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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2026

Performance evaluation of neutron noise analysis in detecting special nuclear materials

Reliable and rapid inspection techniques play a vital role in preventing illicit trafficking of special nuclear materials. Active interrogation systems using neutrons produced by portable, high-flux deuterium-deuterium or deuterium-tritium neutron generators are being actively developed as a secondary scanning tool for this purpose. In this study, a neutron noise analysis-based approach for detecting unshielded and shielded special nuclear materials by using a pulsed deuterium-tritium neutron generator was evaluated. Here, this approach analyzes the fluctuation of neutron counts. Its performance was quantified with regard to time-to-detection to achieve a minimum probability of detection of 99% and a probability of false alarm of less than 1% considering various amounts of special nuclear materials and different shielding configurations. It was demonstrated that this approach could detect 17 uranium slugs in 5 s given a neutron generator yield of 8.1 × 10 7 n/s. These slugs could be detected within a reasonable time frame (200 s) when they were shielded by 10.16 cm of high-density polyethylene. The results obtained using the neutron noise analysis approach were compared with those obtained using the commonly used differential die-away analysis technique, a sensitive technique for detecting the presence of fissile materials by utilizing the prompt fission neutrons produced when the source neutrons from a neutron generator are completely diminished. For example, the time to detect 2 unshielded uranium slugs was 2.1 s when using the differential die-away analysis technique; it increased to 93 s for the neutron noise analysis approach. Although the noise analysis-based approach exhibits an overall performance which is not as good as that of differential die-away, neutron noise provides an alternative method for effective detection of special nuclear materials.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2024

Special Nuclear Material Hold-up Measurement

Facilities that process special nuclear material (SNM) generally have a variety of equipment, shielding, and nearby radiation sources, which can pose challenges when performing nondestructive analysis (NDA) within the facility, as shown in Figure 1. In this figure, the left image features two individuals performing a holdup measurement of a large duct at a posting, utilizing a detector probe attached to a yardstick to reduce some aspect of the measurement uncertainty. Note that the distance to the holdup within the pipe from the posting cannot be accounted for. The right image similarly features several individuals guiding a holdup measurement of a ducting pipe several meters overhead, by attaching a detector probe to a long handle and lining that up with a posting on the outside of the pipe. SNM processing begets SNM holdup, and this difficulty with accurate NDA can result in unaccounted accumulation of SNM holdup within a process or area. Normal SNM processing operations can accumulate holdup within filters, pumps, pipes, ducts, other equipment, and facility support systems, as demonstrated by Figure 2. It is important for deactivation and decommissioning (D&D) gloveboxes and their ancillary equipment, material accountability, criticality safety, facility operations, waste management, radiation safety, and security to accurately characterize the location, composition, and quantity of this holdup to minimize these associated risks and potential diversion pathways. Current NDA techniques for assay of holdup are expensive, time consuming, and have high uncertainty.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Demonstration of active neutron interrogation of special nuclear materials using a high-intensity short-pulse-laser-driven neutron source

Detecting shielded special nuclear material, such as nuclear explosives, is a difficult challenge pursued by non-proliferation, anti-terrorism, and nuclear security programs worldwide. Interrogation with intense fast-neutron pulses is a promising method to characterize concealed nuclear material rapidly but is limited by suitable source availability and proven instrumentation. In this study we have pioneered a demonstration of such an interrogation method using a high-intensity, short-pulse, laser-driven neutron source that offers potential benefits compared to conventional neutron sources. The measurement results reported here represent the first experimental demonstration of this interrogation approach on enriched uranium items and demonstrate the feasibility of a precise measurement using realistic nuclear materials, representative of field scenarios, even with just a single laser-driven neutron pulse. Bright pulsed sources can overcome the nuisance background of items with strong internal neutron sources, improving analytical power, while single-shot assay is attractive in high-throughput situations where time is at a premium. The science and technology of this type of neutron production is developing rapidly, and we anticipate that practical mobile interrogation systems will become available based on the detection concepts demonstrated here to meet the growing measurement needs.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Special Nuclear Material Mass Estimates from Neutron Singles Count Rate [Poster]

