedures to identify anomalous behaviors and document best practices for anomaly assessment and vulnerability mitigation and remediation. Last year we published a Cyber Threat Assessment Methodology for Autonomous and Remote Operations for AR/SMRs along with a companion publication on Cyber Attack and Defense Use Cases. The focus of the methodology was on describing and enumerating ACS processes, components, and functions such that security engineers could: evaluate subversion options against the target; identify threat actor attributes and capabilities derived from each subversion option; and identify security controls and response countermeasures. The Use Cases document offered detailed methodology examples including an assessment of a Military Base SMR, an Autonomous System Decision Loop, and implementation of AR/SMR Machine Learning algorithms. Our proposal at the end of last year was to focus on implementation of subversion prototypes related to the last Use Case area: AR/SMR Machine Learning (ML) Algorithms. We included six attack scenarios in our Use Cases paper: a Poisoning Attack against ML functions implemented using an FPGA; a Trojaning Attack against ML classifiers exploiting the excitability of Nuclear Engineers; a Backdooring Attack against ML Training environments to ensure persistence of an attack vector; a False Positive Evasion Attack against multi-factor Access Control Systems using clever inputs; an Inference Attack against ML models by an Insider with access to the Operational environment; and an Adversarial Reprogramming Attack against a Material Access Control Video Surveillance System. At the beginning of this year these six attack scenarios were provided to our research teams at Georgia Tech and Idaho State University and each team successfully implemented a subversion attack against a ML implementation to include transient misclassifications. While this is a notable outcome from this type of research, this paper offers the reader insight into not only how to structure and execute these types of attacks, but into the thought process behind how the researcher investigated the problem space, performed initial algorithm implementation, and the trial-and-error behind arriving at the successful subversion prototypes. We include in this paper a set of associated Scenarios on how these subversion prototypes could be implemented and an initial set of guidance for AR/SMR architects, Nuclear Regulators, and Cyber Defenders to implement awareness and defense capabilities into their current operational portfolios.
42 ENGINEERING↗
Physical & Cyber Security Modeling Interfacing Through Dante and ARCADE
Physical security is increasingly facing new threats from cyber attackers, for which there is little research in the way of characterizing this threat. This report discusses the efforts to combine cyber and physical security modeling tools to investigate this novel combinatorial threat space. To accomplish this, the Dante force-on-force modeling and simulation software and the Advanced Reactor Cyber Analysis and Development Environment (ARCADE) were integrated. Dante provides a 3D environment which models the physical world, while ARCADE provides the cyber and control systems world.
42 ENGINEERING↗
Expedited Walkdowns and Preparation of Cost Estimates for Decontamination and Demolition of Excess Facilities - 20335
Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC (LLNS) is the prime contractor responsible for managing and operating Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The mission of the LLNL is to strengthen security of the United States through development and application of world-class science and technology to enhance the nation's defense, reduce the global threat from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and respond with vision, quality, integrity, and technical excellence to scientific issues of national importance. To accomplish its mission, LLNL must plan and manage its campus space and facilities to optimize use of its relatively small one-square-mile footprint. LLNL currently has numerous excess facilities that require decontamination and demolition (D and D). The LLNL Legacy Facility Program is responsible for stewardship and risk reduction programs to effectively manage these excess assets at LLNL. The Legacy Facility Program identified 10 excess facilities at LLNL that were candidates for demolition based on risks from further degradation of the facilities, potential exposure to hazardous materials, or need for removal to make way for new program facilities. The buildings range from a structure built in 1943 to serve as a US Navy drill hall during World War II, to a facility that provided neutrons to study material properties for the fusion energy program. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) appropriated FY19 funding for the development of Class 3 estimates for these 10 excess facilities that would be used to develop a Program Management Plan for funding consideration. Class 3 estimates are not conceptual, nor overly detailed, but adequate to be used for budget and appropriation purposes. Using existing strategic sourcing agreements, LLNL was able to organize a team of senior subject matter experts (SMEs) with diverse technical backgrounds across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex to complete extensive process knowledge (PK) reviews and walk-downs of each excess facility and to deliver accurate and complete estimates under an expedited schedule (i.e., within eight weeks). To facilitate the expedited schedule, LLNL was fully prepared for the arrival of the JGMS team, which consisted of the following companies: J.G. Management Systems, Inc. (JGMS); Strata-G, LLC; and Michael Baker International. LLNL provided background and PK information on the excess facilities, pictures, supporting historical documentation, and radiological survey history as well as escorted access to the facilities. The JGMS team has previous experience supporting Program Management Plans for excess facilities at the Y-12 National Security Complex. The team mobilized to LLNL and performed the facility walk-downs from January 22-25, 2019. Using a methodical evaluation process, expertise, and experience, the team was able to deliver walk-down draft reports and estimates to LLNL before their February 8, 2019 deadline. LLNL then in turn reviewed, completed the estimates by adding waste management costs and other LLNL costs, and delivered the estimates to NNSA by February 15, 2019. The completed final reports, including draft D and D estimates, were delivered to LLNL before their March 6, 2019 deadline. The work was successfully completed ahead of the expedited schedule required by LLNL, resulting in a commendation from the client. This paper describes how the partnership and collaboration as a fully integrated team comprised of the prime contractor, LLNS, and the JGMS team successfully met the needs of the US government, resulting in the performance of expedited site walk-downs, the development of summary evaluation reports, and the preparation of draft Class 3 estimates and preliminary schedules for the D and D of 10 excess facilities at LLNL. The efforts of the team will enable the D and D of the first excess facility in the 2020-2021 time frame. (authors)
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