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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Synthetic data generation for machine learning model training for energy theft scenarios using cosimulation

Abstract Technical and non‐technical losses in distribution circuits result in significant economic costs to power utilities. One type of non‐technical loss is energy theft by various means including illegal tapping of feeders, bypassing the meter, and billing fraud. These losses are usually hard to detect, and can remain undetected for long periods of time. Machine learning models have been proven effective in detecting these conditions, but rely on the availability of large, good‐quality training data sets. The problem is exacerbated by the imbalanced nature of data related to these conditions—energy theft, though costly, is very rare. The available data sets generally have very few samples of theft with most of the data pertaining to normal operation. Such data sets are generally not suitable to train machine learning models. In this paper, an overview of energy theft detection techniques, the challenges with their data needs, and the limitations of current techniques to bridge such data limitations is presented. A co‐simulation framework is proposed to generate reliable training data for machine learning algorithms for theft detection. An example scenario is presented and a machine learning model is built to detect certain kinds of energy theft.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Risk of theft and malicious use of radiation sources in transit

Remote radioactive source applications require frequent transportation of sources from storage locations to remote sites. This introduces risk of theft of a source during the transportation process, with the level of risk proportional to the radioactivity of the source. To that end, theft of smaller sources, such as microcurie-level moisture density gauges, are of minor concern, but larger sources, such as those used for radiography and well logging, present more risk. Radiography sources include 192 Ir, 75 Se, or 60 Co radionuclides with radioactivity amounts at or exceeding IAEA Category 2. Well-logging sources, primarily 241 Am/Be, are used for their neutron-emission properties. 137 Cs is also used in well-logging at lower activities than in radiography but at levels that still present some risk. The vulnerability for malicious use of such sources to cause contamination and associated economic effects is dependent on the elemental chemical and physical properties, especially melting point and bulk modulus. Theft of radiography sources is somewhat common, well-logging sources less so. Theft of sources commonly occurs in concert with theft of the vehicle, with the source subsequently abandoned. There have been some instances where a source appears to have been specifically targeted. There are a variety of security measures and protocols, available and under development, to mitigate the risk of theft and assist in source recovery.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Evidence for methanobactin “Theft” and novel chalkophore production in methanotrophs: impact on methanotrophic-mediated methylmercury degradation

Abstract Aerobic methanotrophy is strongly controlled by copper, and methanotrophs are known to use different mechanisms for copper uptake. Some methanotrophs secrete a modified polypeptide—methanobactin—while others utilize a surface-bound protein (MopE) and a secreted form of it (MopE*) for copper collection. As different methanotrophs have different means of sequestering copper, competition for copper significantly impacts methanotrophic activity. Herein, we show that Methylomicrobium album BG8, Methylocystis sp. strain Rockwell, and Methylococcus capsulatus Bath, all lacking genes for methanobactin biosynthesis, are not limited for copper by multiple forms of methanobactin. Interestingly, Mm. album BG8 and Methylocystis sp. strain Rockwell were found to have genes similar to mbnT that encodes for a TonB-dependent transporter required for methanobactin uptake. Data indicate that these methanotrophs “steal” methanobactin and such “theft” enhances the ability of these strains to degrade methylmercury, a potent neurotoxin. Further, when mbnT was deleted in Mm. album BG8, methylmercury degradation in the presence of methanobactin was indistinguishable from when MB was not added. Mc. capsulatus Bath lacks anything similar to mbnT and was unable to degrade methylmercury either in the presence or absence of methanobactin. Rather, Mc. capsulatus Bath appears to rely on MopE/MopE* for copper collection. Finally, not only does Mm. album BG8 steal methanobactin, it synthesizes a novel chalkophore, suggesting that some methanotrophs utilize both competition and cheating strategies for copper collection. Through a better understanding of these strategies, methanotrophic communities may be more effectively manipulated to reduce methane emissions and also enhance mercury detoxification in situ.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2019

Exercise: Abrupt Theft During Shipment

After the session the participants will be able to do the following: 1. Determine system improvements which will improve the overall system effectiveness for this scenario, and 2. Analyse the assigned insider scenario to determine the relative improvement.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2019