The objective of this research was to create an algorithm to provide an estimate of special nuclear material (SNM) mass using only neutron count rate data from a Radioisotope Identification Device (RIID), rather than using time-correlated data from a neutron multiplicity counter. To meet this objective neutron count rate measurements of a 252 Cf source were taken at varying distances with an ORTEC Detective X, FLIR Identifinder 2, and an ORTEC RADEAGLET-R. An algorithm was created to estimate mass of SNM utilizing the singles rate equation and the measured absolute efficiency curves.

FLIR↗
DOE OSTI2025

Characterization of MC&A for the Molten Salt Fuel Cycle

Advanced reactor developers are exploring diverse reactor designs, including molten salt reactors (MSRs). These advanced reactors are considered for wider applications and a range of deployment locations, including supporting the integration of renewable energy sources in the grid. There are three main types of MSRs: (1) reactors in which the fuel salt freely circulates within the core; (2) reactors with the fuel salt contained within vented fuel tubes; and (3) reactors that use molten salt solely as a coolant, with the fuel in a separate, solid form. In this document, the term MSR refers specifically to the first two types, which use fuel salt—special nuclear material (enriched uranium, plutonium, and 233 U) in chloride or fluoride form mixed with chloride- or fluoride-based carrier salt in a peritectic mixture—as the primary medium for fission. The composition of fuel salt, both at startup and for makeup or refueling, varies depending on the MSR design and the chosen fuel cycle approach, which can be either once-through or closed. For MSRs, a variety of fuel cycle approaches (e.g., U, U–Pu, U–Pu–TRU, U–Th, U–Pu–Th) are being considered. Fuel in MSRs is much different than traditional solid fuel, including its preparation. The uniqueness warrants investigation into characterizing fuel preparation processes, known as fuel salt synthesis . This effort characterized major fuel preparation and synthesis processes, identifying temperature, equipment, and environmental requirements for uranium-, plutonium-, and thorium-based fuel preparation and synthesis. Because MSR fuel salt synthesis facilities handle special nuclear material in loose, bulk form, a material control and accounting plan will be required for licensing from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission or under the US Department of Energy authorization. This effort serves as a foundation to investigate material control and accounting approaches for synthesis facilities, including determining measurement points and techniques. Because several MSR developers are planning demonstration facilities in the coming years, this effort will support stakeholders with preparing or reviewing material control and accounting plans for providing assurance that all special nuclear material is accounted for at fuel salt synthesis facilities. This report was produced for Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program under the US Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Supply Chain.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Design of Hypothetical Processes for the Production of 131 I and 99 Mo from Activation Targets

For over six decades, medical isotope production has been a high-priority focus of many research reactors across the globe. The majority of these isotopes were produced using highly-enriched uranium (HEU) or low enriched uranium (LEU) – delivering millions of doses of diagnostic and therapeutic isotopes. As a consequence of this production, however, six decades of isotope production has resulted in massive quantities of spent uranium material worldwide with no known disposition pathway creating growing proliferation concerns. Supported by the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Material Management and Minimization (M3) program, there has been increased focus in the production of high-priority isotopes without special nuclear materials or without uranium altogether. Isotope production via activation can potentially fulfill regional isotope demands – particularly in under-developed regions without access to isotope supply chains. The benefits of this approach would be a reduction in uranium proliferation risks, less special nuclear material wastes, and reduced risk of supply disruption in the likely event that major isotope producers will again go off-line as has happened in recent years due to a number of factors.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2024

