Integrated Supply Chain- Securing & Improving the Supply Chain Nuclear Deterrence Summit.
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This project, undertaken by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) for the Department of Energy (DOE) Wind Energy Technologies Office (WETO), focused on the enumeration and analysis of six key devices important to wind technologies. The devices analyzed included Beckhoff Bus Terminal Controllers (BK1120 and BC9000), a Beckhoff Economy Built-in Panel PC (CP6231), an N-Tron Managed Industrial Ethernet Switch (711FX3), a Bachmann M1 Gateway, and a Bachmann Smart Power Plant Controller. Device selection was driven by availability and budget constraints, with several components sourced from existing wind farms and others procured through a co-agreement with another WETO-funded project. The project's primary objective was to create a hardware bill of materials (HBOM) for each device, identifying and documenting all components to assess potential security and supply chain risks. A detailed analysis revealed over 750 unique components across the six devices, with 80% successfully identified and accompanied by datasheets. Notably, Texas Instruments emerged as the leading supplier, providing over 16% of the components, followed by ON Semiconductor at 11.3%, Analog Devices at 5.3%, and Renesas Electronics Corp at 4.1%. Other notable vendors included Toshiba Corporation, iC-Haus Corporation, Atmel, Vishay, and STMicroelectronics. The enumeration process involved thorough documentation of each component, including its designation, quantity, identifiers, pin package, description, vendor, model, and country of origin. This process provided valuable insights into the complexity and diversity of the electronic systems within these wind devices. It also highlighted the distinct separation of components between vendors, suggesting a trend of vendor-specific component usage. Key findings from the project emphasized the importance of broadening the scope of vendor analysis in future research to gain a comprehensive understanding of component distribution and commonality. The identification of vendor-specific component usage patterns offers new avenues for research and underscores the significance of continued investigation in this field. Overall, this project provides critical insights into the component composition of wind devices, aiding in the development of improved supply chain management and component sourcing strategies. The results contribute valuable knowledge to the wind technology sector, laying the groundwork for enhanced security and resilience in wind energy systems.
Amid growing concerns over foreign manufacturing for components and devices deployed in critical energy infrastructure, this research from the national labs will highlight best practices for developing and maintaining a supply chain security program. Tools for asset inventory, tips for developing and maintaining software- and hardware-bills-of-materials (SBOMs and HBOMs), recommended contractual language for vendor agreements, and identification of responsibilities will be shared. We discuss the one-time requirements to enable a successful supply chain security program and the best ways to operationalize this program for maximum impact, including development of robust practices for vulnerability tracking, patch management, and workarounds, with understanding of the reliability and uptime requirements for utilities. The recommendations shared are based on a cyber-informed engineering approach to identification of high-consequence impacts and the engineering controls related to supply chain management that can best mitigate these impacts. This approach allows for prioritization of resources. Additionally, we highlight relative up-front and ongoing costs associated with recommended controls. Viewers will leave with an understanding what a supply chain security program is, and what steps, prioritized for resource-constrained organizations, can build a robust program.
This presentation provides an overview of the CESER Battery Energy Storage Systems supply chain considerations report and related research. It highlights this challenge for the National Association of Regulatory Energy Commissioners and discusses policy and technical solutions for addressing near term risks.
Supply chain cyberattacks that exploit insecure third-party software are a growing concern for the security of the electric power grid. These attacks seek to deploy malicious software in grid control devices during the fabrication, shipment, installation, and maintenance stages, or as part of routine software updates. Malicious software on grid control devices may inject bad data or execute bad commands, which can cause blackouts and damage power equipment. This paper describes an experimental setup to simulate the software update process of a commercial power relay as part of a hardware-in-the-loop simulation for grid supply chain cyber-security assessment. The laboratory setup was successfully utilized to study three supply chain cyber-security use cases.
Critical raw materials (CRMs) and/or critical minerals and materials (CMMs) are metals, metal groups, and non-metallic minerals essential for the many modern technologies, including wind turbine, electric vehicles and energy storage systems. Different countries have slightly different metrics for determining criticality. However, broadly speaking, the European Union (EU) and United States (US)both define them as materials that reach or exceed thresholds for both economic importance and supply risk. Furthermore, both organizations have implemented instruments, such as the EU's 2024 Critical Raw Materials Act and the US Department of Energy's (DOE) Critical Minerals and Materials Strategy, to facilitate research and development of CRM/CMM ranging from mineral deposit development to geometallurgy to separations to advanced manufacturing. This talk is aimed at an EU audience to explain the DOE CMM strategy and how it compares to the steps taken by the EU to facilitate progress. Furthermore, this talk takes a geology-centric approach on the challenges geoscientists face and how their roles may change in the future.
