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At least 19 records

Characterization and response of three TNT equivalent materials in subsurface explosions

Energetic compositions utilized for inducing seismic responses are often referred to in terms of their TNT equivalent, a metric which is often misused because observations of interest are not often understood with respect to explosive characteristics. Here, in this investigation, we characterize three energetic compositions used to elicit seismic responses in a highly instrumented testbed to further our understanding of subsurface TNT equivalence. Three different energetic sources are prepared and studied for their fidelity to thermochemically predicted detonation behavior. We present effects of subsurface detonation on subsurface rock and seismic emission as a function of energetic source material within the testbed. Field experiments were conducted using a single thermochemical yield of 5 kg using diverse sources consisting of nitromethane, ammonal, and PBXN‐5 (an HMX based plastic bonded explosive) mixtures at the Energetic Materials Research and Testing Center in Socorro, New Mexico. Relative performance of energy density‐related detonation parameters, such as detonation velocity and pressure, affect the observed response in the subsurface. Most notable, equal thermochemical yields described in terms of TNT equivalence do not correlate to equal thermochemical effects in the subsurface.

Blue Canyon Dome↗

Data Release Report for the Source Physics Experiment Phase II: Dry Alluvium Geology Experiments (DAG-1 through DAG-4), Nevada National Security Site

The Dry Alluvium Geology (DAG) project was Phase II of the Source Physics Experiment and consisted of a series of four chemical explosive tests conducted in the same source hole on the Nevada National Security Site. This hole is located at 37.1146°N and -116.0693°W, with a surface elevation of 1,285.2 meters (m) (4,216.5 feet [ft]) above sea level. The first test (DAG-1) was conducted on July 20, 2018, at 16:51:52.67838 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). The explosive source for DAG-1 was nitromethane initiated by a small plastic-bonded explosive (PBX) charge, detonated at the depth of 385.0 m (1,263.2 ft) below ground surface. DAG-1 had a trinitrotoluene (TNT) equivalent yield of 0.908 metric tons (2,002 pounds [lbs]). DAG-2 was conducted on December 19, 2018, at 18:45:56.92115 UTC. This test was the largest in the series, with a TNT equivalent yield of 50.997 metric tons (112,429 lbs). The explosive source for DAG-2 was nitromethane initiated by a small PBX charge, detonated at the depth of 299.8 m (983.6 ft) below ground surface. DAG-3 was conducted on April 27, 2019, at 15:49:01.84183 UTC. The explosive source for this test was nitromethane initiated by a small PBX charge, detonated at the depth of 149.9 m (492.0 ft) below ground surface. DAG-3 had a TNT equivalent yield of 0.908 metric tons (2,002 lbs). The final DAG test (DAG-4) was conducted on June 22, 2019, at 21:06:19.87632 UTC. The explosive source for DAG-4 was nitromethane initiated by a small PBX charge, detonated at the depth of 51.6 m (169.3 ft) below ground surface. DAG-4 had a TNT equivalent yield of 10.357 metric tons (22,833 lbs). The four tests were recorded by an extensive set of instrumentation that included sensors both at near-field (less than 200 m) and far-field (200 m or greater) distances. The near-field instruments consisted of three-component (3C) accelerometers installed at various depths ranging from 51.6 to 385 m (169.3 to 1,263.1 ft) below ground surface in boreholes positioned around the source hole, and arrays of single-component and 3C accelerometers on the surface. The far-field network comprised a variety of seismic and acoustic sensors, including short-period geophones, broadband seismometers, and 3C accelerometers at distances of 200 m to 400 kilometers. In addition, the DAG-2, DAG-3, and DAG-4 explosions were recorded by a temporary array of 496 geophones arranged in a densely spaced grid pattern known as “Large N.” This report coincides with the release of these data for analysts and organizations that are not participants in this program. This report describes the four DAG tests and the various types of near-field, far-field, and other data that are available. Assembled data sets are accessible through: Incorporated Research Institutions for Seismology, Data Management Center 1408 NE 45th Street, Suite 201, Seattle, Washington 98105 USA. www.iris.washington.edu