Detection of uranium-photofission neutrons with a 4 He scintillation detector

The use of photon active interrogation to detect special nuclear material has held significant theoretical promise, as the interrogating source particles, photons, are fundamentally different from one of the main signatures of special nuclear material: neutrons produced in nuclear fission. However, neutrons produced by photonuclear reactions in the accelerator target, collimator, and environment can obscure the fission neutron signal. These (γ, n) neutrons could be discriminated from fission neutrons by their energy spectrum, but common detectors sensitive to the neutron spectrum, like organic scintillators, are typically hampered by the intense photon background characteristic of photon-based active interrogation. In contrast, high-pressure 4 ⁢He-based scintillation detectors are well-suited to photon active interrogation, as they are similarly sensitive to fast neutrons and can measure their spectrum, but show little response to gamma rays. Here, in this work, a photon active interrogation system utilizing a 4 ⁢He scintillation detector and a 9 MeV linac-bremsstrahlung x-ray source was experimentally evaluated. The detector was shown to be capable of operating in intense gamma-ray environments and detecting photofission neutrons from 238 ⁢U when interrogated by this x-ray source. The photofission neutrons show clear spectral separation from (γ, n) neutrons produced in lead, a common shielding material.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2024

Tensioned metastable fluid detector sensing technology for multifarious-multiscale applications in the nuclear fuel cycle

The nuclear fuel cycle presents formidable 10 30+ multiscale challenges for high-efficiency spectroscopic sensing of alpha-neutron-fission radiation signatures amidst extreme gamma-beta radiation backgrounds at various stages of the cycle; it involves diverse arenas ranging from continuous/pulsed power production, security/safeguards, spent fuel, environmental remediation, and personnel health-dosimetry. This paper discusses the novel tensioned metastable fluid detector (TMFD) sensor technology. It discusses the results of studies demonstrating extreme (10 4 Sv/h) gamma-beta field blind high intrinsic efficiencies (80–100%) for neutron-alpha-fission radiation spectrometric detection. Example studies discussed in this paper include Neutron detection with spectroscopy; H*10 neutron radiation dosimetry upwards from ultra-low10 −2 µSv/h levels; Air and/or liquid-borne trace (10 –3 Bq/mL) quantity, 1 keV energy resolved alpha/fission spectroscopy for Rn/Po/U/Pu/Am environmental isotope assays at 106:1 (β:α) ratios; Directional-position enabled extended standoff tracking of neutron emitting (shielded/unshielded) special nuclear materials while stationary or moving at highway speeds; and, U.S. Department of Energy nuclear complex wide nuclear waste reprocessing, criticality safety, health physics, and environmental applications.

Alpha-fission-neutron spectrometry↗
DOE OSTI2024

Passive high explosive neutron inspection (PHENIX): a new method to confirm the presence or absence of high explosives for nuclear treaty verification

Advanced instruments and methods need to be developed now to create a technical basis to support the negotiation of future nuclear arms control treaties. One new capability that is anticipated is the ability to confirm either the declared presence or declared absence of high explosive (HE) material in the presence of special nuclear material (SNM). Towards this goal, Passive HE Neutron Inspection (PHENIX) has been developed and demonstrated as a method for confirming the presence or absence of HE in the presence of plutonium. The method exploits the inherent presence of neutrons associated with the decay of plutonium as an internal probe source for performing prompt gamma-ray neutron activation analysis (PGNAA), searching for the presence of HE as revealed by the emission of characteristic gamma rays following neutron absorption in hydrogen and nitrogen which are building blocks of present-day, military-grade HE. Tests using stoichiometrically-correct hemishells of mock HE with plutonium show that a system can be expected to positively confirm the presence or absence of these signatures, supporting determination of HE presence or absence with Pu, in a few hours. To protect other potentially sensitive gamma-ray signatures from a treaty accountable item, an analog information barrier has been conceptualized and tested which physically prevents the collection of gamma-ray spectral data outside of user selected energy windows strategically chosen to view only narrow spectral regions corresponding to the hydrogen (2223.2 keV) and nitrogen (9807.2 keV, 10,318.2 keV, and 10,829.2 keV) PGNAA signatures.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2026

Technical Basis Update for the Design Life Extension of the SAVY-4000® Series of Containers

