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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Novel Perovskite Semiconductors for the Detection of Special Nuclear Material

Special nuclear material detection using portable, highly efficient detectors is of paramount importance to national security and environmental monitoring. Current neutron detectors, including gas proportional counters and scintillators, are not suitable for discrete or portable monitoring due to size, weight, and power limitations. For example, 3 He gas proportional detectors have significant drawbacks, including long absorption lengths, high voltage requirements, and dependence on the availability of 3 He. The goal of this project is to synthesize a novel, boron-based perovskite semiconductor crystals to create a more efficient and more portable neutron detector. This innovative material will lead to a significant decrease in power and size requirements with higher operating temperatures than other traditional solid-state detectors. Directly incorporating 10 B eliminates the need for a conversion layer and leads to high neutron absorption coefficients. In this seedling project, we used inverse temperature crystallization with boron precursors to create CH 3 NH 3 PbI 3-x (BF 4 ) x . The crystals were analyzed with X-ray diffraction, but the results were inconclusive. Future work will focus on tailoring the solution growth and selecting appropriate solvents and precursors.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2020

12 C(p,p') 12 C Reaction ( E p =19.5–30 MeV) for Active Interrogation of Special Nuclear Material

Passive detection of special nuclear material (SNM) is challenging due to its inherently low rate of spontaneous emission of penetrating radiation, the relative ease of shielding, and the fluctuating and frequently overwhelming background. Active interrogation, the use of external radiation to increase the emission rate of characteristic radiation from SNM, has long been considered to be a promising method to overcome those challenges. Current active-interrogation systems that incorporate radiography tend to use bremsstrahlung beams, which can deliver high radiation doses. Low-energy ion-driven nuclear reactions that produce multiple monoenergetic photons may be used as an alternative. The 12 C ( p , p ' ) 12 C reaction is one such reaction that could produce large yields of highly penetrating 4.4- and 15.1-MeV gamma rays. This reaction does not directly produce neutrons below the approximately 19.7 MeV threshold, and the 15.1-MeV gamma-ray line is well matched to the photofission cross section of 235 U and 238 U . In this article, we report the measurements of thick-target gamma-ray yields at 4.4 and 15.1 MeV from the 12 C ( p , p ' ) 12 C reaction at proton energies of 19.5, 25, and 30 MeV. Measurements are made with two 3 -in. EJ-309 cylindrical liquid scintillation detectors and thermoluminescent dosimeters placed at 0 ° and 90 ° , with an additional 1.5 -in. Na I ( Tl ) cylindrical scintillation detector at 0 ° . We estimate the highest yields of the 4.4- and 15.1-MeV gamma rays of 1.65 × 10 10 and 4.47 × 10 8 sr - 1 μ C - 1 at a proton energy of 30 MeV, respectively. The yields in all experimental configurations are greater than in a comparable deuteron-driven reaction that produces the same gamma-ray energies— 11 B ( d , n γ ) 12 C . However, a significant increase of the neutron radiation dose accompanies the proton energy increase from 19.5 to 30 MeV.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2026

Performance evaluation of neutron noise analysis in detecting special nuclear materials

Reliable and rapid inspection techniques play a vital role in preventing illicit trafficking of special nuclear materials. Active interrogation systems using neutrons produced by portable, high-flux deuterium-deuterium or deuterium-tritium neutron generators are being actively developed as a secondary scanning tool for this purpose. In this study, a neutron noise analysis-based approach for detecting unshielded and shielded special nuclear materials by using a pulsed deuterium-tritium neutron generator was evaluated. Here, this approach analyzes the fluctuation of neutron counts. Its performance was quantified with regard to time-to-detection to achieve a minimum probability of detection of 99% and a probability of false alarm of less than 1% considering various amounts of special nuclear materials and different shielding configurations. It was demonstrated that this approach could detect 17 uranium slugs in 5 s given a neutron generator yield of 8.1 × 10 7 n/s. These slugs could be detected within a reasonable time frame (200 s) when they were shielded by 10.16 cm of high-density polyethylene. The results obtained using the neutron noise analysis approach were compared with those obtained using the commonly used differential die-away analysis technique, a sensitive technique for detecting the presence of fissile materials by utilizing the prompt fission neutrons produced when the source neutrons from a neutron generator are completely diminished. For example, the time to detect 2 unshielded uranium slugs was 2.1 s when using the differential die-away analysis technique; it increased to 93 s for the neutron noise analysis approach. Although the noise analysis-based approach exhibits an overall performance which is not as good as that of differential die-away, neutron noise provides an alternative method for effective detection of special nuclear materials.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2024

