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Results for “Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA)”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

Development of Integrated Safety and Security Models for Comprehensive Reliability and Resiliency Evaluation

The security of the electric grid and supporting energy systems is crucial to national security. One of the complexities in analyzing the security of energy systems is the safety consequences that may result from accidents. For energy systems, the goal is to ensure that they operate as intended and that any consequences are mitigated or prevented. The integration of safety and security is paramount to protecting these systems from attacks and ensuring that large consequences are prevented. This report describes an integrated safety and security methodology to evaluate cybersecurity events that can lead to large consequences. This novel approach first describes how Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) provides a digital causal analysis for Bayesian Networks (BNs). The use of STPA causal analysis provides a systematic approach to constructing BNs that adequately model cyber scenarios that result in consequences. When combined with the technical principles described in Risk-Informed Management of Enterprise Systems (RIMES), a comprehensive risk-informed cybersecurity analysis results that allows decision-makers to prioritize systems that most impact risk.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

LDRD23-0184: Resilience and Hazard Risk Assessment to Prioritize Security Operations for Decisions and Impacts (RHAPSODI)

Recent examples provide a significant concern for the resilience of the U.S. electric grid and represent a need for enhanced decision-making to address an increasingly wide range of complex system interactions and potential consequences. In response, this LDRD project produced a proof-of-concept evaluation called the Resilience and Hazard Assessment to Prioritize Security Operations for Decisions and Impacts (RHAPSODI) methodology as an agile and flexible analytic framework capable of addressing multiple, diverse threats to desired electric grid performance. After empirically grounding needs for the future of U.S. electric grid resilience, this project employed the systems-theoretic process analysis (STPA) to develop a systems engineering risk model. The results of a completed feasibility study of a notional high voltage transmission system demonstrate an improved ability to incorporate both spatial (e.g., geographically distributed) and temporal (e.g., dynamic and time-dependent) elements of security risk to the gird. The success of this LDRD project provides the foundation for further evolution of the systems engineering risk model for the grid; derivation of quantitative approaches to evaluate risk and resilience performance; facilitation of agile experimenting and grid sensitivity to a range of vulnerabilities; and development of tools to assist decision-makers in enhancing U.S. electrical grid resilience.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Adapting Traditional Hazards Analysis Methods to Address Cyber Risks

Traditional hazards analysis (HA) methods, originally developed to address physical and operational risks, often fall short when it comes to identifying and mitigating cyber threats. These cyber threats pose unique and evolving risks to critical infrastructure and industrial control systems (ICS). This report explores the integration of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles into existing HA methods to enhance their ability to address cyber-induced risks. CIE provides organizations with a practical, cost-effective approach to closing the gap between traditional HA methods and the need for cyber risk mitigation. By leveraging existing safety processes and controls, CIE allows users to examine and mitigate cyber vulnerabilities without overhauling existing HA methods. This report identifies areas where HA and CIE naturally align and where their approaches diverge. It emphasizes how CIE principles can be used to adapt HA methods, broadening their scope to include cyber risks and enabling the mitigation of cyber- induced impacts alongside traditional hazards and failure scenarios. This report examines how CIE can be applied across various HA methods—such as Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), Hazard and Consequence Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS), and Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA). It provides strategies for integrating CIE to strengthen the identification, assessment, and mitigation of cyber-induced risks. The findings offer a structured entry point for organizations to embed CIE concepts into hazards and safety analyses, as well as broader engineering processes, ultimately supporting the design and operation of a more resilient infrastructure.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Adapting Traditional Hazards Analysis Methods to Address Cyber Risks