This technical basis update focuses on the design life of the SAVY-4000® (hereafter “SAVY”) series of nuclear material storage container (e.g., used to store, transport, and handle special nuclear material outside of a glovebox), previously approved under DOE Manual 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual. The SAVY is approved for storing all authorized contents for a period of 15 years. The lifetime extension technical basis is established on the compiled technical data from the on-going SAVY and Hagan surveillance programs, destructive analysis results, accelerated aging studies, and performance testing, in line with the regulatory rigor of DOE M441.1-1.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Technical Basis for Proposed Changes to DOE-STD-1194-2019, Nuclear Material Attractiveness Determination and Categorization

The Department of Energy (DOE)’s Technical Standard DOE-STD-1194-2019 (dated September 2019), Nuclear Materials Control and Accountability, provides key guidance for the determination of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) attractiveness levels. Attractiveness levels are a key component in the security categorization of SNM processed, used, and stored at DOE facilities. Upon review, the writing team identified specific components relating to the determination of attractiveness levels that could be modified to improve clarity, reduce burden on sites, and/or better align with the graded safeguards principle that is central to the DOE’s nuclear security program. The report outlines the original verbiage, issues with implementation of that verbiage, proposed new verbiage, and the expected benefits thus serving as the technical basis for the proposed changes.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Flattop-HEU Benchmark Reevaluation Summary

The Flattop critical assembly was first constructed in the 1950’s at Los Alamos National Laboratory as a follow-on to the Topsy experiment. Flattop is composed of a sphere of special nuclear material (SNM) surrounded by a thick spherical reflector made of natural uranium (NU). Two SNM cores currently exist: a highly-enriched-uranium (HEU) core and a plutonium core. The reflector is composed of three parts: a stationary hemisphere and two movable quarter spheres. For fine reactivity control, there are three control rods of NU that are inserted into the stationary hemisphere from underneath the assembly. The final components that allow for reactivity adjustment are the glory hole pieces, mass adjustment buttons, and hemispherical caps. These pieces can be loaded in various configurations to change the available reactivity loaded in the system.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Select Proliferation Studies on TRISO-fueled, Heat-Pipe-cooled Microreactors

Nuclear microreactors carry the potential to open up new markets for the nuclear industry, as their expected cost competitiveness in non-traditional market segments (e.g., mines, military bases, extraterrestrial surfaces, and remote areas), and their inherent safety features make them deployable when other power sources are unavailable or difficult to exploit. For countries that have not traditionally participated in nuclear power, microreactors represent a clean energy solution [1]. However, their use, especially in non-weapons states, may entail challenges in terms of maintaining international nuclear safeguards [2]. Furthermore, the deployment locations where microreactors may prove most cost competitive would be difficult to access by state and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors [3]. In addition to the isolated nature of potential deployment sites, the low-power characteristic of microreactors suggests that numerous microreactors would need to be deployed to meet energy demands. That, coupled with the unique physics of many current microreactor designs, opens up a new area of research with respect to nonproliferation and safeguards concerns [2]. Whereas traditional facilities are inspected as isolated cases when looking for signs of diversion or misuse; microreactors may need to be assessed in the context of the entire fleet to which they belong. International safeguards necessitate timely detection of any significant quantities (SQs) of material that are being diverted (e.g., 1 SQ of special nuclear material diverted over the course of a 1-year period) [4]. For low-enriched uranium, the IAEA defines 1 SQ as corresponding to 75 kg of 235U. The purpose of the present paper is to explore the detectability threshold for material diversion in microreactors by relying on critical control drum angles, excess reactivity, and the reactor lifetime as the selected operational parameters. For this assessment, a heat-pipe-cooled microreactor was regarded as the base design. While the conclusions reached in this paper are not readily extendable to the design of actual microreactors, the analysis herein enables conclusions to be drawn regarding the level of accuracy needed for reference calculations in order to detect diversion scenarios by utilizing the selected operational parameters (i.e., mainly control drum angles, critical insertion angle, and the reactor lifetime).