Special Nuclear Material Hold-up Measurement

Facilities that process special nuclear material (SNM) generally have a variety of equipment, shielding, and nearby radiation sources, which can pose challenges when performing nondestructive analysis (NDA) within the facility, as shown in Figure 1. In this figure, the left image features two individuals performing a holdup measurement of a large duct at a posting, utilizing a detector probe attached to a yardstick to reduce some aspect of the measurement uncertainty. Note that the distance to the holdup within the pipe from the posting cannot be accounted for. The right image similarly features several individuals guiding a holdup measurement of a ducting pipe several meters overhead, by attaching a detector probe to a long handle and lining that up with a posting on the outside of the pipe. SNM processing begets SNM holdup, and this difficulty with accurate NDA can result in unaccounted accumulation of SNM holdup within a process or area. Normal SNM processing operations can accumulate holdup within filters, pumps, pipes, ducts, other equipment, and facility support systems, as demonstrated by Figure 2. It is important for deactivation and decommissioning (D&D) gloveboxes and their ancillary equipment, material accountability, criticality safety, facility operations, waste management, radiation safety, and security to accurately characterize the location, composition, and quantity of this holdup to minimize these associated risks and potential diversion pathways. Current NDA techniques for assay of holdup are expensive, time consuming, and have high uncertainty.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Ion Mobility – Mass Spectrometry Rapid Imaging of Special Nuclear Materials

Robot Nose will use new fast data throughput methods and experience with laser microfocus to dramatically improve the speed and spatial resolution of an established instrument, making it a useful tool for imaging special nuclear materials (SNM). Mass spectrometry imaging instruments have traditionally been too slow and mass alone is generally an insufficient measurement for organic analyses. This situation was markedly improved by Ionwerks Inc., who pioneered the combination of ion mobility with mass spectrometry imaging. In 2D mobility-mass plots, clearly identifiable trend lines can be selected and reduced to 1D mass spectra without isobaric interferences. This is a major advantage over other imaging mass spectrometers that generally cannot distinguish isobars without custom-built lasers or high voltage accelerators. Special nuclear material (SNM) contains substantial fissile isotopes, particularly 233U, 235U, and 239Pu. A complete forensic analysis of SNM therefore requires quantitative isotopic measurement – often through some form of mass spectrometry. SNM contaminated with inclusions such as pollen grains can help identify its prior locations. The project team is presently working on an approach to allow rapid screening of 1-3 cm diameter thin samples of such material.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2021

Measurements of Short-Lived Isomers from Photofission as a Method of Active Interrogation for Special Nuclear Materials

Isomeric fission products, such as 134m Te (T 1/2 = 164 ns) and 136m Xe (T 1/2 = 2.95 μs), are proposed as a signature of special nuclear materials in active interrogation applications. To test this conjecture, monoenergetic 9, 11, and 13 MeV photons from the HIγS facility are used to induce fission of 235 U, 238 U, and 239 Pu targets. The de-excitation γ rays of the isomers are measured using time-gated spectroscopy with high-purity germanium detectors. The 134m Te and 136m Xe isomers are detected and identified by the energy and decay half-life of their characteristic γ-ray transitions. The ratio of yields for these two signature γ rays, corresponding to 134m Te/( 136m Xe + 136 I), is found to be strongly correlated with the identity of the fissioning nuclei. These results show that fission-product isomers may be used in active interrogation to detect and identify special nuclear materials, even providing information on the isotopic enrichment. In conclusion, the feasibility of an active interrogation scenario using a bremsstrahlung beam is discussed.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Demonstration of active neutron interrogation of special nuclear materials using a high-intensity short-pulse-laser-driven neutron source

Detecting shielded special nuclear material, such as nuclear explosives, is a difficult challenge pursued by non-proliferation, anti-terrorism, and nuclear security programs worldwide. Interrogation with intense fast-neutron pulses is a promising method to characterize concealed nuclear material rapidly but is limited by suitable source availability and proven instrumentation. In this study we have pioneered a demonstration of such an interrogation method using a high-intensity, short-pulse, laser-driven neutron source that offers potential benefits compared to conventional neutron sources. The measurement results reported here represent the first experimental demonstration of this interrogation approach on enriched uranium items and demonstrate the feasibility of a precise measurement using realistic nuclear materials, representative of field scenarios, even with just a single laser-driven neutron pulse. Bright pulsed sources can overcome the nuisance background of items with strong internal neutron sources, improving analytical power, while single-shot assay is attractive in high-throughput situations where time is at a premium. The science and technology of this type of neutron production is developing rapidly, and we anticipate that practical mobile interrogation systems will become available based on the detection concepts demonstrated here to meet the growing measurement needs.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Examination of New Theory for Neutron Multiplicity Counting of Non-Point-Like Sources of Special Nuclear Material