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Comparison of Side-on Peak Overpressure Predictions and Measurements for Type IV Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessel Catastrophic Failure

This development of empirical data to support realistic and science-based input to safety regulations and transportation standards is a critical need for the hazardous material (HM) transportation industry. Current regulations and standards are based on the TNT equivalency model. However, real world experience indicates that use of the TNT equivalency model to predict composite overwrapped pressure vessel (COPV) potential energy release is unrealistically conservative. The purpose of this report is to characterize and quantify rupture events involving damaged COPV’s of the type used in HM transportation regulated by the Department of Transportation (DOT). This was accomplished using a series of five tests; 2 COPV tests for compressed natural gas (CNG), 2 COPV tests for hydrogen, and 1 COPV test for nitrogen. Measured overpressures from these tests were compared to predicted overpressures from a TNT equivalence model and blast curves. Comparison between the measurements and predictions shows that the predictions are generally conservative, and that the extent of conservatism is dominated by predictions of the chemical contribution to overpressure from fuel within the COPVs.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

V31 Test Report

The V31 containment vessel was procured by the US Army Recovered Chemical Material Directorate (RCMD) as a third - generation EDS containment vessel. It is the fifth EDS vessel to be fabricated under Code Case 2564 of the 2019 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, which provides rules for the design of impulsively loaded vessels. The explosive rating for the vessel, based on the code case, is twenty-four (24) pounds TNT - equivalent for up to 1092 detonations. This report documents the results of explosive tests that were performed on the vessel at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico to qualify the vessel for field operations use. There were three design basis configurations for qualification testing. Qualification test (1) consisted of a simulated M55 rocket motor and warhead assembly of 24lbs of Composition C-4 (30 lb TNT equivalent). This test was considered the maximum load case, based on modeling and simulation methods performed by Sandia prior to the vessel design phase. Qualification test (2) consisted of a regular, right circular cylinder, unitary charge, located central to the vessel interior of 19.2 lb of Composition C-4 (24 lb TNT equivalent). Qualification test (3) consisted of a 12-pack of regular, right circular cylinders of 2 lb each, distributed evenly inside the vessel (totaling 19.2 lb of C-4, or 24 lb TNT equivalent). All vessel acceptance criteria were met.

42 ENGINEERING↗

V31 Test Report

The V31 containment vessel was procured by the US Army Recovered Chemical Materiel Directorate (RCMD) as a third-generation EDS containment vessel. It is the fifth EDS vessel to be fabricated under Code Case 2564 of the 2019 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, which provides rules for the design of impulsively loaded vessels. The explosive rating for the vessel, based on the code case, is twenty-four (24) pounds TNT-equivalent for up to 1092 detonations. This report documents the results of explosive tests that were performed on the vessel at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico to qualify the vessel for field operations use. There were three design basis configurations for qualification testing. Qualification test (1) consisted of a simulated M55 rocket motor and warhead assembly of 24lbs of Composition C-4 (30 lb TNT equivalent). This test was considered the maximum load case, based on modeling and simulation methods performed by Sandia prior to the vessel design phase. Qualification test (2) consisted of a regular, right circular cylinder, unitary charge, located central to the vessel interior of 19.2 lb of Composition C-4 (24 lb TNT equivalent). Qualification test (3) consisted of a 12-pack of regular, right circular cylinders of 2 lb each, distributed evenly inside the vessel (totaling 19.2 lb of C-4, or 24 lb TNT equivalent). All vessel acceptance criteria were met .

