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Results for “Special Fissionable Material Diversion”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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Exploring diversion-pathway analysis of a generic molten-salt fast reactor using multiphysics informed signatures

Molten salt reactors are being explored by multiple commercial ventures due to their inherent safety features, flexibility in fuel sources, and high fuel utilization and thermal efficiency. The continual flow of fuel salt, large fissile quantities present, and ability to add or divert material due to the liquid nature introduces new challenges for international safeguards. To understand how international safeguards should be applied, it is important to capture the inherent multi-physics nature of a molten salt reactor. This work examines a generic molten salt fast reactor to understand how potential diversion scenarios would affect the concentration of radionuclides in the primary and auxiliary systems. Three types of diversion were examined: a slow drip of fuel salt, gaseous plutonium extraction, and uranium metal plating. The analysis determined that several key isotopes become statistically significant once diversion begins, indicating that detection of such diversion cases would be possible through measuring specific signatures such as gamma spectra.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Modeling 233 Pa Generation in Thorium-fueled Reactors for Safeguards

Thorium has been considered as a possible alternative to uranium for nuclear fuel for many decades. It is three to four times more abundant in the earth than uranium and produces significantly less long-lived transuranic nuclear waste. Some claim thorium poses fewer proliferation concerns than other fuel types largely due to 232 U buildup (and associated high energy gamma-emitting decay products) in the irradiated thorium fuel. However, to fully explore potential proliferation concerns, generation and subsequent decay of 233 Pa produced in the reactor core still must be studied. With its half-life of 27 days, 233 Pa decays to 233 U, which is an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defined special fissionable material that can be used for nuclear weapons production. With more research being dedicated to thorium-fueled reactors, and several of these reactor designs possessing online fuel processing (allowing for on-site protactinium separation), it is important to understand this potential proliferation pathway. In particular, it is theoretically possible to extract protactinium from the irradiated fuel salt before it decays into 233 U. This hypothetical potential diversion can become an even greater proliferation concern if the extracted protactinium is purified through a second separation of protactinium approximately ten days later to remove the short half-life decay products of 232 Pa and 234 Pa, thus resulting in a higher concentration of the 233 Pa isotope, which decays into weapons usable 233 U with hardly any 232 U or 234 U in it. To estimate the concern of this potential proliferation challenge of thorium, different nuclear material accountancy techniques were reviewed for their viability to quantify 233 Pa if extracted from used thorium fuel. Characteristics of interest included technology maturity, cost, precision, and time taken to acquire results. Some technologies, like hybrid K-edge densitometry and passive gamma spectroscopy, appear to be viable techniques based on current literature. Due to the limited scope of this project, only passive gamma spectroscopy was further investigated. Three different reactor types (PWR, CANDU, MSR) were modeled with mixed thorium-uranium oxide fuels that were burned until the fuel was spent. The protactinium in the used fuel was extracted at the time of shutdown and the change in isotopic content of the protactinium quantified. Gamma spectroscopy simulations were performed for the protactinium isotopes and their decay products at various decay times. Given the simplicity of the models and large assumptions made (e.g. no background, no shielding, no self-attenuation), the initial results indicate that though 233 Pa is detectible for all the reactor types modeled at all decay times (0 to 300 days), more work should be done with higher fidelity models.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Development and validation of a gamma-ray detection response model for neutron-diagnosed subcritical experiments

In a neutron-diagnosed subcritical experiment, a highly sensitive and fast detector is required to accurately determine the true fission γ-ray emission rate from an object composed of special nuclear material under interrogation, in addition to a proper detector response model for use in forward modeling. We present the development of a detector response model that is based in GEANT4 and uses post-processing techniques to include photomultiplier tube time and pulse height response effects. We also define a set of detector performance evaluation metrics that emphasized our experimental objectives. A suite of time and pulse height response measurements for several diverse detector assemblies are described. These assemblies were simulated with this response model and benchmarked against the laboratory measurements. This response model reproduces the pulse height curve shapes and performance hierarchy of the measured detectors well. Additionally, the simulated time response curves exhibit reasonable agreement with counterpart measurements. These measurements and simulation results together suggest that a large volume EJ-299-49 plastic scintillator that is mated to an ultraviolet transmitting plastic light guide and relies on total internal reflection for light transport to the photocathode will provide significantly faster timing, increase pulse height by a factor of 3, and require 25% less γ rays to meet experimental needs, compared to the candidate detector design developed prior to the availability of this response model. Application of this response model and associated performance metrics in the context of large-scale design sensitivity studies is also discussed.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Tensioned metastable fluid detector sensing technology for multifarious-multiscale applications in the nuclear fuel cycle