The purpose of a nondestructive assay is to accurately verify the declared mass of special nuclear material (SNM) samples in a limited amount of time. One measurement modality is neutron multiplicity counting (NMC), which relates time-correlated neutron detection rates to the mass of SNM present. Traditional theory assumes point-like sources, which can be ill-posed for kilogram-quantity, bulk samples. Recent theory was developed to improve NMC accuracy for non-point-like samples. This work preliminarily examines the theory with measured data. The OSCAR prototype (a 3-by-4 array of 5.08-cm-thick, 5.08-cm-diameter trans-stilbene organic scintillators) measures configurations of 29.41-49.00 kg of highly enriched uranium (93wt% 235 U). Adjusted factorial moments for the emitted neutron multiplicity distributions are used to account for the shape and type of SNM being measured.

252Cf↗
DOE OSTI2025

Special Nuclear Material Mass Estimates from Neutron Singles Count Rate [Poster]

The objective of this research was to create an algorithm to provide an estimate of special nuclear material (SNM) mass using only neutron count rate data from a Radioisotope Identification Device (RIID), rather than using time-correlated data from a neutron multiplicity counter. To meet this objective neutron count rate measurements of a 252 Cf source were taken at varying distances with an ORTEC Detective X, FLIR Identifinder 2, and an ORTEC RADEAGLET-R. An algorithm was created to estimate mass of SNM utilizing the singles rate equation and the measured absolute efficiency curves.

FLIR↗
DOE OSTI2023

Detecting and characterizing special nuclear material for nuclear nonproliferation applications

Abstract There is an urgent need for new, better instrumentation and techniques for detecting and characterizing special nuclear material (SNM), i.e., highly enriched uranium and plutonium. The development of improved instruments and techniques requires experiments performed with the SNM itself, which is of limited availability. This paper describes the findings of experiments performed at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center conducted using new instruments and techniques on unclassified, kg-quantity SNM objects. These experiments, performed in the framework of the Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Consortium for Monitoring, Technology, and Verification, focused on detecting, characterizing, and localizing SNM samples with masses ranging from 3.3 to 13.8 kg, including plutonium and highly enriched uranium using prototype detectors and techniques. The work demonstrates SNM detection and characterization using recently-developed prototype detection systems. Specifically, we present new results in passive detection and imaging of plutonium and uranium objects using gamma-ray and dual particle (fast neutron and gamma-ray) imaging. We also present a new analysis of the delayed neutron emissions during active interrogation of uranium using a neutron generator.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2022

Traditional Forensic Examinations on Bulk Special Nuclear Material

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Laboratory at Quantico, Virginia is responsible for the forensic examination of radiological evidence and evidence contaminated with radioactive materials. Due to these unique hazards and the necessary specialized safety protocols, the FBI has developed a network of Partner Laboratories (PLs) across the United States of America to support conventional forensic examinations of radiological evidence and evidence contaminated with radioactive materials. In support of this, the FBI Laboratory has established the Hazardous Evidence Analysis Team (HEAT), a group of qualified forensic examiners, scientists, technicians, and photographers who can deploy to laboratories outside of the FBI Laboratory at Quantico, VA to perform conventional forensics on evidence containing/contaminated with hazardous materials. One of the FBI’s PLs, the United States Department of Energy’s Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), in Los Alamos, New Mexico, has unique facilities, personnel, and procedures to secure, safely handle, and process significant quantities of special nuclear material (SNM). While LANL’s procedures for working with SNM are well established, working with SNM under evidentiary controls is not. Close cooperation between LANL and FBI HEAT is required due to FBI policies on evidence handling, as well as the challenges associated with the exploitation and preservation of conventional forensics (fingerprints, trace evidence, and photography) on SNM evidence.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Verification of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) using Active Well Coincidence Counter (AWCC) and a High Purity Germanium (HPGe) Detector