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Methodology for Determining Impulse and Quasi-Static Pressure Loading for Design of 6-ft Inner Diameter Confinement Vessel

A brief study of the TNT-equivalence of PBX-9501 is presented herein utilizing a new basis via application of one-dimensional spherical (1DS) hydrocode models in a 6-ft ID confinement vessel geometry with no internal furniture. Specifically, TNT-equivalence herein is based upon two separate features: (1) matching the peak reflected specific impulse of PBX-9501 to TNT under detonation process, and (2) matching quasi-static peak gas pressure of PBX-9501 to TNT at steady-state.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Joint Bayesian Inference for Near-Surface Explosion Yield and Height-of-Burst

Forensic capabilities to understand chemical and nuclear explosions are greatly aided by an accurate estimate of explosive yield with uncertainty. The relationship between explosive size and geophysical observations of seismic, acoustic, and optical waves can be exploited to provide an estimate of yield. Any near-surface yield estimate is complicated by the surface interaction, so an estimate for the explosion height-of-burst is necessarily included in the relationship. Additionally, the relationship dictates a trade-off between estimates of yield and height-of-burst. Fortunately, the surface interaction for each type of observation is different, which breaks the trade-off, and the inclusion of height-of-burst with multiple data types improves yield estimation. We define simple parametric forward models to relate seismoäcoustoöptic observations from a data set of known explosive yields and height-of-bursts. The parameters of the models and a prediction for the yield and height-of-burst of a new event can then be estimated given new observations via Bayesian inference. We report posterior distribution estimates of the parametric models using a Markov chain Monte Carlo sampling technique. These models are then used to predict the yield and height-of-burst of SUGAR, a historical near-surface nuclear explosion, using its reported historical observations. The reported yield of 1.2 ktonne Trinitrotoluene (TNT)-equivalent (Department of Energy, 2015) is within the estimated posterior. Yield uncertainty can be estimated from the spread of the posterior, which is between 0.9 and 2.1 ktonne TNT-equivalent. The posterior for height-of-burst has a wider range between 10 m below and 8 m above ground that includes the true height-of-burst of 1 m.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

V28 Test Report

The V28 containment vessel was procured by the US Army Recovered Chemical Material Directorate (RCMD) as a replacement vessel for use on the P2 Explosive Destruction Systems. It is the fourth EDS vessel to be fabricated under Code Case 2564 of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, which provides rules for the design of impulsively loaded vessels. The explosive rating for the vessel, based on the Code Case, is nine (9) pounds TNT- equivalent for up to 637 detonations. This report documents the results of explosive tests that were done on the vessel at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque New Mexico to qualify the vessel for explosive use. The primary qualification test consisted of six, 1.5 pounds charges of Composition C-4 (equivalent to 11.25 pounds TNT) distributed around the vessel in accordance with the User Design Specification. This test was repeated due to a lack of proper clamp settings. Two additional tests using less explosive were performed, one identical in configuration to a test performed in the V27 qualification series as a baseline for comparison, and one where the separation distance of the charges was increased to extend the V27 analysis of distributed load effects on the P2 vessel. All vessel acceptance criteria were met.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Beirut Explosion Yield and Mushroom Cloud Height - Effects of the Source Environment

I use crater dimensions to estimate the yield of the August 4th, 2020 Beirut explosion to be equivalent to approximately 1.4 kilotons of TNT with a lower bound of about 0.7 kilotons. Based on the amount of ammonium nitrate reported to have been stored at the Beirut harbor, I assume an upper bound for the yield of 2.75 kilotons. However, it is highly likely that the yield was less than 2.75 kilotons, since reported values for TNT equivalence of ammonium nitrate are typically much less than one hundred percent. The crater-size based yield estimates are based on crater radius estimates from satellite imagery and empirical curves and data for scaled crater radius from past chemical and nuclear explosions. I present evidence that suggests that the relatively large crater radius is due to a high degree of coupling of shock wave energy to the surrounding medium and a reduction of the effective stress because of a high level of saturation of the geologic media beneath the explosion. I provide yield estimates based on seismic body-wave magnitude and crater depth as corroborating evidence. I compare preliminary estimates for the maximum debris cloud height, based on cell phone videos/images, with predicted maximum heights for this yield range from empirical formulas and numerical cloud-rise models. Based on a preliminary analysis of cell phone footage, the observed maximum cloud height appears to be approximately 1600 m. This is much lower than that predicted using standard empirical formulas and buoyant cloud rise models. I present results from a modified buoyant cloud rise model that more accurately predicts the maximum cloud height by allowing for the inclusion of a fixed amount of air and/or water into the fireball at the start of cloud rise. The amount of mass that needs to be added at the start, to reproduce the observed maximum cloud height, is relatively small compared to the total mass entrained during cloud rise. A much greater amount of dry air or debris is required, relative to water, for an equivalent reduction in maximum cloud height. The ammonium nitrate is one possible source for water in the fireball since it was being stored in a very humid environment and ammonium nitrate is known to be hygroscopic. The ground beneath the explosion, especially if it were saturated, and the nearby harbor could also have been sources for water or debris in the fireball.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Numerical Analysis of Blast Effects and Mitigation in the Far-Field from Small Explosions