A poster presentation on a novel soft ferromagnetic material for transformers and inductors for the REHEDS Research Foundation External Review
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Global food security is under significant threat from climate change, population growth, and resource scarcity. This review examines how advanced AI-driven forecasting models, including machine learning (ML), deep learning (DL), and time-series forecasting models like SARIMA/ARIMA, are transforming regional agricultural practices and food supply chains. Through the integration of Internet of Things (IoT), remote sensing, and blockchain technologies, these models facilitate the real-time monitoring of crop growth, resource allocation, and market dynamics, enhancing decision making and sustainability. The study adopts a mixed-methods approach, including systematic literature analysis and regional case studies. Highlights include AI-driven yield forecasting in European hydroponic systems and resource optimization in southeast Asian aquaponics, showcasing localized efficiency gains. Furthermore, AI applications in food processing, such as plasma, ozone and Pulsed Electric Field (PEF) treatments, are shown to improve food preservation and reduce spoilage. Key challenges—such as data quality, model scalability, and prediction accuracy—are discussed, particularly in the context of data-poor environments, limiting broader model applicability. The paper concludes by outlining future directions, emphasizing context-specific AI implementations, the need for public–private collaboration, and policy interventions to enhance scalability and adoption in food security contexts.
The adoption of clean energy technologies, including solar photovoltaics, continues to introduce non-traditional stakeholders to the operations and planning of the electric system. Stakeholders such as manufacturers, vendors, owners, aggregators, and others are enabling the adoption, integration, and optimum operations of solar technologies at accelerated rates. Inverters form the foundation of many digitally controlled energy sources for clean energy technologies, including Solar, Battery Energy Storage Systems, Hybrid Systems, and Hydrogen Fuel Cells. Their supply chain is complex, a series of microchips, electronic switches and other components making up its primary functions. The complexity of this space and the growing digitization associated with these components can create supply chain cyber risks. One measure to mitigate cybersecurity attacks is proper digital supply chain security. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Solar Energy Technologies Office (SETO), in partnership with the Cybersecurity, Energy, Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) office, is hosting a workshop to bring together solar vendors and services providers to discuss digital supply chain security for solar systems and challenges and opportunities in the transitioning to a fully domestic supply chain for solar energy in the U.S. This workshop will support the Securing Solar for the Grid (S2G) and Energy Cyber Sense program activities. During the workshop, industry experts and researchers from DOE National Laboratories will discuss the current solar supply chain landscape and the transition to domestic manufacturing of solar components in the U.S. Tools and techniques to better manage and secure the digital supply chain of solar devices and systems will be discussed.
The opportunity for U.S. global leadership on clean energy is enormous. On February 24, 2021, President Biden issued Executive Order 14017, “America’s Supply Chains,” directing the Secretary of Energy to submit a supply chain strategy overview report for the Energy Sector Industrial Base (ESIB). This report lays out the myriad challenges and opportunities facing the energy supply chain along with key strategies to secure America’s position as a clean energy superpower in the years and decades to come.
In this talk, INL will discuss how to develop a cyber supply chain risk management program, to include assessment of vendor risk and applying appropriate mitigations. INL will discuss key risk factors and the challenges of securing supply chain in complex and dynamic vendor environments. Finally, INL will share example language that can be adopted in RFPs and procurement contracts to promote supply chain security.
GridTrust represents a departure from reliance on a single organization or a single person to multiple organizations and therefore multiple people across organizational structures. The motivating idea behind involving multiple organizations is the increase in security due to human factors. More specifically, the requirement that distinct people in different organizations sign off on a change or an update makes a cyberattack much less likely due to the inherent requirement that both organizations be penetrated and fooled. GridTrust focuses on the software update process as the primary exemplar for the research and development work. A novel hardware-based technology referred to as a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) provides a microchip Root-of-Trust (RoT), i.e., a starting point for verifying that the hardware being communicated with is the hardware the control center believes the hardware to be. As a result, staff at power grid control centers can ensure the accurate and reliable identification of hardware devices from the outset. The GridTrust protocol introduces two key innovations, as detailed in this report. Firstly, the utilization of a PUF as a root-of-trust in the initial phase of a software or firmware update. Secondly, the application of multiple cryptographic signatures from two or more organizations to the update binary. These signatures are verified before implementing the update on a power grid device in the field. In terms of GridTrust hardware design, this report outlines two main components. The first is the GridTrust Native Device, integrating PUF technology intrinsically into the hardware device itself. The second is the GridTrust Interfacing Device, which incorporates PUF technology and multiple cryptographic signatures. These signatures are cross-checked within a separate hardware positioned between the power grid control center and the legacy power grid device, functioning as an intermediary. While the GridTrust Interfacing Device offers the advantage of being applicable to existing power grid equipment, it may have reduced security if the intermediary component is targeted. On the other hand, the GridTrust Native Device boasts increased security due to protocol integration within a unified form factor. The effectiveness of GridTrust technology has been extensively demonstrated, with multiple external red-team attackers unable to breach GridTrust's security measures. This was observed both in controlled laboratory settings during Phase 1 of the project and in real-world conditions within a City of Marietta substation during Phase 2 of the project.