Traditional hazards analysis (HA) methods, originally developed to address physical and operational risks, often fall short when it comes to identifying and mitigating cyber threats. These cyber threats pose unique and evolving risks to critical infrastructure and industrial control systems (ICS). This report explores the integration of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles into existing HA methods to enhance their ability to address cyber-induced risks. CIE provides organizations with a practical, cost-effective approach to closing the gap between traditional HA methods and the need for cyber risk mitigation. By leveraging existing safety processes and controls, CIE allows users to examine and mitigate cyber vulnerabilities without overhauling existing HA methods. This report identifies areas where HA and CIE naturally align and where their approaches diverge. It emphasizes how CIE principles can be used to adapt HA methods, broadening their scope to include cyber risks and enabling the mitigation of cyber- induced impacts alongside traditional hazards and failure scenarios. This report examines how CIE can be applied across various HA methods—such as Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), Hazard and Consequence Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS), and Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA). It provides strategies for integrating CIE to strengthen the identification, assessment, and mitigation of cyber-induced risks. The findings offer a structured entry point for organizations to embed CIE concepts into hazards and safety analyses, as well as broader engineering processes, ultimately supporting the design and operation of a more resilient infrastructure.

42 - ENGINEERING↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Safety-Driven Approach to Exploring and Comparing Air Traffic Management Concepts for Enabling Urban Air Mobility

There is broad recognition that the high tempo and density of Urban Air Mobility (UAM) operations will require identifying new Air Traffic Management (ATM) concepts to safely integrate UAM air traffic into the airspace alongside existing air traffic. However, the simulation models used to compare ATM concepts today are difficult to apply during the early stages of concept development and do not offer enough support in identifying potential new concepts. In addition, they have limited ability to evaluate ATM concepts in terms of safety, security, and other key emergent properties. Instead of using simulation to evaluate ATM concepts, this paper demonstrates how a safety-driven systems engineering approach based on Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) can be used to design properties such as safety into an ATM system from the earliest stages of development. Using a hazard analysis technique called Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), system requirements and the desired ATM behavior are derived. As an example, two possible ATM concepts to implement that behavior are compared to identify their safety-related benefits and tradeoffs. This new approach enables (1) systematic exploration of alternative ATM concepts and (2) identification of the safety-related tradeoffs between concepts as early as possible in the development process.

system safety↗
DOE OSTI2022

Failure Mechanism Traceability and Application in Human System Interface of Nuclear Power Plants using RESHA

In recent years, there has been considerable effort to modernize existing and new nuclear power plants with digital instrumentation and control systems (DI&C). However, there has also been considerable concern both by industry and regulatory bodies for the risk and consequence analysis of these systems. Of particular concern are digital common cause failures (CCFs) specifically related to software defects. These “misbehaviors” by the software can occur in both the control and monitoring of a system. While many new methods have been proposed to identify potential software failure modes, such as Systems-theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), Hazard and Consequence Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS), etc., these methods are focused primarily on the control action pathway of a system. In contrast, the information feedback pathway lacks unsafe control actions (UCAs), which are typically related to software basic events; thus, assessment of software basic events in such systems is unclear. In this work, we present the idea of intermediate processors and unsafe information flow (UIF) to help safety analysts trace failure mechanisms in the feedback pathway and how they can be integrated into a fault tree for improved assessment capability. The concepts presented are demonstrated in two comprehensive case studies, a smart sensor integrated platform for unmanned autonomous vehicles and another on a representative advanced human system interface (HSI) for safety critical plant monitoring. The qualitative software basic events are identified, and a fault tree analysis is conducted based on a modified Redundancy-guided Systems-theoretic Hazard Analysis (RESHA) methodology. The case studies demonstrate the use of UIF and intermediate processors in the fault tree to improve traceability of software failures in highly complex digital instrumentation feedback. The improved method can also clarify fault tree construction when multiple component dependencies are present in the system.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Failure Mechanism Traceability and Application in Human System Interface of Nuclear Power Plants using RESHA

