SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Stackelberg game”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

SourceResearch connectionFrom yearThrough year

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

11 records

All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

DOE OSTI2025

Game theoretic modeling and optimization of competition and collaboration in dual channel electronic waste supply chains

The rapid growth of electronic waste (e-waste) presents critical challenges for sustainable resource recovery and environmental protection. This study develops a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) model formulated as a hierarchical Stackelberg game, that integrates dynamic pricing and cost-sharing mechanisms to optimize both economic and environmental outcomes. The model explicitly captures strategic interactions between manufacturer-led and third-party recycling channels, accounting for consumer behavior, regulatory incentives, and market competition. Numerical simulations conducted (implemented over a four-iteration horizon using a commercial optimization solver) show that, relative to the baseline equilibrium, manufacturer profit increases from 11.6 thousand USD to 37.9 thousand USD (+226.8%), total recycled volume rises from 7,848 to 7,942 units (+1.2%), and collector profit nearly doubles under cost-sharing, enabling more equitable profit distribution. Furthermore, scenario-based simulations across Sub-Saharan Africa, high-income economies, and emerging Asian industrial countries reveal that infrastructure quality, policy intensity, and labor costs critically shape recycling efficiency and profit allocation. These findings demonstrate that subsidies alone are insufficient to ensure system efficiency. Instead, coordinated strategies that integrate internal incentive alignment with context-sensitive policy support are required. Overall, this study offers a robust framework for designing resilient, efficient, and regionally adaptable e-waste management systems.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

DOE OSTI2026

Optimizing Transportation Networks for E-Waste Reverse Logistics: A Multi-Modal Cost Allocation and Pricing Strategy

The exponential growth of electronic waste (e-waste) poses critical challenges for sustainable reverse logistics and transportation network optimization. This study develops a dual-channel transportation framework for e-waste logistics that integrates dynamic freight pricing, cost allocation mechanisms, and game-theoretic coordination. The model captures interactions between centralized hubs and distributed processing networks, accounting for freight rate elasticity, volume allocation, and capacity constraints. Using Stackelberg game theory and cost-sharing strategies, the framework optimizes transportation efficiency and profit distribution across logistics channels. Numerical simulations show that the dual-channel structure increases centralized hub profit by 226.8% compared to baseline single-channel operations, while boosting total transported volume by 1.2% and nearly doubling freight collector profit under cost-sharing. Scenario analyses across regional infrastructures reveal that network density, policy incentives, and logistics costs shape routing efficiency and profit allocation. These findings suggest that coordinated strategies combining dynamic pricing, targeted infrastructure investment, and strategic cost allocation are needed to design efficient, resilient, and regionally adaptable e-waste transportation systems.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

DOE OSTI2024

A Decentralized Market Mechanism for Energy Communities under Operating Envelopes

Here, we propose an operating envelopes (OEs) aware energy community market mechanism that dynamically charges/rewards its members based on two-part pricing. The OEs are imposed exogenously by a regulated distribution system operator (DSO) on the energy community's revenue meter and is subject to a generalized net energy metering (NEM) tariff design. By formulating the interaction of the community operator and its members as a Stackelberg game, we show that the proposed two-part pricing achieves a Nash equilibrium and maximizes the community's social welfare in a decentralized fashion while ensuring that the community's operation abides by the OEs. The market mechanism conforms with the cost-causation principle and guarantees community members a surplus level no less than their maximum surplus when they autonomously face the DSO. The dynamic and uniform community price is a monotonically decreasing function of the community's aggregate renewable generation. We also analyze the impact of exogenous parameters such as NEM rates and OEs on the value of joining the community. Lastly, through numerical studies, we showcase the community's welfare, and pricing, and compare its members' surplus to customers under the DSO's regime.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2025

Game Theory Approaches for System-level Incentive Design

This report presents a generalized Stackelberg game framework for designing and evaluating financial incentives that enhance power system resilience through strategic deployment of distributed energy resources(DERs) under various contingencies. The proposed approach addresses the challenge of coordinating individual community investment decisions to meet system-wide resilience objectives. The framework is demonstrated in a three-community test system subjected to two transmission contingency scenarios: inter-community line failure (Case 1) and complete main grid disconnection (Case 2). In both cases, three incentive levels are compared: a Base case with no financial incentives, and low and high incentive cases. In Case 1, the Base case (no incentives) results in a total installed DER capacity of 217.2 MW, with no load shedding due to alternative routing, but community costs remain high. Increasing incentives raises DER deployment to 286.9 MW, lowers aggregate community costs by $22M annually, and completely avoids the need for costly new transmission line construction. In Case 2, the Base case results in 24.3 MWh of unserved load; introducing incentives eliminates all load shedding and ensures up to 89 MWh of battery storage is available for emergency reserve. These results demonstrate that targeted incentives can dramatically improve grid resilience and cost-effectiveness. The framework thus offers policymakers and system planners a robust tool to quantify and compare the effectiveness of incentive programs for multi-community transmission networks behavior, system resilience, and economic efficiency.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2025