Battery energy storage systems (BESS), inverters, and associated digital equipment are integral pieces of interdependent energy delivery systems. When considering the supply chain security of such systems, there is often a misplaced focus on the origin of energy generation and storage materials like battery cells, overlooking the more significant cyber risks that stem from digital power electronics control systems. Part of this misplaced focus is due to the relative costs of these components, with more attention given to expensive raw materials rather than the impactful digital elements themselves. The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is addressing this gap in supply chain security through a systems-of-systems approach that considers the impact various components in digital energy systems can have should misoperation occur. Therefore, INL assigns a cyber criticality score based on quantitative analysis, which enables informed prioritization of mitigations and allows operators to reduce risk in light of the prevalence of a BESS and associated systems foreign supply chain.
With the expected growth of electric vehicles (EV) in the transportation sector, recycling or upcycling spent battery materials will be required to reduce EV costs, lessen waste, and ease critical material supply chain pressure for EV battery applications. “Direct” recycling or upcycling is an alternative to current industrial approaches. Many challenges remain for viable direct battery upcycling, including upgrading the transition metal ratio in the costliest component (cathode oxide); separation of transition metal ions in the exit stream; battery disassembly; improving cathode exfoliation which can lead to a new way of direct recycling; and lithium metal anode recycling -- including safety concerns. We devise and deploy a suite of methods to deal with these challenges. The results pave the way to future work on battery recycling, in areas of technological/commercial readiness level ranging from basic research to large-scale commercialization.
Demand for clean energy technologies such as wind turbines and batteries for electric vehicles has increased significantly as technology costs have plummeted over the last decade and countries seek to diversify their energy systems with more reliable clean energy sources to lower costs for businesses and consumers. The global clean energy market is expected to grow exponentially — reaching $23 trillion at a minimum by 2030. Without new domestic raw materials production and manufacturing capacity, the U.S. will continue to rely on clean energy imports, exposing the nation to supply chain vulnerabilities while simultaneously losing out on the enormous job opportunities associated with the energy transition. Yet, in many cases, the United States has untapped potential to support greater domestic production.
Presentation for Procurement webinar providing technical guidance for entities, procuring Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS), Inverter Based Resources (IBR), Distributed Energy Resource Management Systems (DERMS) and other energy digital systems and services on how to incorporate cybersecurity requirements into the procurement process to enhance both supply chain security as well as entity-specific supply chain risk management (SCRM) programs.
The global transition toward low-carbon energy not only means an increase in demand for clean electricity and renewable resources, but also an increase in demand for the critical minerals (CMs) and rare earth elements (REEs) that these technologies rely upon. Indeed, low-carbon energy technologies, such as those used for wind turbines and electric vehicle motors, require significantly more lithium, nickel, cobalt, manganese, graphite, and other CMs than fossil-based energy technologies. The growing demand for new forms of low- carbon energy will necessitate a proportional scale-up of CM and REE extraction and processing. Presently, the majority of extraction and processing activities for CMs and REEs are concentrated in very few countries, primarily in China and the Global South. CM and REE supply chain activities conducted in or controlled by these countries are commonly associated with widespread and well- documented human rights abuses and environmental degradation. As a result of concerns related to supply chain security, worker welfare, and the overall need for additional sources of CMs and REEs, governments worldwide have begun to explore policy pathways for the development of new supply chains. The development of new supply chains for CMs and REEs re s a multifold opportunity to accelerate the global deployment of low-carbon energy fleets, reduce global carbon emissions, build political resilience—and also to enhance policy objectives of environmental justice and equity in the clean energy transition. Fulfilling these policy objectives requires energy producers to navigate a maze of global supply chain policies designed to shape and accelerate the growth of new markets. In the United States, for instance, President Biden recently implemented fiscal and trade policies that incentivize both domestic and global reliance on U.S.-produced CMs and REEs, leveraging key relationships in Asia and Europe to ensure the accelerated buildout of the U.S. supply chain. The Biden Administration’s framework also emphasizes that new supply chains for CMs, REEs, and other low-carbon energy pathways must generate benefits for marginalized and disadvantaged communities, build energy equity, and contribute to the Biden Administration’s vision of environmental justice. present CM and REE supply chains include several stages, including mining, processing, transport, utilization, and disposal, each of which involves different environmental justice considerations and potential injustices. This study explores how technical innovation, paired with responsible community engagement and empowerment, can help inform the development of energy equity and environmental justice at all stages of new supply chains. The study highlights these opportunities on a broad scale. We also lend a specific focus to research at the University of Wyoming School of Energy Resources that aims to guide the development of CM and REE industries in communities with high economic dependence on coal and other fossil fuel industries, identifying pathways to grow a U.S. domestic supply chain by producing CMs from coal, coal by-products, and coal waste streams. These production pathways represent a potential new supply for CMs across the U.S. and elsewhere, thereby enhancing national security and accelerating the widespread deployment of low-carbon energy technologies, while also generating alternative applications for remaining coal reserves and aiding in a just transition for rural energy-producing communities.