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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2006

Model-Based Safety Analysis

System safety analysis techniques are well established and are used extensively during the design of safety-critical systems. Despite this, most of the techniques are highly subjective and dependent on the skill of the practitioner. Since these analyses are usually based on an informal system model, it is unlikely that they will be complete, consistent, and error free. In fact, the lack of precise models of the system architecture and its failure modes often forces the safety analysts to devote much of their effort to gathering architectural details about the system behavior from several sources and embedding this information in the safety artifacts such as the fault trees. This report describes Model-Based Safety Analysis, an approach in which the system and safety engineers share a common system model created using a model-based development process. By extending the system model with a fault model as well as relevant portions of the physical system to be controlled, automated support can be provided for much of the safety analysis. We believe that by using a common model for both system and safety engineering and automating parts of the safety analysis, we can both reduce the cost and improve the quality of the safety analysis. Here we present our vision of model-based safety analysis and discuss the advantages and challenges in making this approach practical.

Joshi, Anjali↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

System Safety Analysis of Complex NASA Systems with Model-Based Engineering (REV B)

The emergence of model-based engineering is transforming design and analysis methodologies. A recognized benefit of model-based engineering is the existence of a “single source of truth” about the system that becomes the authoritative source of data and information for designers, analysts, and developers. This promotes consistency and efficiency as the design emerges and can be used to further optimize the design. Integrating System Safety Engineers to the “single source of truth” will ensure that the outputs of their assessments and analyses are relevant to the design as it evolves. Use of an integrated system model enables near immediate evaluation of a design change as well as development of operational processes for risk assessment and communication. Such models can enable efficient and timely analysis of system hazards (e.g., hazard fault tree analysis and procedure simulations) and produce complete, accurate, and more consistent products (e.g., hazard reports and safety requirement evaluations). Therefore, an agency-sponsored team at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) recently completed a System Safety Study of modeling and testing capabilities as part of a Model-Based Safety and Mission Assurance Initiative (MBSMAI). Using an existing model developed for reliability analyses, GSFC modeling and system safety experts performed system safety analysis/modeling and produced safety products. The team evaluated model-based feasibility to support System Safety Engineering, developed safety analysis modeling processes, and identified tool capability advancement/development needs. These study results indicate model-based engineering is valid and useable for System Safety Engineering for NASA if adequate modeling processes and environment are established.

NASA↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

System Safety Analysis of Complex NASA Systems with Model Based Engineering

The emergence of model-based engineering is transforming design and analysis methodologies [5]. A recognized benefit of model-based engineering is the existence of a “single source of truth” about the system that becomes the authoritative source of data and information for designers, analysts, and developers. This promotes consistency and efficiency as the design emerges and can be used to further optimize the design. Integrating System Safety Engineers to the “single source of truth” will ensure that the outputs of their assessments and analyses are relevant to the design as it evolves. Use of an integrated system model enables near immediate evaluation of a design change as well as development of operational processes for risk assessment and communication. Such models can enable efficient and timely analysis of system hazards (e.g., hazard fault tree analysis and procedure simulations) and produce complete, accurate, and more consistent products (e.g., hazard reports and safety requirement evaluations). Therefore, an agency-sponsored team at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) recently completed a System Safety Study of modeling and testing capabilities as part of a Model-Based Safety and Mission Assurance Initiative (MBSMAI). Using an existing model developed for reliability analyses [1], GSFC modeling and system safety experts performed system safety analysis/modeling and produced safety products. The team evaluated model-based feasibility to support System Safety Engineering, developed safety analysis modeling processes, and identified tool capability advancement/development needs. These study results indicate model-based engineering is valid and useable for System

Model Based Engineering↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

System Safety Analysis of Complex NASA Systems with Model-Based Engineering

NASA↗

NASA NTRS1987

ESSAA: Embedded system safety analysis assistant

The Embedded System Safety Analysis Assistant (ESSAA) is a knowledge-based tool that can assist in identifying disaster scenarios. Imbedded software issues hazardous control commands to the surrounding hardware. ESSAA is intended to work from outputs to inputs, as a complement to simulation and verification methods. Rather than treating the software in isolation, it examines the context in which the software is to be deployed. Given a specified disasterous outcome, ESSAA works from a qualitative, abstract model of the complete system to infer sets of environmental conditions and/or failures that could cause a disasterous outcome. The scenarios can then be examined in depth for plausibility using existing techniques.