Requirements for explosive safety are often given in terms of a “K-Factor”, correlating incident blast effects with the distance and TNT equivalent weight of an explosion. Traditionally, this is conducted using empirical correlations to experimental measurements (e.g., the Kingery–Bulmash equations). In the far-field, empirical verification of incident overpressure and impulse magnitudes can be difficult; extrapolations from data give expected values at reasonable standoff distances that sometimes are too small to measure on available equipment but are larger than some regulations require. The present paper describes the results of numerical hydrocode analysis to verify the expected incident overpressure and impulse from small hemispherical ground charges of TNT at these relatively large distances. Furthermore, the dynamic effect of incident blast waves on lightweight, modular mitigation barriers is studied to gauge their effectiveness at providing safety standard compliance.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

IMS observations of infrasound and acoustic-gravity waves produced by the January 2022 volcanic eruption of Hunga, Tonga: A global analysis

The 15 January 2022 Hunga, Tonga, volcano's explosive eruption produced the most powerful blast recorded in the last century, with an estimated equivalent TNT yield of 100–200 megatons. The blast energy was propagated through the atmosphere as various wave types. The most prominent wave was a long-period (>2000 s) surface-guided Lamb wave with energy comparable to that of the 1883 Krakatoa Lamb wave; both were clearly observed by pressure sensors (barometers) worldwide. Internal gravity, acoustic-gravity, and infrasound waves were captured in great detail by the entire infrasound component of the International Monitoring System (IMS). For instance, infrasound waves (<300 s period) were seen to circumnavigate Earth up to eight times. Atmospheric waves captured by the IMS infrasound network and selected barometers near the source provide insight on Earth's impulse response at planetary scales.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Explosion behavior investigation and safety assessment of large-format lithium-ion pouch cells

We report large-format lithium-ion (Li-ion) batteries with high energy density for electric vehicles are prone to thermal runaway (or even explosion) under abusive conditions. In this study, overcharge induced explosion behaviors of large-format Li-ion pouch cells with Li[Ni 0.8 Co 0.1 Mn 0.1 ]O 2 cathode at different current rates (C-rates) (0.5C, 1C, 2C) were investigated. The explosion characteristics of the cells were elucidated by discussing the evolution of the cell voltage, the surface temperature and the shock wave pressure. Generally, the whole overcharge process could be divided into four stages according to the evolution of several key parameters and the overcharge behaviors; the overcharge C-rate has a great influence on cells’ thermal behaviors. The experimental results showed that the thermal runaway process of Li-ion cells caused by overcharging consisted of two kinds of explosions, physical explosion and chemical explosion. The existence of observable negative pressure zone in the pressure curves indicated that the Li-ion cells are not a self-supplying oxygen system during the explosion. Further, the explosion dynamics parameters were matched. An explosion TNT-equivalent conversion strategy that depended on the pressure of the shock wave was utilized to evaluate the released energy and its hazards. In addition, with respect to the overcharge of Li-ion pouch cells, a safety assessment method and a safety management method were proposed based on the explosion behaviors. From the perspective of battery safety, this study is of great significance for the safety design of Li-ion cells and can provide guidance for engineers to optimize the safety function of battery packs.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Projected network performance for multiple isotopes using next-generation xenon monitoring systems