SNM verification can be accomplished via two methods i.e. destructive analysis (DA) or nondestructive analysis (NDA). The DA modes are much more accurate compared to NDA modes; nevertheless, the sample's physical integrity is destroyed in the process. Techniques such as ICP-MS, ID-ICP-MS, TI-MS are few examples of DA, where a bulk material is ground and mixed with a solution (some form of acid) to acquire a homogenous sample. In contrast, NDA modes utilize signals emitted by the sample such as gamma, neutrons, light, or heat to analyze samples under investigation. HPGe detectors are some of the most frequently used gamma detectors to assay SNM. However, in a high activity scenario it provides a large uncertainty and sometimes becomes unfeasible to measure low energy gamma rays. Meanwhile, neutron detectors are not affected by the gamma background, therefore they can be used in addition to the gamma detectors to verify total fissile mass ({sup 235}U + {sup 239}Pu) of SNM. The AWCC is one of the thermal neutron NDA systems developed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). It consists of 42 {sup 3}He detectors to measure gross neutrons (singles), coincidence neutrons (doubles), higher order multiplicity counting (triples, quadruples, etc.). It can effectively operate in both active and passive neutron interrogation modes. It can utilize AmLi, AmBe, or {sup 252}Cf active interrogation neutron sources. It is used to verify declared fissile mass ({sup 235}U or {sup 239}Pu) present in SNM. Objectives: Calibrate HPGe and AWCC for lightly irradiated (with enough {sup 137}Cs gamma background) ∼93% enriched HEU fuels; Verify fissile mass ({sup 235}U +{sup 239}Pu) content using AWCC and HPGe; Model and benchmark AWCC in MCNP6. Neutron coincidence and multiplicity counting: Two or more neutrons are coincident if they are detected by the system within the specified gate window; In AWCC: Gate window is 128 μsec; Induced fission in fissile material such as {sup 235}U and {sup 239}Pu - emission of time correlated neutrons - Singles, Doubles, Triples, or Quadruples; No induced fission in non-fissile materials- no correlated neutrons - only singles. SNM can be verified with high accuracy and precision using gamma and neutron NDA instruments such as HPGe and AWCC. Interaction with thermal neutrons. Non-fissile atoms - do not emit correlated neutrons. Fissile atoms - emit correlated neutrons during induced fission events. The time correlated neutrons can be detected by using coincidence or multiplicity counters such as AWCC. Likewise, {sup 235}U produces 186 keV gamma peak that can be measured by a HPGe gamma detector. Counts under 186 keV gamma peak provide information about {sup 235}U content. Combining AWCC and HPGe results can provide better understanding of special nuclear material under investigation.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Active Neutron Interrogation as a Method for Verification of the Absence of Special Nuclear Material in Arms Control Dismantlement

The next step in arms control reductions will deal with both strategic and non-strategic weapons, presenting new and hard challenges for verification. One verification approach that might be used in support of these reductions is the concept of deferred verification, which forgoes inspections at sensitive nuclear sites and relies on an inspection regime having access to the open segment of a State's nuclear sector, in "monitored transfer zones." A component of this approach is the anticipated need for an instrument suite capable of detecting well-shielded highly-enriched uranium or plutonium where it isn't supposed to be. This specific need was recently identified by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research in an enabling operating concept they call "contain and dispose." At the foundation of this approach is the idea that items declared as "not nuclear" are, by definition, not treaty limited and are thus "fair-game" for inspection and questioning. Active Neutron Interrogation (ANI), using beta-delayed neutron emissions as the signature for special nuclear material (SNM) detection, is a promising method to address this challenge. The method is quick, has high sensitivity and high specificity for detecting shielded SNM, is robust against changing background radiation environments, is robust against the presence of unknown shielding, and avoids the use of gamma-ray spectrometry which may introduce complications due to the potential release of sensitive information. This paper will present recent research activities exploring technical aspects of using ANI as a FAIRGAME verification method and discuss future prospects and research needs

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗
DOE OSTI2020

Characterizing Shielded Special Nuclear Material by Neutron Capture Gamma-Ray Multiplicity Counting

We present a new neutron multiplicity counting analysis and measurement method for neutron-shielded fissile material using neutron-capture gamma rays. Neutrons absorbed in shielding produce characteristic gamma rays that preserve the otherwise lost neutron multiplicity signature. Neutron multiplicity counting provides estimates of fission parameters, such as neutron leakage multiplication, spontaneous fissioner (e.g. Pu-240) mass, and (α,n) ratio. Standard neutron multiplicity counting can incorporate the new neutron-capture gamma-ray multiplicity counting technique to characterize previously degenerate or intractable source configurations by maximizing the multiplicity signature. The new method decouples neutron source-detector interferences, such as reflection and thermalization time in the detector, that could improve measurements of the mean neutron lifetime. We also develop a detector prototype for the multiplicity counting of neutron-capture gamma rays and present detector design considerations, such as detection material and shielding, to optimize the detection of the 2.2 MeV hydrogen capture gamma ray. We simulate the prototype neutron- capture gamma-ray multiplicity counter against the BeRP ball in polyethylene shells to inform future measurements.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