In recent years, there has been considerable effort to modernize existing and new nuclear power plants with digital instrumentation and control systems (DI&C). However, there has also been considerable concern both by industry and regulatory bodies for the risk and consequence analysis of these systems. Of particular concern are digital common cause failures (CCFs) specifically related to software defects. These “misbehaviors” by the software can occur in both the control and monitoring of a system. While many new methods have been proposed to identify potential software failure modes, such as Systems-theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), Hazard and Consequence Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS), etc., these methods are focused primarily on the control action pathway of a system. In contrast, the information feedback pathway lacks unsafe control actions (UCAs), which are typically related to software basic events; thus, assessment of software basic events in such systems is unclear. In this work, we present the idea of intermediate processors and unsafe information flow (UIF) to help safety analysts trace failure mechanisms in the feedback pathway and how they can be integrated into a fault tree for improved assessment capability. The concepts presented are demonstrated in two comprehensive case studies, a smart sensor integrated platform for unmanned autonomous vehicles and another on a representative advanced human system interface (HSI) for safety critical plant monitoring. The qualitative software basic events are identified, and a fault tree analysis is conducted based on a modified Redundancy-guided Systems-theoretic Hazard Analysis (RESHA) methodology. The case studies demonstrate the use of UIF and intermediate processors in the fault tree to improve traceability of software failures in highly complex digital instrumentation feedback. The improved method can also clarify fault tree construction when multiple component dependencies are present in the system.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Hazard Analysis to Support Fusion Systems Safety Assessments

Reliability, safety, and performance are vital aspects of any nuclear operation. Fusion technology continues to grow in public, private, and research interest, and coupled with rapidly growing energy needs, fusion technology research is poised for fast progress. The development of a Fusion Nuclear Science Facility (FNSF) is seen as stepping stone for demonstrating long-cycle fusion. Naturally, such operation requires systems that are available, reliable, and safe. This work provides a novel demonstration of systems theory coupled with traditional hazard analysis to provide insights into the risk priority of components and systems found within the FNSF. The results of this work are a set of identified hazards that should be considered for the risk-informed design and development of the FNSF.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Light Water Sustainability Program: Optimizing Information Automation Using a New Method Based on System-Theoretic Process Analysis

This report describes the interim progress for research supporting the design and optimization of information automation systems for nuclear power plants. Much of the domestic nuclear fleet is currently focused on modernizing technologies and processes, including transitioning toward digitalization in the control room and elsewhere throughout the plant, along with a greater use of automation, artificial intelligence, robotics, and other emerging technologies. While there are significant opportunities to apply these technologies toward greater plant safety, efficiency, and overall cost-effectiveness, optimizing their design and avoiding potential safety and performance risks depends on ensuring that human-performance-related organizational and technical design issues are identified and addressed. This report describes modeling tools and techniques, based on sociotechnical system theory, to support these design goals and their application in the current research effort. The report is intended for senior nuclear energy stakeholders, including regulators, corporate management, and senior plant management. We have developed and employed a method to design an optimized information automation ecosystem (IAE) based on the systems-theoretic constructs underlying sociotechnical systems theory in general and the Systems-Theoretic Accident Modeling and Processes (STAMP) approach in particular. We argue that an IAE can be modeled as an interactive information control system whose behavior can be understood in terms of dynamic control and feedback relationships amongst the system’s technical and organizational components. Up to this point, we have employed a Causal Analysis based on STAMP (CAST) technique to examine a performance- and safety-related incident at an industry partner’s plant that involved the unintentional activation of an emergency diesel generator. This analysis provided insight into the behavior of the plant’s current information control structure within the context of a specific, significant event. Our ongoing analysis is focused on identifying near-term process improvements and longer-term design requirements for an optimized IAE system. The latter analyses will employ a second STAMP-derived technique, System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA). STPA is a useful modeling tool for generating and analyzing actual or potential information control structures. Finally, we have begun modeling plantwide organizational relationships and processes. Organizational system modeling will supplement our CAST and STPA findings and provide a basis for mapping out a plantwide information control architecture. CAST analysis findings indicate an important underlying contributor to the incident under investigation, and a significant risk to information automation system performance, was perceived schedule pressure, which exposed weaknesses in interdepartmental coordination between and within responsible plant organizations and challenged the resilience of established plant processes, until a human caused the initiating event. These findings are discussed in terms of their risk to overall system performance and their implications for information automation system resilience and brittleness. We present two preliminary information automation models. The proactive issue resolution model is a test case of an information automation concept with significant near-term potential for application and subsequent reduction in significant plant events. The IAE model is a more general representation of a broader, plantwide information automation system. From our results, we have generated a set of preliminary system-level requirements and safety constraints. These requirements will be further developed over the remainder of our project in collaboration with nuclear industry subject matter experts and specialists in the technical systems under consideration. Additionally, we will continue to pursue the system analyses initiated in the first part of our effort, with a particular emphasis on STPA as the main tool to identify weak or weakening control structures that affect the resilience of organizations and programs. Our intent is to broaden the scope of the analysis from an individual use case to a related set of use cases (e.g., maintenance tasks, compliance tasks) with similar human-system performance challenges. This will enable more generalized findings to refine the Proactive Issue Resolution and IAE models, as well as their system-level requirements and safety constraints. We will use organizational system modeling analyses to supplement STPA findings and model development. We conclude the report with a set of summary recommendations and an initial draft list of system-level requirements and safety constraints for optimized information automation systems.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Optimizing Information Automation Using a New Method Based on System-Theoretic Process Analysis: Tool Development and Method Evaluation