Wallace, Peter↗

NASA NTRS1974

A guide for performing system safety analysis

A general guide is presented for performing system safety analyses of hardware, software, operations and human elements of an aerospace program. The guide describes a progression of activities that can be effectively applied to identify hazards to personnel and equipment during all periods of system development. The general process of performing safety analyses is described; setting forth in a logical order the information and data requirements, the analytical steps, and the results. These analyses are the technical basis of a system safety program. Although the guidance established by this document cannot replace human experience and judgement, it does provide a methodical approach to the identification of hazards and evaluation of risks to the system.

Brush, J. M.↗

NASA NTRS1972

In-space propellant systems safety. Volume 3: System safety analysis

The primary objective was to examine from a system safety viewpoint in-space propellant logistic elements and operations to define the potential hazards and to recommend means to reduce, eliminate or control them. A secondary objective was to conduct trade studies of specific systems or operations to determine the safest of alternate approaches.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2018

FUELEAP Model-Based System Safety Analysis

NASA researchers, in a partnership with Boeing, are investigating a fuel-cell powered variant of the X-57 “Maxwell” Mod-II electric propulsion aircraft, which is itself derived from a stock Tecnam P2006T. The “Fostering Ultra-Efficient Low-Emitting Aviation Power” (FUELEAP) project will replace the X-57 power subsystem with a hybrid Solid-Oxide Fuel Cell (SOFC) system to increase the potential range of the electric-propulsion aircraft while dramatically improving efficiency and emissions over stock internal-combustion engines. Our FUELEAP safety analysis faces two primary challenges. First, the Part 23 certificated Tecnam P2006T is undergoing significant modifications to host the hybrid electric-propulsion system, and the challenge is to assure that the safety inherent in the stock aircraft (and subsequently in X-57 Mod-II) is not compromised by changes in avionics, aircraft structural loading, weight and balance, or other considerations. Secondly, because the SOFC power system has little (if any) relevant in-service precedent, our challenge is to assure that we identify and mitigate all reasonably plausible hazards introduced by unique FUELEAP equipage. We are investigating and utilizing Model-Based Safety Analysis (MBSA) methods to help us address these FUELEAP safety challenges. We captured aircraft-level system hazard conditions using instances of a SysML hazard block via aircraft-level Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA). Then, using SysML models of the FUELEAP architecture, we related the hazard conditions to initiating system events and possible mitigations, such as design architecture modifications or operational constraints. We are continuing to define our approach to MBSA by developing a component-by-component inventory of local failure modes and tracing their possible contribution to hazard conditions. Finally, we are applying an argument-based approach to FUELEAP assurance. Through a FUELEAP “safety case,” we are providing an explicit argument for FUELEAP safety by associating assurance evidence with overarching safety claims through a structured argument.

Woodham, Kurt P.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Automation for System Safety Analysis

This presentation describes work to integrate a set of tools to support early model-based analysis of failures and hazards due to system-software interactions. The tools perform and assist analysts in the following tasks: 1) extract model parts from text for architecture and safety/hazard models; 2) combine the parts with library information to develop the models for visualization and analysis; 3) perform graph analysis and simulation to identify and evaluate possible paths from hazard sources to vulnerable entities and functions, in nominal and anomalous system-software configurations and scenarios; and 4) identify resulting candidate scenarios for software integration testing. There has been significant technical progress in model extraction from Orion program text sources, architecture model derivation (components and connections) and documentation of extraction sources. Models have been derived from Internal Interface Requirements Documents (IIRDs) and FMEA documents. Linguistic text processing is used to extract model parts and relationships, and the Aerospace Ontology also aids automated model development from the extracted information. Visualizations of these models assist analysts in requirements overview and in checking consistency and completeness.

Malin, Jane T.↗

NASA NTRS1972

System safety engineering analysis handbook

The basic requirements and guidelines for the preparation of System Safety Engineering Analysis are presented. The philosophy of System Safety and the various analytic methods available to the engineering profession are discussed. A text-book description of each of the methods is included.

Ijams, T. E.↗

NASA NTRS2021

Architectural Modeling and Analysis for Safety Engineering

Model-based development tools are increasingly being used for system-level development of safety-critical systems. Architectural and behavioral models provide important information that can be leveraged to improve the system safety analysis process. Model-based design artifacts produced in early stage development activities can be used to perform system safety analysis, reducing costs and providing accurate results throughout the system life-cycle. In this report we describe an extension to the Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL) that supports modeling of system behavior under failure conditions. This Safety Annex enables the independent modeling of component failures and allows safety engineers to weave various types of fault behavior into the nominal system model. The accompanying tool support uses model checking to propagate errors from their source to their effect on safety properties without the need to add separate propagation specifications. The tool also captures all minimal set of fault combinations that can cause violation of the safety properties, that can be compared to qualitative and quantitative objectives as part of the safety assessment process. We describe the Safety Annex, illustrate its use with a representative example, and discuss and demonstrate the tool support enabling an analyst to investigate the system behavior under failure conditions.