Exercise: Abrupt Theft Using Shielding When Needed

After the session the participants will be able to do the following: 1. Determine system improvements which will improve the overall system effectiveness for this scenario, and 2. Analyse the assigned insider scenario to determine the relative improvement.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2019

Exercise: Abrupt Theft During Emergency Evacuation

After the session the participants will be able to do the following: 1. Determine system improvements which will improve the overall system effectiveness for this scenario, and 2. Analyse the assigned insider scenario to determine the relative improvement.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2025

SURVEILLANCE DETECTION FOR TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS PERSONNEL TO PREVENT HIJACKING, THEFT, SABOTAGE, AND MALICIOUS SECURITY EVENTS DURING TRANSPORTING NUCLEAR MATERIAL

The secure transportation of high-consequence materials, including nuclear and radiological assets, is a critical global priority in the face of escalating terrorism, security threats, and violent protests targeting these operations. Effective surveillance detection—the ability to identify, assess, and respond to potential threats across a continuum of scenarios—is paramount in addressing these challenges. This paper outlines a phased, multi-tiered training program designed to strengthen the surveillance detection capabilities of organizations responsible for nuclear material transport. The proposed training program adopts a progressive approach, gradually increasing in technical complexity to provide participants with comprehensive knowledge and tools for implementing robust security strategies. It targets a wide spectrum of stakeholders, including competent authorities, regulators, inspectors, shippers, carriers, law enforcement, and emergency response personnel, equipping them to plan, evaluate, and safeguard nuclear material transportation effectively. Each phase of the program emphasizes distinct elements of the surveillance detection continuum and transport security, focusing on critical topics such as threat identification, adversary task timelines, protective methodologies, and attack mitigation strategies. The training framework is anchored in technical exchanges and scenario-driven courses that reflect real-world complexities and challenges. By addressing the surveillance detection continuum comprehensively—from early threat assessment to active countermeasures—the program reinforces global efforts to secure nuclear assets. It aligns with international security objectives and fosters a strong security culture within participating organizations, ensuring personnel are prepared to counter potential threats and maintain the safe, secure movement of these materials. Ultimately, this initiative aims to enhance preparedness, security, and response capabilities, supporting the global mission to safeguard high-consequence materials against evolving threats.

Zineddin, Dr. Z. [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000848740725)↗
DOE OSTI2016