The nuclear fuel cycle presents formidable 10 30+ multiscale challenges for high-efficiency spectroscopic sensing of alpha-neutron-fission radiation signatures amidst extreme gamma-beta radiation backgrounds at various stages of the cycle; it involves diverse arenas ranging from continuous/pulsed power production, security/safeguards, spent fuel, environmental remediation, and personnel health-dosimetry. This paper discusses the novel tensioned metastable fluid detector (TMFD) sensor technology. It discusses the results of studies demonstrating extreme (10 4 Sv/h) gamma-beta field blind high intrinsic efficiencies (80–100%) for neutron-alpha-fission radiation spectrometric detection. Example studies discussed in this paper include Neutron detection with spectroscopy; H*10 neutron radiation dosimetry upwards from ultra-low10 −2 µSv/h levels; Air and/or liquid-borne trace (10 –3 Bq/mL) quantity, 1 keV energy resolved alpha/fission spectroscopy for Rn/Po/U/Pu/Am environmental isotope assays at 106:1 (β:α) ratios; Directional-position enabled extended standoff tracking of neutron emitting (shielded/unshielded) special nuclear materials while stationary or moving at highway speeds; and, U.S. Department of Energy nuclear complex wide nuclear waste reprocessing, criticality safety, health physics, and environmental applications.

Alpha-fission-neutron spectrometry↗

Characterization of MC&A for the Molten Salt Fuel Cycle

Advanced reactor developers are exploring diverse reactor designs, including molten salt reactors (MSRs). These advanced reactors are considered for wider applications and a range of deployment locations, including supporting the integration of renewable energy sources in the grid. There are three main types of MSRs: (1) reactors in which the fuel salt freely circulates within the core; (2) reactors with the fuel salt contained within vented fuel tubes; and (3) reactors that use molten salt solely as a coolant, with the fuel in a separate, solid form. In this document, the term MSR refers specifically to the first two types, which use fuel salt—special nuclear material (enriched uranium, plutonium, and 233 U) in chloride or fluoride form mixed with chloride- or fluoride-based carrier salt in a peritectic mixture—as the primary medium for fission. The composition of fuel salt, both at startup and for makeup or refueling, varies depending on the MSR design and the chosen fuel cycle approach, which can be either once-through or closed. For MSRs, a variety of fuel cycle approaches (e.g., U, U–Pu, U–Pu–TRU, U–Th, U–Pu–Th) are being considered. Fuel in MSRs is much different than traditional solid fuel, including its preparation. The uniqueness warrants investigation into characterizing fuel preparation processes, known as fuel salt synthesis . This effort characterized major fuel preparation and synthesis processes, identifying temperature, equipment, and environmental requirements for uranium-, plutonium-, and thorium-based fuel preparation and synthesis. Because MSR fuel salt synthesis facilities handle special nuclear material in loose, bulk form, a material control and accounting plan will be required for licensing from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission or under the US Department of Energy authorization. This effort serves as a foundation to investigate material control and accounting approaches for synthesis facilities, including determining measurement points and techniques. Because several MSR developers are planning demonstration facilities in the coming years, this effort will support stakeholders with preparing or reviewing material control and accounting plans for providing assurance that all special nuclear material is accounted for at fuel salt synthesis facilities. This report was produced for Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program under the US Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Supply Chain.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Singlet fission