FTA↗

DOE OSTI2025

System Safety Risk Analysis Models (SSRAM)

This presentation provides a high level overview of the System Safety Risk Analysis (SSRAM) methodology and motivation.

Clark, Andrew Jordan [Sandia National Laboratories↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

System and Safety Analysis for TaxiNet using SYSAI

Explore the source record for details and available documents.

TaxiNet↗

DOE OSTI2024

SAM: A Modern System Code for Advanced Non-LWR Safety Analysis

The System Analysis Module (SAM), developed at Argonne National Laboratory and by collaborators at other organizations, is for advanced non–light water reactor safety analysis. SAM aims to provide fast-running, modest-fidelity, whole-plant transient analysis capabilities that are essential for fast-turnaround design scoping and engineering analyses of advanced reactor concepts. To facilitate code development, SAM utilizes the MOOSE object-oriented application framework, its underlying finite element library, and linear and nonlinear solvers to leverage modern advanced software environments and numerical methods. SAM aims to solve tightly coupled physical phenomena, including fission reaction, heat transfer, fluid dynamics, and thermal-mechanical responses in advanced reactor structures, systems, and components with high accuracy and efficiency. Finally, this paper gives an overview of the SAM code development, including goals and functional requirements, physical models, current capabilities, verification and validation, software quality assurance, and examples of simulations for advanced nuclear reactor applications.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

System and Safety Analysis with SysAI A Statistical Learning Framework

This is a tutorial on how to use the SYSAI (System Analysis using Statistical AI), a flexible statistical learning framework for the V&V and analysis of complex and high-dimensional Aerospace systems with DNN and AI components. SYSAI provides functionality for a variety of analyses and V&V tasks, including statistical data analysis, high dimensional safety-envelope and time-series analysis, property checking, as well as intelligent test-case generation. The tutorial will demonstrate SYSAI with our industrial partner’s Autonomous Centerline Tracking system, which uses a DNN to enable autonomous aircraft taxiing as an example. Video & Tutorial

Statistical V&V for Complex safety-critical system↗

NASA NTRS2014

Analysis of Aviation Safety Reporting System Incident Data Associated With the Technical Challenges of the Vehicle Systems Safety Technology Project

This analysis was conducted to support the Vehicle Systems Safety Technology (VSST) Project of the Aviation Safety Program (AVsP) milestone VSST4.2.1.01, "Identification of VSST-Related Trends." In particular, this is a review of incident data from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). The following three VSST-related technical challenges (TCs) were the focus of the incidents searched in the ASRS database: (1) Vechicle health assurance, (2) Effective crew-system interactions and decisions in all conditions; and (3) Aircraft loss of control prevention, mitigation, and recovery.

Withrow, Colleen A.↗

NASA NTRS2008

Information Extraction for System-Software Safety Analysis: Calendar Year 2007 Year-End Report

This annual report describes work to integrate a set of tools to support early model-based analysis of failures and hazards due to system-software interactions. The tools perform and assist analysts in the following tasks: 1) extract model parts from text for architecture and safety/hazard models; 2) combine the parts with library information to develop the models for visualization and analysis; 3) perform graph analysis on the models to identify possible paths from hazard sources to vulnerable entities and functions, in nominal and anomalous system-software configurations; 4) perform discrete-time-based simulation on the models to investigate scenarios where these paths may play a role in failures and mishaps; and 5) identify resulting candidate scenarios for software integration testing. This paper describes new challenges in a NASA abort system case, and enhancements made to develop the integrated tool set.

Malin, Jane T.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Information Extraction for System-Software Safety Analysis: Calendar Year 2008 Year-End Report

This annual report describes work to integrate a set of tools to support early model-based analysis of failures and hazards due to system-software interactions. The tools perform and assist analysts in the following tasks: 1) extract model parts from text for architecture and safety/hazard models; 2) combine the parts with library information to develop the models for visualization and analysis; 3) perform graph analysis and simulation to identify and evaluate possible paths from hazard sources to vulnerable entities and functions, in nominal and anomalous system-software configurations and scenarios; and 4) identify resulting candidate scenarios for software integration testing. There has been significant technical progress in model extraction from Orion program text sources, architecture model derivation (components and connections) and documentation of extraction sources. Models have been derived from Internal Interface Requirements Documents (IIRDs) and FMEA documents. Linguistic text processing is used to extract model parts and relationships, and the Aerospace Ontology also aids automated model development from the extracted information. Visualizations of these models assist analysts in requirements overview and in checking consistency and completeness.

Malin, Jane T.↗