Supply Chain-Based Solution to Prevent Fuel Tax Evasion: Final Report

The primary source of funding for the United States transportation system is derived from motor fuel and other highway use taxes. Loss of revenue attributed to fuel-tax evasion has been assessed to be somewhere between 1 billion and 3 billion per year. Any solution that addresses this problem needs to include not only the tax-collection agencies and auditors, but also the carriers transporting oil products and the carriers customers. This report presents a system developed by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) for the Federal Highway Administration which has the potential to reduce or eliminate many fuel-tax evasion schemes. The solution balances the needs of tax-auditors and those of the fuel-hauling companies and their customers. The system has three main components. The on-board subsystem combined sensors, tracking and communication devices, and software (the on-board Evidential Reasoning System, or obERS) to detect, monitor, and geo-locate the transfer of fuel among different locations. The back office sub-system (boERS) used self-learning algorithms to determine the legitimacy of the fuel loading and offloading (important for tax auditors) and detect potential illicit operations such as fuel theft (important for carriers and their customers, and may justify the deployment costs). The third sub-system, the Fuel Distribution and Auditing System or FDAS, is a centralized database, which together with a user interface allows tax auditors to query the data submitted by the fuel-hauling companies and correlate different parameters to quickly identify any anomalies. Industry partners included Barger Transport of Weber City, Virginia (fleet); Air-Weigh, of Eugene, Oregon (and their wires and harnesses); Liquid Bulk Tank (LBT) of Omaha, Nebraska (three five-compartment trailers); and Innovative Software Engineering (ISE) of Coralville, Iowa(on-board telematics device and back-office system). ORNL conducted a pilot test with the three instrumented vehicles collecting real-world data during an eight-month period (October 2014 to June 2015). The vehicles logged a total of 375,000 miles and transported more than 7.5 million gallons of fuel. The drivers entered information on the telematics device about 77% of the time, with about 15% (10%) of the data showing at least one compartment with loading (offloading) valve activity, but not driver information entry for that compartment. Seven events (or about 0.7% of the trips) were identified by the boERS as having a missing fuel diversion number. The solution developed and tested in the pilot test had federal- and state-level tax auditors as its main audience. Nonetheless, the technology has to be adopted by the fuel carriers and therefore the solution had to address the needs of fuel-hauling companies and their customers (i.e., fuel theft and cocktailing). Sensors in the hatches allowed the obERS recognize when one of those were opened (always a suspicious activity, unless it happens at locations where maintenance is performed on the vehicle). The fuel-theft issue was addressed by a self-learning algorithm deployed on the boERS that continuously processed the data from the field to construct probability distributions of measures such as elapsed time of fuel loading and offloading by driver, vehicle, and compartment, valve actuation sequence, elapsed time between the first two valve actuations (by driver, compartment, and location), and other parameters. Probability thresholds, which can be set up by the carrier, determined how to classify the observed events. The boERS also kept track of valve sequencing at a given location and analyzed these actuations to help identify any suspicious activities. Technical and economic recommendations include: a) simplification of the driver data-entry task; b) reduction of system deployment cost; c) addition of capabilities that make the system more appealing to industry (i.e., identify and avoid fuel misdelivery); and d) incorporation of additional capabilities to the FDAS. Path to commercialization recommendations include: a) identify a company willing to further develop, test, and certify a hardened system with a price point the market will bear; b).transfer ERS to licensee; c) establish a fleet or fleets who want this technology for carrier benefits or trailer manufacturer who wants to offer it as optional technology; and d) identify a location for the deployment of FDAS.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Regulatory Considerations for Domestic Reprocessing Facility Physical Security

U.S. advanced non-light-water reactor vendors may pursue collocated on-site reprocessing activities. Therefore, these facilities are likely to possess formula quantities, or Category I quantities, of special nuclear material (SNM) during normal operations. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S. NRC) has yet to formally establish a regulatory framework for commercial reprocessing. While Category I requirements would explicitly not apply in this circumstance under current regulatory requirements, regulatory certainty does not exist. A novel framework should be developed to ensure public health and safety while also risk-informing the physical security requirements. This report reviews the relevant background of related rulemaking activities and proposes risk-informed physical protection requirements to satisfy these objectives. Insights from NRC security-related rulemaking activities provide a substantial technical basis to approach potential establishment of physical security requirements for reprocessing facilities. If a licensee can provide justification that the material satisfies a sufficient self-protecting radiation dose threshold, the material may not be subject to theft or diversion requirements and only potential sabotage requirements would apply. Furthermore, if the material can be justified to be moderately dilute, a set of risk-informed requirements could provide adequate protection of public health and safety. A revised performance objective for prevention of theft of moderately dilute Category I SNM may be detection to allow prompt recovery by a local law enforcement agency. However, a significant caveat to the proposed categorization scheme is the unknown integration of radiological sabotage with requirements for the protection against theft. Future licensees should consult with the NRC regarding treatment of this regulatory topic. Additionally, the self-protecting radiation dose threshold (either the existing or a proposed future threshold) would need to be considered. An integrated approach may apply graded potential requirements for protection against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage currently applicable to commercial nuclear power plants and Category I SNM facilities defined within 10 CFR 73.1(a).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Diversion Path Analysis: A Proposed Methodology to Develop an MC&A Approach for Liquid-Fueled Molten Salt Reactors