Singlet fission (SF) is a process whereby a photo-excited singlet exciton spontaneously splits into lower energy triplet excitons. This process has been known to occur in select organic materials for over 50 years but in the past was viewed as a curiosity and not as a problem worthy of focused attention. Over the past decade, this viewpoint has changed as the promising use of SF to improve photovoltaic efficiency has spurred vast activity, which has revealed the richness of the phenomenon. Currently, our understanding of the role played by various bright and dark states and their couplings to vibrations and to each other and by chemical composition and packing, among other factors, has enabled a large increase in the number of viable SF systems as well as a far deeper understanding of the process itself. These advances have allowed for the demonstration of proof-of-concept increases in the solar cell efficiency via the use of SF materials in simple tandem cells and as sensitizers in conjunction with conventional photovoltaics. Indeed, concepts surrounding the field have now invaded other fields, with a prominent example being the use of photon upconversion associated with triplet–triplet fusion (the inverse process to SF) in organic chemistry and photocatalysis. The 23 research articles in this special topic showcase recent cutting-edge advances in the field and highlight the diverse new directions being explored in the field of SF.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Diversion Path Analysis: A Proposed Methodology to Develop an MC&A Approach for Liquid-Fueled Molten Salt Reactors

Nuclear material control and accounting (MC&A) is a critical element of both the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and US Department of Energy (DOE)’s domestic safeguards and security requirements. NRC licensees are required, under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 74 to establish and maintain an MC&A program that captures and records the quantities and locations of special nuclear material (SNM) at the facility. Along with physical protection, MC&A is a key element of domestic nuclear material safeguards that enables the NRC to ensure that SNM is controlled and accounted for. SNM, per 10 CFR Part 74, refers to plutonium, 233 U, and uranium enriched in the isotope 233 U or 235 U, but does not include source material. Periodic physical inventories, coupled with material balance evaluations, are effective and demonstrated tools to account for and detect theft or diversion of SNM in facilities containing SNM in bulk material form (i.e., not in discrete, countable items). Historically in the United States, these types of facilities have included fuel fabrication, conversion, and enrichment facilities. In comparison, reactors have relied on item counting of assemblies and control of SNM while in containment (e.g., a sealed reactor pressure vessel) because, to date, reactor fuel has been in item form. In liquid-fueled molten salt reactors (MSRs), unlike traditional light water reactors (LWRs) or bulk facilities, bulk SNM quantities can change significantly during operation as a result of depletion and transmutation. This introduces challenges to the use of traditional periodic physical inventories and material balance evaluations to detect theft or diversion of SNM in reactors that use SNM in bulk material form. Liquid-fueled (i.e., salt-fueled) MSR facilities are MSRs that use SNM within a salt eutectic as the fuel. The SNM is in a bulk material form any time it is outside of fresh or spent fuel storage containers. Some examples of when SNM will be in bulk form in the facility are during addition of fuel to the reactor system, while fuel is circulating in operation, and while fuel is in a drain tank. Periodic physical inventories and material balance evaluations can likely be effectively applied to many portions of an MSR facility, including all areas where depletion and transmutation are not significantly changing the quantities of SNM within the control area. Within an MSR facility, this would include fresh fuel receipt and loading, waste streams that may contain SNM, irradiated fuel storage outside of the reactor core, and any irradiated fuel processing that may happen after SNM has been removed from the reactor. All of these process steps could rely on measurements of SNM quantities compared with documented inventories. Any discrepancies from predicted (i.e., book) inventories and measured inventories could be quantified as inventory differences, consistent with traditional MC&A guidance from the NRC (e.g., in NUREG-1065 Revision 2, NUREG-2159 Revision 1, and RG 5.29 Revision 2). Within the reactor system, additions and removals to the book inventory include depletion of the SNM (e.g., fission of 235 U), which complicates the use of physical inventories. SNM control, however, can also likely be effectively applied to detect theft of SNM throughout a liquid-fueled MSR facility. To complement these approaches, prior technical reports have identified that a diversion path analysis may be a useful, risk-informed, and performance-based tool to determine suitable elements of an MC&A approach for the reactor system within a liquid-fueled MSR facility.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