Network-Aware and Welfare-Maximizing Dynamic Pricing for Energy Sharing

The proliferation of behind-the-meter (BTM) distributed energy resources (DER) within the electrical distribution network presents significant supply and demand flexibilities, but also introduces operational challenges such as voltage spikes and reverse power flows. In response, this paper proposes a network-aware dynamic pricing framework tailored for energy-sharing coalitions that aggregate small, but ubiquitous, BTM DER downstream of a distribution system operator's (DSO) revenue meter that adopts a generic net energy metering (NEM) tariff. By formulating a Stackelberg game between the energy-sharing market leader and its prosumers, we show that the dynamic pricing policy induces the prosumers toward a network-safe operation and decentrally maximizes the energysharing social welfare. The dynamic pricing mechanism involves a combination of a locational ex-ante dynamic price and an ex-post allocation, both of which are functions of the energy sharing's BTM DER. The ex-post allocation is proportionate to the price differential between the DSO NEM price and the energy-sharing locational price. Simulation results using real DER data and the IEEE 13-bus test systems illustrate the dynamic nature of network-aware pricing at each bus, and its impact on voltage.

aggregates↗

DOE OSTI2024

Network-Aware and Welfare-Maximizing Dynamic Pricing for Energy Sharing: Preprint

The proliferation of behind-the-meter (BTM) distributed energy resources (DER) within the electrical distribution network presents significant supply and demand flexibilities, but also introduces operational challenges such as voltage spikes and reverse power flows. In response, this paper proposes a network-aware dynamic pricing framework tailored for energy-sharing coalitions that aggregate small, but ubiquitous, BTM DER downstream of a distribution system operator's (DSO) revenue meter that adopts a generic net energy metering (NEM) tariff. By formulating a Stackelberg game between the energy-sharing market leader and its prosumers, we show that the dynamic pricing policy induces the prosumers toward a network-safe operation and decentrally maximizes the energysharing social welfare. The dynamic pricing mechanism involves a combination of a locational ex-ante dynamic price and an ex-post allocation, both of which are functions of the energy sharing's BTM DER. The ex-post allocation is proportionate to the price differential between the DSO NEM price and the energy sharing locational price. Simulation results using real DER data and the IEEE 13-bus test systems illustrate the dynamic nature of network-aware pricing at each bus, and its impact on voltage.

energy communities↗

DOE OSTI2024

A Blockchain and PKI-Based Secure Vehicle-to-Vehicle Energy-Trading Protocol

With the increasing awareness for sustainable future and green energy, the demand for electric vehicles (EVs) is growing rapidly, thus placing immense pressure on the energy grid. To alleviate this, local trading between EVs should be encouraged. In this paper, we propose a blockchain and public key infrastructure (PKI)-based secure vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) energy-trading protocol. A permissioned blockchain utilizing the proof of authority (PoA) consensus and smart contracts is used to securely store data. Encrypted communication is ensured through transport layer security (TLS), with PKI managing the necessary digital certificates and keys. A multi-leader, multi-follower Stackelberg game-based trade algorithm is formulated to determine the optimal energy demands, supplies, and prices. Finally, we propose a detailed communication protocol that ties all the components together, enabling smooth interaction between them. Key findings, such as system behavior and performance, scalability of the trade algorithm and the blockchain, smart contract execution costs, etc., are presented through numerical results by implementing and simulating the protocol in various scenarios. This work not only enhances local energy trading among EVs, encouraging efficient energy usage and reducing burden on the power grid, but also paves a way for future research in sustainable energy management.