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Material Control and Accounting for Liquid-Fueled Molten Salt Reactors: Material Control and Holdup Considerations

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) will likely require license applicants for liquid-fueled molten salt reactors (MSRs) with circulating fuel to submit a nuclear material control and accounting (MC&A) plan or detailed MC&A program description for the facility. In liquid-fueled MSRs with special nuclear material (SNM) in bulk (i.e., not in discrete items) form and rapidly changing quantities due to fuel transmutation and depletion, using traditional nuclear material accounting methods with material balance evaluations is challenging. In reactors with changing inventories, these expected quantities of SNM must be calculated based on operational parameters. Reducing uncertainties on these expected quantities is challenging in the case of MSRs without decades of operational experience to verify and validate predictive computational codes. Moreover, many areas in MSRs are inaccessible because of high-temperature and high-radiation environments, making measurements challenging.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Recommendations for a Fundamental Nuclear Material Control (FNMC) Plan for TRISO Fuel Fabrication Facilities Under NRC Regulations

A fundamental nuclear material control (FNMC) plan, which is required for all fuel fabrication facilities that are authorized to possess more than 1 effective kg of special nuclear material, describes how material control and accounting (MC&A) requirements will be met to comply with US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations. Tristructural isotropic (TRISO) fuel fabrication facilities are likely to have issues in meeting MC&A requirements because of the new processes and fuel types their work involves. This report provides recommendations for an FNMC plan specifically for a TRISO fuel fabrication facility under NRC regulations and includes a draft outline of an FNMC plan. This report was produced for the Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program under the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Technologies programs within the US Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Detector Response and Battery Reliability

The Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) measurements team performs confirmation measurements of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) at different locations around Sandia. The measurement team has access to two High purity Germanium (HPGe) detectors, the AEGIS (Model: AEGIS-BEGE5030), and the ORTEC (Model: trans-SPEC-DX-100). These two can operate purely on battery power, but the response of the detectors while on battery power is not well documented. To enhance our knowledge with these detectors the team wants to investigate the detectors response to changes in battery range, wall charging, and mid operation battery swaps (Hot Swaps).

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2025

Control Boundary Analysis for Liquid-Fueled Molten Salt Reactors

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) will likely require license applicants for liquid-fueled molten salt reactors (MSRs) with circulating fuel to submit a nuclear material control and accounting (MC&A) plan or provide a detailed MC&A program description for the facility. In liquid-fueled MSRs with special nuclear material (SNM) in bulk form (i.e., not in discrete items) and with rapidly changing quantities due to fuel transmutation and depletion, a novel MC&A approach is needed because traditional nuclear material accounting methods with material balance evaluations will not be sufficient. This report details the continued efforts carried out at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) during FY 2025 to develop a distinct MC&A approach suitable specifically for domestic safeguards of the first-of-a-kind MSRs. These efforts are built on previous ORNL efforts reported in ORNL/SPR-2023/3181 and ORNL/SPR-2024/3555.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Collision Tracking in OpenMC: Methods and Applications in Neutron Noise, Neutron Imaging, Time-of-Flight, and Multiplicity Counting

We present the development and application of a collision tracking feature within the OpenMC Monte Carlo particle transport code, designed for diverse applications such as neutron spectroscopy, scatter camera system, neutron noise, and multiplicity counting simulations. This feature enables the tracking of individual particle collisions, with potential applications in nuclear nonproliferation, reactor physics, and nuclear security. Additionally, the feature holds potential for the calibration of neutron detectors, specifically in converting light output into energy deposited within the detectors. The implementation consists of a set of filters—such as reaction type, energy, cell, and material—that constrain the set of collisions that are tracked, extensions to the Python API to enable simple input specification, and support for writing either OpenMC’s native HDF5-based format or the Monte Carlo particle list format. This feature was added to the official OpenMC release in version 0.15.3. In this work, the feature will be applied to showcase scenarios such as time-of-flight simulations, scatter-camera imaging for neutron source localization, neutron-noise analysis to extract integral kinetic parameters such as the prompt decay constant α, and multiplicity counting to estimate the mass of special nuclear materials. Ultimately, this feature aims to expand the application scope of open-source Monte Carlo particle transport codes such as OpenMC.

Monte Carlo code↗