This report is an update to a prior report that describes progress and findings for a program of research supporting the design and optimization of information automation systems for nuclear power plants. Much of the domestic nuclear fleet is currently focused on modernizing technologies and processes, including transitioning toward digitalization in the control room and throughout the plant, along with a greater interest in the use of automation, artificial intelligence, robotics, and other emerging technologies. While there are significant opportunities to apply these technologies toward greater plant safety, efficiency, and overall cost-effectiveness, optimizing their design and avoiding potential safety and performance risks depends on ensuring that human performance-related organizational and technical design issues are identified and addressed early in the design process. This report describes modeling tools and techniques, based on sociotechnical systems theory, to support these design goals and their application in the current research effort. The report is primarily intended for senior nuclear energy stakeholders, including regulators, corporate management, and senior plant management. We have developed and employed a method to design an optimized information automation ecosystem (IAE) based on the systems-theoretic constructs underlying sociotechnical systems theory in general and the Systems-Theoretic Accident Modeling and Processes (STAMP) approach in particular. We argue that an IAE can be modeled as an interactive information control system whose behavior can be understood in terms of dynamic control, feedback, and communication relationships amongst the system’s technical and organizational components. We have employed two STAMP-based tools in this effort. The first is Causal Analysis based on STAMP (CAST), an accident and incident analysis technique that was used to examine a performance- and safety-related incident at an industry partner’s plant involving the unintentional activation of an emergency diesel generator. This analysis provided insight into the behavior of the plant’s current information control structure within the context of a specific, significant event. The second tool is Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) which is a proactive risk analysis tool used to examine existing and potential, planned sociotechnical systems. STPA was used to identify risk factors in the current design of a generic nuclear power plant (NPP) preventive maintenance system. Our analyses focused on identifying near-term system improvements and longer-term design requirements for an optimized IAE system. CAST analysis findings indicate an important underlying contributor to the incident under investigation, and a significant risk to information automation system performance, was perceived time and schedule pressure, which exposed weaknesses in interdepartmental coordination between and within responsible plant organizations and challenged the resilience of established plant processes, until a human caused the eventual event. These findings are discussed in terms of their risk to overall system performance and their implications for information automation system resilience and brittleness. STPA findings exposed several areas of concern in the design of current preventive maintenance systems. We also present two preliminary information automation models. The proactive issue resolution (PIR) model is a test case of an information automation concept with significant near-term potential for application and subsequent reduction in significant plant events. The IAE model is a more general representation of a broader, plantwide information automation system and represents an end-state vision for our work. From our results, we have generated an initial set of preliminary system-level requirements and safety constraints for these models. We have also focused on early development of easy to learn, easy to use “transportable” tools for sociotechnical systems analysis. We intend these to be used by NPP personnel as a means of gaining reliable and relatively quick insight into (1) sociotechnical systems factors impacting incidents and accidents, (2) potential sociotechnical risk factors in existing or planned system designs, and (3) potential weaknesses in a system’s safety and/or information control structure. We conclude the report with a set of summary recommendations, a discussion of planned and potential follow-on research and development, and a draft list of system-level requirements and safety constraints for optimized information automation systems.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