Stackelberg game↗

DOE OSTI2026

Adaptive Cybersecurity for Distributed Energy Resources (AdCyDER): Online Reinforcement Learning with Stackelberg-Optimized Defenses — Pipeline Architecture, Evaluation Methodology, and Findings from a Synthetic-Data Evaluation

This report documents the design and evaluation of an integrated online-learning pipeline developed within the AdCyDER project for Distributed Energy Resource (DER) cybersecurity. The pipeline couples a Reinforcement Learning (RL) attack classifier — which produces an attack-type probability distribution — with a Stackelberg game-theoretic (GT) defense selector that consumes those distributions alongside SME-encoded priors over (defense, attack) effectiveness pairings and perdefense costs to choose grid-health-preserving defenses. The objective is not attack classification per se but production of distributions that drive effective defense selection through the Stackelberg layer, learned from delayed grid-health feedback rather than labeled attack data. AdCyDER as a whole is broader than the work presented here; this report covers the specific RL/GT loop integration and its evaluation. We present the integrated pipeline (SCADA telemetry with Fronius inverter physics, Suricata IDS, time-windowed aggregation, per-facility LSTM classifier, Stackelberg optimizer, OpenC2 actuators), an experimental campaign of 28 eight-hour iterations across three baseline modes, and a pipeline-ordered diagnostic protocol. The protocol identifies two distinct failure modes within the loop: paired supervised ceilings on the same features establish that the deployed online RL classifier (macro F1 ≈ 0.07) sits at least 4.7× below a same-architecture supervised LSTM (≈ 0.34) and 10–11× below a linear feature-signal ceiling (≈ 0.70–0.79 depending on per-facility isolation), localizing the dominant failure to the training procedure; and the reward signal driving online updates carries weak directional coupling with classifier correctness in the methodology-expected direction (multi-lens convergent: top-decile P(true) records produce more frequent state changes and slightly larger improvements, top-vs-bot Cohen’s 𝑑 ≈ −0.19), but at effect magnitudes too small to drive gradient-based learning at the campaign sample size. The original learning hypothesis is not supported by the data. The primary contributions are the diagnostic methodology — proposed as a transferable falsification protocol for online RL/GT defense pipelines learning from delayed environmental reward — and the open, reproducible experimental infrastructure. We outline reward reformulation as the highest-priority aspirational next step given the underpowered-but-aligned Q6 reading, with hardware-in-the-loop evaluation as the broadest scope-expansion option.

Blakely, Benjamin [Argonne National Laboratory (AN↗

DOE OSTI2025

Learning with Adaptive Conservativeness for Distributionally Robust Optimization: Incentive Design for Voltage Regulation

Information asymmetry between the Distribution System Operator (DSO) and Distributed Energy Resource Aggregators (DERAs) obstructs designing effective incentives for voltage regulation. To capture this effect, we employ a Stackelberg game-theoretic framework, where the DSO seeks to overcome the information asymmetry and refine its incentive strategies by learning from DERA behavior over multiple iterations. We introduce a model-based online learning algorithm for the DSO, aimed at inferring the relationship between incentives and DERA responses. Given the uncertain nature of these responses, we also propose a distributionally robust incentive design model to control the probability of voltage regulation failure and then reformulate it into a convex problem. This model allows the DSO to periodically revise distribution assumptions on uncertain parameters in the decision model of the DERA. Finally, we present a gradient-based method that permits the DSO to adaptively modify its conservativeness level, measured by the size of a Wasserstein metric-based ambiguity set, according to historical voltage regulation performance. The effectiveness of our proposed method is demonstrated through numerical experiments.

adaptation models↗

DOE OSTI2024

Learning with Adaptive Conservativeness for Distributionally Robust Optimization: Incentive Design for Voltage Regulation: Preprint

distribution system operator↗

DOE OSTI2025

A Regularized Variance-Reduced Modified Extragradient Method for Stochastic Hierarchical Games

We consider an N -player hierarchical game in which the i th player’s objective comprises of an expectation-valued term, parametrized by rival decisions, and a hierarchical term. Such a framework allows for capturing a broad range of stochastic hierarchical optimization problems, Stackelberg equilibrium problems, and leader-follower games. We develop an iteratively regularized and smoothed variance-reduced modified extragradient framework for iteratively approaching hierarchical equilibria in a stochastic setting. We equip our analysis with rate statements, complexity guarantees, and almost-sure convergence results. We then extend these statements to settings where the lower-level problem is solved inexactly and provide the corresponding rate and complexity statements. Our model framework encompasses many game theoretic equilibrium problems studied in the context of power markets. We present a realistic application to the study of virtual power plants, emphasizing the role of hierarchical decision making and regularization. Preliminary numerics suggest that empirical behavior compares well with theoretical guarantees.

Tikhonov regularization↗