Nuclear material control and accounting (MC&A) is a critical element of both the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and US Department of Energy (DOE)’s domestic safeguards and security requirements. NRC licensees are required, under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 74 to establish and maintain an MC&A program that captures and records the quantities and locations of special nuclear material (SNM) at the facility. Along with physical protection, MC&A is a key element of domestic nuclear material safeguards that enables the NRC to ensure that SNM is controlled and accounted for. SNM, per 10 CFR Part 74, refers to plutonium, 233 U, and uranium enriched in the isotope 233 U or 235 U, but does not include source material. Periodic physical inventories, coupled with material balance evaluations, are effective and demonstrated tools to account for and detect theft or diversion of SNM in facilities containing SNM in bulk material form (i.e., not in discrete, countable items). Historically in the United States, these types of facilities have included fuel fabrication, conversion, and enrichment facilities. In comparison, reactors have relied on item counting of assemblies and control of SNM while in containment (e.g., a sealed reactor pressure vessel) because, to date, reactor fuel has been in item form. In liquid-fueled molten salt reactors (MSRs), unlike traditional light water reactors (LWRs) or bulk facilities, bulk SNM quantities can change significantly during operation as a result of depletion and transmutation. This introduces challenges to the use of traditional periodic physical inventories and material balance evaluations to detect theft or diversion of SNM in reactors that use SNM in bulk material form. Liquid-fueled (i.e., salt-fueled) MSR facilities are MSRs that use SNM within a salt eutectic as the fuel. The SNM is in a bulk material form any time it is outside of fresh or spent fuel storage containers. Some examples of when SNM will be in bulk form in the facility are during addition of fuel to the reactor system, while fuel is circulating in operation, and while fuel is in a drain tank. Periodic physical inventories and material balance evaluations can likely be effectively applied to many portions of an MSR facility, including all areas where depletion and transmutation are not significantly changing the quantities of SNM within the control area. Within an MSR facility, this would include fresh fuel receipt and loading, waste streams that may contain SNM, irradiated fuel storage outside of the reactor core, and any irradiated fuel processing that may happen after SNM has been removed from the reactor. All of these process steps could rely on measurements of SNM quantities compared with documented inventories. Any discrepancies from predicted (i.e., book) inventories and measured inventories could be quantified as inventory differences, consistent with traditional MC&A guidance from the NRC (e.g., in NUREG-1065 Revision 2, NUREG-2159 Revision 1, and RG 5.29 Revision 2). Within the reactor system, additions and removals to the book inventory include depletion of the SNM (e.g., fission of 235 U), which complicates the use of physical inventories. SNM control, however, can also likely be effectively applied to detect theft of SNM throughout a liquid-fueled MSR facility. To complement these approaches, prior technical reports have identified that a diversion path analysis may be a useful, risk-informed, and performance-based tool to determine suitable elements of an MC&A approach for the reactor system within a liquid-fueled MSR facility.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Study on Application of Distributed Network of Sensors with List Mode for NMAC Literature Review

Nuclear material accounting and control (NMAC) for nuclear security detects, deters, and resolves questions related to unauthorized removal (i.e. theft) or misuse of nuclear material. NMAC also serves as a key insider threat mitigation measure and aids in recovery of nuclear material that is missing. Effective nuclear security depends on NMAC for timely and accurate information about nuclear material types, quantities, and locations. Bulk nuclear material processing facilities, however, present unique challenges for effective NMAC due to the presence of large quantities of material in-process and the accumulation of residual material holdup within process equipment. These holdup accumulations can obscure accurate physical inventory taking and complicate efforts to resolve NMAC irregularities at the facility level. Bulk material monitoring systems often rely on material balance calculations and indirect measurement techniques, which may mask protracted theft of smaller amounts of nuclear material. These monitoring limitations have generated increased interest in continuous monitoring technologies, including distributed non-destructive assay (NDA) sensor networks capable of providing real-time or near-real-time measurement of material movement and accumulation within bulk processing environments. Recent advancements in distributed networks of NDA radiation detectors and sensing technologies provide an opportunity to address these limitations. Although such distributed sensor networks have been implemented in select facilities for IAEA Safeguards applications, their potential for supporting NMAC functions specifically tailored to nuclear security objectives remains largely unexplored. Furthermore, emerging list-mode data acquisition technologies have reached high technology readiness levels, enabling time-correlated detection of nuclear events across multiple temporal scales. These capabilities provide enhanced opportunities for accurate holdup measurement, continuous process monitoring, and improved detection of material theft or misuse over time. The increasing global expansion of civil nuclear power and development of related bulk material processing facilities, including those supporting high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) and other advanced reactor fuel fabrication, further increases the need for advanced measurement and monitoring strategies for NMAC.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