Since about 2000 (Bowyer et al., 1998), radioxenon monitoring systems have been under development and testing for the verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Operation of the systems since then has resulted in development of a next-generation of systems that are nearly ready for operational deployment. By 2010, the need to screen out civilian sources was well known (Auer et al., 2010; Saey, 2009), and isotopic ratio approaches were soon considered (Kalinowski et al., 2014) to identify specific sources. New generation systems are expected to improve the ability to verify the absence of nuclear tests by using isotopic ratios when multiple isotopes are detected. In this work, thousands of releases were simulated to compute the global detection probability of 131m Xe, 133m Xe, 133 Xe, and 135 Xe at 39 noble gas systems in the International Monitoring System (IMS) for both current and next-generation systems. Three release scenarios are defined at 1 h, 1 d, and 10 d past a 1 kt TNT equivalent 235U explosion event. Multiple cases using from one part in a million to the complete release of the xenon isotopic activity are evaluated for each scenario. Coverage maps and global integrals comparing current and next-generation monitoring systems are presented showing that next-generation noble gas systems will create measurable improvements in the IMS. The global detection probability for 133 Xe is shown to be strong in all scenarios, but only modestly improved by next-generation equipment. However, the detection probability for 131m Xe and 133m Xe increased to about 50% in different scenarios, providing a second detectable isotope for many events. As anticipated from shorter sampling intervals, the expected number of detecting samples roughly doubled and the expected number of detecting stations rose by approximately 50% for all release scenarios. Thus, it might be anticipated that future events would consist of multiple 133 Xe detections and one or more second isotope detections. In conclusion, signals of this nature should increase detection confidence, tighten release location estimates, improve rejection of civilian signals, and lessen the impacts from individual systems being offline for maintenance or repair reasons.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Projected network performance for next generation aerosol monitoring systems

Aerosol monitoring for radioactivity is a mature and proven technology. However, by improving key specifications of aerosol monitoring equipment, more samples per day can be collected and analyzed with the same minimum detectable concentrations as current systems. This work models hypothetical releases of 140 Ba and 131 I over a range of magnitudes corresponding to the inventory produced from the fission of about 100 g to 1 kiloton TNT-equivalent of 235 U. The releases occur over an entire year to incorporate the natural variability in atmospheric transport. Sampling equipment located at the 79 locations for radionuclide stations identified in the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) for the International Monitoring System are used to determine the detections of the individual releases. Alternative collection schemes in next generation equipment that collect 2, 3, or 4 samples per day, rather than the current 1 sample per day, would result in detections in many more samples at more stations with detections for a given release level. The authors posit that next generation equipment will result in increased network resilience to outages and improved source-location capability for lower yield source releases. The application of dual-detector and coincidence measurements to these systems would significantly boost sensitivity for some isotopes and would further enhance the monitoring capability.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Preliminary Analysis of Source Physics Experiment Explosion-Triggered Microseismicity Using the Back-Projection Method

A series of four chemical explosions were detonated in a deep borehole within the Yucca Flat Dry Alluvium Geology (DAG) at the Nevada National Security Site between 2018 and 2019. The two larger chemical explosions of 50 tons (DAG-2) and 10 tons (DAG-4) TNT equivalent yield triggered energetic aftershock sequences numbering 1392 and 347 microearthquakes, respectively, within the first 10 days. No significant aftershock activity was observed for the two smaller 1-ton explosions (DAG-1 and DAG-3). Here, we used a back-projection method based on travel-time migration and stacking of signal-to-noise ratio traces to detect, associate and locate aftershocks from a subset of 22-geophones within a larger 2 urn:x-wiley:21699313:media:jgrb54910:jgrb54910-math-0001 2 km seismic array surrounding the borehole. The aftershocks located within 300 m of the borehole and the depths were above the working points of 300 and 50 m depths of DAG-2 and DAG-4, respectively, ruling out triggering slip on geologic faults or disturbances beneath neighboring collapse craters. DAG-2 and DAG-4 aftershocks decayed at similar rates, with power-law exponents of p = 1.48 and p = 1.49, respectively. These decay rates are comparable to aftershocks sequences triggered by earthquakes and historical nuclear explosions at Yucca Flat. A smooth power-law aftershock decay within the first 10 days suggests a triggering mechanism from explosion generated stress relaxation due to the diffusion of high gas pressures in the cavity and radial fractures. A more random and episodic aftershock rate would be expected due to cavity collapse or falling rubble in chimney formation.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Modeling Subsurface Explosions Recorded on a Distributed Fiber Optic Sensor

Fiber optic distributed acoustic sensors (DAS) are becoming a widely used tool for seismic sensing. Here we examine recordings of two subsurface chemical explosions, DAG-1 and DAG-3, each of which was about one metric ton (TNT equivalent), that were recorded from a helical fiber installed in two boreholes 80 m away from the source location. Several clear phases including the initial P wave, a weak S wave, and a surface reflected P wave are observed on the helical DAS data. We estimate a velocity model using arrival times measured from the fiber. The DAS waveform data were compared with colocated accelerometers at specific depths in both frequency and time domains. Furthermore, the spectra of the DAS data matched spectra estimated from the accelerometer records. Comparisons of observed waveform shape between the accelerometer records and the fiber measurements (strain-rate) show reasonable agreement except for the data near the event depth. The DAS data and the accelerometer agreed in relative amplitudes but we had difficulties in matching absolute amplitudes, possibly due to errors in metadata. Synthetic strain-rate waveforms were calculated using a 2D wavenumber algorithm and matched the waveform shape and relative amplitudes. In general, DAS is effective at recording strong ground motions at high spatial density. Comparison of the synthetic seismograms with observed data indicate that the waveforms are not consistent with a pure isotropic explosion source and that the observed S waves originate from very near the source region.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Identification of Acoustic Wave Signatures in the Ionosphere From Conventional Surface Explosions Using MF/HF Doppler Sounding

Here, we present an experiment to detect one ton TNT-equivalent chemical explosions using pulsed Doppler radar observations of isodensity layers in the ionospheric E region during two campaigns. The first campaign, conducted on 15 October 2019, produced potential detections of all three shots. The detections closely resemble the temporal and spectral properties predicted using the InfraGA ray tracing and weakly nonlinear waveform propagation model. Here the model predicts that within 6.5–7.25 min of each shot a waveform peaking between 0.9 and 0.4 Hz will impact the ionosphere at 100 km. As the waves pass through this region, they will imprint their signal on an isodensity layer, which is detectable using a Doppler radar operating at the plasma frequency of the isodensity. Within the time windows of each of the three shots in the first campaign, we detect enhanced wave activity peaking near 0.5 Hz. These waves were imprinted on the Doppler signal probing an isodensity layer at 2.785 MHz near 100 km altitude. Despite these detections, the method appears to be unreliable as none of the six shots from the second campaign, conducted on 10 July 2020 were detected. The observations from this campaign were characterized by an increased acoustic noise environment in the microbarom band and persistent scintillation on the radar returns. These effects obscured any detectable signal from these shots and the baseline noise was well above the detection levels of the first campaign.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Observational Evidence for Wind‐Driven Low‐Pass Filtering of Infrasound at Short Range

Infrasound from controlled explosions provides a unique opportunity to isolate atmospheric effects on propagation. We report observations from two campaigns in May and October 2024, each featuring 10‐ton TNT‐equivalent controlled surface chemical explosions recorded by a dense network of 31 single‐sensor stations within 23 km. Despite identical sources, the observed wavefields were very different. October signals followed a near‐unimodal period–distance trend, whereas May signals exhibited a pronounced azimuthal bifurcation in both period and celerity. Downwind paths largely preserved the short‐period baseline observed in October, while upwind paths showed systematically longer periods caused by wind‐driven low‐pass filtering. This study provides the first direct observational evidence that tropospheric winds can impose azimuth‐dependent low‐pass filtering at local ranges, without the influence of measured temperature inversions. Thus, the structure of the atmosphere can modify the spectral characteristics of low‐frequency acoustic waves even at a distance of only a few kilometers.

Geosciences↗